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Microsoft Windows

product · product:microsoft-windows single-sourcesingle-source-national-cert

Coverage
29
first 2026-05-08 → last 2026-10-20
Latest activity
2026-10-14
Microsoft patches an exploited Windows Shell zero-day that evades Mark of the Web protections on files and…
Peak priority
high
10 high · 18 notable · 1 routine
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, technology, finance · regions: europe, apac, us
Sources cited
83
42 hosts

Action items (17)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Microsoft Windows, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Deploy the 2026-10-13 cumulative update for each release (KB5127648 for Windows 11 24H2, 25H2 and 26H2, KB5127646 for Windows 11 26H1, KB5126657 for Windows 10 21H2 and 22H2, KB5126655 for Server 2022, KB5126646 for Server 2025, and the others listed in the CVE record) to every Windows endpoint and server, starting with the systems whose users open mail and chat attachments or download files; Rapid7 says Windows Server 2012 receives no patch.
    2026-10-14CVE-2026-96951
  • Turn Developer Mode off fleet-wide by GPO and scope any enterprise sideloading policy away from AllowAllTrustedApps: that toggle is the single prerequisite the whole chain needs, and without it package registration fails closed.
    2026-09-27Huntress: attacker JavaScript in a signed Windows…
  • After confirming Chrome ≥152.0.7977.82 and the September Windows cumulative update are deployed fleet-wide, separately audit installed Chromium extensions requesting broad host/tab/storage permissions and any browser-associated scheduled task created in the days before patching; neither the malicious GemStone extension nor the kit's scheduled-task persistence is removed by the OS/browser patch.
    2026-09-10CVE-2026-85046 +2
  • Confirm every Windows endpoint reports Microsoft Malware Protection Engine 1.1.26080.3 or later: the engine version updates on its own cadence and is not covered by the OS patch level, so check it separately; 1.26070.7 is the last affected build.
    2026-08-12CVE-2026-50656 +1
  • Deploy the September 2026 cumulative update to every Windows and Windows Server host now: the Update Stack fix (CVE-2026-81963) covers Server 2025 and Windows 11, the ALPC fix (CVE-2026-85880) covers Windows 10 and Server 2012 through 2022, and a mixed estate needs both to close the SYSTEM-escalation exposure.
    2026-09-09CVE-2026-81963 +1
12 older action items
  • Check whether RTCore64.sys and DBUtil_2_3.sys can load in your estate; Microsoft's vulnerable-driver blocklist covers both, and confirming it is enforced (rather than merely available) removes this implant's entire kernel-write path.
    2026-08-23CVE-2019-16098 +1
  • Enumerate which accounts and groups hold SeLoadDriverPrivilege across your Windows estate and remove it wherever it is not required; it is the sole precondition for this technique and the only control Microsoft's servicing decision leaves you.
    2026-08-23No exploit, no vulnerability, nothing to blocklist…
  • Confirm every internet-facing NetScaler ADC/Gateway is on 13.1-62.23, 14.1-66.59 or 13.1-FIPS/NDcPP 13.1-37.262 or later, and on any appliance configured as a SAML Identity Provider that ran an earlier build, invalidate existing AAA sessions rather than assuming the patch ended the exposure, the flaw leaks live session material from appliance memory.
    2026-07-31CVE-2026-3055 +2
  • Confirm every marimo notebook instance is on 0.23.0 or later and that none answers from outside the development network, then, separately, compromise-assess any instance that was exposed while below 0.23.0, because Unit 42 records command execution as confirmed on 11 endpoints in this campaign rather than merely attempted, and the patch does not evict an attacker who already had a PTY shell.
    2026-07-31CVE-2026-3055 +2
  • Confirm the April 2026 cumulative update is installed on every Windows host that answers IKEv2 (VPN gateways, Always On VPN endpoints and any domain member running Routing and Remote Access) and treat an unpatched internet-reachable responder as a compromise-assessment candidate rather than a patch backlog item; where a host cannot be patched this cycle, apply Microsoft's stated interim control (block inbound UDP 500/4500 on systems not using IKE, restrict those ports to known peers on systems that do).
    2026-07-31CVE-2026-3055 +2
  • Sweep Windows event logs across servers and workstations for Kernel-Boot EID 27 carrying a SAFEBOOT load option and Kernel-General EID 12 with BootMode=2, and for writes under HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\SafeBoot\\Minimal or \\Network that name a remote-access tool rather than a core OS driver; treat any hit with no change-ticket behind it as a live intrusion, because in Safe Mode the endpoint agent that would normally have told you was not running.
    2026-08-17Akira reboots a SonicWall-VPN victim into Safe Mode…
  • Deploy the August 2026 Windows cumulative update to every Windows 11 24H2/25H2 endpoint that handles externally-sourced documents; CVE-2026-68820 is the exploited step that turns a user-level foothold into SYSTEM and removes endpoint visibility.
    2026-08-12CVE-2026-68820 +1
  • Check every internet-facing Roundcube instance against the vendor's 2025 advisory for CVE-2025-49113 and treat any unpatched hit as a candidate C2 relay node rather than only a mail-data exposure, look for unexpected PHP files in the web root and repeated small POSTs to plausible-looking static-asset paths.
    2026-08-12CVE-2026-68820 +1
  • Deploy the June Patch Tuesday HTTP.sys fix (CVE-2026-47291) on any IIS/WinRM host; as an interim check, confirm MaxRequestBytes is at the 16384-byte default (raised values are the exposed configuration). Apply the Chrome 149.0.7827.103 update fleet-wide for the in-the-wild V8 zero-day CVE-2026-11645 (CISA KEV).
    2026-06-10CVE-2026-47291 +4
  • Confirm the June 2026 Windows cumulative update is applied on every internet-facing IIS/HTTPS host and any service built on the HTTP Server API; ZDI notes the patch is the only reliable remediation.
    2026-06-10CVE-2026-47291 +4
  • As an interim measure on unpatched hosts, keep the HTTP.sys MaxRequestBytes registry value (HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\HTTP\\Parameters) at or below 65,535 bytes; a request must be able to carry ~262,144 bytes to trigger the overflow, so this configuration blocks it.
    2026-06-10CVE-2026-47291 +4
  • Where TLS inspection exists, alert on any single HTTP/1.x request carrying more than ~1,000 header field lines; without decryption, flag HTTPS connections that send more than ~1,000 tiny TLS application-data records over roughly 11 minutes.
    2026-06-10CVE-2026-47291 +4

Defender insights

What each entry about Microsoft Windows tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-14HIGHexploitedMicrosoft patches an exploited Windows Shell zero-day that evades Mark of the Web protections on files and links

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-09-21NOTABLESentinelLabs: the same DPRK backdoors from a $292M crypto theft resurface on a victim with no crypto ties, in a campaign that uses poisoned Terraform lockfiles

Triage

2026-10-04NOTABLEHuntress: a ChatGPT Custom GPT lure feeds a ClickFix chain that ends in a signed-host DLL sideload and a RAT

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-09-30NOTABLEMicrosoft: Star Blizzard adds mass mailings and a one-click scheduled-task chain to its CosmicPulse backdoor delivery

Triage

2026-09-27NOTABLEHuntress: attacker JavaScript in a signed Windows AppX host drives Microsoft's own OAuth broker, so a genuine login yields MFA-surviving refresh tokens

Triage · detection

2026-09-10HIGHexploitedSix espionage clusters ran the identical click-to-SYSTEM exploit kit within days of each other; Proofpoint calls it the same code, not parallel development

Triage

23 earlier entries carry guidance too, listed under the story timeline below.

