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Akira

actor · actor:akira single-source

Akira, ransomware operator targeting EU healthcare and SME via edge-device CVE chains and intermittent-encryption EDR evasion

Coverage
16
13 about it · 3 mentions · first 2026-05-10 → last 2026-11-15
Latest activity
2026-11-12
PK Softech apparently kept Publica data it had promised in writing to delete; Tamedia says Akira holds about…
Peak priority
high
4 high · 9 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, healthcare, education · regions: switzerland, europe, us
Sources cited
96
56 hosts
2026-05-1016 appearances2026-10-28

Action items (4)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Akira, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Tell the helpdesk, HR and payroll teams of every body whose staff are insured with Publica (including the federal administration and the ETH domain) or with the Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich, which says data of its insured persons and pensioners was stolen, that AHV number, date of birth, address, salary and IBAN may now be known to criminals and must not count as proof of identity, and route requests that quote them, a request to change a payout account included, to a call-back on a known number; for staff insured with Pensionskasse Post, the Bernische Pensionskasse (which can neither confirm nor rule out that its insured persons' data left), the Ticino cantonal fund IPCT (which found data of about 1,800 of its insured persons on the attacked server and writes to all its insured because it cannot exclude more), the Pensionskasse der Stadt Zug (which reports an elevated but unconfirmed risk that its insured persons' data left), a fund administered or advised by Libera AG or the Bernische Lehrerversicherungskasse apply the same rule until those funds report the scope; also tell insured staff that cantonal police warn of investment-fraud calls from people who know their salary and pension details, which prove nothing about the caller.
    2026-10-09PK Softech apparently kept Publica data it had…
  • If your organisation's pension administration, HR or payroll runs on PK Softech software, is being migrated to it or tested on it, or your staff are insured with Pensionskasse Post, ask the supplier or the fund in writing whether your data, test data included, was in the affected environment, project, test and migration copies included, and what it holds outside the productive system.
    2026-10-09PK Softech apparently kept Publica data it had…
  • Sweep Windows event logs across servers and workstations for Kernel-Boot EID 27 carrying a SAFEBOOT load option and Kernel-General EID 12 with BootMode=2, and for writes under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\\Minimal or \\Network that name a remote-access tool rather than a core OS driver; treat any hit with no change-ticket behind it as a live intrusion, because in Safe Mode the endpoint agent that would normally have told you was not running.
    2026-08-17Akira reboots a SonicWall-VPN victim into Safe Mode…
  • Run the SonicWall post-patch hardening pass on any Gen 5/6/7 device patched for CVE-2024-40766: rotate all SonicWall account passwords, enforce SSLVPN MFA (including LDAP default-group-derived users), remove the LDAP Default Group's implicit VPN grant, and restrict the Virtual Office Portal to internal networks. Patching alone did not close the path Akira/Fog use.
    2026-06-23CVE-2024-40766

Defender insights

What each entry about Akira tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-09HIGHPK Softech apparently kept Publica data it had promised in writing to delete; Tamedia says Akira holds about 100 GB

Exposure · detection

2026-08-17HIGHAkira reboots a SonicWall-VPN victim into Safe Mode to strip EDR, and starves its own encryptor

Triage

2026-08-10NOTABLEESXi's minimal shell is expressive enough to hide commands, and its logging captures the parsing stage rather than the result

Triage

2026-05-10NOTABLEAkira ransomware hits Swiss imaging network Groupe 3R; administrative data stolen and published, medical data encrypted

Exposure

2026-06-30NOTABLEBumblebee → AdaptixC2 → Akira: a full SEO-poisoning-to-ransomware kill chain with a parallel Swiss intrusion

Detection

2026-06-23HIGHexploitedSonicWall CVE-2024-40766: why patched firewalls keep falling to Akira and Fog

Detection

1 earlier entry carry guidance too, listed under the story timeline below.

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

related to

attributed activity

Story timeline

Every entry that names Akira, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-10-28ARA-Region Lyss-Limpachtal (canton Bern, communal wastewater-treatment association): SafePay has put about 49 GB into the darknet, which Risikomonitor's analysis, relayed by Inside IT, finds holds personal records, bank statements, weak passwords and a third party's monitoring credentials; the association declines to comment
    mentionactive-threatsInside IT: SafePay published about 49 GB from a Bernese wastewater association; the association declines to comment
  2. 2026-10-09PK Softech, software supplier of Swiss pension funds: malware and a data outflow at Publica, with the City of Zurich fund PKZH saying its insured persons' test data was stolen, the Bernese funds BPK and BLVK and Pensionskasse Post also reporting the supplier incident, and the Federal Prosecutor's Office investigating
    active-threatsPK Softech apparently kept Publica data it had promised in writing to delete; Tamedia says Akira holds about 100 GB
  3. 2026-08-17Akira blinds EDR by rebooting a victim host into Safe Mode with Networking, the operator's first observed use of the technique, and the stripped-down boot starved its own encryptor
    active-threatsAkira reboots a SonicWall-VPN victim into Safe Mode to strip EDR, and starves its own encryptor
  4. 2026-08-10CrowdStrike catalogues 21 working command-obfuscation techniques inside VMware ESXi's BusyBox ash shell, and shell logs record the command before expansion, so the logged string is not what ran
    researchESXi's minimal shell is expressive enough to hide commands, and its logging captures the parsing stage rather than the result
  5. 2026-08-05Swiss Defence Department closes its RUAG review: the Akira ransom payment broke no law, but the risk weighing and the owner notification were deficient, and the federal no-payment recommendation stands
    researchBern rules a federally-owned firm's ransom payment lawful, faults the governance, and reaffirms not to pay
  6. 2026-06-30Bumblebee → AdaptixC2 → Akira: a full SEO-poisoning-to-ransomware kill chain with a parallel Swiss intrusion
    deep-dive
  7. 2026-06-25"Mistic" backdoor: signed-Defender DLL sideloading and in-memory tradecraft by access broker Woodgnat/KongTuke
    active-threats
  8. 2026-06-23SonicWall CVE-2024-40766: why patched firewalls keep falling to Akira and Fog
    deep-dive
  9. 2026-06-10Dragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis: 1,020 industrial incidents, The Gentleman's 4× surge against Romanian energy, and the IT-adjacent intrusion pattern
    deep-diveDragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis: 1,020 industrial incidents, The Gentleman's 4× surge against Romanian energy, and the IT-adjacent intrusion
  10. 2026-06-10CVE-2026-44963, Veeam Backup & Replication: authenticated domain-user deserialization RCE on the backup server (CVSS 9.4)
    trending-vulnerabilities
  11. 2026-05-28SANS ISC, Akira ransomware kill chain reconstructed entirely from SSLVPN syslog and Windows EVTX, no EDR
    research
  12. 2026-05-23Rapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report: vulnerability exploitation now top initial-access vector at 38 %; KEV median time to listing collapses to 5 days
    research
  13. 2026-05-21SonicWall Gen6 SSL-VPN: patched-firmware appliances still open to the CVE-2024-12802 MFA bypass without manual LDAP remediation, exploited February to March 2026 by a suspected access broker
    mentionactive-threatsPatched SonicWall Gen6 SSL-VPNs still let brute-forced accounts skip MFA unless the LDAP fix is redone by hand
  14. 2026-05-21Keycloak 26.6.2 fixes 16 security issues, among them an OIDC login session fixation (CVE-2026-7507) and a WebAuthn execute-actions token replay (CVE-2026-37982)
    mentiontrending-vulnerabilitiesKeycloak 26.6.2: a crafted link can hand an attacker the victim's session, up to the master-realm admin account
  15. 2026-05-20Microsoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service that enabled Rhysida deployments and is linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliates
    active-threatsMicrosoft disrupts Fox Tempest, a signing service used for Rhysida attacks and linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliates
  16. 2026-05-10Groupe 3R (Réseau Radiologique Romand): Akira ransomware attack on 20 Swiss imaging centres, administrative data stolen and published, medical data encrypted
    active-threatsAkira ransomware hits Swiss imaging network Groupe 3R; administrative data stolen and published, medical data encrypted
ATT&CK techniques (41 across 14 tactics)

