2026-10-09HIGHPK Softech apparently kept Publica data it had promised in writing to delete; Tamedia says Akira holds about 100 GB
Akira
actor · actor:akira single-source
Akira, ransomware operator targeting EU healthcare and SME via edge-device CVE chains and intermittent-encryption EDR evasion
Coverage
16
13 about it · 3 mentions · first 2026-05-10 → last 2026-11-15
Latest activity
2026-11-12
PK Softech apparently kept Publica data it had promised in writing to delete; Tamedia says Akira holds about…
Peak priority
high
4 high · 9 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, healthcare, education · regions: switzerland, europe, us
Sources cited
96
56 hosts
2026-05-1016 appearances2026-10-28
Action items (4)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Akira, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Tell the helpdesk, HR and payroll teams of every body whose staff are insured with Publica (including the federal administration and the ETH domain) or with the Pensionskasse Stadt Zürich, which says data of its insured persons and pensioners was stolen, that AHV number, date of birth, address, salary and IBAN may now be known to criminals and must not count as proof of identity, and route requests that quote them, a request to change a payout account included, to a call-back on a known number; for staff insured with Pensionskasse Post, the Bernische Pensionskasse (which can neither confirm nor rule out that its insured persons' data left), the Ticino cantonal fund IPCT (which found data of about 1,800 of its insured persons on the attacked server and writes to all its insured because it cannot exclude more), the Pensionskasse der Stadt Zug (which reports an elevated but unconfirmed risk that its insured persons' data left), a fund administered or advised by Libera AG or the Bernische Lehrerversicherungskasse apply the same rule until those funds report the scope; also tell insured staff that cantonal police warn of investment-fraud calls from people who know their salary and pension details, which prove nothing about the caller.2026-10-09PK Softech apparently kept Publica data it had…
- If your organisation's pension administration, HR or payroll runs on PK Softech software, is being migrated to it or tested on it, or your staff are insured with Pensionskasse Post, ask the supplier or the fund in writing whether your data, test data included, was in the affected environment, project, test and migration copies included, and what it holds outside the productive system.2026-10-09PK Softech apparently kept Publica data it had…
- Sweep Windows event logs across servers and workstations for Kernel-Boot EID 27 carrying a SAFEBOOT load option and Kernel-General EID 12 with BootMode=2, and for writes under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\\Minimal or \\Network that name a remote-access tool rather than a core OS driver; treat any hit with no change-ticket behind it as a live intrusion, because in Safe Mode the endpoint agent that would normally have told you was not running.2026-08-17Akira reboots a SonicWall-VPN victim into Safe Mode…
- Run the SonicWall post-patch hardening pass on any Gen 5/6/7 device patched for CVE-2024-40766: rotate all SonicWall account passwords, enforce SSLVPN MFA (including LDAP default-group-derived users), remove the LDAP Default Group's implicit VPN grant, and restrict the Virtual Office Portal to internal networks. Patching alone did not close the path Akira/Fog use.2026-06-23CVE-2024-40766
Defender insights
What each entry about Akira tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · detection
Triage
Triage
Exposure
Detection
Detection
1 earlier entry carry guidance too, listed under the story timeline below.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
related to
- Microsoft DCU Fox Tempest disruptiondownstream user of the disrupted signing service
attributed activity
- Akira kill-chain reconstruction (SANS ISC)
- Bumblebee → AdaptixC2 → Akira intrusion
- Groupe 3R ransomware breachthe victim attributes the attack to Akira on methods its partners observed
- PK Softech cyberattack and Publica data outflow (September 2026)Tamedia (relayed by Inside IT, 2026-10-20): the involved federal bodies assume Akira is responsible; neither the Confederation nor Publica has confirmed it
- RUAG LLC Akira ransomware incident and VBS ownership reviewVBS names the Akira group as the attacker in its own review
Story timeline
Every entry that names Akira, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-10-28ARA-Region Lyss-Limpachtal (canton Bern, communal wastewater-treatment association): SafePay has put about 49 GB into the darknet, which Risikomonitor's analysis, relayed by Inside IT, finds holds personal records, bank statements, weak passwords and a third party's monitoring credentials; the association declines to comment