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-14CVE-2026-96951, Windows Shell: a Mark of the Web bypass exploited as a zero-day, fixed in the 2026-10-13 cumulative updates and listed in CISA KEV (CVSS 8.8)
    trending-vulnerabilitiesMicrosoft patches an exploited Windows Shell zero-day that evades Mark of the Web protections on files and links
  2. 2026-10-04A malicious ChatGPT Custom GPT sends users to a Google Sites ClickFix page that installs a sideloaded, in-memory RAT
    active-threatsHuntress: a ChatGPT Custom GPT lure feeds a ClickFix chain that ends in a signed-host DLL sideload and a RAT
  3. 2026-09-30Star Blizzard's RedFlick: mass-mailed think-tank event invitations, compromised-website senders and a single-click scheduled-task chain to the CosmicPulse backdoor
    active-threatsMicrosoft: Star Blizzard adds mass mailings and a one-click scheduled-task chain to its CosmicPulse backdoor delivery
  4. 2026-09-27A sideloaded AppX package turns a Microsoft-signed web host into an OAuth token thief: the login dialog is genuine, the MFA is genuine, and the tokens go to the attacker
    researchHuntress: attacker JavaScript in a signed Windows AppX host drives Microsoft's own OAuth broker, so a genuine login yields MFA-surviving refresh tokens
  5. 2026-09-24CLOSEDQUORUM: Cisco Talos documents what it calls, to its knowledge, the first publicly documented Windows implant that lets a panel of four commercial LLMs vote on its next action instead of a human operator
    active-threatsA malware implant treats commercial AI chatbot endpoints as its command-and-control infrastructure, no attacker server required
  6. 2026-09-22CVE-2026-66804, Windows Cross Device Service: a dangling COM registration reaches SYSTEM privilege escalation, and Google Project Zero publishes a general method to hunt for others
    trending-vulnerabilitiesProject Zero details a reusable Windows privilege-escalation technique and a hunting method for finding it elsewhere
  7. 2026-09-21TraderTraitor (Jade Sleet) backdoors resurface on a non-cryptocurrency IT-services firm in a campaign that delivers malware through weaponized Terraform provider lockfiles, resolving C2 through a Nostr-relay dead drop
    active-threatsSentinelLabs: the same DPRK backdoors from a $292M crypto theft resurface on a victim with no crypto ties, in a campaign that uses poisoned Terraform lockfiles
  8. 2026-09-21NightEagle (APT-Q-95) pivots to Russian targets, tunnels RDP through Microsoft's own legitimate dev-tunnels service, and attempts DCSync against Active Directory
    active-threatsKaspersky: an APT group that abused Microsoft's own developer-tunnel feature to expose RDP outward, then attempted DCSync once it held a privileged account
  9. 2026-09-21A phishing chain reported against conference attendees installs a rogue root CA generated fresh on every host, plus a hosts-file/firewall local proxy able to fake clean VirusTotal results and to mint trusted certificates for any domain, surviving reboot
    active-threatsHuntress: a fake Lenovo driver installs a working, private certificate authority into a victim's own trust store, able to fake 'clean' VirusTotal lookups
  10. 2026-09-16CHOSEN BRICK; Iranian state cyber actors run Telegram-C2 Windows spyware against dissidents, activists and journalists, per joint NCSC-UK/FBI/AIVD advisory
    active-threatsNCSC-UK, the FBI and AIVD detail an Iranian spyware family that gives every victim their own private Telegram bot for command and control
  11. 2026-09-10BlueMoon: six separate state-nexus actor clusters independently weaponize a shared Chrome V8 + Windows kernel zero-day chain
    active-threatsSix espionage clusters ran the identical click-to-SYSTEM exploit kit within days of each other; Proofpoint calls it the same code, not parallel development
  12. 2026-09-09September 2026 Patch Tuesday: two actively exploited Windows privilege-escalation zero-days (CVE-2026-81963 Update Stack, CVE-2026-85880 ALPC)
    trending-vulnerabilitiesMicrosoft names two exploited Windows privilege-escalation zero-days, splitting the newest and legacy build lines
  13. 2026-09-03MoiClient: an invoice-themed backdoor chains an RPC-based UAC bypass with a vulnerable Lenovo PC Manager driver to kill security products and steal browser credentials
    active-threatsA debug-object handle borrowed from winver.exe is enough to hijack a self-elevating system binary with no prompt
  14. 2026-09-03Kimsuky's seafood-invoice LNK campaign abuses Backblaze B2 cloud storage as C2 and exfiltration infrastructure, keyed by victim BIOS serial number
    active-threatsThe command-and-control channel is a legitimate cloud storage API, not a registered domain
  15. 2026-08-28Nimbus Manticore (Iranian IRGC-affiliated APT, aka Tortoiseshell/UNC1549/Smoke Sandstorm/Mirage Kitten) deploys a third 2026 toolset refresh (a TWOSTROKE-like backdoor abusing DLL search-order hijacking, paired with a reverse SSH tunneler) with confirmed expansion into the UK, France, Albania and Belarus
    active-threatsAn Iranian espionage actor already tracked for aerospace and telecom targeting adds a new backdoor and materially widens its named European footprint
  16. 2026-08-28CNCMachineRMS, an undocumented remote-access trojan delivered through a four-stage BabaDeda loader chain that smuggles shellcode via a benign Windows date-formatting API
    active-threatsA ClickFix lure abuses a signed IBM SPSS binary's own scripting engine, then hides its final shellcode injection inside a Windows time-formatting call
  17. 2026-08-23SPECTRE unlinks EDR's kernel callbacks one at a time using a two-driver BYOVD toolkit and an offset table for thirteen Windows builds, and its Linux half hides through ftrace rather than the syscall table
    active-threatsA cross-platform implant that blinds callback-dependent endpoint security products to process, thread and image-load events for the rest of the session
  18. 2026-08-23Windows Defender ships its own kernel write primitive: BTR.sys, the signed boot-time remediation driver, takes an encrypted job list from an alternate data stream and will delete or create any file or registry value asked of it
    deep-diveNo exploit, no vulnerability, nothing to blocklist; the driver is a required Defender component, and its instructions live in a hidden stream on its own file
  19. 2026-08-17Akira blinds EDR by rebooting a victim host into Safe Mode with Networking, the operator's first observed use of the technique, and the stripped-down boot starved its own encryptor
    active-threatsAkira reboots a SonicWall-VPN victim into Safe Mode to strip EDR, and starves its own encryptor
  20. 2026-08-15Mustang Panda's CoolClient backdoor gains a kernel driver signed with a 2013 certificate that expired in 2014, and it hides the malware's own C2 traffic by hooking the driver Windows uses to report network state
    active-threatsKaspersky documents a previously undocumented CoolClient rootkit driver, deployed only once the implant already holds SCM access and SeTcbPrivilege
  21. 2026-08-12ShieldBreak, a public proof-of-concept defeats Microsoft's July fix for the RoguePlanet Defender flaw, claims 100% reliability where the original was a coin flip, and now covers Windows Server 2025
    trending-vulnerabilitiesMicrosoft has now shipped an engine fix (1.1.26080.3), and the same researcher claims a partial bypass of it
  22. 2026-08-12Lazarus burned a Windows AFD.sys zero-day (CVE-2026-68820) on European defence targets, FudModule v3.1 blinds the endpoint, and the C2 is other people's Roundcube and WordPress servers
    deep-diveCheck Point ties Operation Dream Job's 2026 wave to an exploited kernel zero-day patched on 11 August, with confirmed compromises in France and Germany
  23. 2026-08-07A fake Zoom installer stages Overlord RAT through the first .NET macOS downloader Jamf has observed, PE-format DLLs bundled inside a Mach-O binary
    active-threatsmacOS malware picks up .NET: one downloader codebase now targets Mac and Windows, and the Go payload is Garble-obfuscated to break static analysis
  24. 2026-07-31Unit 42 recovers a live autonomous-AI attack operation after it exposed its own home directory, the confirmed compromises came from manual exploitation of Citrix NetScaler (CVE-2026-3055) and Marimo notebooks, not the agent
    active-threatsThe autonomous agent landed nothing; the operator's hand-driven work took data from three NetScaler targets and ran commands on 11 Marimo servers
  25. 2026-07-29LegacyHive: a public Windows technique that redirects a profile's Local AppData into the NT Object Manager namespace via offline hive edits, reproduced on fully patched systems
    researchLevelBlue reproduces Nightmare Eclipse's latest Windows PoC on a July-2026-patched build, no CVE, no fix, and the abuse uses only legitimate APIs
  26. 2026-07-28MedusaHVNC: a malware-as-a-service RAT that drives the victim's own logged-in browser on an invisible second Windows desktop
    active-threatsMedusaHVNC rides real logged-in browser sessions on a hidden Windows desktop, defeating device-based fraud checks
  27. 2026-07-26An exposed WebDAV delivery lab shows industrialised .url/.lnk lure testing against CVE-2025-33053, with LLM-written tooling and ClickFix pages
    research1,048 artifacts on an exposed staging server show how a delivery operator now QA-tests lures like a product team
  28. 2026-06-10CVE-2026-47291, Microsoft June Patch Tuesday: HTTP.sys pre-auth RCE (CVSS 9.8) headlines the largest-ever release (198 CVEs)
    trending-vulnerabilities
  29. 2026-05-08CVE-2026-32202 in Windows Shell: an incomplete fix for an APT28-exploited LNK flaw leaks NTLM hashes when a folder is opened, exploited and re-released in July (CVSS 4.3)
    trending-vulnerabilitiesOpening a folder with a crafted shortcut sends the user's NTLM hash to an attacker. Exploited, and re-fixed in July 2026
ATT&CK techniques (136 across 15 tactics)

