Fox Tempest
actor · actor:fox-tempest
Financially motivated malware-signing-as-a-service (MSaaS) operator; its web domain was seized on 2026-05-19 in the Microsoft DCU disruption.
Defender insights
What each entry about Fox Tempest tells a defender to do, newest first.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
related to
- Microsoft DCU Fox Tempest disruptionMicrosoft DCU disruption of Fox Tempest's signing service
attributed activity
Story timeline
- 2026-06-09Microsoft Threat Intelligence: AI-brand impersonation drives Lumma Stealer and Vidar delivery via signed binaries
- 2026-05-20Microsoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service that enabled Rhysida deployments and is linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliates
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (6 across 4 tactics)
6 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Malvertising · Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates · Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
- ExecutionUser Execution: Malicious File
- StealthMasquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
Resource Development TA0042
T1583.008Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising×1
Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements. Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1588.003Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates×1
Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1608.006Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning×1
Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×2
Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.
Evidence: 2026-06-09/microsoft-threat-intelligence-ai-brand-impersonation-drives · 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Fox Tempest (2)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Akira×1
- INC Ransom×1
- Qilin×1
- Rhysida×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- microsoft.com2 (50%)
- blogs.microsoft.com1 (25%)
- therecord.media1 (25%)
All cited sources (4)
- blogs.microsoft.comMicrosoft On the Issues, DCU legal action, 2026-05-19https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2026/05/19/disrupting-fox-tempest-a-cybercrime-service/
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Threat Intelligence, Exposing Fox Tempest, 2026-05-19https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/19/exposing-fox-tempest-a-malware-signing-service-operation/
- microsoft.comMicrosoft, AI brands as baithttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/08/ai-brands-as-bait-how-threat-actors-are-using-the-ai-hype-in-social-engineering/
- therecord.mediaThe Record, 2026-05-19https://therecord.media/microsoft-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-service