- 2026-10-09PK Softech, software supplier of Swiss pension funds: malware and a data outflow at Publica, with the City of Zurich fund PKZH saying its insured persons' test data was stolen, the Bernese funds BPK and BLVK and Pensionskasse Post also reporting the supplier incident, and the Federal Prosecutor's Office investigating
- 2026-08-17Akira blinds EDR by rebooting a victim host into Safe Mode with Networking, the operator's first observed use of the technique, and the stripped-down boot starved its own encryptor
- 2026-08-10CrowdStrike catalogues 21 working command-obfuscation techniques inside VMware ESXi's BusyBox ash shell, and shell logs record the command before expansion, so the logged string is not what ran
- 2026-08-05Swiss Defence Department closes its RUAG review: the Akira ransom payment broke no law, but the risk weighing and the owner notification were deficient, and the federal no-payment recommendation stands
- 2026-06-30Bumblebee → AdaptixC2 → Akira: a full SEO-poisoning-to-ransomware kill chain with a parallel Swiss intrusion
- 2026-06-25"Mistic" backdoor: signed-Defender DLL sideloading and in-memory tradecraft by access broker Woodgnat/KongTuke
- 2026-06-23SonicWall CVE-2024-40766: why patched firewalls keep falling to Akira and Fog
- 2026-06-10Dragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis: 1,020 industrial incidents, The Gentleman's 4× surge against Romanian energy, and the IT-adjacent intrusion pattern
- 2026-06-10CVE-2026-44963, Veeam Backup & Replication: authenticated domain-user deserialization RCE on the backup server (CVSS 9.4)
- 2026-05-28SANS ISC, Akira ransomware kill chain reconstructed entirely from SSLVPN syslog and Windows EVTX, no EDR
- 2026-05-23Rapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report: vulnerability exploitation now top initial-access vector at 38 %; KEV median time to listing collapses to 5 days
- 2026-05-21SonicWall Gen6 SSL-VPN: patched-firmware appliances still open to the CVE-2024-12802 MFA bypass without manual LDAP remediation, exploited February to March 2026 by a suspected access broker
- 2026-05-21Keycloak 26.6.2 fixes 16 security issues, among them an OIDC login session fixation (CVE-2026-7507) and a WebAuthn execute-actions token replay (CVE-2026-37982)
- 2026-05-20Microsoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service that enabled Rhysida deployments and is linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliates
- 2026-05-10Groupe 3R (Réseau Radiologique Romand): Akira ransomware attack on 20 Swiss imaging centres, administrative data stolen and published, medical data encrypted
Hunting pivots
CVEs (exploited first)
Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (41 across 14 tactics)
41 techniques observed across 11 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Malvertising · Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates · Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
- Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · External Remote Services · Trusted Relationship
- ExecutionWindows Management Instrumentation · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell · User Execution · User Execution: Malicious File · Hijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
- PersistenceValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Modify Registry · External Remote Services · Create Account · Create Account: Domain Account
- Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Hijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
- Defense ImpairmentModify Registry · Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing · Safe Mode Boot
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping · OS Credential Dumping: NTDS · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
- DiscoveryRemote System Discovery · Network Service Discovery · Account Discovery: Domain Account
- Lateral MovementRemote Services · Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Exploitation of Remote Services
- CollectionArchive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
- Command and ControlRemote Access Tools
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol · Exfiltration Over Web Service · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Inhibit System Recovery · Financial Theft
Resource Development TA0042
T1583.008Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising×1
Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements. Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1588.003Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates×1
Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1608.006Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning×2
Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1078Valid Accounts×3
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · ATT&CK page ↗
T1133External Remote Services×4
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗
T1199Trusted Relationship×1
Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.