136 techniques observed across 29 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceGather Victim Identity Information · Active Scanning · Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
  • Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Domains · Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising · Compromise Infrastructure: Server · Obtain Capabilities: Exploits · Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · External Remote Services · Drive-by Compromise · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain · Phishing · Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment · Phishing: Spearphishing Link · Phishing: Spearphishing via Service
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript · Native API · Exploitation for Client Execution · User Execution: Malicious File · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste · Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model · Hijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts · Modify Registry · External Remote Services · Create Account: Local Account · Software Extensions · Server Software Component: Web Shell · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription · Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification · Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Process Injection · Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call · Process Injection: Process Hollowing · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation · Valid Accounts · Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription · Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification · Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
  • StealthRootkit · Obfuscated Files or Information · Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography · Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution · Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads · Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation · Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File · Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Masquerading: Masquerade File Type · Process Injection · Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call · Process Injection: Process Hollowing · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Valid Accounts · Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Indirect Command Execution · System Binary Proxy Execution · System Binary Proxy Execution: Control Panel · System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec · System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 · Execution Guardrails: Mutual Exclusion · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks · Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window · Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes · Hijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL · Reflective Code Loading
  • Defense ImpairmentModify Registry · Subvert Trust Controls: Gatekeeper Bypass · Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing · Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate · Subvert Trust Controls: Mark-of-the-Web Bypass · Disable or Modify Tools · Safe Mode Boot
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · OS Credential Dumping: DCSync · Input Capture: Keylogging · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Forced Authentication · Steal Application Access Token · Steal Web Session Cookie · Unsecured Credentials: Shell History · Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain · Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers · Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager · Adversary-in-the-Middle · Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
  • DiscoverySystem Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery · Remote System Discovery · System Owner/User Discovery · System Network Connections Discovery · Process Discovery · System Information Discovery · Account Discovery: Domain Account · Browser Information Discovery · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks · Software Discovery
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Exploitation of Remote Services · Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
  • CollectionData from Local System · Input Capture: Keylogging · Screen Capture · Email Collection: Local Email Collection · Clipboard Data · Automated Collection · Audio Capture · Video Capture · Browser Session Hijacking · Adversary-in-the-Middle · Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
  • Command and ControlFallback Channels · Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Application Layer Protocol: DNS · Proxy · Proxy: Internal Proxy · Proxy: External Proxy · Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy · Web Service · Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Web Service: Bidirectional Communication · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools · Non-Standard Port · Protocol Tunneling · Encrypted Channel · Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel · Exfiltration Over Web Service · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration Over Webhook
  • ImpactData Destruction · Data Encrypted for Impact · Endpoint Denial of Service

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1589Gather Victim Identity Information×1

Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, security question responses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials or multi-factor authentication (MFA) configurations.

Evidence: 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1595Active Scanning×1

Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.

Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1595.002Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning×1

Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.

Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗

Resource Development TA0042

T1583.001Acquire Infrastructure: Domains×1

Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1583.008Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising×1

Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements. Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1584.004Compromise Infrastructure: Server×1

Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a Server or Virtual Private Server, adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations.

Evidence: 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1588.005Obtain Capabilities: Exploits×1

Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.

Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1608.006Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning×1

Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.

Evidence: 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×3

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-07-29/legacyhive-offline-registry-hive-profile-hijack-no-fix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1189Drive-by Compromise×1

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×5

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · 2026-06-10/cve-2026-47291-microsoft-june-patch-tuesday-http-sys-pre-aut · ATT&CK page ↗

T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×1

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566Phishing×1

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.

Evidence: 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×4

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-10-14/cve-2026-96951-windows-shell-motw-bypass-zero-day-kev · 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · 2026-09-03/moiclient-byovd-rpc-uac-bypass-invoice-backdoor · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link×2

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-10-14/cve-2026-96951-windows-shell-motw-bypass-zero-day-kev · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.003Phishing: Spearphishing via Service×3

Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×8

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-09-03/moiclient-byovd-rpc-uac-bypass-invoice-backdoor +2 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter×1

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.

Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×5

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as SSH.

Evidence: 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×2

Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×2

Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.

Evidence: 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×2

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1106Native API×1

Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.

Evidence: 2026-08-12/shieldbreak-defender-rogueplanet-patch-bypass-no-fix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1203Exploitation for Client Execution×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×10

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-10-14/cve-2026-96951-windows-shell-motw-bypass-zero-day-kev · 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 +4 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×3

An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · 2026-07-26/rapid7-exposed-webdav-delivery-lab-cve-2025-33053-clickfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1559.001Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model×1

Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Remote COM execution is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/legacyhive-offline-registry-hive-profile-hijack-no-fix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×8

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-09-03/moiclient-byovd-rpc-uac-bypass-invoice-backdoor · 2026-08-28/nimbus-manticore-twostroke-backdoor-europe · 2026-08-28/cncmachinerms-babadeda-loader-enumtimeformats-shellcode · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit +2 more · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×8

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-09-03/moiclient-byovd-rpc-uac-bypass-invoice-backdoor +2 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×3

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-07-29/legacyhive-offline-registry-hive-profile-hijack-no-fix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1112Modify Registry×5
T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · ATT&CK page ↗

T1176Software Extensions×1

Adversaries may abuse software extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Software extensions are modular components that enhance or customize the functionality of software applications, including web browsers, Integrated Development Environments (IDEs), and other platforms. Extensions are typically installed via official marketplaces, app stores, or manually loaded by users, and they often inherit the permissions and access levels of the host application.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×2

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×2

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/btr-sys-defender-remediation-driver-kernel-primitive · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.003Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription×1

Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.004Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification×1

Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User Unix Shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home directory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.015Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking×1

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.

Evidence: 2026-09-22/cve-2026-66804-windows-dangling-com-privesc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution×1

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon. These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.

Evidence: 2026-08-28/cncmachinerms-babadeda-loader-enumtimeformats-shellcode · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×5

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · 2026-08-23/btr-sys-defender-remediation-driver-kernel-primitive · 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×8

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-09-03/moiclient-byovd-rpc-uac-bypass-invoice-backdoor +2 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055Process Injection×5

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-08-28/cncmachinerms-babadeda-loader-enumtimeformats-shellcode · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.004Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call×2

Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.012Process Injection: Process Hollowing×5

Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · 2026-09-03/moiclient-byovd-rpc-uac-bypass-invoice-backdoor · 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · ATT&CK page ↗

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×8

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-09-22/cve-2026-66804-windows-dangling-com-privesc · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-09-09/windows-september-2026-two-exploited-lpe-zero-days-kev · 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · 2026-08-12/shieldbreak-defender-rogueplanet-patch-bypass-no-fix · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule +2 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×3

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-07-29/legacyhive-offline-registry-hive-profile-hijack-no-fix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1134.001Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft×1

Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`. The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×2

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/btr-sys-defender-remediation-driver-kernel-primitive · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.003Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription×1

Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.004Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification×1

Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User Unix Shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home directory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.015Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking×1

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.

Evidence: 2026-09-22/cve-2026-66804-windows-dangling-com-privesc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution×1

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon. These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.

Evidence: 2026-08-28/cncmachinerms-babadeda-loader-enumtimeformats-shellcode · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×5

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · 2026-08-23/btr-sys-defender-remediation-driver-kernel-primitive · 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1548Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism×2

Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control privilege elevation to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.

Evidence: 2026-08-12/shieldbreak-defender-rogueplanet-patch-bypass-no-fix · 2026-07-29/legacyhive-offline-registry-hive-profile-hijack-no-fix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1548.002Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control×2

Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/moiclient-byovd-rpc-uac-bypass-invoice-backdoor · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1014Rootkit×3

Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×10

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-08-28/nimbus-manticore-twostroke-backdoor-europe · 2026-08-28/cncmachinerms-babadeda-loader-enumtimeformats-shellcode +4 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027.003Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography×1

Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.

