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CrashStealer

tool · tool:crashstealer

Native-C++ macOS infostealer impersonating Apple's CrashReporter (bundle id com.apple.crashreporter), delivered via a signed and Apple-notarized 'Werkbit Setup' dropper that stages an ad-hoc-signed payload from a hidden /private/tmp path; validates the victim's login password locally with dscl -authonly before harvesting keychain, browser, wallet-extension and password-manager data, AES-GCM-encrypted and exfiltrated over libcurl. Tracked by Jamf Threat Labs as a distinct family from AMOS/MacSync/Phexia (Jamf Threat Labs, 2026-07-13).

Coverage timeline
2
first 2026-07-14 → last 2026-07-19
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 notable
Sources cited
5
5 hosts
Sections touched
2
active-threats, legacy-strategic
Co-occurring entities
2
see Related entities below
ATT&CK techniques
18
pinned v19.2 · see below
2026-07-142 appearances2026-07-19

ATT&CK techniques

18 techniques observed across 2 entries — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-07-19/weekly-w29-clickfix-crimeware-macos-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204User Execution×1

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.

Evidence: 2026-07-19/weekly-w29-clickfix-crimeware-macos-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.006Indicator Removal: Timestomp×1

Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.001Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories×1

Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1622Debugger Evasion×1

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1553.001Subvert Trust Controls: Gatekeeper Bypass×1

Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple’s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed on a host. Gatekeeper was built on top of File Quarantine in Snow Leopard (10.6, 2009) and has grown to include Code Signing, security policy compliance, Notarization, and more. Gatekeeper also treats applications running for the first time differently than reopened applications.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-07-19/weekly-w29-clickfix-crimeware-macos-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1555.001Credentials from Password Stores: Keychain×2

Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service.

Evidence: 2026-07-19/weekly-w29-clickfix-crimeware-macos-coercion · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×2

Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.

Evidence: 2026-07-19/weekly-w29-clickfix-crimeware-macos-coercion · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1622Debugger Evasion×1

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility×1

Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1102Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

Evidence: 2026-07-19/weekly-w29-clickfix-crimeware-macos-coercion · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-07-19ClickFix was the week's universal crimeware delivery vector, and macOS gained a coercion playbook — five families this week converged on paste-into-terminal delivery, local password validation before theft, and decentralized dead-drop C2
    legacy-strategicCrimeware convergence — ClickFix delivered CrashStealer, ClickLock, ACR Stealer, TELEPUZ and Starland RAT; macOS stealers now coerce the login password
  2. 2026-07-14CrashStealer — a native-C++ macOS infostealer using a notarized dropper and local dscl password validation to raid keychain, browsers and wallets
    active-threatsCrashStealer: notarized-dropper macOS stealer validates stolen passwords with dscl before harvesting keychain and browser data

Where this entity is cited

  • active-threats1
  • legacy-strategic1

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (20%)
  • elastic.co1 (20%)
  • group-ib.com1 (20%)
  • jamf.com1 (20%)
  • microsoft.com1 (20%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived — referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Entries about CrashStealer (2)

2026-07-19 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOB1

ClickFix was the week's universal crimeware delivery vector, and macOS gained a coercion playbook — five families this week converged on paste-into-terminal delivery, local password validation before theft, and decentralized dead-drop C2

The week's crimeware is best read as one pattern with five instances, because the reuse is where the detection leverage is.

ClickFix removed the exploit from the intrusion. All five families started from paste-a-command-into-a-terminal social engineering rather than a vulnerability: ClickLock and CrashStealer on macOS, ACR Stealer's two chains, TELEPUZ (via a ClickFix→Vidar hand-off), and UAT-11795's Starland RAT (a ClickFix lure running mshta.exe). When the initial access is the user pasting a command, the earliest reliable telemetry is process lineage — a shell, mshta, rundll32 or osascript spawned shortly after a browser/clipboard interaction, with no dropped-file exploit stage to catch upstream.

macOS gained a credential-coercion playbook, and Europe is the target. Two independent macOS families reached the same escalation this week. Jamf's CrashStealer prompts for the login password and "validates it locally with dscl -authonly" before unlocking the keychain and profiling installed EDR (Jamf, 2026-07-13). Group-IB's ClickLock is more aggressive: it kills every visible application roughly every 210 ms — for up to ~83 hours — leaving only a fake password dialog on screen until the victim surrenders the macOS password (validated locally, so only the correct one is exfiltrated), and a parallel module coerces a real Keychain-authorization dialog to steal Chrome's Safe Storage key; more than 50% of the ~100 identified victims across 33 countries are in Europe (Group-IB, 2026-07-16). For a constituency issuing macOS endpoints, this is the week macOS credential theft stopped being a footnote.