41 techniques observed across 11 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Malvertising · Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates · Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · External Remote Services · Trusted Relationship
  • ExecutionWindows Management Instrumentation · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell · User Execution · User Execution: Malicious File · Hijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Modify Registry · External Remote Services · Create Account · Create Account: Domain Account
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Hijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • Defense ImpairmentModify Registry · Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing · Safe Mode Boot
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping · OS Credential Dumping: NTDS · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
  • DiscoveryRemote System Discovery · Network Service Discovery · Account Discovery: Domain Account
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services · Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Exploitation of Remote Services
  • CollectionArchive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
  • Command and ControlRemote Access Tools
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol · Exfiltration Over Web Service · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Inhibit System Recovery · Financial Theft

Resource Development TA0042

T1583.008Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising×1

Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements. Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1588.003Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates×1

Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1608.006Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning×2

Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×3

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×4

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗

T1199Trusted Relationship×1

Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/publica-pk-softech-supplier-malware-intrusion-data-outflow · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1047Windows Management Instrumentation×1

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×1

Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/esxi-busybox-ash-command-obfuscation-21-techniques · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204User Execution×1

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×2

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×2

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-06-25/mistic-backdoor-signed-defender-dll-sideloading-and-in-memor · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×3

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · ATT&CK page ↗

T1112Modify Registry×1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×4

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136Create Account×1

Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.002Create Account: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add /domain</code> command can be used to create a domain account.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×3

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/esxi-busybox-ash-command-obfuscation-21-techniques · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×2

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/mistic-backdoor-signed-defender-dll-sideloading-and-in-memor · 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×3

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/esxi-busybox-ash-command-obfuscation-21-techniques · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×2

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-06-25/mistic-backdoor-signed-defender-dll-sideloading-and-in-memor · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1112Modify Registry×1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1

Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1688Safe Mode Boot×1

Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003OS Credential Dumping×1

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×1

Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×1

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1558.003Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting×1

Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1018Remote System Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1046Network Service Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021Remote Services×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×3

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗

T1210Exploitation of Remote Services×1

Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/cve-2026-44963-veeam-backup-replication-authenticated-domain · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility×1

Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1219Remote Access Tools×3

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×7

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/publica-pk-softech-supplier-malware-intrusion-data-outflow · 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · 2026-06-10/cve-2026-44963-veeam-backup-replication-authenticated-domain +1 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1490Inhibit System Recovery×1

Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.

Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1657Financial Theft×1

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/publica-pk-softech-supplier-malware-intrusion-data-outflow · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Akira (13)

2026-10-09 · view entry permalink →

HIGHupdatedNATOA2

PK Softech, software supplier of Swiss pension funds: malware and a data outflow at Publica, with the City of Zurich fund PKZH saying its insured persons' test data was stolen, the Bernese funds BPK and BLVK and Pensionskasse Post also reporting the supplier incident, and the Federal Prosecutor's Office investigating

The Confederation, in a release headlined "data outflow confirmed" (translated from German), says an external software supplier of the federal pension fund Publica detected a cyberattack at the end of September, informed its other customers, and that the Federal Prosecutor's Office has opened an investigation; no other federal office has a business relationship with the supplier (Swiss Federal Administration, 2026-10-08); the supplier, PK Softech AG, says unknown persons used malware to reach part of its IT infrastructure and that it must be assumed data left its systems, with type and scope still under investigation (PK Softech, 2026-10-08). Publica's own page lists name, date of birth, AHV number, address, contact details, salary, civil status, partner details and IBAN as data that could be affected, adding that its investigation indicates personal data of insured persons has presumably left and that it cannot rule out that an individual member's data left (Publica, 2026-10-08). The Bernische Pensionskasse dates the supplier incident to 2026-09-29 and says software that encrypts data (ransomware) was installed (translated from German) (BPK, 2026-10-30); no source names an access vector. The Bernische Pensionskasse names PK Softech AG as its supplier (BPK, 2026-10-30), and the Bernische Lehrerversicherungskasse (BLVK, 2026-10-08) and Pensionskasse Post (Pensionskasse Post, 2026-10-09) report the supplier incident too. The Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich, which has suspended its planned early-2027 move to PK Softech's system (Inside IT, 2026-11-03), says its inquiries indicate that personal data of its insured persons and pensioners, handed over as test data, was stolen (PKZH, 2026-10-15), and Pensionskasse Post says personal data did leave but not yet whether its insured persons' data is among it (Pensionskasse Post, 2026-10-15). Tamedia's Tages-Anzeiger reports that the Akira ransomware group holds about 100 GB of compressed pension data on well over 100,000 current and former federal employees, including staff of the security authorities, and demands ransom; as of 2026-10-20 neither the Confederation nor Publica had confirmed the perpetrator or the demand, and Publica said it still had no indication that data was published on the darkweb (Tages-Anzeiger, 2026-10-20; Inside IT, 2026-10-20; Publica, 2026-10-20). On 2026-11-10 PK Softech said on its homepage that no concrete ransom demand reached it and that it never contacted the attackers (PK Softech, 2026-11-10); Publica's page of the same day says the supplier received general extortion letters immediately after the attack, never made concrete with an amount or payment deadline, and that Publica itself received no demand (Publica, 2026-11-10); the State Secretariat for Security Policy told Keystone-SDA that the federal bodies handling the incident know of no concrete ransom demand to them, that the Confederation paid no ransom, that, as she put it, a demand to the supplier was "not made concrete with an amount or deadline" (translated from German) and that it still has no indication of publication on the darkweb (watson.ch, 2026-11-10). Netzwoche, relaying the same paper, adds that the Federal Council and the security authorities now assume data on practically all current and former federal and federally affiliated staff left (Netzwoche, 2026-10-21).

