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Fox Tempest

actor · actor:fox-tempest

Financially motivated malware-signing-as-a-service (MSaaS) operator; its web domain was seized on 2026-05-19 in the Microsoft DCU disruption.

Coverage
2
first 2026-05-20 → last 2026-09-30
Latest activity
2026-06-09
Microsoft Threat Intelligence: AI-brand impersonation drives Lumma Stealer and Vidar delivery via signed…
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, healthcare, education · regions: europe, us
Sources cited
4
3 hosts
2026-05-202 appearances2026-06-09

Defender insights

What each entry about Fox Tempest tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-20NOTABLEMicrosoft disrupts Fox Tempest, a signing service used for Rhysida attacks and linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliates

Exposure · triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

related to

attributed activity

Story timeline

  1. 2026-06-09Microsoft Threat Intelligence: AI-brand impersonation drives Lumma Stealer and Vidar delivery via signed binaries
    research
  2. 2026-05-20Microsoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service that enabled Rhysida deployments and is linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliates
    active-threatsMicrosoft disrupts Fox Tempest, a signing service used for Rhysida attacks and linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliates
ATT&CK techniques (6 across 4 tactics)

6 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Malvertising · Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates · Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
  • ExecutionUser Execution: Malicious File
  • StealthMasquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
  • Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Code Signing

Resource Development TA0042

T1583.008Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising×1

Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements. Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1588.003Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates×1

Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1608.006Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning×1

Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×2

Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.

Evidence: 2026-06-09/microsoft-threat-intelligence-ai-brand-impersonation-drives · 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Fox Tempest (2)

2026-06-09 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

Microsoft Threat Intelligence: AI-brand impersonation drives Lumma Stealer and Vidar delivery via signed binaries

Microsoft Threat Intelligence documents a campaign by Storm-3075 (initial-access broker) and Fox Tempest (malware-signing-as-a-service operator) that weaponises public enthusiasm for AI tools, impersonating ChatGPT, Claude, DeepSeek and Microsoft Copilot through SEO poisoning, malvertising and multi-stage redirection chains (Rebrandly → CAPTCHA gate → credential-harvesting landing) (Microsoft, 2026-06-08). Downloaded binaries are code-signed with certificates obtained through Fox Tempest's MSaaS operation (T1553.002), suppressing initial detection; payloads include Lumma Stealer, Vidar, Hijack Loader and Oyster, with fraudulent GitHub repositories used for payload staging. Microsoft's separate analysis details the Fox Tempest malware-signing-as-a-service operation that supplies the certificates (Microsoft, 2026-05-19).

Why it matters to us: Code-signing is no longer a trust anchor here; a valid Authenticode signature on a fresh "AI tool" installer is consistent with this chain. Detection concepts: Sysmon EID 1 for browser-parented processes spawning infostealer-family command lines; EDR process-injection alerts for Hijack Loader. Phish-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) removes the downstream AiTM credential-replay value even when an endpoint is seeded.

research09 Jun 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-05-20 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

Microsoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service that enabled Rhysida deployments and is linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliates

Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit unsealed a legal case in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York against Fox Tempest, a malware-signing-as-a-service (MSaaS) operation active since May 2025. It seized the service's website, took hundreds of the virtual machines running the operation offline and blocked access to a site hosting its code (Microsoft On the Issues, 2026-05-19). Fox Tempest abused Microsoft Artifact Signing (formerly Azure Trusted Signing) to obtain Microsoft-issued code-signing certificates valid for only 72 hours, which let malware masquerade as software such as AnyDesk, Teams, PuTTY and Webex and bypass security controls. Microsoft assesses that the actor very likely used stolen identities based in the United States and Canada to pass Artifact Signing's identity validation (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-19).

Customers uploaded files through a web portal and, from February 2026, through pre-configured virtual machines hosted on Cloudzy infrastructure, and received signed binaries in return. They chose plans priced at $5,000, $7,500 or $9,000, with higher plans getting priority in the queue (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-19). Microsoft has revoked over a thousand certificates attributed to Fox Tempest (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-19) and reports the operators trying to move operations and customers to another code-signing service (Microsoft On the Issues, 2026-05-19).

Microsoft links Fox Tempest to Vanilla Tempest, Storm-0501, Storm-2561 and Storm-0249, which all used Fox Tempest-signed malware in active intrusions delivered through purchased advertisements, malvertising and SEO poisoning. Separately, cryptocurrency analysis ties the actor to affiliates delivering the INC, Qilin and Akira ransomware families (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-19). In Microsoft's case study, Vanilla Tempest bought ads that sent users searching for Microsoft Teams to fraudulent download pages serving a signed, trojanized Teams installer, which deployed the Oyster backdoor (also known as Broomstick) and in some cases Rhysida ransomware. Microsoft lists healthcare, education, government and financial services among the affected sectors, and the United States, France, India and China among the affected countries (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-19).

Triage: a genuine Teams, AnyDesk, PuTTY or Webex installer carries its publisher's signature. A Fox Tempest-signed copy carries a valid Microsoft-issued Artifact Signing certificate in the name of an entity that is not the product's publisher, obtained, Microsoft assesses, with stolen identities (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-19).

Correctionrun 2026-09-30T0639Z-auditsummarybodyclassificationtechniquesprioritytitleheadline

Microsoft assesses, rather than states, that Fox Tempest very likely used stolen identities based in the United States and Canada, and its customers paid for plans of $5,000, $7,500 or $9,000 with queue priority, not per signing run (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-19). INC, Qilin and Akira are tied to Fox Tempest through cryptocurrency links to affiliates delivering those ransomware families, not named as confirmed customers (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-19). No cited source reports European public-sector or healthcare victims of these affiliates. Earlier advice about installers spawning shells and about alerting on Key Vault certificate creation had no source. The earlier text also named the installer's file name and the seized domain; both are removed. Microsoft describes a trojanized Teams installer that deployed the Oyster backdoor (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-19). The court case is described by Microsoft as a legal case unsealed in the Southern District of New York (Microsoft On the Issues, 2026-05-19).

threat20 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1
  • Research1

Source distribution

  • microsoft.com2 (50%)
  • blogs.microsoft.com1 (25%)
  • therecord.media1 (25%)