Windows RATs shared evasion and a blockchain fallback. Elastic's TELEPUZ executes indirect syscalls from the .text section of a randomly chosen legitimate DLL to bypass user-mode hooking, patches AMSI/ETW, and resolves its C2 through four decentralized fallbacks — a Telegram bio, a Steam profile, a DNS TXT record and a Polygon smart contract (Elastic, 2026-07-16); Talos's Starland RAT independently uses a Polygon smart-contract dead-drop as its fallback C2 and patches AMSI/ETW before injecting shellcode. Microsoft's ACR Stealer chains both end in DPAPI theft of Chromium credential stores (Microsoft, 2026-07-16).

Builds on: 2026-07-19/clicklock-stealer-macos-clickfix-forced-password-coercion · 2026-07-14/crashstealer-macos-native-cpp-infostealer · 2026-07-17/microsoft-acr-stealer-two-clickfix-intrusion-chains · 2026-07-16/telepuz-modular-windows-rat-maas-clickfix-vidar · 2026-07-17/talos-uat-11795-starland-rat-wldr-c2

research19 Jul 23:20Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-07-14 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

CrashStealer — a native-C++ macOS infostealer using a notarized dropper and local dscl password validation to raid keychain, browsers and wallets

Jamf Threat Labs documents CrashStealer, a macOS infostealer written in native C++ (around an internal MacOSData class) rather than the AppleScript droppers or thin Objective-C wrappers typical of commodity macOS stealers; Jamf first saw a sample on VirusTotal in early May 2026 and observed in-the-wild payload detections by early July, and tracks it as a distinct family rather than a variant of Atomic (AMOS), MacSync or Phexia (Jamf Threat Labs, 2026-07-13; BleepingComputer, 2026-07-13). Initial access is a signed and Apple-notarized dropper distributed as a "Werkbit Setup" disk image (both the image and the inner app are signed under a valid Developer ID — which Jamf reported to Apple after confirming it was used to distribute malicious payloads — with hardened runtime enabled) — because it carries a valid notarization ticket it clears Gatekeeper on first launch, so the "right-click → Open" instruction the installer shows is pure social engineering rather than a technical bypass (Jamf Threat Labs, 2026-07-13). The dropper fetches a first-stage file from a GitHub repository (keeping the opening network hop on a trusted developer domain), decodes a curl command, and pulls a shell script delivered as successive Base64 blobs decoded at runtime and piped to bash; that script downloads the payload disk image, copies the app into a hidden /private/tmp/.CrashReporter directory, strips and re-signs it ad-hoc (codesign --remove-signature then codesign -s - --force --deep), registers it with Launch Services and launches it (Jamf Threat Labs, 2026-07-13).

The payload impersonates Apple's crash reporter (bundle identifier com.apple.crashreporter, executing from the hidden staging path), clears its own quarantine and last-used-date extended attributes with xattr -cr, then presents a native-styled password prompt and validates the entered credential locally with dscl . -authonly, looping until a valid password is supplied — so the operator only ever collects credentials that actually authenticate (Jamf Threat Labs, 2026-07-13). With the validated password it unlocks the login keychain, copies login.keychain-db into a hidden ~/.cache staging root, runs a reconnaissance sweep (defaults read for version paired with du -sh for on-disk size) against an embedded list skewed toward malware-analysis and EDR tooling to profile the defensive environment, and collects browser data, Chromium/Firefox extensions (including cryptocurrency-wallet extensions) and password-manager material — AES-GCM-encrypting each item into hidden staging files as it is collected (so the loot is never written to disk in the clear), then packaging each staging directory into its own zip archive before exfiltrating over libcurl. Persistence is a LaunchAgent registered under an Apple-impersonating label with a second re-signed copy of the binary. Anti-analysis is layered throughout: the binary checks for an attached debugger via sysctl process-flag (P_TRACED) inspection at two separate points in initialization — so patching out the first check alone does not defeat it — and its C2 address and collection-target list are held as encrypted, runtime-decoded strings behind control-flow-flattening obfuscation rather than in cleartext (Jamf Threat Labs, 2026-07-13).

Validating the password with dscl -authonly before harvesting lets the operator keep only credentials that actually work

Patching out that first check is not enough on its own: a second check later in application initialization exits the same way

Jamf Threat Labs 2026-07-13
threat14 Jul 04:35Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