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SonicWall SSL VPN

product · product:sonicwall-ssl-vpn single-source

Coverage
2
first 2026-05-21 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-08-17
Akira reboots a SonicWall-VPN victim into Safe Mode to strip EDR, and starves its own encryptor
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 notable
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
7
6 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about SonicWall SSL VPN, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Sweep Windows event logs across servers and workstations for Kernel-Boot EID 27 carrying a SAFEBOOT load option and Kernel-General EID 12 with BootMode=2, and for writes under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\\Minimal or \\Network that name a remote-access tool rather than a core OS driver; treat any hit with no change-ticket behind it as a live intrusion, because in Safe Mode the endpoint agent that would normally have told you was not running.
    2026-08-17Akira reboots a SonicWall-VPN victim into Safe Mode…

Defender insights

What each entry about SonicWall SSL VPN tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-08-17HIGHAkira reboots a SonicWall-VPN victim into Safe Mode to strip EDR, and starves its own encryptor

Triage

2026-05-21NOTABLEexploitedPatched SonicWall Gen6 SSL-VPNs still let brute-forced accounts skip MFA unless the LDAP fix is redone by hand

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-08-17Akira blinds EDR by rebooting a victim host into Safe Mode with Networking, the operator's first observed use of the technique, and the stripped-down boot starved its own encryptor
    active-threatsAkira reboots a SonicWall-VPN victim into Safe Mode to strip EDR, and starves its own encryptor
  2. 2026-05-21SonicWall Gen6 SSL-VPN: patched-firmware appliances still open to the CVE-2024-12802 MFA bypass without manual LDAP remediation, exploited February to March 2026 by a suspected access broker
    active-threatsPatched SonicWall Gen6 SSL-VPNs still let brute-forced accounts skip MFA unless the LDAP fix is redone by hand

Hunting pivots

CVEs (exploited first)
Releases covered
SonicWall SSL VPN ×2
ATT&CK techniques (16 across 13 tactics)

16 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · External Remote Services
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · Modify Registry · External Remote Services · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts
  • Defense ImpairmentModify Registry · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Disable or Modify Tools · Safe Mode Boot
  • Credential AccessBrute Force · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
  • DiscoveryRemote System Discovery · Account Discovery: Domain Account
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
  • CollectionArchive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
  • Command and ControlRemote Access Tools
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×2

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

T1112Modify Registry×1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×2

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1112Modify Registry×1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

T1688Safe Mode Boot×1

Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1110Brute Force×1

Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×1

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1018Remote System Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×2

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-05-21/sonicwall-gen6-ssl-vpn-incomplete-patching-cve-2024-12802-ak · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility×1

Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about SonicWall SSL VPN (2)

2026-08-17 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOB2

Akira blinds EDR by rebooting a victim host into Safe Mode with Networking, the operator's first observed use of the technique, and the stripped-down boot starved its own encryptor

An Akira affiliate took a compromised Windows host into Safe Mode with Networking to strip its endpoint defences, which Huntress reports is the first time it has observed this operator using the technique; Snatch and AvosLocker have abused Safe Mode for years, but not Akira (Huntress, 2026-08-12). Everything around that step is the operator's familiar chain. From roughly 03:45 UTC on 4 August the SonicWall logged a burst of failed logins against multiple usernames from several external addresses, and about seven minutes later one succeeded against an SSL VPN with no multi-factor authentication in front of it; nearly two hours passed before any hands-on-keyboard activity (Huntress, 2026-08-12). The operator then reached the domain controller over RDP, spawned an elevated command shell, and ran full-property Get-ADUser and Get-ADComputer exports to files under C:\ProgramData; prefixed with $formatenumerationlimit = -1 so PowerShell's default four-item truncation would not clip multi-valued attributes such as group membership. Collection followed on an application server: WinRAR was installed mid-intrusion and used to recursively archive mapped file shares with the same flag string Huntress has documented in earlier SonicWall-entry Akira cases, and the archives went out to cloud object storage.

The evasion itself is three cheap steps. AnyDesk was installed as a service to carry both hands-on control and payload delivery; because third-party services do not start in Safe Mode (including the attacker's own) the operator first wrote that service into the Safe Mode allow-list with a single reg.exe add against HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot\Network, then ran msconfig.exe at 06:29:21 UTC and forced the reboot. The host came back with Kernel-Boot event 27 recording a SAFEBOOT:NETWORK load option and Kernel-General event 12 recording BootMode = 2. Windows Defender logged event 3002 seconds into the boot, and Huntress states plainly that "For the entire Safe Mode window, the host had no working EDR, and AV was blinded" (Huntress, 2026-08-12).

What the operator did not anticipate is that the same stripped-down environment starved the ransomware. The encryptor launched at 06:34:29 UTC, and within about two minutes the host logged System event 26 for virtual-memory exhaustion and a cascade of PowerShell stack failures; it never encrypted. A scheduled Defender scan identified the binary at 07:43:50 UTC but its cleanup routine failed repeatedly because real-time protection was down, and quarantine only succeeded at 08:12:28 UTC, after the attacker rebooted back to normal operation at 08:10:38 UTC and thereby restored the very protection they had removed (Huntress, 2026-08-12). Huntress calls that "a lucky side effect of the attacker's own mistake in these circumstances, not a defence you can plan around", and notes that a host with more memory or a larger page file, or a retooled encryptor with a lighter footprint, could carry the same play to completion (Huntress, 2026-08-12).

