2026-05-10NOTABLEMicrosoft: macOS infostealer campaign moves from disk images to ClickFix Terminal-paste lures for MacSync, SHub and AMOS
MacSync
malware · malware:macsync single-source
Six-stage macOS infostealer and remote-access tool analysed by Huntress, delivered through a sponsored search result leading to a publicly shared conversation page on the genuine claude.ai domain that instructs the victim to paste a curl one-liner into Terminal. Stages run a polymorphic zsh loader in memory, a server-side AppleScript stealer, a Mach-O remote-access tool persisting via a launch agent, a helper for the screen-recording permission and a set of wallet-application trojans; collection covers browser cookies and logins, keychain secrets, Telegram sessions, SSH and cloud keys (Huntress, 2026-08-17).
Coverage
3
1 about it · 2 mentions · first 2026-05-10 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-10
Microsoft: macOS infostealer campaign moves from disk images to ClickFix Terminal-paste lures for MacSync…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, finance
Sources cited
5
4 hosts
Defender insights
What each entry about MacSync tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · detection
Story timeline
Every entry that names MacSync, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-08-07The macOS ClickFix chain now qualifies visitors server-side before showing the lure, with anti-analysis probes that detect a console rather than a sandbox
- 2026-07-14CrashStealer, a native-C++ macOS infostealer using a notarized dropper and local dscl password validation to raid keychain, browsers and wallets
- 2026-05-10macOS infostealer campaign shifts to ClickFix Terminal commands to deliver MacSync, SHub Stealer and AMOS
ATT&CK techniques (24 across 10 tactics)
24 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- PersistenceCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon · Compromise Host Software Binary
- Privilege EscalationCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon
- StealthMasquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
- Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Gatekeeper Bypass
- Credential AccessInput Capture: GUI Input Capture · Steal Web Session Cookie · Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain · Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- DiscoverySystem Information Discovery · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks · System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- CollectionData from Local System · Input Capture: GUI Input Capture · Data Staged: Local Data Staging · Archive Collected Data
- Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Ingress Tool Transfer
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel
Execution TA0002
T1059.002Command and Scripting Interpreter: AppleScript×1
Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents. These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×1
Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×1
An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.004Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon×1
Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1554Compromise Host Software Binary×1
Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.004Create or Modify System Process: Launch Daemon×1
Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1
Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1553.001Subvert Trust Controls: Gatekeeper Bypass×1
Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple’s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed on a host. Gatekeeper was built on top of File Quarantine in Snow Leopard (10.6, 2009) and has grown to include Code Signing, security policy compliance, Notarization, and more. Gatekeeper also treats applications running for the first time differently than reopened applications.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1056.002Input Capture: GUI Input Capture×1
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×1
An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.001Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain×1
Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1
Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1082System Information Discovery×1
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1614.001System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Collection TA0009
T1005Data from Local System×1
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1056.002Input Capture: GUI Input Capture×1
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1074.001Data Staged: Local Data Staging×1
Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1560Archive Collected Data×1
An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Evidence: 2026-05-10/clickfix-campaign-expands-to-macos-macsync-shub-stealer-and · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about MacSync (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- microsoft.com2 (40%)
- bleepingcomputer.com1 (20%)
- jamf.com1 (20%)
- malwarebytes.com1 (20%)
All cited sources (5)
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-crashstealer-malware-poses-as-apple-crash-reporting-tool/
- jamf.comJamf Threat Labshttps://www.jamf.com/blog/crashstealer-macos-infostealer-analysis/
- malwarebytes.comMalwarebyteshttps://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/03/fake-cleanmymac-site-installs-shub-stealer-and-backdoors-crypto-wallets
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Security Bloghttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/06/clickfix-campaign-uses-fake-macos-utilities-lures-deliver-infostealers/
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Threat Intelligencehttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/08/05/macos-clickfix-campaign-learned-hide/