Evidence: 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027.007Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution×1

Adversaries may obfuscate then dynamically resolve API functions called by their malware in order to conceal malicious functionalities and impair defensive analysis. Malware commonly uses various Native API functions provided by the OS to perform various tasks such as those involving processes, files, and other system artifacts.

Evidence: 2026-08-12/shieldbreak-defender-rogueplanet-patch-bypass-no-fix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027.009Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads×2

Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to Subvert Trust Controls by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027.010Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation×1

Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection. Command-line obfuscation is a method of making strings and patterns within commands and scripts more difficult to signature and analyze. This type of obfuscation can be included within commands executed by delivered payloads (e.g., Phishing and Drive-by Compromise) or interactively via Command and Scripting Interpreter.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027.013Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File×2

Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.004Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service×1

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description. Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.

Evidence: 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×6
T1036.008Masquerading: Masquerade File Type×2

Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file’s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format, including how they are encoded and organized. For example, a file’s signature (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning bytes of a file and is often used to identify the file’s type. For example, the header of a JPEG file, is <code> 0xFF 0xD8</code> and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or `.JPG`.

Evidence: 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055Process Injection×5

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-08-28/cncmachinerms-babadeda-loader-enumtimeformats-shellcode · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.004Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call×2

Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.012Process Injection: Process Hollowing×5

Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · 2026-09-03/moiclient-byovd-rpc-uac-bypass-invoice-backdoor · 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×3

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-08-12/shieldbreak-defender-rogueplanet-patch-bypass-no-fix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×3

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-07-29/legacyhive-offline-registry-hive-profile-hijack-no-fix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1134.001Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft×1

Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`. The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×4

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1202Indirect Command Execution×1

Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. For example, Forfiles, the Program Compatibility Assistant (`pcalua.exe`), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), `Scriptrunner.exe`, as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command and Scripting Interpreter, Run window, or via scripts. Adversaries may also abuse the `ssh.exe` binary to execute malicious commands via the `ProxyCommand` and `LocalCommand` options, which can be invoked via the `-o` flag or by modifying the SSH config file.

Evidence: 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218System Binary Proxy Execution×2

Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.

Evidence: 2026-09-27/wwahost-appx-webauthbroker-oauth-token-theft · 2026-08-12/shieldbreak-defender-rogueplanet-patch-bypass-no-fix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.002System Binary Proxy Execution: Control Panel×1

Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings.

Evidence: 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.007System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec×3

Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi). The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32×1

Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).

Evidence: 2026-07-26/rapid7-exposed-webdav-delivery-lab-cve-2025-33053-clickfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1480.002Execution Guardrails: Mutual Exclusion×1

Adversaries may constrain execution or actions based on the presence of a mutex associated with malware. A mutex is a locking mechanism used to synchronize access to a resource. Only one thread or process can acquire a mutex at a given time.

Evidence: 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion×1

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497.003Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks×1

Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.003Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window×1

Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.

Evidence: 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.004Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes×1

Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. Within MFT entries are file attributes, such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files).

Evidence: 2026-08-23/btr-sys-defender-remediation-driver-kernel-primitive · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/legacyhive-offline-registry-hive-profile-hijack-no-fix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×8

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-09-03/moiclient-byovd-rpc-uac-bypass-invoice-backdoor · 2026-08-28/nimbus-manticore-twostroke-backdoor-europe · 2026-08-28/cncmachinerms-babadeda-loader-enumtimeformats-shellcode · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit +2 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1620Reflective Code Loading×2

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1112Modify Registry×5
T1553.001Subvert Trust Controls: Gatekeeper Bypass×1

Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple’s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed on a host. Gatekeeper was built on top of File Quarantine in Snow Leopard (10.6, 2009) and has grown to include Code Signing, security policy compliance, Notarization, and more. Gatekeeper also treats applications running for the first time differently than reopened applications.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×3

Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1553.004Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate×1

Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1553.005Subvert Trust Controls: Mark-of-the-Web Bypass×3

Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named <code>Zone.Identifier</code> with a specific value known as the MOTW. Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file is not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.

Evidence: 2026-10-14/cve-2026-96951-windows-shell-motw-bypass-zero-day-kev · 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×11

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · 2026-09-03/moiclient-byovd-rpc-uac-bypass-invoice-backdoor · 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink +5 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1688Safe Mode Boot×1

Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.006OS Credential Dumping: DCSync×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · ATT&CK page ↗

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×2

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×1

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1187Forced Authentication×1

Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/cve-2026-32202-windows-shell-ntlm-coercion-apt28-itw-cvss-4 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1528Steal Application Access Token×1

Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.

Evidence: 2026-09-27/wwahost-appx-webauthbroker-oauth-token-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×4

An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.003Unsecured Credentials: Shell History×1

Adversaries may search the command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.001Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×4

Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-09-03/moiclient-byovd-rpc-uac-bypass-invoice-backdoor · 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.004Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1558Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets×1

Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable Pass the Ticket. Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC). Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting. Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1016.001System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery×1

Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using Ping, <code>tracert</code>, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial speed testing to confirm bandwidth.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1018Remote System Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1033System Owner/User Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1049System Network Connections Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network.

Evidence: 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1057Process Discovery×3

Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · ATT&CK page ↗

T1082System Information Discovery×5

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1217Browser Information Discovery×1

Adversaries may enumerate information about browsers to learn more about compromised environments. Data saved by browsers (such as bookmarks, accounts, and browsing history) may reveal a variety of personal information about users (e.g., banking sites, relationships/interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion×1

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497.003Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks×1

Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1518Software Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×2

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1210Exploitation of Remote Services×1

Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · ATT&CK page ↗

T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×1

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Evidence: 2026-09-27/wwahost-appx-webauthbroker-oauth-token-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1005Data from Local System×2

Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×2

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗

T1113Screen Capture×5

Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗

T1114.001Email Collection: Local Email Collection×1

Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files.

Evidence: 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1115Clipboard Data×3
T1119Automated Collection×1

Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1123Audio Capture×3

An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗

T1125Video Capture×2

An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗

T1185Browser Session Hijacking×1

Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.

Evidence: 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · ATT&CK page ↗

T1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility×2

Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1008Fallback Channels×1

Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×7

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-08-28/nimbus-manticore-twostroke-backdoor-europe · 2026-08-23/spectre-uat-10147-byovd-edr-callback-unlink · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit +1 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1

Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090Proxy×2

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Evidence: 2026-08-28/nimbus-manticore-twostroke-backdoor-europe · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090.001Proxy: Internal Proxy×1

Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090.002Proxy: External Proxy×1

Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.

Evidence: 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy×1

Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.

Evidence: 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102Web Service×2

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/kimsuky-seafood-invoice-lnk-backblaze-b2-c2 · 2026-07-31/unit42-autonomous-deepseek-hermes-netscaler-cve-2026-3055 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×4

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×7

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-10-04/chatgpt-custom-gpt-clickfix-sideloaded-in-memory-rat · 2026-09-30/star-blizzard-redflick-cosmicpulse-single-click-chain · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · 2026-08-12/lazarus-operation-dream-job-cve-2026-68820-afd-fudmodule · 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos +1 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×3

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/conference-phishing-rogue-root-ca-mitm-persistence · 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · 2026-08-15/mustang-panda-coolclient-signed-kernel-driver-rootkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1571Non-Standard Port×1

Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×2

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/nighteagle-apt-q-95-ghostcontainer-devtunnels-rdp2tcp-dcsync · 2026-08-28/nimbus-manticore-twostroke-backdoor-europe · ATT&CK page ↗

T1573Encrypted Channel×1

Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗

T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography×1

Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/tradertraitor-terraform-lockfile-nostr-dead-drop · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×2

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567.004Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration Over Webhook×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client without the need for the client to continuously poll the server. Many public and commercial services, such as Discord, Slack, and `webhook.site`, support the creation of webhook endpoints that can be used by other services, such as Github, Jira, or Trello. When changes happen in the linked services (such as pushing a repository update or modifying a ticket), these services will automatically post the data to the webhook endpoint for use by the consuming application.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1485Data Destruction×1

Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.

