2026-09-30HIGHexploitedApple patches a CoreGraphics zero-day exploited against targeted iPhone users; a crafted file can lead to code execution
Apple macOS
product · product:apple-macos single-source
Coverage
6
first 2026-07-14 → last 2026-10-11
Latest activity
2026-10-02
Apple patches a CoreGraphics zero-day exploited against targeted iPhone users; a crafted file can lead to…
Peak priority
high
2 high · 4 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, technology, finance · regions: europe
Sources cited
24
14 hosts
Action items (6)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Apple macOS, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Push iOS and iPadOS 26.7.1, macOS Tahoe 26.7.1 and macOS Sequoia 15.8.1 through device management now, starting with the devices of staff who could be individually targeted; Apple describes the exploitation only on iOS before iOS 27.2026-09-30CVE-2026-86950
- Patch every Mac to macOS 26.6.1 / 15.7.9 / 14.8.9 and turn Screen Sharing off wherever it is not actively needed; close port 5900 at the network edge and confirm no host still answers Screen Sharing from the internet. Re-check hosted or leased bare-metal Macs after provisioning, which Huntress reports being built from vulnerable images.2026-08-08CVE-2026-65400
- Run a compromise assessment on every Mac that answered Screen Sharing from the internet before it was patched: look for an unexpected long-running high-CPU process, because the confirmed outcome on exploited hosts was root plus a planted cryptocurrency miner.2026-08-08CVE-2026-65400
- Roll macOS endpoints to 26.4 or later where the estate allows it: that release adds a native warning when a user pastes a potentially malicious command into Terminal, which is the delivery step this campaign depends on and the only control that engages before execution.2026-08-07Microsoft documents the cloaking layer in front of…
- Add a detection on the2026-08-07Microsoft documents the cloaking layer in front of…
file<word><word>domain-generation pattern in DNS and proxy telemetry rather than a blocklist of the individual hostnames, Microsoft names this as the pivot to hunt and counted more than 250 front-end domains in one tracking window.
1 older action item
- Sweep the macOS fleet for a bundle identifier com.apple.crashreporter executing from a hidden path (/private/tmp/.CrashReporter or ~/Library/Caches) with an ad-hoc (rather than Apple) signature, and for a LaunchAgent whose label impersonates an Apple service; Apple's genuine CrashReporter never runs from those paths.2026-07-14CrashStealer: notarized-dropper macOS stealer…
Defender insights
What each entry about Apple macOS tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · triage · detection
Triage
Triage
Triage
Triage
Story timeline
- 2026-09-30CVE-2026-86950, Apple iOS, iPadOS and macOS CoreGraphics: out-of-bounds write exploited in an extremely sophisticated attack on targeted iOS users, CISA KEV-listed (CVSS 8.8)
- 2026-08-08CVE-2026-65400, macOS Screen Sharing lets a network attacker authenticate without valid credentials, the second severe defect in the same daemon in two releases
- 2026-08-07The macOS ClickFix chain now qualifies visitors server-side before showing the lure, with anti-analysis probes that detect a console rather than a sandbox
- 2026-08-07A fake Zoom installer stages Overlord RAT through the first .NET macOS downloader Jamf has observed, PE-format DLLs bundled inside a Mach-O binary
- 2026-07-19ClickLock Stealer, a macOS ClickFix infostealer that force-kills every visible app until the victim types their login password
- 2026-07-14CrashStealer, a native-C++ macOS infostealer using a notarized dropper and local dscl password validation to raid keychain, browsers and wallets
Hunting pivots
CVEs (exploited first)
Releases covered
Apple macOS ×5Apple macOS SequoiaApple macOS SonomaApple macOS Tahoe
ATT&CK techniques (42 across 14 tactics)
42 techniques observed across 6 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Resource DevelopmentStage Capabilities: Drive-by Target
- Initial AccessDrive-by Compromise · Exploit Public-Facing Application
- ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Cron · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell · Exploitation for Client Execution · User Execution: Malicious File · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Cron · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon · Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification
- Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Cron · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon · Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Indicator Removal: Timestomp · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks · Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories · Debugger Evasion
- Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Gatekeeper Bypass · Disable or Modify Tools
- Credential AccessInput Capture: Keylogging · Input Capture: GUI Input Capture · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain · Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- DiscoveryVirtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks · Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery · Debugger Evasion
- Lateral MovementRemote Services: VNC
- CollectionInput Capture: Keylogging · Input Capture: GUI Input Capture · Screen Capture · Automated Collection · Audio Capture · Video Capture · Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
- Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Web Service · Ingress Tool Transfer · Non-Standard Port · Encrypted Channel
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel · Exfiltration Over Web Service
- ImpactResource Hijacking
Resource Development TA0042
T1608.004Stage Capabilities: Drive-by Target×1
Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in Drive-by Compromise. In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as Application Access Token. Prior to Drive-by Compromise, adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired (Acquire Infrastructure) or previously compromised (Compromise Infrastructure).