Evidence: 2026-10-09/publica-pk-softech-supplier-malware-intrusion-data-outflow · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1047Windows Management Instrumentation×1
Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×1
Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/esxi-busybox-ash-command-obfuscation-21-techniques · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204User Execution×1
An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×2
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×2
Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-06-25/mistic-backdoor-signed-defender-dll-sideloading-and-in-memor · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078Valid Accounts×3
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · ATT&CK page ↗
T1112Modify Registry×1
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗
T1133External Remote Services×4
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗
T1136Create Account×1
Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1136.002Create Account: Domain Account×1
Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add /domain</code> command can be used to create a domain account.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1078Valid Accounts×3
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/esxi-busybox-ash-command-obfuscation-21-techniques · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×2
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-06-25/mistic-backdoor-signed-defender-dll-sideloading-and-in-memor · 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078Valid Accounts×3
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · ATT&CK page ↗
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1
Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/esxi-busybox-ash-command-obfuscation-21-techniques · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×2
Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-06-25/mistic-backdoor-signed-defender-dll-sideloading-and-in-memor · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1112Modify Registry×1
Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗
T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1
Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1688Safe Mode Boot×1
Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003OS Credential Dumping×1
Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×1
Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×1
Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗
T1558.003Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting×1
Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1018Remote System Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗
T1046Network Service Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1021Remote Services×1
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×3
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-05-28/sans-isc-akira-ransomware-kill-chain-reconstructed-entirely · ATT&CK page ↗
T1210Exploitation of Remote Services×1
Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.
Evidence: 2026-06-10/cve-2026-44963-veeam-backup-replication-authenticated-domain · ATT&CK page ↗
Collection TA0009
T1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility×1
Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1219Remote Access Tools×3
An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×1
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.
Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×7
Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.
Evidence: 2026-10-09/publica-pk-softech-supplier-malware-intrusion-data-outflow · 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · 2026-06-23/sonicwall-cve-2024-40766-why-patched-firewalls-keep-falling · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · 2026-06-10/cve-2026-44963-veeam-backup-replication-authenticated-domain +1 more · ATT&CK page ↗
T1490Inhibit System Recovery×1
Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.
Evidence: 2026-06-30/bumblebee-adaptixc2-akira-a-full-seo-poisoning-to-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗
T1657Financial Theft×1
Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.
Evidence: 2026-10-09/publica-pk-softech-supplier-malware-intrusion-data-outflow · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Akira (13)
Earlier coverage (10)