Evidence: 2026-09-16/chosen-brick-iran-telegram-c2-dissident-spyware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-08-17/akira-safe-mode-boot-edr-blinding-sonicwall-vpn · ATT&CK page ↗

T1499Endpoint Denial of Service×1

Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes and to support other malicious activities, including distraction, hacktivism, and extortion.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/cve-2026-47291-microsoft-june-patch-tuesday-http-sys-pre-aut · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Microsoft Windows (29)

2026-10-14 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-96951exploitedNATOA2

CVE-2026-96951, Windows Shell: a Mark of the Web bypass exploited as a zero-day, fixed in the 2026-10-13 cumulative updates and listed in CISA KEV (CVSS 8.8)

Microsoft's 2026-10-13 release fixes CVE-2026-96951, a Windows Shell security feature bypass that Microsoft marks as exploited and not publicly disclosed (Microsoft Security Response Center, 2026-10-13); CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog the same day, citing evidence of active exploitation (CISA, 2026-10-13). Microsoft says an attacker who exploits it could evade Mark of the Web defenses, by sending a crafted file by email or instant message or enticing the user to click a link or open an attachment (Microsoft Security Response Center, 2026-10-13). Microsoft's record gives the root cause as improper neutralization of special elements in a command (command injection, CWE-77) (Microsoft Security Response Center, 2026-10-13). Rapid7 describes the effect as Windows not showing the dialog that says it protected the PC, because the tag that triggers it is bypassed, calls this the second exploited Windows Shell zero-day this year, and says the flaw also affected Outlook.com, patched in a build several weeks ago (Rapid7, 2026-10-13). Rapid7 says Windows Server 2012 receives no patch while Server 2012 R2 does (Rapid7, 2026-10-13), and Microsoft's record lists no Windows Server 2012 product for this flaw (Microsoft Security Response Center, 2026-10-13).

Triage: a file a user created or received from a trusted local source also carries no tag; the discriminator is an internet origin (mail, chat or web download) together with the absence of the tag on the opened item.

An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could evade Mark of the Web (MOTW) defenses.

Microsoft Security Response Center 2026-10-13

Once again, the immediate prize for an attacker is a Mark of the Web (MOTW) bypass.

Windows Server 2012 doesn’t receive a patch, although Server 2012 R2 does.

Rapid7 2026-10-13

Builds on: Microsoft names two exploited Windows privilege-escalation zero-days, splitting the newest and…

vulnerability14 Oct 03:39Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-09-21 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

TraderTraitor (Jade Sleet) backdoors resurface on a non-cryptocurrency IT-services firm in a campaign that delivers malware through weaponized Terraform provider lockfiles, resolving C2 through a Nostr-relay dead drop

SentinelLabs hunted its telemetry for the FLATROOF (also known as macOS.Gaslight) and ROOFDECK macOS backdoors first disclosed in April 2026's USD 292 million LayerZero/KelpDAO cryptocurrency theft, and found an unrelated victim carrying the same implants: a small India-based IT-services provider with no cryptocurrency exposure, compromised through a single Apple Silicon MacBook belonging to a DevOps engineer (SentinelOne SentinelLabs, 2026-09-18). The lure follows DPRK's established "Contagious Interview" pattern: fake job-interview GitHub repositories themed as infrastructure-engineering coding challenges each carry a weaponized .terraform.lock.hcl pointing to a typosquatted, attacker-controlled Terraform provider registry impersonating HashiCorp's own naming. Because Terraform treats the lockfile's declared provider source as authoritative, running terraform init against the poisoned lockfile causes Terraform itself to download and execute the attacker's provider module in place of the genuine HashiCorp one. SentinelLabs cannot prove how this victim's backdoors were delivered: both were on disk by March 18, and the victim cloned a lure repository only on April 13 (SentinelOne SentinelLabs, 2026-09-18).

On the victim host, both backdoors sat dormant on disk from March 18 to March 29, 2026, then launched the moment the developer opened a specific Cursor IDE workspace: the Cursor process itself spawned both implants directly, which began beaconing to their command-and-control servers within two seconds, before FLATROOF stripped the macOS quarantine attribute from ROOFDECK and set its executable bit moments later, a Gatekeeper bypass. FLATROOF is a Rust ARM64 backdoor supporting shell, kill, upload and stop commands, paired with a Python data-harvesting module that pulls Chrome/Brave/Firefox/Safari data, Terminal history, installed-application lists, ps aux output, system_profiler output and a raw copy of login.keychain-db, exfiltrated via a hardcoded Telegram bot. ROOFDECK is the more capable second-stage implant: on first run it queries a public Nostr relay-status API plus a hardcoded relay list, searches Nostr relays for an operator profile matching a configured public key, and reads that profile's "website" field as its live command-and-control URL, a decentralized dead-drop resolver that survives takedown of any single C2 domain. A third stage later replaced both original implants and beaconed intermittently to a separate C2 until 2026-06-01, the last beacon in SentinelLabs' collected telemetry (SentinelOne SentinelLabs, 2026-09-18).

Triage: developers legitimately run terraform init against new or unfamiliar repositories constantly, so the command itself is not the signal: the discriminator is the lockfile's declared provider source pointing to a domain that is not registry.terraform.io or a known private registry the organization operates.

Unlike the previous high-profile victim, this target was a much smaller organization in the IT services industry.

When the victim runs terraform init with the weaponized lockfile in place, Terraform treats the custom provider as the source of truth, resulting in Terraform downloading and executing the malicious provider modules.

When found, it reads the website field of the profile and uses that as its C2 URL.

SentinelOne / SentinelLabs 2026-09-18

a trojanized Terraform provider that executes malicious code as soon as Terraform loads the provider

Zscaler ThreatLabz 2026-10-08
Correctionrun 2026-09-30T0639Z-auditprioritybodysourcing_notetitleheadlinesummaryevidence

SentinelLabs cannot prove how this victim's backdoors were delivered: both were on disk by March 18 and ran from March 29, while the victim cloned a lure repository only on April 13 (SentinelOne SentinelLabs, 2026-09-18). The weaponized Terraform lockfile is the campaign's documented delivery method for its lure repositories, not this victim's proven initial access (SentinelOne SentinelLabs, 2026-09-18).

Updaterun 2026-10-09T0255Z-intelsummarytechniquesentitiesaffected_productssourcesevidenceverificationsourcing_notebody

Zscaler ThreatLabz reports a July 2026 campaign that it suspects is TraderTraitor, citing substantial overlap in tactics and targeting but no code, infrastructure or cryptographic links sufficient for attribution with high confidence, in which a Go-built Terraform provider that poses as an AWS provider executes malicious code the moment Terraform loads the plugin: it writes a run-once marker in the temporary directory, downloads a Bash loader from a lookalike of a HashiCorp domain, starts it through a detached sh -c child and keeps behaving like a normal provider (Zscaler ThreatLabz, 2026-10-08). The loader runs on macOS, Linux and Windows with a Unix-like shell, picks a payload by operating system and CPU architecture and recovers an encrypted executable appended after a marker in a file named like a web font; on macOS it removes the quarantine attribute and applies an ad-hoc signature (Zscaler ThreatLabz, 2026-10-08). The delivered FLATROOF is a Rust backdoor with Telegram Bot API, GitHub-polling and HTTP-webhook command channels, persistence as a service on Linux, a zlogout entry on macOS and a registry entry on Windows, and Python stealers for browser data, cookies, keychain or Credential Manager entries, shell history and wallet-extension data; it drops ROOFDECK, which finds its server through a local configuration, then an RSA-signed Pastebin dead drop, with Nostr profile metadata only as the fallback, so its order of resolvers differs from the Nostr-first behaviour SentinelLabs describes above (Zscaler ThreatLabz, 2026-10-08). Zscaler does not know how the provider reached the victim, and notes that SentinelLabs independently reported related activity with weaponized Terraform projects (Zscaler ThreatLabz, 2026-10-08).

The telemetry that follows from the provider path is the Terraform provider plugin process making an HTTPS download from a host that is not the Terraform registry, writing a script to the temporary directory and starting it through sh -c; Zscaler advises restricting untrusted Terraform providers, verifying provider checksums and monitoring unexpected process activity (Zscaler ThreatLabz, 2026-10-08).

Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-auditsummarybody

Zscaler's loader selects FLATROOF payloads for macOS, Linux and Windows, and FLATROOF ultimately drops the ROOFDECK backdoor; Zscaler identifies Windows and macOS variants of ROOFDECK (Zscaler ThreatLabz, 2026-10-08). The 2026-10-09 note said both families were delivered on all three platforms.