PK Softech had confirmed in writing to Publica in January 2026 that it deleted the data of the 2019 migration and held no personal data in plaintext, and the Tages-Anzeiger reports that this apparently did not happen, because the data was still on its servers when the attackers got in (Tages-Anzeiger, 2026-10-21; Inside IT, 2026-10-22). Publica confirmed the sequence: it asked PK Softech to delete all legacy data, including that of the 2019 migration, and received written confirmation in January 2026, and is now clarifying why personal data presumably lay on the servers, while PK Softech did not answer and says it does not comment on individual customer relationships (Inside IT, 2026-10-22). Inside IT, citing Tamedia, adds that the Federal Prosecutor's Office confirmed that data was extracted by the Akira ransomware group, which 20 Minuten words as according to findings so far; the Prosecutor's Office has since confirmed to watson.ch that a notorious extortion gang is behind the attack (watson.ch, 2026-11-03), and Publica's own newsletter of 2026-10-22 also says the Akira group is being associated with the attack while it clarifies whether and whose Publica data left (Inside IT, 2026-10-22; 20 Minuten, 2026-10-22; Publica, 2026-10-22). The Ticino cantonal pension fund IPCT first said through Corriere del Ticino, relayed by Ticinonline, that potentially all of its insured could be involved (Ticinonline, 2026-10-20); its letter of 2026-10-23 narrows that: its own checks found data of about 1,800 persons among the documents on the attacked server, it has no certain evidence that these data were taken but finds it plausible, and it wrote to all insured because it cannot exclude that more was affected (IPCT, 2026-10-23; Ticinonline, 2026-10-23).

At the end of September an external software supplier of the federal pension fund Publica detected a cyberattack. (translated from German)

Swiss Federal Administration (admin.ch) 2026-10-08

According to current knowledge it must be assumed that data left our systems. (translated from German)

PK Softech AG 2026-10-08

Whether and which data actually left in the incident is, however, still unclear. (translated from German)

watson.ch 2026-10-08

The software supplier is the same company that also counts the federal pension fund Publica among its customers. (translated from German)

cash.ch (AWP) 2026-10-09

At this time there are no indications that data of the BPK was stolen. (translated from German)

Bernische Pensionskasse (BPK)

The manufacturer's customers include the Bernische Lehrerversicherungskasse, the Bernische Pensionskasse, the Migros-Pensionskasse, the Pensionskasse Post and the Syngenta Pensionskasse. (translated from German)

Inside IT 2026-10-09

Pensionskasse Post obtains software for administering insured persons' data from PK Softech AG. (translated from German)

Pensionskasse Post 2026-10-09

Among others, the BPK insures the canton's staff and the staff of the three cantonal universities for occupational pension provision. (translated from German)

Netzwoche 2026-10-08

Further investigations have shown that personal data of insured persons has presumably left. (translated from German)

According to current knowledge, the following personal data could be affected: (translated from German)

At this time it cannot be ruled out that your personal data actually left. (translated from German)

Publica (Pensionskasse des Bundes) 2026-10-08

According to the software firm, a rather small amount of data left. (translated from German)

cash.ch (AWP) 2026-10-09

Currently we have no indications that data from the cyberattack on Publica's software supplier has been published on the darkweb. (translated from German)

Publica (Pensionskasse des Bundes) 2026-10-08

After a cyberattack on a software provider of a pension fund, criminals could use the leaked personal and financial data to contact those affected by telephone and lure them into fraudulent investments of their pension assets. (translated from German)

Cybercrimepolice (cantonal police platform) 2026-10-13

After a cyberattack on PK Softech, the cantonal police of Zurich and Bern warn of the misuse of the leaked data. (translated from German)

SwissCybersecurity.net 2026-10-15

PK Softech AG holds from the BVK only working material such as documentation, troubleshooting reports and further-development concepts. (translated from German)

PK Softech can neither confirm nor rule out that further customers are affected. (translated from German)

NZZ 2026-10-13

The switch to the administration system of PK Softech AG is planned for the beginning of 2027. (translated from German)

The PKZH is currently clarifying whether, because of tests in preparation for the switch, PKZH data is also affected. (translated from German)

The inquiries so far indicate that personal data of insured persons of the PKZH was also stolen in the cyberattack. (translated from German)

This includes personal data of insured persons and of pensioners of the PKZH. (translated from German)

Which data was stolen is currently being clarified. (translated from German)

Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich (PKZH) 2026-10-13

The current investigations have shown that personal data did in fact leave. (translated from German)

Whether data of the insured persons of Pensionskasse Post is affected remains unclear. (translated from German)

Pensionskasse Post 2026-10-09

Neither the Federal Council nor a department exercises a supervisory function over Publica. (translated from German)

Internally the Confederation expects "considerable damage" and literally calls the incident "serious". (translated from German)

The security organs of the Confederation are particularly affected (translated from German)

According to Blick's information the cantons were also informed. (translated from German)

Blick (SonntagsBlick) 2026-10-18

On Friday Libera AG confirmed that it also works with PKS and is therefore affected. (translated from German)

that contrary to PKS's earlier information it must be assumed that personal data left (translated from German)

Publica, by contrast, concedes that it did not carry out regular on-site security audits at PKS. (translated from German)

NZZ 2026-10-13

The hacker group Akira stole about one hundred gigabytes of compressed pension fund data. (translated from German)

Tages-Anzeiger (Tamedia, paywalled) 2026-10-20

The NDB is therefore forgoing certain operations for the time being. (translated from German)

Inside IT 2026-10-09

The Federal Council and the security authorities now assume that data on practically all current and former employees of the Confederation and of federally affiliated bodies has left (translated from German)

A check on site at PK Softech on 7 October brought clarity about the outflow of security-critical federal data, according to the paper. (translated from German)

Netzwoche 2026-10-08

The affected software company reported in January that it had deleted the information on former Federal Councillors and agents. But this was false. (translated from German)

Tages-Anzeiger (Tamedia, paywalled; summary lines readable) 2026-10-21

The Baselland company had confirmed in writing to the pension fund in January 2026 that it held no personal data in plaintext and had deleted the data from the 2019 migration. (translated from German)

that data was extracted by the ransomware group Akira (translated from German)

Inside IT 2026-10-09

Potentially everyone could be involved, but at the moment there is no evidence that their data was actually taken (translated from Italian)

Ticinonline (relaying Corriere del Ticino) 2026-10-20

According to our information, a folder labelled IPCT with the data of a few hundred insured persons was on the company's server. (translated from Italian)

TicinoNews 2026-10-21

At the moment we have no certain evidence that these personal data were actually taken, but this appears plausible. (translated from Italian)

Ticinonline (relaying the IPCT letter)

After he had started an informal preliminary inquiry at Publica on 14.10.2026, the EDÖB opened a formal investigation against Softech AG on 22.10.2026. (translated from German)

In the course of the cyberattack reported by PK Softech AG, data of several important occupational pension institutions of the 2nd pillar were exfiltrated (translated from German)

EDÖB (Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner), press release 2026-10-23

Neither the Confederation nor Publica has so far confirmed the perpetrator or an alleged ransom demand. (translated from German)

The Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich (PKZH) is suspending the introduction of PK Softech's new administration solution. (translated from German)

Inside IT 2026-10-09

In the course of project-related work, however, we cannot rule out that non-pseudonymised data was temporarily present. (translated from German)

PK Softech AG (quoted by watson.ch)

no concrete ransom demands have been received at PK Softech AG (translated from German)

the company has at no time made contact with the attackers (translated from German)

PK Softech AG 2026-10-08

not made concrete with an amount or a deadline (translated from German)

there are still no indications that data from the attack was published on the darknet (translated from German)

watson.ch (Keystone-SDA) 2026-11-10

According to current knowledge, the affected software supplier received general extortion letters immediately after the attack. (translated from German)