Swiss Defence Department closes its RUAG review: the Akira ransom payment broke no law, but the risk weighing and the owner notification were deficient, and the federal no-payment recommendation standsOn 2026-08-04 the Swiss Defence Department (VBS) published the outcome of its ownership review into how RUAG MRO handled the Akira ransomware attack on its US subsidiary RUAG LLC, detected 9-10 October 2025, in which data was stolen and a ransom was paid. VBS finds no indication of a legal violation (the decision sat with the company's own corporate bodies and required no prior consent from the Confederation as owner) but faults RUAG MRO for weighing the decision mainly on legal and economic grounds without sufficient regard for political and reputational consequences, and for not informing the owner before communicating publicly. The federal recommendation not to pay is explicitly unchanged.Groupe 3R (Réseau Radiologique Romand): Akira ransomware attack on 20 Swiss imaging centres, administrative data stolen and published, medical data encryptedGroupe 3R (Réseau Radiologique Romand), which runs 20 medical-imaging centres in seven Swiss cantons, was hit on 2026-04-30 by a ransomware attack that encrypted administrative and medical data; Akira listed the operator on its leak site on 2026-05-08. Groupe 3R, which attributes the attack to Akira and refused to pay, confirmed that administrative data including employee personal information was stolen and internal documents published, and says it cannot establish whether patient medical data was also taken.Bumblebee → AdaptixC2 → Akira: a full SEO-poisoning-to-ransomware kill chain with a parallel Swiss intrusionThe DFIR Report published (2026-06-29) the full reconstruction of an intrusion that began with SEO poisoning and ended in Akira ransomware in under three days."Mistic" backdoor: signed-Defender DLL sideloading and in-memory tradecraft by access broker Woodgnat/KongTukeTwo new initial-access-broker toolsets surface (Mistic and Edgecution) Symantec details Mistic, sideloaded via a signed Microsoft Defender binary so its activity reads as legitimate Defender behaviour (Symantec, 2026-06-24); Zscaler details Edgecution, a malicious Edge extension that bridges the browser sandbox to a host Python backdoor via the Native Messaging API (today's deep dive) (Zscaler, 2026-06-23).SonicWall CVE-2024-40766: why patched firewalls keep falling to Akira and FogSonicWall firewalls that were patched against CVE-2024-40766 are still being breached by Akira and Fog ransomware within hours, because the patch leaves behind the stale local accounts, implicit-VPN LDAP default groups, and un-enforced SSLVPN MFA that the intrusions actually ride. A fresh SANS ISC write-up names the exact residual misconfigurations to remediate post-patch (SANS ISC, 2026-06-23). Today's deep dive, § 5.Dragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis: 1,020 industrial incidents, The Gentleman's 4× surge against Romanian energy, and the IT-adjacent intrusion patternDragos' quarterly industrial-ransomware report (published 3 June) is the single periodic landscape report treated in this brief; the focus below is only on what changes a Swiss/EU public-sector and critical-infrastructure SOC's posture, not the full survey (Dragos, 2026-06-03).CVE-2026-44963, Veeam Backup & Replication: authenticated domain-user deserialization RCE on the backup server (CVSS 9.4)Veeam patched CVE-2026-44963 (CVSS v4 9.4, CWE-502) on 9 June: any authenticated domain user (no elevated Veeam privilege required) can execute code on the Backup Server when it is domain-joined; workgroup servers are unaffected (Veeam, 2026-06-09).SANS ISC, Akira ransomware kill chain reconstructed entirely from SSLVPN syslog and Windows EVTX, no EDRSANS ISC handler Manuel Humberto Santander Pelaez published a forensic walkthrough on 2026-05-27 reconstructing an Akira ransomware intrusion using only two log sources (SSLVPN syslog and Windows EVTX exports) joined by source IP and normalised time (SANS Internet Storm Center, 2026-05-27). [SINGLE-SOURCE] …Rapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report: vulnerability exploitation now top initial-access vector at 38 %; KEV median time to listing collapses to 5 daysRapid7 Labs published its Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report on 2026-05-21 covering January–March 2026 IR data; the GlobeNewswire release accompanied the post the same day. The findings that change what a Swiss/EU public-sector SOC should prioritise:Microsoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service that enabled Rhysida deployments and is linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliatesMicrosoft's Digital Crimes Unit disrupted Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service active since May 2025 that abused Microsoft Artifact Signing to obtain code-signing certificates valid for 72 hours, seizing its website under a case unsealed in the Southern District of New York and revoking over a thousand certificates. Microsoft links it to Vanilla Tempest (which in some cases deployed Rhysida), Storm-0501, Storm-2561 and Storm-0249, and through cryptocurrency analysis to affiliates delivering INC, Qilin and Akira ransomware. The signed malware posed as AnyDesk, Teams, PuTTY and Webex installers.