Builds on: A Swiss research lab co-publishes the DPRK actor-tracking update: two nominally-espionage…

threat21 Sep 04:43Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-10-04 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

A malicious ChatGPT Custom GPT sends users to a Google Sites ClickFix page that installs a sideloaded, in-memory RAT

Huntress reports a campaign from late September 2026 in which, in some incidents, victims who searched Google for "chatgpt" got a sponsored result that opened an attacker-built Custom GPT on the genuine chatgpt.com domain. It answers any input with a fake service-availability notice pointing to a "backup domain" on Google Sites, which shows a CAPTCHA and tells the user to paste a command into a terminal. The command fetches a layered, obfuscated script from a host written as a single decimal number, so "rules and URL filters that look for a dotted IP address never see one"; the script installs a hidden MSI with msiexec and deletes itself (Huntress, 2026-09-28).

The MSI presents itself as a printer-configuration reader, launches a legitimately signed Canon application, which loads a patched Canon logging DLL whose imports pull in unsigned DLLs; one XOR-decodes shellcode hidden in a file posing as audio. The shellcode bypasses AMSI, unhooks ntdll, runs anti-VM checks and hosts the .NET runtime, then opens a custom encrypted archive holding a persistence script and the remote access trojan. The script re-creates an HKCU Run value every 150 seconds and a scheduled task of the same name every 875 seconds if either is removed. The RAT offers remote desktop, camera, microphone and audio capture, file search and follow-on payload execution, and resolves its command server through DNS-over-HTTPS to public resolvers, "so they never appear in local DNS logs" (Huntress, 2026-09-28).

Huntress has responded to at least 40 incidents from the Google Sites domain and confirmed two through a Custom GPT. OpenAI took the first GPT down as of 2026-09-25; on 2026-09-27 Huntress found a replacement that swaps the signed host for a Stardock application, hides the loader in a Microsoft NuGet package, strips Mark-of-the-Web from the MSI and pulls a second script that is freshly obfuscated on every request, while the RAT is byte-identical (Huntress, 2026-09-28).

Triage: the signed Canon and Stardock host binaries are legitimate (Huntress: do not block globally); the discriminator is the same binary launched by msiexec from a fake product folder under the user profile, beside a same-named Run value and scheduled task that return when deleted (Huntress, 2026-09-28).

has responded to at least 40 incidents stemming from the specific Google Sites domain involved in this attack, and confirmed that two of these incidents came through a Custom GPT instance

Most ClickFix chains we see are two or three hops: paste a command, download something, run it. This one has eight, and each hop exists to hide the next one.

rules and URL filters that look for a dotted IP address never see one

Detections tied to Canon or Stardock names will miss the next swap.

Kill the process first, then remove both.

Huntress 2026-09-28
threat04 Oct 04:39Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Huntress

Earlier coverage (26)