Publica (Pensionskasse des Bundes) 2026-10-08

On enquiry the company confirms that it ignores the request left by Akira in its network to get in touch via an anonymous chat. (translated from German)

watson.ch 2026-10-08
Updaterun 2026-10-10T0255Z-inteltitleheadlinesummaryprioritysourcesevidencesourcing_noteactionsbody

The supplier's customer base is now partly public and includes cantonal-level institutions. The Bernische Pensionskasse (BPK) states in a notice dated 2026-10-09 that an external software supplier of the BPK suffered a cyberattack at the end of September 2026 (BPK, 2026-10-30), which AWP reports is the same company that counts Publica among its customers (cash.ch (AWP), 2026-10-09); the supplier filed a criminal complaint, informed the relevant federal bodies and its affected customers, various federal bodies are clarifying with it which data is affected, and the Federal Prosecutor's Office has opened an investigation (BPK, 2026-10-30). The BPK says there are currently no indications that its data was stolen but that this cannot be entirely excluded, and that insured persons are being informed (BPK, 2026-10-30). Netzwoche reports that the Canton of Bern's own notice names the BPK and the Bernische Lehrerversicherungskasse (BLVK) as concretely affected, that the BPK insures canton staff and the personnel of the three cantonal universities (42,145 active insured and 18,321 pensioners on 31 December 2025) and that the BLVK insures 21,417 active Bernese teachers (Netzwoche, 2026-10-08). The BLVK's own notice does not name its supplier; it says the supplier took the affected environment off the network, brought in external specialists, informed the authorities and filed a criminal complaint, and that the supplier and the BLVK are still checking whether and to what extent BLVK data is affected (BLVK, 2026-10-08). Pensionskasse Post, the occupational pension fund of Swiss Post, names PK Softech and says whether and to what extent its insured persons' data is affected is under review; it states that its data at PK Softech is anonymised and holds no particularly sensitive personal data such as IV disability-insurance files, a claim that is the fund's own and not independently verified (Pensionskasse Post, 2026-10-09). Inside IT lists the BLVK, the BPK, Migros-Pensionskasse, Pensionskasse Post and Syngenta Pensionskasse as customers of the manufacturer "among others" and says some of the funds have already announced that they are checking with PK Softech for a possible data outflow (Inside IT, 2026-10-09). PK Softech says it has been fully available to its customers again since 2 October 2026 (PK Softech, 2026-10-08). The access vector, the actor, which data belongs to which fund and whether a ransom was demanded were not public in any source read as of that date.

Improvementrun 2026-10-13T0256Z-intelsummarysourcesevidencesourcing_noteactionsbody

Publica's own page, dated 2026-10-08, lists civil status, details of the spouse or partner and the IBAN among the data that could be affected, besides name, date of birth, AHV number, address, contact details and pension data, and Publica says its investigation indicates that personal data of insured persons has presumably left, while it cannot rule out that an individual member's data left (Publica, 2026-10-08). The AWP report, which relays the software firm's position, says the firm knows that data left but not yet whether personal data is among it, that it could also be business data unrelated to member files, and that the volume is rather small (cash.ch, 2026-10-09). Publica's wording is stronger than the supplier's, and which data left is still open; a request that quotes an IBAN deserves the same call-back as one that quotes an AHV number.

Updaterun 2026-10-15T0256Z-intelsourcesevidencesourcing_noteactions

The City of Zurich's pension fund has commented, and its position differs from the other funds': the Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich (PKZH) says in a notice dated 2026-10-13 that PK Softech was hit at the end of September, that it currently works with another software provider and plans to move to PK Softech's administration system in early 2027, so the attack does not touch the system it uses today, and that it is still clarifying whether, because of tests carried out ahead of that switch, PKZH data is also affected (PKZH, 2026-10-13). It adds that the incident does not affect insured persons' pension assets (PKZH, 2026-10-13). PKZH's concern is that migration tests may have left PKZH data at the supplier; it has not said that they did. Publica's page now carries a status of 2026-10-14 saying that it currently has no indications that data from the attack on its software supplier has been published on the darkweb and that it keeps monitoring the situation; its list of data that could be affected is unchanged (Publica, 2026-10-20). Neither statement says which data left, how the attackers got in or who they are.

Updaterun 2026-10-16T0256Z-intelsummarysourcesevidencesourcing_noteactionsbody

On the Cybercrimepolice platform, dated 2026-10-13, the cantonal police warn that after a cyberattack on a software provider of a pension fund, criminals could use the leaked personal and financial data to phone those affected and lure them into fraudulent investments of their pension assets (translated from German); the page describes a ransomware attack at the end of September and names no company (Cybercrimepolice, 2026-10-13). SwissCybersecurity.net ties the warning to PK Softech, names the cantonal police of Zurich and Bern as its authors, and reads its conditional wording as meaning no case of actual misuse had been registered yet (SwissCybersecurity.net, 2026-10-15). The police ask pension funds to tell insured persons that knowing someone's personal details or the size of their pension assets is no proof that a caller is trustworthy, and to let them check enquiries through official channels (Cybercrimepolice, 2026-10-13).

The Zurich cantonal fund BVK, which insures the cantonal administration and has bought PK Softech software since 2011, says through its spokesperson that the application runs in the BVK's own data centre independently of the supplier, so it is from today's view not directly affected, and that PK Softech holds only working material from it such as documentation, troubleshooting reports and further-development concepts (translated from German; NZZ, 2026-10-13). PK Softech told the NZZ that it can neither confirm nor rule out that further customers are affected and left the question whether a ransom was demanded unanswered (NZZ, 2026-10-13). Inside IT adds that the Istituto di previdenza del Cantone Ticino is listed on the Simap procurement platform as a PK Softech customer since 2018 and has made no statement on whether its data is at risk (Inside IT, 2026-10-14).

Updaterun 2026-10-17T0256Z-inteltitleheadlinesummarysourcesevidencesourcing_noteactionsbody

The Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich (PKZH), the City of Zurich's pension fund, has moved from checking to confirming. Its notice of 2026-10-15 says its inquiries so far indicate that personal data of PKZH insured persons was also stolen in the attack, and that this data had been used in tests for the planned system switch (PKZH, 2026-10-15); its FAQ adds that data was taken from PK Softech's system, including personal data of insured persons and of pensioners (PKZH, 2026-10-15). Inside IT reports that PKZH currently uses another software provider and plans to move to PK Softech's system in 2027 (Inside IT, 2026-10-16); PKZH's own FAQ says the system it uses to manage assets and pay pensions is not affected and dates the move to the beginning of 2027 (PKZH, 2026-10-15). The page still carries its earlier line that PKZH is checking whether its data is affected next to the confirmation (PKZH, 2026-10-15). It says a switch of this kind has to be tested with data that reproduces the real pension relationships as completely as possible, that PK Softech is contractually bound to protect and keep the data confidential, and that whether it met that duty is being investigated (PKZH, 2026-10-15).

Which data was stolen is still being clarified; in the worst case the fields are first name, name, date of birth, AHV number, address, private and business e-mail and telephone, insured earnings and retirement assets, civil status, partner details and IBAN (PKZH, 2026-10-15). PKZH was told on 2026-10-13 that data of its insured persons might be affected, has filed a criminal complaint and has reported the incident to the data-protection office (PKZH, 2026-10-15). It says a payout needs a signed written request and an identity check and that a change of bank details is checked additionally, so the data alone cannot trigger one, but that criminals can use it to appear credible (PKZH, 2026-10-15).