Triage: Safe Mode with Networking is a legitimate diagnostic boot mode, so a lone Safe Mode boot is not the signal and IT-driven troubleshooting will generate them. The discriminators are what surrounds it: a SafeBoot Minimal or Network registry write naming a remote-access tool rather than a core Windows driver, a boot-configuration change made from an interactive session that traces back to an external VPN logon minutes earlier, and third-party security services stopping without a corresponding maintenance window. A genuine support-driven Safe Mode boot carries none of those, and the registry write in particular has no benign reason to name a remote-support binary.

Ransomware families like Snatch and AvosLocker have abused Safe Mode for years, but this is the first reported tie to Akira that Huntress has observed.

For the entire Safe Mode window, the host had no working EDR, and AV was blinded.

Alert on boot-configuration changes and Safe Mode boots: msconfig.exe / bcdedit activity, Kernel-Boot EID 27 with a SAFEBOOT load option, Kernel-General EID 12 BootMode=2, and third-party security services stopping (System EID 7036).

That's a lucky side effect of the attacker's own mistake in these circumstances, not a defence you can plan around.

Huntress 2026-08-12
threat17 Aug 04:28Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-05-21 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2024-12802exploitedupdatedNATOB2

SonicWall Gen6 SSL-VPN: patched-firmware appliances still open to the CVE-2024-12802 MFA bypass without manual LDAP remediation, exploited February to March 2026 by a suspected access broker

SonicWall's SNWLID-2025-0001 describes CVE-2024-12802 (CWE-305, CVSS 6.5): when SSL-VPN authenticates against Microsoft Active Directory, UPN and SAM account names are handled separately, so MFA can be configured independently for each and an attacker can bypass it through the alternative account name (SonicWall SNWLID-2025-0001); in practice an attacker with valid credentials authenticates without the MFA step (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-20). On Gen6 the fixed firmware does not remove the vulnerable LDAP configuration, so six manual steps are needed: delete the LDAP configuration that uses userPrincipalName, remove cached LDAP users, remove the SSL VPN user domain, reboot, recreate the LDAP configuration without userPrincipalName and take a fresh backup (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-20); Gen7 firmware version 7.2.0-7015 and Gen8 firmware version 8.0.1-8017 build those steps in (SonicWall SNWLID-2025-0001). ReliaQuest responded to intrusions between February and March 2026 on Gen6 devices that looked patched and assesses with medium confidence that they are the first in-the-wild exploitation; the attacker brute-forced VPN accounts with an automated tool, in one case after only 13 attempts, and reached a file server within 30 minutes (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19), connected to it over RDP with a shared local administrator password, and tried to deploy a Cobalt Strike beacon and a vulnerable driver to disable endpoint protection, both blocked by EDR (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-20). ReliaQuest describes the tools as consistent with actors in the ransomware ecosystem and the logouts and later re-entries with other accounts as initial access broker activity (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19); the researchers could not attribute the attacks, though the activity resembled the Akira ransomware group's (Cybersecurity Dive, 2026-05-19).

Triage: where no CLI-based VPN client is authorized or typical, any sess="CLI" event is a high-fidelity indicator; where scripted VPN authentication is legitimate, ReliaQuest says to baseline it and tune on volume, source IP and timing (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19).

SSL-VPN MFA Bypass in SonicWALL SSL-VPN can arise in specific cases due to the separate handling of UPN (User Principal Name) and SAM (Security Account Manager) account names when integrated with Microsoft Active Directory

SonicWall SNWLID-2025-0001 2025-01-07

The sess="CLI" session type indicates scripted or automated VPN authentication.

The voluntary logouts, combined with re-entry attempts days later using different accounts in some environments, are consistent with initial access broker (IAB) activity.

ReliaQuest 2026-05-19

Researchers could not provide direct attribution for the attacks, but the threat activity was consistent with ransomware activity from the Akira group.

Cybersecurity Dive 2026-05-19
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditaffected_productsbodyclassificationcvesentitiesevent_dateevidenceheadlineregionssectorssourcessourcing_notesummarytagstechniquestitle

SonicWall scores CVE-2024-12802 CVSS 6.5 with a vector that requires a low-privileged account (PR:L), not 9.1 for an unauthenticated attacker; 9.1 is the assessment of CISA's Authorized Data Publisher (SonicWall SNWLID-2025-0001) (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19), and the attacker needs valid credentials, which here were brute-forced. The attacks are not attributed: ReliaQuest describes a likely initial access broker using tools of the ransomware ecosystem, and the researchers could not attribute them, only compare them with Akira's 2025 activity (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19) (Cybersecurity Dive, 2026-05-19).

The six remediation steps come from SonicWall's advisory as BleepingComputer lists them (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-20). The detection signal ReliaQuest found is the sess="CLI" session type with Event IDs 238 and 1080 and a CLI-to-GMS transition, not UPN-format login names (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19).

threat21 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats2

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com2 (29%)
  • cybersecuritydive.com1 (14%)
  • huntress.com1 (14%)
  • psirt.global.sonicwall.com1 (14%)
  • reliaquest.com1 (14%)
  • theregister.com1 (14%)