2026-09-30NOTABLENATOB2Star Blizzard's RedFlick: mass-mailed think-tank event invitations, compromised-website senders and a single-click scheduled-task chain to the CosmicPulse backdoorMicrosoft Threat Intelligence reports that the Russian state actor Star Blizzard has moved from purely targeted spear-phishing to at least 13 large-scale campaigns since January 2026, sent from accounts on compromised WordPress and cPanel websites and lured with closed-door think-tank event invitations. Its new RedFlick delivery chain needs one user interaction and installs the CosmicPulse Python backdoor through scheduled tasks; Microsoft counts over 100 affected organizations, primarily in the US and UK, and names governments and diplomatic and multilateral bodies among the targets.2026-09-27NOTABLENATOB2A sideloaded AppX package turns a Microsoft-signed web host into an OAuth token thief: the login dialog is genuine, the MFA is genuine, and the tokens go to the attackerHuntress documents a post-compromise token-theft technique with no phishing page and no lookalike domain. An AppX package whose manifest declares WindowsRuntimeAccess="all" gives attacker-hosted JavaScript the full Windows Runtime surface inside a Microsoft-signed host process, including the legacy WebAuthenticationBroker. The JavaScript opens a genuine login.microsoftonline.com dialog using Microsoft Office's own first-party client ID and an out-of-band redirect, so the authorization code returns to the attacker rather than a browser. The user authenticates and completes MFA normally; the resulting refresh token keeps minting access tokens from any network until it is revoked. The prerequisite is Developer Mode or an enterprise sideloading policy; after that no admin rights, UAC prompt, SmartScreen check or code signature is involved.2026-09-10HIGHexploitedupdatedNATOB1BlueMoon: six separate state-nexus actor clusters independently weaponize a shared Chrome V8 + Windows kernel zero-day chainProofpoint documents BlueMoon, an exploit kit chaining a Chrome V8 patch-gap zero-day (CVE-2026-85046) with a WebAssembly V8-sandbox escape (CVE-2026-87491) and a Windows kernel ALPC/WNF local-privilege-escalation flaw (CVE-2026-85880) into a single click-to-SYSTEM chain, independently adopted by TA412/APT31, three new China-nexus clusters, a fifth operator (UTA0560) and a sixth (UTA0565) Volexity later confirmed, targeting US, Vietnamese and Southeast Asian government, aerospace and manufacturing victims, with Government also named among NGO, Consulting, Finance, Mining and Commodity Trading targets by NCSC Switzerland. All three CVEs are patched, but the kit's persistence mechanisms (malicious browser extensions, DLL sideloading, scheduled tasks) survive an OS/browser patch untouched.2026-09-24ROUTINEupdatedNATOB2CLOSEDQUORUM: Cisco Talos documents what it calls, to its knowledge, the first publicly documented Windows implant that lets a panel of four commercial LLMs vote on its next action instead of a human operatorCisco Talos disclosed CLOSEDQUORUM on 2026-09-22, a Go-compiled Windows implant that queries up to four commercial LLM providers (DeepSeek, Qwen, Mistral, Google Gemini) each cycle and executes whichever action wins a plurality vote among their responses (credential theft, process injection, or persistence), with results relayed and stolen data exfiltrated through a Discord webhook. Talos found it via CAIRN, a new open-source toolkit it released the same day for tracking AI-integrated malware, and states plainly it has no confirmation of in-the-wild deployment; the public distribution build ships placeholder API keys.2026-09-22NOTABLENATOB1CVE-2026-66804, Windows Cross Device Service: a dangling COM registration reaches SYSTEM privilege escalation, and Google Project Zero publishes a general method to hunt for othersGoogle Project Zero researcher James Forshaw published a working local privilege-escalation exploit for CVE-2026-66804 (CVSS 7.8), fixed in Microsoft's August 2026 Patch Tuesday and not reported exploited in the wild. The bug is an incomplete fix of an earlier flaw (CVE-2026-50343, "Dark Elevator"): a machine-wide COM class registration points to a DLL under a world-writable ProgramData path, and Forshaw shows how COM's custom-marshaling mechanism lets an unprivileged user force a SYSTEM-context COM server to load a planted DLL from that path. He also publishes a general PowerShell method for finding other, still-undiscovered dangling COM registrations on any Windows estate.2026-09-21NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2A phishing chain reported against conference attendees installs a rogue root CA generated fresh on every host, plus a hosts-file/firewall local proxy able to fake clean VirusTotal results and to mint trusted certificates for any domain, surviving rebootA Huntress researcher was targeted post-conference by a fake CoinDesk executive persona over a legitimate Google Doc carrying a zero-click reconnaissance sidebar, in a chain that abused three code-signing certificates. The most novel component is a payload that hollows MsBuild.exe, generates its own self-signed certificate authority impersonating Google Trust Services, installs it into the system root store, and adds a hosts-file entry plus a firewall rule so a local proxy can answer the machine's VirusTotal lookups over fully validating HTTPS with fabricated results. The CA's private key sits on disk, so a trusted certificate can be minted for any domain.2026-09-21NOTABLEexploitedupdatedNATOB2NightEagle (APT-Q-95) pivots to Russian targets, tunnels RDP through Microsoft's own legitimate dev-tunnels service, and attempts DCSync against Active DirectoryKaspersky's Global Emergency Response Team documents NightEagle (also tracked as APT-Q-95), active since at least 2023 and previously focused on Asia, now confirmed against Russian organizations. The group deploys an Exchange backdoor (GhostContainer) that Kaspersky assesses, with high confidence, was delivered through VIEWSTATE injection and that carries a CVE-2020-0688 exploit component, abuses Microsoft's legitimate dev-tunnels service plus the rdp2tcp tool to expose RDP outward through legitimate services without opening additional suspicious ports, exploited CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) in one incident to create a local administrator, and attempted DCSync after obtaining a sufficiently privileged account.2026-09-16NOTABLEupdatedNATOA2CHOSEN BRICK; Iranian state cyber actors run Telegram-C2 Windows spyware against dissidents, activists and journalists, per joint NCSC-UK/FBI/AIVD advisoryNCSC-UK, the FBI and the Netherlands' AIVD jointly published a technical advisory on 2026-09-15 for CHOSEN BRICK, a Windows-only malware family Iranian state cyber actors have used since at least 2025 against dissidents, activists and journalists around the world, including in the UK, US and the Netherlands. Delivery is social-engineering-led over WhatsApp/Telegram. The malware persists via a registry Run key, adds Microsoft Defender exclusions to evade detection, and uses a per-victim unique Telegram bot for command and control, with data exfiltrated through Telegram or legitimate cloud object stores.2026-08-12NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2ShieldBreak, a public proof-of-concept defeats Microsoft's July fix for the RoguePlanet Defender flaw, claims 100% reliability where the original was a coin flip, and now covers Windows Server 2025Researcher Nightmare Eclipse published ShieldBreak on 2026-08-11/12, a proof-of-concept the researcher describes as a full bypass of the patch Microsoft shipped in July for RoguePlanet (CVE-2026-50656), the Microsoft Malware Protection Engine privilege-escalation flaw that yields a SYSTEM shell on fully updated Windows. Two properties make it worse than what it replaces: it is listed with a 100 percent success rate where RoguePlanet was an unreliable race, and it is listed as tested on Windows Server 2025 alongside Windows 11 25H2, where the June exploit did not run. Microsoft acknowledged it as CVE-2026-69414 and has since shipped a fix: Malware Protection Engine 1.1.26080.3 addresses it, with 1.26070.7 the last affected engine. On 2026-09-08 the same researcher published ShieldCrash, claiming that fix is incomplete under specific conditions; Microsoft has not confirmed that claim.2026-09-09HIGHexploitedupdatedNATOA1September 2026 Patch Tuesday: two actively exploited Windows privilege-escalation zero-days (CVE-2026-81963 Update Stack, CVE-2026-85880 ALPC)Microsoft's September 2026 Patch Tuesday (2026-09-08) flagged exactly two of its 966 fixed CVEs as exploited in the wild, both local privilege-escalation zero-days now on CISA KEV: CVE-2026-81963 in the Windows Update Stack, affecting the newest builds (Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11), and CVE-2026-85880 in Windows ALPC, affecting the legacy line (Windows 10 and Windows Server 2012 through 2022). Both raise a low-privilege foothold to SYSTEM, so a mixed estate needs both September cumulative updates to close the exposure.2026-09-03NOTABLENATOB2Kimsuky's seafood-invoice LNK campaign abuses Backblaze B2 cloud storage as C2 and exfiltration infrastructure, keyed by victim BIOS serial numberAhnLab ASEC attributes a malicious-LNK campaign to Kimsuky based on code and behavioural overlap with prior operations. The lure, a spearphishing LNK named for a seafood-purchase invoice, drops a decoy document while silently deploying a PowerShell/JScript persistence chain that authenticates to the Backblaze B2 API and uploads reconnaissance data to a per-victim path keyed on the BIOS serial number, then polls the same path for follow-up commands, using legitimate cloud storage as command-and-control rather than attacker-registered infrastructure.2026-09-03NOTABLENATOB2MoiClient: an invoice-themed backdoor chains an RPC-based UAC bypass with a vulnerable Lenovo PC Manager driver to kill security products and steal browser credentialsAhnLab ASEC documents MoiClient, a backdoor distributed as an invoice-themed .vhdx archive that DLL-sideloads via a repackaged SumatraPDF viewer. Once running, it bypasses UAC through an RPC technique against the AppInfo Service resembling Google Project Zero's 2019 disclosure, then drops a vulnerable Lenovo PC Manager kernel driver (BootRepair.sys) to terminate Defender, Kaspersky, Bitdefender and four other security products, before deploying an in-memory "MoiXD Stealer" that harvests browser-stored credentials.2026-08-28NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2CNCMachineRMS, an undocumented remote-access trojan delivered through a four-stage BabaDeda loader chain that smuggles shellcode via a benign Windows date-formatting APILevelBlue SpiderLabs documents CNCMachineRMS, a previously undocumented 1.14 MB x64 remote- access trojan delivered through a four-stage BabaDeda loader chain. A ClickFix-style lure launches a legitimately signed IBM SPSS IDE executable, abusing its scripting engine to load a malicious DLL; the final stage smuggles shellcode into execution via EnumTimeFormatsEx, a benign date-formatting Windows API that hides the injection point from analysts watching conventional process-injection calls.2026-08-28HIGHNATOB2Nimbus Manticore (Iranian IRGC-affiliated APT, aka Tortoiseshell/UNC1549/Smoke Sandstorm/Mirage Kitten) deploys a third 2026 toolset refresh (a TWOSTROKE-like backdoor abusing DLL search-order hijacking, paired with a reverse SSH tunneler) with confirmed expansion into the UK, France, Albania and BelarusGroup-IB documents new infrastructure and a new toolset for Nimbus Manticore, the Iranian IRGC-affiliated actor tracked under multiple aliases. A reverse SSH tunneler establishes outbound connections over port 443 to give operators interactive access into compromised networks; a TWOSTROKE-family C++ backdoor masquerades as the Windows Terminal Server SDK DLL for search-order hijacking. Infrastructure analysis