Pensionskasse Post's notice of 2026-10-15 says the investigation has shown that personal data did leave, and that it remains unclear whether data of its insured persons is affected, though that is possible (Pensionskasse Post, 2026-10-15). It does not repeat its earlier statement that its data at PK Softech is anonymised, and lists name, address, date of birth, AHV number, contact details, e-mail address and pension data as data that could be affected (Pensionskasse Post, 2026-10-15). The access vector, the actor and any ransom demand were not public in any source read as of that date.

Updaterun 2026-10-20T0256Z-intelheadlinesummarysourcesevidencesourcing_noteactionsbody

SonntagsBlick reports that Federal Councillor Karin Keller-Sutter brought information on the supplier incident to the Federal Council's meeting of Wednesday 2026-10-14, and that a confidential information note says the Confederation internally expects "considerable damage", calls the incident "serious" and tells current and retired federal staff to expect longer-term effects (translated from German; Blick, 2026-10-18). The note says the security organs of the Confederation are particularly affected, which Blick glosses as the Federal Intelligence Service (NDB), the Defence Group in the VBS department and the Federal Office of Police (fedpol) (Blick, 2026-10-18). Blick adds, from its own information, that the cantons were also informed because a combination of certain stolen data sets may allow conclusions about Swiss defence capability, and that the Confederation warns internally that some employees could be recognised and questioned by the authorities of another country (Blick, 2026-10-18). The Finance Department confirms only that the Federal Council was informed on Wednesday and says neither the Federal Council nor a department supervises Publica; Publica says it set up a crisis staff and is still establishing which data and how many people are affected (Blick, 2026-10-18). The scenario of matching stolen federal data against entry lists is Blick's reading and an unnamed insider's, not an authority finding.

The NZZ reports that the pension consultancy Libera AG confirmed on Friday 2026-10-16 that it also works with PK Softech and is therefore affected, and that PK Softech first told Libera on 2026-10-14 that personal data had also left, without knowing which; Libera can neither confirm nor rule out that the funds it manages or individual insured persons are affected (NZZ, 2026-10-17). The Bernische Pensionskasse told the NZZ that, contrary to the supplier's earlier information, it must be assumed that personal data left, and PK Softech cannot currently say which of its customers are affected (NZZ, 2026-10-17). Publica concedes that it did not carry out regular on-site security audits at PK Softech, although after the Xplain incident it had old data deleted there (NZZ, 2026-10-17). The access vector, the actor and any ransom demand were not public in any source read as of that date.

Updaterun 2026-10-21T0256Z-intelheadlinesummarytagsentitiestechniquessourcesevidencesourcing_notebodypriority

Tamedia's Tages-Anzeiger reported on 2026-10-20 that the Akira ransomware group stole about one hundred gigabytes of compressed pension fund data, that data on well over a hundred thousand current and former federal employees is affected, that special agents and elite soldiers could be identified from it, and that Akira now demands ransom (translated from German; Tages-Anzeiger, 2026-10-20); the article is paywalled. Inside IT, summarising the investigation, adds that the data sets contain employer details of people who work under a cover identity for fedpol or the Federal Intelligence Service (NDB), that an internal assessment sees a danger to life and limb for individual persons, that the NDB is forgoing certain operations for now without recalling agents from abroad, that the State Secretariat for Security Policy has already seen first fraudulent contact attempts connected with Publica, and that State Secretary Markus Mäder set up a task force under the federal information security officer Anne Rivera (translated from German; Inside IT, 2026-10-20). It says the involved federal bodies assume Akira is responsible and that the group holds the data and threatens to publish or sell it if unpaid, and that at that date neither the Confederation nor Publica had confirmed the perpetrator or an alleged ransom demand (Inside IT, 2026-10-20).

Inside IT recalls that Akira was also behind the attack on a US subsidiary of the state-owned arms company Ruag a year ago, where Ruag paid the ransom, and that the Federal Prosecutor's Office, fedpol and the Federal Office for Cybersecurity warned in October 2025 of stepped-up Akira activity in Switzerland (Inside IT, 2026-10-20). Publica's page, updated on 2026-10-20, says it is still examining whether data left its holdings and whose, still has no indication that data was published on the darkweb, and has updated its list of questions and answers (Publica, 2026-10-20).

Updaterun 2026-10-22T0256Z-intelbodyevidencesourcessourcing_notesummary

Netzwoche updated its running story on 2026-10-21, relaying the paywalled article that Tamedia's Tages-Anzeiger published on 2026-10-20: the Federal Council and the security authorities now assume that data on practically all current and former employees of the Confederation and of federally affiliated bodies left, among them federal judges, former Federal Council members (the sitting members are said to be spared), intelligence-service staff, elite soldiers and cleaning staff (translated from German; Tages-Anzeiger, 2026-10-20; Netzwoche, 2026-10-21). According to the paper, an on-site inspection at PK Softech on 2026-10-07 established the outflow of security-relevant federal data, and Publica's letter to its insured persons mentions neither Akira nor the ransom demand (Netzwoche, 2026-10-21). This is one chain of reporting, and the article quotes no confirmation of the actor, the ransom demand or the scope from the Confederation, Publica or PK Softech (Netzwoche, 2026-10-21).

Updaterun 2026-10-23T0256Z-intelheadlinesummarysourcesevidencesourcing_noteactionsbody

Tamedia's Tages-Anzeiger reported on 2026-10-21 that PK Softech AG had confirmed in writing to Publica that it deleted the data, and that this apparently did not happen: its summary says the company reported in January that it had deleted the information on former Federal Councillors and agents, "but this was false" (translated from German; Tages-Anzeiger, 2026-10-21); the article is paywalled. Inside IT, working from the Tamedia research, dates the written confirmation to January 2026 and says PK Softech confirmed it held no personal data in plaintext and had deleted the data of the 2019 migration, that Publica confirmed the sequence (after the Xplain case it asked the supplier to delete all legacy data, including that of the 2019 migration, and received written confirmation), that Publica is clarifying why personal data presumably lay on the servers regardless, and that PK Softech did not answer and does not comment on individual customer relationships (Inside IT, 2026-10-22). 20 Minuten reports the same sequence and notes that PK Softech received the data in 2019 in a migration for Publica (20 Minuten, 2026-10-22).

Inside IT also relays, from Tamedia, that the Federal Prosecutor's Office confirmed that data was extracted by the Akira ransomware group, which still threatens to publish or sell it; 20 Minuten writes that according to findings so far Akira stole the data (Inside IT, 2026-10-22; 20 Minuten, 2026-10-22). This is a reported confirmation of the actor by an authority, but it reaches the reader second-hand through the paywalled Tamedia article: the Federal Prosecutor's Office is not quoted directly, and Publica's own page, in its entry of 2026-10-20, still says it is clarifying whether data of Publica left and whose (Publica, 2026-10-20).

The Ticino cantonal pension fund IPCT says through Corriere del Ticino, relayed by Ticinonline on 2026-10-20, that potentially all of its insured could be involved but that there is no evidence yet that their data was actually taken; it has filed a complaint with the Federal Prosecutor's Office and is preparing a letter to the insured warning of telephone and e-mail fraud (Ticinonline, 2026-10-20). TicinoNews adds, from its own information, that a folder labelled IPCT with the data of a few hundred insured persons was on the supplier's server, while IPCT, which has about 27,000 affiliated persons, says it has no certainty yet that data of its insured is involved (TicinoNews, 2026-10-21).

