2026-08-07NOTABLEmacOS malware picks up .NET: one downloader codebase now targets Mac and Windows, and the Go payload is Garble-obfuscated to break static analysis
Overlord
tool · tool:overlord-rat single-source
Open-source Go remote-access framework, publicly hosted, abused as a cross-platform RAT, keylogging, screen/audio/webcam capture, filesystem access and arbitrary script execution, with optional LaunchAgent persistence and encrypted-WebSocket C2. Jamf Threat Labs observed it staged as a Garble-obfuscated Go build by the first .NET-based macOS downloader it has recorded, delivered inside a counterfeit Zoom installer (2026-08-06). Jamf records two separate similarity observations and draws no conclusion from either: Overlord was also used by UNK_DeadDrop, a cluster Proofpoint assesses as likely North Korean, with no direct overlap identified to the fake-Zoom campaign; and this variant's LaunchAgent label and plist name match FlexibleFerret, a DPRK-attributed macOS family tied to the Contagious Interview campaign per SentinelOne (February 2025). Jamf does not attribute this malware to a specific threat actor.
Coverage
2
1 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-06-16 → last 2026-08-07
Latest activity
2026-08-07
macOS malware picks up .NET: one downloader codebase now targets Mac and Windows, and the Go payload is…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, public-sector
Sources cited
3
3 hosts
2026-06-162 appearances2026-08-07
Defender insights
What each entry about Overlord tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage
Story timeline
Every entry that names Overlord, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-08-07A fake Zoom installer stages Overlord RAT through the first .NET macOS downloader Jamf has observed, PE-format DLLs bundled inside a Mach-O binary
- 2026-06-16DPRK UNK_DeadDrop weaponises VS Code / Cursor auto-run to hit developers, including EU targets
ATT&CK techniques (14 across 7 tactics)
14 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell · User Execution: Malicious File
- PersistenceCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent
- Privilege EscalationCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- Credential AccessInput Capture: Keylogging
- CollectionInput Capture: Keylogging · Screen Capture · Audio Capture · Video Capture
- Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Ingress Tool Transfer · Non-Standard Port · Encrypted Channel
Execution TA0002
T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×1
Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1027.013Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File×1
Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
Collection TA0009
T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1113Screen Capture×1
Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1123Audio Capture×1
An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1125Video Capture×1
An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1571Non-Standard Port×1
Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
T1573Encrypted Channel×1
Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/fake-zoom-dotnet-downloader-overlord-rat-macos · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Overlord (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- jamf.com1 (33%)
- proofpoint.com1 (33%)
- thehackernews.com1 (33%)
All cited sources (3)
- jamf.comJamf Threat Labshttps://www.jamf.com/blog/fake-zoom-installer-delivers-overlord-rat-macos/
- proofpoint.comProofpointhttps://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/dont-fear-repo-unkdeaddrop-phishing-campaign-targets-developers-steal
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/06/north-korean-hackers-are-turning.html