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Qilin×3
- Rhysida×2
- SonicWall SSL VPN×2
- AdaptixC2×1
- Akira kill-chain reconstruction (SANS ISC)×1
- ARA-Region Lyss-Limpachtal data publication, October 2026×1
- Bumblebee → AdaptixC2 → Akira intrusion×1
- Dragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- attack.mitre.org12 (12%)
- inside-it.ch8 (8%)
- redhat.com4 (4%)
- watson.ch4 (4%)
- access.redhat.com3 (3%)
- bleepingcomputer.com2 (2%)
- blick.ch2 (2%)
- dexpose.io2 (2%)
- other59 (61%)
All cited sources (96)
- 20min.ch20 Minutenhttps://www.20min.ch/story/daten-gau-trotz-loeschbestaetigung-bundesdaten-landeten-bei-hackern-103653740
- access.redhat.comRed Hat RHSA-2026:19594https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19594
- access.redhat.comRed Hat RHSA-2026:19596https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19596
- access.redhat.comRed Hat CVE-2026-7507https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7507
- admin.chSwiss Federal Administration (admin.ch)https://www.admin.ch/de/newnsb/FjG4XOIms04s
- arcticwolf.comArctic Wolfhttps://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/smash-and-grab-aggressive-akira-campaign-targets-sonicwall-vpns/
- attack.mitre.orgNTDS.dit via `wbadmin.exe` (`T1003.003`)https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/
- attack.mitre.orgRDP (`T1021.001`)https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
- attack.mitre.orgWMI (`T1047`)https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/
- attack.mitre.orgT1078https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
- attack.mitre.orgT1078.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/
- attack.mitre.orgT1133https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/
- attack.mitre.org`T1136.002` Create Account: Domain Accounthttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/002/
- attack.mitre.org`T1204.002` Malicious Filehttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/
- attack.mitre.org`T1219` Remote Access Softwarehttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1219/
- attack.mitre.orgT1486https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/
- attack.mitre.org`T1490` Inhibit System Recoveryhttps://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
- attack.mitre.orgDLL search-order hijacking (`T1574.001`)https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/001/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/akira-hackers-disable-edr-with-safe-mode-steal-data-but-fail-to-encrypt/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-bypass-sonicwall-vpn-mfa-due-to-incomplete-patching/
- blick.chBlick.chhttps://www.blick.ch/fr/suisse/romande/cyberattaque-le-groupe-romand-3r-de-radiologie-cible-id21930477.html
- blick.chBlick (SonntagsBlick)https://www.blick.ch/politik/daten-debakel-beim-bund-sicherheitsorgane-betroffen/jle39rp
- blogs.microsoft.comMicrosoft On the Issues, DCU legal action, 2026-05-19https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2026/05/19/disrupting-fox-tempest-a-cybercrime-service/
- blvk.chBernische Lehrerversicherungskasse (BLVK)https://blvk.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/20261008_Cyberangriff-auf-Softwarelieferant-von-der-BLV.pdf
- bpk.chBernische Pensionskasse (BPK), notice page with its notices of 8 to 30 October 2026https://bpk.ch/hauptnavigation/cybervorfall
- broadcom.comBroadcom/Symantec protection bulletinhttps://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/backdoor-mistic-new-backdoor-may-be-linked-to-ransomware-access-broker
- cash.chcash.ch (AWP)https://www.cash.ch/news/cyberangriff-auf-softwarefirma-betrifft-auch-berner-pensionskassen-975542
- cisa.govCISA (AA24-109A, revised 2025-11-13)https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-109a
- crowdstrike.comCrowdStrikehttps://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/crowdstrike-hunts-for-shell-command-obfuscation-vmware-esx/