Updaterun 2026-10-24T0255Z-intelactionsbodyevidencesourcessourcing_notesummary

The Ticino cantonal pension fund IPCT has put numbers on its exposure in a letter of 2026-10-23 to its roughly 17,000 active insured and 10,000 pensioners (IPCT, 2026-10-23). PK Softech told it in the late afternoon of 2026-10-14 that the authorities had established that personal data were taken from the supplier's servers, without saying which funds the data belonged to, and the fund's checks to date found among the documents on the attacked server data of about 1,800 persons, held there for two ongoing projects of spot checks and recalculations (IPCT, 2026-10-23). About 1,700 are persons who left the fund through resignation or death in 2024 and 2025: surname, first name, postal address, date of birth, AHV number and insured number, the exit-benefit amount and the receiving fund with its bank account (IBAN), and the personal IBAN for about 50 who were paid out directly, with no e-mail address or telephone number (IPCT, 2026-10-23). About 80 are insured persons on a disability pension whose passive pension data was being updated: name, date of birth, AHV number, insured number, passive insured salary, passive retirement assets, degree and start of invalidity, with no contact data (IPCT, 2026-10-23).

The fund says it has no certain evidence that these data were taken but that it appears plausible, that savings capital and pensions of all insured are untouched, that the cantonal administration's IT centre hosting the fund's infrastructure was not breached, and that it filed a criminal complaint against unknown persons and was recognised as private plaintiff, while the Federal Prosecutor's Office and the federal police investigate (IPCT, 2026-10-23; Ticinonline, 2026-10-23). It decided to send the letter to all insured because its information is partial, the analyses are still evolving and it may never have certainty, and it asks them to watch for unexpected e-mails, calls and messages over the coming weeks and never to disclose passwords, access data or personal data unless sure of the requester (IPCT, 2026-10-23). The letter names PK Softech's other customers as Publica, large cantonal public funds such as Bern and Zurich and company funds such as Migros and Post, for hundreds of thousands of insured persons in total (IPCT, 2026-10-23).

Updaterun 2026-10-25T0256Z-intelsummarysourcesevidencesourcing_notebody

The Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (EDÖB) says PK Softech notified it of the cyberattack on its IT infrastructure on 2026-10-08, that the affected pension funds also reported to it, that it started an informal preliminary inquiry at Publica on 2026-10-14 and that on 2026-10-22 it opened a formal investigation against PK Softech AG on suspicion of data-protection violations (EDÖB, 2026-10-23). Its release states that data of several important occupational pension institutions, Publica among them, was exfiltrated in the attack; the investigation is to give an overall picture of the personal data the funds handed to the software supplier and to clarify the legal framework of those transfers, how they were actually implemented and the scope of the data that left, and the EDÖB gives no further information on pending proceedings (EDÖB, 2026-10-23). Der Bund relays the step and adds that besides Publica the pension funds of Migros, Post and the City of Zurich obtain software from PK Softech (Der Bund, 2026-10-23). The release names neither the actor nor the number of insured persons.

Correctionrun 2026-10-30T0255Z-intelbodyevidencesourcessourcing_notesummary

Publica's own newsletter of 2026-10-22 says that the hacker group Akira is being associated with the attack, referring readers to the Federal Office for Cybersecurity's description of the group's methods, and that Publica filed a criminal complaint with the Federal Prosecutor's Office on 2026-10-15 (Publica, 2026-10-22). The same newsletter says Publica must assume that data left the supplier and that whether and to what extent Publica's personal data is among it is still being investigated (Publica, 2026-10-22). The ransom demand and the Federal Prosecutor's Office confirmation of the exfiltration by Akira remain press reports.

Updaterun 2026-11-04T0256Z-intelsummarysourcesevidencebodysourcing_note

The Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich's foundation board suspended the introduction of PK Softech's administration system planned for early 2027 because of the supplier's cyberattack and will keep operating its existing system in 2027; it will decide whether, when and under what conditions to introduce a new system only once the attack and the possible data loss are worked through (translated from German) (Inside IT, 2026-11-03). PK Softech, quoted by watson.ch, says it cannot rule out that non-pseudonymised data was temporarily present in project-related work, and the Federal Prosecutor's Office confirmed to watson.ch that a notorious extortion gang is behind the attack and has added the case to its criminal proceeding against the Akira group, open since April 2024 (translated from German) (watson.ch, 2026-11-03).

Correctionrun 2026-11-08T1309Z-auditactionsbodyevidencesourcessummarytechniques

The Bernische Pensionskasse's own notices say it does not know (2026-10-15) and can neither confirm nor rule out (2026-10-30) whether personal data of its insured persons left PK Softech; what it assumes, after the press reports of 2026-10-20, is that more data left the supplier than first thought (translated from German) (BPK, 2026-10-30). The NZZ's report of 2026-10-17 quoted the fund more broadly, as saying personal data must be assumed to have left (NZZ, 2026-10-17). Its notice also dates the supplier incident to 2026-09-29, says software that encrypts data (ransomware) was installed and that the data theft became known on 2026-10-08, and says BPK filed its own criminal complaint on 2026-10-19 (translated from German) (BPK, 2026-10-30). A month after the attack watson.ch found no PK Softech entry on Akira's leak site, so the group's possession of the data and its demand still rest on press reports and the Federal Prosecutor's statement as relayed (watson.ch, 2026-11-03). Inside IT names the supplier's customers in its own voice; the AWP agency is its source only for PK Softech's statement (Inside IT, 2026-10-09).

Updaterun 2026-11-10T0255Z-intelsummarysourcesactionsbody

The Pensionskasse der Stadt Zug said on 2026-11-09 that its administration is outsourced to the consultancy Libera AG, which uses software from PK Softech; the fund says it was first informed of the incident in mid-October, believed it was not affected, and received only last week the information that data of its insured persons could be affected, an "elevated risk" that is not yet confirmed (translated from German) (Inside IT, 2026-11-09). It says names, AHV numbers, birth dates, addresses and salary details, in part also phone numbers and e-mail addresses, were stored at the supplier, that it has informed its insured persons and the Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner, that retirement assets are safe and that particularly sensitive data such as documents on incapacity to work or disability are not affected (Inside IT, 2026-11-09).

Updaterun 2026-11-11T0256Z-intelsummarysourcesevidencebody

PK Softech said on its homepage on 2026-11-10, "because of media speculation", that no concrete ransom demand has reached it and that it has at no time contacted the attackers; its investigation continues (PK Softech, 2026-11-10). A spokeswoman of the State Secretariat for Security Policy told Keystone-SDA the same day that the federal bodies handling the incident know of no concrete ransom demand addressed to them and that the Confederation paid no ransom, that, as she put it, a demand to the supplier was "not made concrete with an amount or deadline" (translated from German), and that the Secretariat still has no indication that data from the attack was published on the darkweb; Publica said it also received no demand, is not in contact with the hackers and does not know whether other organisations or individuals are being extorted, which the Federal Prosecutor's Office is investigating (watson.ch, 2026-11-10). This qualifies the press report that Akira demands ransom: watson.ch's headline and lead say no demand reached the supplier or the Confederation, while the spokeswoman's wording leaves a non-specific demand to the supplier open, and neither the supplier nor the federal authorities confirm a concrete demand, and the Akira attribution and the data volume remain press-sourced.