indicates targeting expanded specifically into the UK, France, Albania and Belarus, alongside continued Middle Eastern activity, the actor's third distinct toolset refresh reported in roughly seven months.2026-08-23HIGHupdatedNATOB2SPECTRE unlinks EDR's kernel callbacks one at a time using a two-driver BYOVD toolkit and an offset table for thirteen Windows builds, and its Linux half hides through ftrace rather than the syscall tableCisco Talos published an analysis on 2026-08-20 of SPECTRE, a cross-platform C backdoor deployed by a Chinese-speaking intrusion actor it tracks as UAT-10147 against compromised IIS and Linux web servers. The Windows variant loads one of two long-known vulnerable drivers as a transient kernel service, locates the kernel image through a documented information call, and uses a hardcoded per-build offset table covering thirteen Windows versions to unlink registered process-creation, thread-creation and image-load notification callbacks from their linked lists, blinding callback-dependent endpoint security products for the remainder of the session. Credential access deliberately avoids LSASS entirely, and the C2 configuration is held in an alternate data stream on the hosts file so it can be rotated without recompiling. The Linux variant persists as a systemd unit ordered ahead of security tooling and hides through the kernel's ftrace debugging interface rather than by patching the syscall table.2026-08-23HIGHNATOB2Windows Defender ships its own kernel write primitive: BTR.sys, the signed boot-time remediation driver, takes an encrypted job list from an alternate data stream and will delete or create any file or registry value asked of itCheck Point Research published an analysis on 2026-08-20 showing that BTR.sys, the Microsoft-signed "Boot Time Removal Tool" driver Windows Defender extracts from MpEngine.dll to finish remediation actions that need a reboot, exposes a general-purpose kernel-mode file and registry primitive once its transaction format is understood. There is no memory corruption and no vulnerability: the driver reads an RC4-encrypted job list from an NTFS alternate data stream on its own file and executes six action types, two of which amount to arbitrary file write and arbitrary registry write. Because the driver is a functionally required Defender component carrying a genuine signature, it cannot be added to the vulnerable-driver blocklist or blocked by WDAC without breaking Defender's own remediation, and because the tool extracts it from the local MpEngine.dll there is no third-party binary for a blocklist to key on. The precondition is pre-existing administrative privilege, which is why MSRC declined to service it; Check Point reports no evidence of real-world abuse.2026-08-15NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2Mustang Panda's CoolClient backdoor gains a kernel driver signed with a 2013 certificate that expired in 2014, and it hides the malware's own C2 traffic by hooking the driver Windows uses to report network stateKaspersky's GReAT team published on 2026-08-14 a new CoolClient backdoor variant, attributed to the actor it tracks as HoneyMyte and also known as Mustang Panda, that installs a signed kernel-mode driver as a Windows service. The driver hides processes, files, registry keys and (distinctively) strips the implant's own C2 addresses from the network information Windows returns to user-mode tools. It is deployed only where the implant already holds Service Control Manager access and SeTcbPrivilege, and follows a PlugX foothold.2026-07-31HIGHexploitedupdatedNATOB2Unit 42 recovers a live autonomous-AI attack operation after it exposed its own home directory, the confirmed compromises came from manual exploitation of Citrix NetScaler (CVE-2026-3055) and Marimo notebooks, not the agentPalo Alto Unit 42 obtained full visibility into a Chinese-speaking operator's offensive tooling after the operator's own agent framework started an HTTP file server from its home directory, exposing tool configurations, API keys, exploit scripts, target lists and session logs. The operator ran DeepSeek behind the open-source Hermes Agent for fully autonomous target enumeration and exploitation against seven CVEs and more than 460 targets, and every autonomous exploitation attempt failed, defeated only by target-side configuration. The confirmed compromises came from the operator's own manual work: memory exfiltration from three Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway targets (CVE-2026-3055), searched for session cookies and including multi-day targeting of a Malaysian government entity, and command execution on 11 Marimo notebook endpoints. That CVE is KEV-listed and was already being exploited by an unrelated cluster months earlier.2026-08-17HIGHNATOB2Akira blinds EDR by rebooting a victim host into Safe Mode with Networking, the operator's first observed use of the technique, and the stripped-down boot starved its own encryptorHuntress documents the first Akira intrusion it has observed using a Safe Mode with Networking reboot to take endpoint defences offline. After a credential spray resolved into a successful login on a SonicWall SSL VPN with no multi-factor authentication, the operator wrote its own AnyDesk service into the Safe Mode service allow-list, forced a reboot through msconfig, and worked from 06:29 UTC until 08:10 UTC on a host where neither the EDR agent nor Microsoft Defender real-time protection could start. The encryptor then failed (Safe Mode's constrained virtual memory starved the process tree) but Active Directory dumps and archived file shares had already left, so the intrusion stayed extortion-viable, and Huntress is explicit that the failure was the attacker's own memory-budget mistake rather than a defence to rely on.2026-07-29NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2LegacyHive: a public Windows technique that redirects a profile's Local AppData into the NT Object Manager namespace via offline hive edits, reproduced on fully patched systemsLevelBlue SpiderLabs published a full analysis on 2026-07-27 of LegacyHive, the latest public Windows proof-of-concept from the Nightmare Eclipse disclosure persona. It is not a software vulnerability: the chain edits a helper account's ntuser.dat offline through Microsoft's own Registry Offline API, repoints the User Shell Folders Local AppData value into an attacker-created NT Object Manager namespace, uses a batch opportunistic lock on UsrClass.dat to pause until profile initialisation reaches the right moment, then forces a profile load via CreateProcessWithLogonW with LOGON_WITH_PROFILE, aliasing into a third account's profile data without ever holding that account's credentials. LevelBlue reproduced the whole chain on fully patched Windows with July 2026 updates installed and reports no Microsoft mitigation for this class of abuse. It is strictly post-compromise: the attacker needs a low-privileged session plus a separate helper account's credentials.2026-08-12HIGHexploitedNATOB1Lazarus burned a Windows AFD.sys zero-day (CVE-2026-68820) on European defence targets, FudModule v3.1 blinds the endpoint, and the C2 is other people's Roundcube and WordPress serversCheck Point Research published the analysis behind CVE-2026-68820 on 2026-08-11, the sole exploitation-detected flaw in Microsoft's August Patch Tuesday: a use-after-free race in the Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock that a DPRK-linked Lazarus intrusion used to reach SYSTEM and load the FudModule v3.1 kernel rootkit. The delivery is a fake defence-sector job offer leading to a trojanised PDF viewer or a DLL-sideloading bundle; the command-and-control runs on compromised Roundcube and WordPress servers, one of them a French victim organisation later reused to phish others. Check Point records successful targeting in France and Germany, and CISA added the CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog the same day.2026-08-07NOTABLENATOB2A fake Zoom installer stages Overlord RAT through the first .NET macOS downloader Jamf has observed, PE-format DLLs bundled inside a Mach-O binaryJamf Threat Labs analysed a counterfeit Zoom installer, a macOS ARM64 Mach-O binary named ZoomMeetings built as a self-contained .NET 10 single-file application, the first case Jamf has observed of .NET rather than Go or Rust used as a macOS downloader. Because .NET assemblies keep the Windows PE container for their bytecode even inside a Mach-O wrapper, one codebase targets both platforms; static analysis pulled 34 embedded PE/DLL files, one carrying Zoom product metadata copied from the legitimate installer. The stage-two payload is a Garble-obfuscated Go build of the open-source Overlord framework, reached over an encrypted WebSocket.2026-07-28NOTABLENATOB2MedusaHVNC: a malware-as-a-service RAT that drives the victim's own logged-in browser on an invisible second Windows desktopBlackFog analysed MedusaHVNC (2026-07-27), a Windows remote-access trojan sold as malware-as-a-service whose hidden-VNC module opens Chrome, Edge or Firefox on a separate, invisible Windows desktop using the victim's existing browser profile, so the operator drives live, already-authenticated sessions from the victim's own machine while the user sees nothing. The five-stage chain runs from an obfuscated JScript launcher through an AutoIt interpreter that XOR-decrypts a loader and injects it into charmap.exe, then unpacks the final payload behind repeating-XOR and ChaCha20 layers. Because the session originates from the real device with the real profile, controls that key on device fingerprint and session continuity see nothing unusual.2026-07-26NOTABLEexploitedNATOB1An exposed WebDAV delivery lab shows industrialised .url/.lnk lure testing against CVE-2025-33053, with LLM-written tooling and ClickFix pagesRapid7 pivoted from a single WebDAV rundll32 alert to an exposed, fully operational malware delivery lab holding 1,048 artifacts organised like a development workspace: 453 shortcut-based launchers, 236 filename-spoofing tests, 146 trusted-Windows-tool execution tests, encrypted droppers, ClickFix pages impersonating Cloudflare, Adobe and Discord, and LLM-generated operator documentation. The operator was systematically testing CVE-2025-33053 (a Windows shortcut working-directory resolution flaw that makes a legitimate binary load an attacker-supplied file from a remote WebDAV share) and its own notes claim the technique raises no SmartScreen or Mark-of-the-Web prompt.2026-06-10HIGHupdatedCVE-2026-47291, Microsoft June Patch Tuesday: HTTP.sys pre-auth RCE (CVSS 9.8) headlines the largest-ever release (198 CVEs)June Patch Tuesday is the largest ever (198 CVEs); headline is an HTTP.sys pre-auth RCE (CVE-2026-47291, CVSS 9.8); separately Chrome patched an in-the-wild V8 zero-day (CVE-2026-11645, now CISA KEV). (Rapid7, 2026-06-09; Chrome, 2026-06-08).2026-05-08NOTABLEexploitedupdatedNATOA1CVE-2026-32202 in Windows Shell: an incomplete fix for an APT28-exploited LNK flaw leaks NTLM hashes when a folder is opened, exploited and re-released in July (CVSS 4.3)CVE-2026-32202 is left over from Microsoft's February fix for CVE-2026-21510, which APT28 exploited with crafted LNK files: Windows Explorer still opens an SMB connection to an attacker server when it renders the folder holding the shortcut, sending the user's Net-NTLMv2 hash for relay or cracking. Microsoft patched it on 2026-04-14, marked it exploited later and re-released the fix on 2026-07-28, recommending the July 2026 updates. CISA listed it on 2026-04-28. No source ties this CVE's exploitation to APT28 itself.

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats18
  • Vulns6
  • Research3
  • Deep dive2

Source distribution

  • msrc.microsoft.com12 (14%)
  • huntress.com5 (6%)
  • thehackernews.com5 (6%)
  • cisa.gov4 (5%)
  • rapid7.com4 (5%)
  • levelblue.com3 (4%)
  • securelist.com3 (4%)
  • 0patch.com2 (2%)
  • other45 (54%)
All cited sources (83)