- csoonline.comCSO Onlinehttps://www.csoonline.com/article/4189132/be-on-the-lookout-for-mistic-a-new-backdoor-used-by-ransomware-broker.html
- cybercrimepolice.chCybercrimepolice (cantonal police platform)https://cybercrimepolice.ch/de/faelle/betrugerische-investitionsanrufe-nach-datenabfluss-bei-pensionskassendienstleister
- cybersecuritydive.comCybersecurity Divehttps://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/patch-bypass-hackers-exploit-flaw-sonicwall/820600/
- derbund.chDer Bund (Tamedia)https://www.derbund.ch/cyberangriff-auf-pk-softech-bund-eroeffnet-untersuchung-985784970943
- dexpose.ioDeXposehttps://www.dexpose.io/?p=32553
- dexpose.ioDeXpose (leak-site tracker, claim record)https://www.dexpose.io/safepay-ransomware-attack-on-ara-lyss-in-switzerland/
- dragos.comDragos, 2026-06-03https://www.dragos.com/dragos-industrial-ransomware-analysis-q1-2026
- edoeb.admin.chEDÖB (Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner), press releasehttps://www.edoeb.admin.ch/de/edoeb-leitete-nach-cyberangriff-auf-softwarelieferant-abklaerungen-ein
- github.comKeycloak issue #48388https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/issues/48388
- globenewswire.comGlobeNewswire press releasehttps://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/05/21/3299378/36514/en/Rapid7-Q1-2026-Threat-Landscape-Report-Finds-Vulnerability-Exploitation-Overtakes-Social-Engineering-as-the-Top-Initial-Access-Vector.html
- groupe3r.chGroupe 3R statementhttps://www.groupe3r.ch/fr/information-importante-perturbation-de-nos-services-7268/
- huntress.comHuntresshttps://www.huntress.com/blog/akira-hits-safe-mode-ransomware-rebooting-around-edr
- ictjournal.chICTjournal.chhttps://www.ictjournal.ch/news/2026-05-06/le-reseau-radiologique-romand-a-nouveau-victime-dune-cyberattaque-ses-systemes
- ictjournal.chICTjournal.chhttps://www.ictjournal.ch/news/2026-07-06/donnees-volees-systemes-retablis-le-groupe-3r-fait-le-point-apres-la-cyberattaque
- inside-it.chInside IThttps://www.inside-it.ch/auch-pensionskasse-zug-von-pk-softech-hack-betroffen-20261109
- inside-it.chInside IThttps://www.inside-it.ch/cyberangriff-auf-pensionskassen-lieferant-zieht-kreise-20261014
- inside-it.chInside IThttps://www.inside-it.ch/datenleck-bei-publica-gefaehrdet-auch-sicherheitsbehoerden-20261020
- inside-it.chInside IT (article with Risikomonitor's analysis)https://www.inside-it.ch/kritische-schweizer-infrastrukturen-attackiert-20261027
- inside-it.chInside IThttps://www.inside-it.ch/pensionskasse-stadt-zuerich-untersucht-datenabfluss-20261016
- inside-it.chInside IThttps://www.inside-it.ch/pensionskasse-zuerich-sistiert-softwaremigration-20261103
- inside-it.chInside IThttps://www.inside-it.ch/publica-wollte-pensionskassendaten-loeschen-lassen-20261022
- inside-it.chInside IThttps://www.inside-it.ch/weitere-pensionskassen-pruefen-datenabfluesse-20261009
- ipct.chIstituto di previdenza del Cantone Ticino (IPCT, letter to its insured)https://www.ipct.ch/Attacco-informatico-criminale-presso-un-fornitore-di-software-dell-IPCT-Lettera-inviata-a-tutti-gli-assicurati-IPCT-b03fe500?i=1
- isc.sans.eduSANS ISChttps://isc.sans.edu/diary/33094
- isc.sans.eduSANS Internet Storm Centerhttps://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/33024
- keycloak.orgKeycloakhttps://www.keycloak.org/2026/05/keycloak-2662-released
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Threat Intelligence, Exposing Fox Tempest, 2026-05-19https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/19/exposing-fox-tempest-a-malware-signing-service-operation/
- netzwoche.chNetzwochehttps://www.netzwoche.ch/news/2026-10-08/bundespensionskasse-publica-meldet-datenabfluss
- nzz.chNZZhttps://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/immer-mehr-betroffene-pensionskassen-die-daten-von-ueber-100-000-versicherten-koennten-nun-bei-cyberkriminellen-sein-ld.10035090
- nzz.chNZZhttps://www.nzz.ch/zuerich/nach-einem-cyberangriff-auf-einen-softwarezulieferer-sagt-die-pensionskasse-der-stadt-zuerich-es-ist-moeglich-dass-auch-daten-von-uns-betroffen-sind-ld.10032710
- pkpost.chPensionskasse Posthttps://www.pkpost.ch/news/260-cyberangriff-auf-softwarelieferant-der-pensionskasse-post
- pkpost.chPensionskasse Posthttps://www.pkpost.ch/news/263-cyberangriff-bei-softwarelieferant-versichertendaten-moeglicherweise-betroffen
- pksoftech.chPK Softech AGhttps://pksoftech.ch/de/newsreader/Cyberangriff-auf-die-PKSoftechAG
- pksoftech.chPK Softech AG (notice of 2026-11-10)https://pksoftech.ch/de/newsreader/Information-zum-Cyberangriff-auf-die-PKSoftechAG