Updaterun 2026-11-12T0255Z-intelsummarysourcesevidencesourcing_notebody

Publica's own page, in a correction headed "Stand: 10.11.2026", says that according to current knowledge the affected software supplier received general extortion letters immediately after the attack, which have not since been made concrete with an amount or a payment deadline; that the federal bodies involved know of no concrete ransom demand; that Publica received no demand itself and is in no contact with the attacker group; and that it knows of no case of persons demonstrably contacted or harmed and has no indication of publication on the darkweb (Publica, 2026-11-10). PK Softech's own page of 2026-11-10 mentions no extortion letter and does not name the attackers (PK Softech, 2026-11-10). watson.ch reports that PK Softech confirmed on enquiry that it ignores the prompt Akira left in its network to contact it through an anonymous chat and does not want to negotiate a ransom; watson's reading that the denials mean only that nobody opened the link, and that the firm and the Confederation knew early that Akira was behind the attack, is its own inference (watson.ch, 2026-11-11). SRF reported on 2026-11-10, citing several sources, that the perpetrators demanded ransom and threatened to publish or resell the data, while PK Softech and Publica told SRF that no ransom demand reached them (SRF, 2026-11-10).

Correctionrun 2026-11-15T1407Z-auditsourcesevidencebody

That the supplier is the same company that counts Publica among its customers is AWP's report (cash.ch (AWP), 2026-10-09); the Bernische Pensionskasse's notice of 9 October says that an external software supplier of the fund detected a cyber incident at the end of September 2026 but does not name its other customers (BPK, 2026-10-30). Two statements about contacts with insured persons differ in scope: Inside IT relayed on 2026-10-20 a report that the State Secretariat for Security Policy had seen first fraudulent contact attempts connected with Publica (Inside IT, 2026-10-20), while Publica says it knows of no case of a person demonstrably contacted or harmed in connection with the attack (Publica, 2026-11-10); neither names a case.

incident09 Oct 03:41Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-08-17 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOB2

Akira blinds EDR by rebooting a victim host into Safe Mode with Networking, the operator's first observed use of the technique, and the stripped-down boot starved its own encryptor

An Akira affiliate took a compromised Windows host into Safe Mode with Networking to strip its endpoint defences, which Huntress reports is the first time it has observed this operator using the technique; Snatch and AvosLocker have abused Safe Mode for years, but not Akira (Huntress, 2026-08-12). Everything around that step is the operator's familiar chain. From roughly 03:45 UTC on 4 August the SonicWall logged a burst of failed logins against multiple usernames from several external addresses, and about seven minutes later one succeeded against an SSL VPN with no multi-factor authentication in front of it; nearly two hours passed before any hands-on-keyboard activity (Huntress, 2026-08-12). The operator then reached the domain controller over RDP, spawned an elevated command shell, and ran full-property Get-ADUser and Get-ADComputer exports to files under C:\ProgramData; prefixed with $formatenumerationlimit = -1 so PowerShell's default four-item truncation would not clip multi-valued attributes such as group membership. Collection followed on an application server: WinRAR was installed mid-intrusion and used to recursively archive mapped file shares with the same flag string Huntress has documented in earlier SonicWall-entry Akira cases, and the archives went out to cloud object storage.

The evasion itself is three cheap steps. AnyDesk was installed as a service to carry both hands-on control and payload delivery; because third-party services do not start in Safe Mode (including the attacker's own) the operator first wrote that service into the Safe Mode allow-list with a single reg.exe add against HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network, then ran msconfig.exe at 06:29:21 UTC and forced the reboot. The host came back with Kernel-Boot event 27 recording a SAFEBOOT:NETWORK load option and Kernel-General event 12 recording BootMode = 2. Windows Defender logged event 3002 seconds into the boot, and Huntress states plainly that "For the entire Safe Mode window, the host had no working EDR, and AV was blinded" (Huntress, 2026-08-12).

What the operator did not anticipate is that the same stripped-down environment starved the ransomware. The encryptor launched at 06:34:29 UTC, and within about two minutes the host logged System event 26 for virtual-memory exhaustion and a cascade of PowerShell stack failures; it never encrypted. A scheduled Defender scan identified the binary at 07:43:50 UTC but its cleanup routine failed repeatedly because real-time protection was down, and quarantine only succeeded at 08:12:28 UTC, after the attacker rebooted back to normal operation at 08:10:38 UTC and thereby restored the very protection they had removed (Huntress, 2026-08-12). Huntress calls that "a lucky side effect of the attacker's own mistake in these circumstances, not a defence you can plan around", and notes that a host with more memory or a larger page file, or a retooled encryptor with a lighter footprint, could carry the same play to completion (Huntress, 2026-08-12).

Triage: Safe Mode with Networking is a legitimate diagnostic boot mode, so a lone Safe Mode boot is not the signal and IT-driven troubleshooting will generate them. The discriminators are what surrounds it: a SafeBoot Minimal or Network registry write naming a remote-access tool rather than a core Windows driver, a boot-configuration change made from an interactive session that traces back to an external VPN logon minutes earlier, and third-party security services stopping without a corresponding maintenance window. A genuine support-driven Safe Mode boot carries none of those, and the registry write in particular has no benign reason to name a remote-support binary.

Ransomware families like Snatch and AvosLocker have abused Safe Mode for years, but this is the first reported tie to Akira that Huntress has observed.

For the entire Safe Mode window, the host had no working EDR, and AV was blinded.

Alert on boot-configuration changes and Safe Mode boots: msconfig.exe / bcdedit activity, Kernel-Boot EID 27 with a SAFEBOOT load option, Kernel-General EID 12 BootMode=2, and third-party security services stopping (System EID 7036).

That's a lucky side effect of the attacker's own mistake in these circumstances, not a defence you can plan around.

Huntress 2026-08-12
threat17 Aug 04:28Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-08-10 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

CrowdStrike catalogues 21 working command-obfuscation techniques inside VMware ESXi's BusyBox ash shell, and shell logs record the command before expansion, so the logged string is not what ran

CrowdStrike has published a systematic test of command obfuscation inside VMware ESXi's shell, catalogued as 21 distinct working techniques across six classes and validated against a named build, "ESX 7.0.3 build-20036589 running the VMware-provided BusyBox at /usr/lib/vmware/busybox/bin/busybox, which enables the awk GNU math extensions" (CrowdStrike, 2026-08-07). The motivation is that the hypervisor layer is where ransomware operations end: CrowdStrike names Scattered Spider and Akira among the groups that have demonstrated that reaching it allows an adversary to encrypt virtual machines, disable logging and cripple a data centre at once.

Two findings carry the operational weight. The first is that the assumption behind ignoring this shell is wrong; BusyBox's minimal footprint does not mean minimal capability, because it keeps POSIX compliance for command substitution, variable expansion, escape-sequence interpretation and quoting, and the bundled awk brings string manipulation, arithmetic, bitwise operations and its own command-execution facility. The obfuscation engine, in other words, is a coreutils applet rather than the shell, which is precisely why hardening and monitoring approaches designed for a full Linux server shell do not transfer.