Evidence: 2026-08-07/macos-clickfix-server-side-fingerprinting-gate-amos · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1189Drive-by Compromise×1
Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:
Evidence: 2026-08-07/macos-clickfix-server-side-fingerprinting-gate-amos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/cve-2026-65400-macos-screen-sharing-auth-state-bypass · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1053.003Scheduled Task/Job: Cron×1
Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×3
Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/macos-clickfix-server-side-fingerprinting-gate-amos · 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1203Exploitation for Client Execution×1
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.
Evidence: 2026-09-30/cve-2026-86950-apple-coregraphics-zero-day-kev · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×2
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×2
An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/macos-clickfix-server-side-fingerprinting-gate-amos · 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1053.003Scheduled Task/Job: Cron×1
Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×3
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.004Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon×1
Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/cve-2026-65400-macos-screen-sharing-auth-state-bypass · ATT&CK page ↗
T1546.004Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification×2
Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User Unix Shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home directory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/cve-2026-65400-macos-screen-sharing-auth-state-bypass · 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1053.003Scheduled Task/Job: Cron×1
Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×3
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.004Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon×1
Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/cve-2026-65400-macos-screen-sharing-auth-state-bypass · ATT&CK page ↗
T1546.004Event Triggered Execution: Unix Shell Configuration Modification×2
Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User Unix Shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home directory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/cve-2026-65400-macos-screen-sharing-auth-state-bypass · 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×3
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/macos-clickfix-server-side-fingerprinting-gate-amos · 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1027.013Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File×1
Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×2
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1070.006Indicator Removal: Timestomp×2
Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1
Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/macos-clickfix-server-side-fingerprinting-gate-amos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1564.001Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories×2
Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1622Debugger Evasion×1
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.
Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1553.001Subvert Trust Controls: Gatekeeper Bypass×1
Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple’s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed on a host. Gatekeeper was built on top of File Quarantine in Snow Leopard (10.6, 2009) and has grown to include Code Signing, security policy compliance, Notarization, and more. Gatekeeper also treats applications running for the first time differently than reopened applications.
Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1
Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1056.002Input Capture: GUI Input Capture×1
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×2
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/macos-clickfix-server-side-fingerprinting-gate-amos · 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.001Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain×2
Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service.
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×3
Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/macos-clickfix-server-side-fingerprinting-gate-amos · 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/macos-clickfix-server-side-fingerprinting-gate-amos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1622Debugger Evasion×1
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.
Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1021.005Remote Services: VNC×1
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/cve-2026-65400-macos-screen-sharing-auth-state-bypass · ATT&CK page ↗
Collection TA0009
T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1056.002Input Capture: GUI Input Capture×1
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1113Screen Capture×1
Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1119Automated Collection×1
Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals.
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1123Audio Capture×1
An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1125Video Capture×1
An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility×1
Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.
Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1102Web Service×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×4
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-08-07/macos-clickfix-server-side-fingerprinting-gate-amos · 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1571Non-Standard Port×1
Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1573Encrypted Channel×1
Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗
T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.
Evidence: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1496Resource Hijacking×1
Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/cve-2026-65400-macos-screen-sharing-auth-state-bypass · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Apple macOS (6)
Earlier coverage (3)
A fake Zoom installer stages Overlord RAT through the first .NET macOS downloader Jamf has observed, PE-format DLLs bundled inside a Mach-O binaryJamf Threat Labs analysed a counterfeit Zoom installer, a macOS ARM64 Mach-O binary named ZoomMeetings built as a self-contained .NET 10 single-file application, the first case Jamf has observed of .NET rather than Go or Rust used as a macOS downloader. Because .NET assemblies keep the Windows PE container for their bytecode even inside a Mach-O wrapper, one codebase targets both platforms; static analysis pulled 34 embedded PE/DLL files, one carrying Zoom product metadata copied from the legitimate installer. The stage-two payload is a Garble-obfuscated Go build of the open-source Overlord framework, reached over an encrypted WebSocket.ClickLock Stealer, a macOS ClickFix infostealer that force-kills every visible app until the victim types their login passwordGroup-IB has documented ClickLock Stealer, a previously undetected modular macOS infostealer delivered via ClickFix social engineering (paste-into-Terminal) that needs no exploit and no elevated privilege. Its signature move: on next login, a module kills every visible application every ~210 ms, leaving only a fake password dialog on screen (for up to ~83 hours) until the victim types their macOS password (validated locally so only the correct one is exfiltrated); a parallel module uses the same coercion to force a real Keychain-authorization dialog and steal Chrome's Safe Storage key. More than 50% of the ~100 identified victims across 33 countries are in Europe, making this directly relevant to any Swiss or European organization issuing macOS endpoints.CrashStealer, a native-C++ macOS infostealer using a notarized dropper and local dscl password validation to raid keychain, browsers and walletsJamf Threat Labs details CrashStealer, a native-C++ macOS infostealer (distinct from AMOS/MacSync) that reached in-the-wild deployment by early July 2026. A signed, Apple-notarized "Werkbit Setup" dropper clears Gatekeeper and stages an ad-hoc-signed payload impersonating Apple's CrashReporter from a hidden /private/tmp path; the payload prompts for the login password, validates it locally with dscl -authonly, unlocks the keychain, profiles installed EDR tooling, and exfiltrates browser, wallet-extension and keychain data AES-GCM-encrypted over libcurl. Any organisation with a macOS fleet should hunt for the staging artifacts.