- pkzh.chPensionskasse Stadt Zürich (PKZH)https://www.pkzh.ch/de/aktuelles/cyberangriff-softech.html
- pkzh.chPensionskasse Stadt Zürich (PKZH)https://www.pkzh.ch/de/aktuelles/news/cyberangriff-PK-softech.html
- psirt.global.sonicwall.comSonicWall SNWLID-2025-0001https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2025-0001
- publica.chPublica (Pensionskasse des Bundes)https://www.publica.ch/de/cyberangriff-auf-softwarelieferanten
- publica.chPublica (newsletter of 2026-10-22, Cyberangriff auf Softwarelieferanten: Was wir wissen und was nicht)https://www.publica.ch/de/dokumente/newsletter-22102026-cyberangriff-was-wir-wissen-und-was-nicht
- ransomware.liveransomware.livehttps://ransomware.live/id/UsOpc2VhdSBSYWRpb2xvZ2lxdWUgUm9tYW5kQGFraXJh
- rapid7.comRapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Reporthttps://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-q1-2026-threat-landscape-report-geopolitics-ransomware/
- redhat.comRed Hat CVE-2026-37978https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2026-37978.html
- redhat.comRed Hat CVE-2026-37979https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2026-37979.html
- redhat.comRed Hat CVE-2026-37982https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2026-37982.html
- redhat.comRed Hat CVE-2026-4630https://www.redhat.com/security/data/cve/CVE-2026-4630.html
- reliaquest.comReliaQuesthttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-vpn-exploitation-when-patched-doesnt-mean-protected/
- securityweek.comSecurityWeekhttps://www.securityweek.com/new-mistic-rat-opens-door-to-several-ransomware-families/
- srf.chSRFhttps://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/heikle-daten-gestohlen-hacker-fordern-loesegeld-nach-angriff-auf-publica-lieferantin
- srf.chSRFhttps://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/nach-cyberangriff-loesegeldzahlung-der-ruag-an-hackergruppe-war-gesetzeskonform
- swisscybersecurity.netSwissCybersecurity.nethttps://www.swisscybersecurity.net/news/2026-05-07/cyberangriff-legt-westschweizer-radiologie-netzwerk-erneut-lahm
- swisscybersecurity.netSwissCybersecurity.nethttps://www.swisscybersecurity.net/news/2026-10-08/bundespensionskasse-publica-meldet-datenabfluss
- tagesanzeiger.chTages-Anzeiger (Tamedia, paywalled)https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/akira-gruppe-alt-bundesraete-von-hacker-angriff-betroffen-181002064025
- tagesanzeiger.chTages-Anzeiger (Tamedia, paywalled; summary lines readable)https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/akira-hacker-erpressen-loesegeld-mit-publica-daten-654128340841
- thedfirreport.comThe DFIR Reporthttps://thedfirreport.com/2026/06/29/from-bing-search-to-ransomware-bumblebee-and-adaptixc2-deliver-akira-3/
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker News, 2026-06-09https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/veeam-backup-replication-rce-flaw-lets.html
- therecord.mediaThe Record, 2026-05-19https://therecord.media/microsoft-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-service
- theregister.comThe Registerhttps://www.theregister.com/research/2026/08/12/akira-ransomware-scum-blocked-victims-security-tools-and-broke-their-own-encryptor/5286515
- ticinonews.chTicinoNewshttps://www.ticinonews.ch/ticino/hackeraggio-casse-pensioni-centinaia-di-ticinesi-a-rischio-445085
- tio.chTicinonlinehttps://www.tio.ch/ticino/attualita/1958742/dati-stati-cantone-istituto-ticino-attacco-pensioni-casse-previdenza
- tio.chTicinonline (relaying Corriere del Ticino)https://www.tio.ch/ticino/cronaca/1958050/informazioni-ticino-dati-ipct-attacco
- vbs.admin.chEidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport (VBS)https://www.vbs.admin.ch/de/newnsb/5bBC1HPXGI21
- veeam.comVeeam, 2026-06-09https://www.veeam.com/kb4869
- watson.chwatson.ch (Keystone-SDA)https://www.watson.ch/schweiz/datenschutz/664513749-nach-daten-klau-keine-loesegeldforderung-von-hackern-an-publica-softwarelieferan
- watson.chwatson.chhttps://www.watson.ch/schweiz/digital/228405160-pensionskasse-des-bundes-cyberangriff-auf-publica-softwarefirma
- watson.chwatson.ch (analysis)https://www.watson.ch/schweiz/digital/705538861-pk-softech-ag-und-publica-ransomware-attacke-wirft-neue-fragen-auf
- watson.chwatson.chhttps://www.watson.ch/schweiz/digital/929554930-bund-verschwieg-details-zu-ransomware-attacke-von-akira-das-wissen-wir
- wid.cert-bund.deBSI WID-SEC-2026-1612https://wid.cert-bund.de/portal/wid/securityadvisory?name=WID-SEC-2026-1612