The second finding is the one that changes detection engineering, and it is a property of the platform's own telemetry: "ESX shell logs capture commands during the parsing stage, before expansions occur." The logged string is therefore the obfuscated form, not the command that executed. CrowdStrike states the consequence plainly for the concrete case; "Any detection strategy that searches for the keyword 'esxcli' would miss this command entirely." Any rule, hunt query or SIEM correlation built on literal administrative command names against ESXi shell telemetry inherits this gap, regardless of vendor.

Detection, telemetry class first. The usable signal is the ESXi shell command log itself, but keyed on structure rather than on command names: substitution and expansion syntax, escape-sequence density, arithmetic or bitwise construction of strings, and invocations of the shell's text-processing applet in positions where an administrator would type a command name. CrowdStrike calibrated false-positive risk against real production activity and lists what normal looks like (service restarts, vendor hardware tools, backup scripts, certificate renewal, NTP restarts, configuration greps) none of which resemble any of the six classes. Triage: administrators legitimately use quoting and variables in ESXi shell one-liners, so their presence alone is not the signal; the discriminator is obfuscation that serves no readability or scripting purpose, a command name assembled from fragments or computed arithmetically, when typing it directly would have been shorter.

The critical insight is that ESX shell logs capture commands during the parsing stage, before expansions occur.

All techniques were validated on ESX 7.0.3 build-20036589 running the VMware-provided BusyBox at /usr/lib/vmware/busybox/bin/busybox, which enables the awk GNU math extensions (xor, and, or).

Any detection strategy that searches for the keyword "esxcli" would miss this command entirely.

CrowdStrike 2026-08-07
research10 Aug 04:45Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: CrowdStrike

Earlier coverage (10)

2026-08-05NOTABLENATOA1Swiss Defence Department closes its RUAG review: the Akira ransom payment broke no law, but the risk weighing and the owner notification were deficient, and the federal no-payment recommendation standsOn 2026-08-04 the Swiss Defence Department (VBS) published the outcome of its ownership review into how RUAG MRO handled the Akira ransomware attack on its US subsidiary RUAG LLC, detected 9-10 October 2025, in which data was stolen and a ransom was paid. VBS finds no indication of a legal violation (the decision sat with the company's own corporate bodies and required no prior consent from the Confederation as owner) but faults RUAG MRO for weighing the decision mainly on legal and economic grounds without sufficient regard for political and reputational consequences, and for not informing the owner before communicating publicly. The federal recommendation not to pay is explicitly unchanged.2026-05-10NOTABLEupdatedNATOA2Groupe 3R (Réseau Radiologique Romand): Akira ransomware attack on 20 Swiss imaging centres, administrative data stolen and published, medical data encryptedGroupe 3R (Réseau Radiologique Romand), which runs 20 medical-imaging centres in seven Swiss cantons, was hit on 2026-04-30 by a ransomware attack that encrypted administrative and medical data; Akira listed the operator on its leak site on 2026-05-08. Groupe 3R, which attributes the attack to Akira and refused to pay, confirmed that administrative data including employee personal information was stolen and internal documents published, and says it cannot establish whether patient medical data was also taken.2026-06-30NOTABLEBumblebee → AdaptixC2 → Akira: a full SEO-poisoning-to-ransomware kill chain with a parallel Swiss intrusionThe DFIR Report published (2026-06-29) the full reconstruction of an intrusion that began with SEO poisoning and ended in Akira ransomware in under three days.2026-06-25HIGH"Mistic" backdoor: signed-Defender DLL sideloading and in-memory tradecraft by access broker Woodgnat/KongTukeTwo new initial-access-broker toolsets surface (Mistic and Edgecution) Symantec details Mistic, sideloaded via a signed Microsoft Defender binary so its activity reads as legitimate Defender behaviour (Symantec, 2026-06-24); Zscaler details Edgecution, a malicious Edge extension that bridges the browser sandbox to a host Python backdoor via the Native Messaging API (today's deep dive) (Zscaler, 2026-06-23).2026-06-23HIGHexploitedSonicWall CVE-2024-40766: why patched firewalls keep falling to Akira and FogSonicWall firewalls that were patched against CVE-2024-40766 are still being breached by Akira and Fog ransomware within hours, because the patch leaves behind the stale local accounts, implicit-VPN LDAP default groups, and un-enforced SSLVPN MFA that the intrusions actually ride. A fresh SANS ISC write-up names the exact residual misconfigurations to remediate post-patch (SANS ISC, 2026-06-23). Today's deep dive, § 5.2026-06-10NOTABLEDragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis: 1,020 industrial incidents, The Gentleman's 4× surge against Romanian energy, and the IT-adjacent intrusion patternDragos' quarterly industrial-ransomware report (published 3 June) is the single periodic landscape report treated in this brief; the focus below is only on what changes a Swiss/EU public-sector and critical-infrastructure SOC's posture, not the full survey (Dragos, 2026-06-03).2026-06-10NOTABLECVE-2026-44963, Veeam Backup & Replication: authenticated domain-user deserialization RCE on the backup server (CVSS 9.4)Veeam patched CVE-2026-44963 (CVSS v4 9.4, CWE-502) on 9 June: any authenticated domain user (no elevated Veeam privilege required) can execute code on the Backup Server when it is domain-joined; workgroup servers are unaffected (Veeam, 2026-06-09).2026-05-28NOTABLESANS ISC, Akira ransomware kill chain reconstructed entirely from SSLVPN syslog and Windows EVTX, no EDRSANS ISC handler Manuel Humberto Santander Pelaez published a forensic walkthrough on 2026-05-27 reconstructing an Akira ransomware intrusion using only two log sources (SSLVPN syslog and Windows EVTX exports) joined by source IP and normalised time (SANS Internet Storm Center, 2026-05-27). [SINGLE-SOURCE] …2026-05-23NOTABLERapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report: vulnerability exploitation now top initial-access vector at 38 %; KEV median time to listing collapses to 5 daysRapid7 Labs published its Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report on 2026-05-21 covering January–March 2026 IR data; the GlobeNewswire release accompanied the post the same day. The findings that change what a Swiss/EU public-sector SOC should prioritise:2026-05-20NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2Microsoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service that enabled Rhysida deployments and is linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliatesMicrosoft's Digital Crimes Unit disrupted Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service active since May 2025 that abused Microsoft Artifact Signing to obtain code-signing certificates valid for 72 hours, seizing its website under a case unsealed in the Southern District of New York and revoking over a thousand certificates. Microsoft links it to Vanilla Tempest (which in some cases deployed Rhysida), Storm-0501, Storm-2561 and Storm-0249, and through cryptocurrency analysis to affiliates delivering INC, Qilin and Akira ransomware. The signed malware posed as AnyDesk, Teams, PuTTY and Webex installers.

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats7
  • Research4
  • Deep dive3
  • Vulns2

Source distribution

  • attack.mitre.org12 (12%)
  • inside-it.ch8 (8%)
  • redhat.com4 (4%)
  • watson.ch4 (4%)
  • access.redhat.com3 (3%)
  • bleepingcomputer.com2 (2%)
  • blick.ch2 (2%)
  • dexpose.io2 (2%)
  • other59 (61%)
All cited sources (96)