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- MacSync×2
- Apple iOS×1
- Apple iOS/iPadOS/macOS CoreGraphics out-of-bounds write exploited in a targeted attack on iOS before iOS 27, fixed in 26.7.1 / Tahoe 26.7.1 / Sequoia 15.8.1, CISA KEV 2026-09-29×1
- Apple iPadOS×1
- Apple macOS Screen Sharing (screensharingd) pre-authentication improper authentication, CVSS 7.1, fixed in macOS Tahoe 26.6.1, Sequoia 15.7.9 and Sonoma 14.8.9. NCSC-NL advisory NCSC-2026-0280 revision 1.0.1 (2026-08-12) records active abuse observed on multiple systems with port 5900 reachable from the internet, root access obtained in all of them and a Monero cryptocurrency miner planted.×1
- ClickFix macOS expansion×1
- ClickLock Stealer×1
- Contagious Interview×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- support.apple.com6 (25%)
- bleepingcomputer.com3 (12%)
- advisories.ncsc.nl2 (8%)
- jamf.com2 (8%)
- thehackernews.com2 (8%)
- blog.calif.io1 (4%)
- cisa.gov1 (4%)
- euvd.enisa.europa.eu1 (4%)
- other6 (25%)
All cited sources (24)
- advisories.ncsc.nlNCSC-NL (Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum)https://advisories.ncsc.nl/2026/ncsc-2026-0280.html
- advisories.ncsc.nlNCSC-NLhttps://advisories.ncsc.nl/advisory?id=NCSC-2026-0280
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploit-macos-screen-sharing-flaw-to-deploy-monero-miner/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-clicklock-macos-malware-traps-users-into-revealing-login-password/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-crashstealer-malware-poses-as-apple-crash-reporting-tool/
- blog.calif.ioCalifhttps://blog.calif.io/p/no-country-for-old-passwords
- cisa.govCISA KEV cataloghttps://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
- euvd.enisa.europa.euENISA EU Vulnerability Databasehttps://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-88445
- forbes.comForbeshttps://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2026/07/18/app-killing-mac-malware-triggers-83-hour-password-entry-loop/
- group-ib.comGroup-IB Threat Intelligencehttps://www.group-ib.com/blog/clicklock-stealer-macos-malware/
- huntress.comHuntresshttps://www.huntress.com/blog/macos-screen-sharing-rce-patched
- jamf.comJamf Threat Labshttps://www.jamf.com/blog/crashstealer-macos-infostealer-analysis/
- jamf.comJamf Threat Labshttps://www.jamf.com/blog/fake-zoom-installer-delivers-overlord-rat-macos/
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Threat Intelligencehttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/08/05/macos-clickfix-campaign-learned-hide/
- reverse.put.asfG! (reverse.put.as)https://reverse.put.as/2026/07/29/its-a-pre-auth-stupid/
- securityweek.comSecurityWeekhttps://www.securityweek.com/apple-patches-meta-reported-zero-day-linked-to-extremely-sophisticated-attack/
- support.apple.comApplehttps://support.apple.com/en-us/148170
- support.apple.comApplehttps://support.apple.com/en-us/148171
- support.apple.comApplehttps://support.apple.com/en-us/148172
- support.apple.comApple Security (iOS 26.7.1 and iPadOS 26.7.1)https://support.apple.com/en-us/149226
- support.apple.comApple Security (macOS Tahoe 26.7.1)https://support.apple.com/en-us/149228
- support.apple.comApple Security (macOS Sequoia 15.8.1)https://support.apple.com/en-us/149229
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/09/apple-patches-coregraphics-flaw.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/10/apple-coregraphics-poc-emerges-as.html