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← Back to Daily brief 2026-05-21
NOTABLECVE-2024-12802exploitedupdatedNATOB2threat

SonicWall Gen6 SSL-VPN: patched-firmware appliances still open to the CVE-2024-12802 MFA bypass without manual LDAP remediation, exploited February to March 2026 by a suspected access broker

Patched SonicWall Gen6 SSL-VPNs still let brute-forced accounts skip MFA unless the LDAP fix is redone by hand

Analysis

SonicWall's SNWLID-2025-0001 describes CVE-2024-12802 (CWE-305, CVSS 6.5): when SSL-VPN authenticates against Microsoft Active Directory, UPN and SAM account names are handled separately, so MFA can be configured independently for each and an attacker can bypass it through the alternative account name (SonicWall SNWLID-2025-0001); in practice an attacker with valid credentials authenticates without the MFA step (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-20). On Gen6 the fixed firmware does not remove the vulnerable LDAP configuration, so six manual steps are needed: delete the LDAP configuration that uses userPrincipalName, remove cached LDAP users, remove the SSL VPN user domain, reboot, recreate the LDAP configuration without userPrincipalName and take a fresh backup (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-20); Gen7 firmware version 7.2.0-7015 and Gen8 firmware version 8.0.1-8017 build those steps in (SonicWall SNWLID-2025-0001). ReliaQuest responded to intrusions between February and March 2026 on Gen6 devices that looked patched and assesses with medium confidence that they are the first in-the-wild exploitation; the attacker brute-forced VPN accounts with an automated tool, in one case after only 13 attempts, and reached a file server within 30 minutes (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19), connected to it over RDP with a shared local administrator password, and tried to deploy a Cobalt Strike beacon and a vulnerable driver to disable endpoint protection, both blocked by EDR (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-20). ReliaQuest describes the tools as consistent with actors in the ransomware ecosystem and the logouts and later re-entries with other accounts as initial access broker activity (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19); the researchers could not attribute the attacks, though the activity resembled the Akira ransomware group's (Cybersecurity Dive, 2026-05-19).

Triage: where no CLI-based VPN client is authorized or typical, any sess="CLI" event is a high-fidelity indicator; where scripted VPN authentication is legitimate, ReliaQuest says to baseline it and tune on volume, source IP and timing (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19).

Cited evidence

SSL-VPN MFA Bypass in SonicWALL SSL-VPN can arise in specific cases due to the separate handling of UPN (User Principal Name) and SAM (Security Account Manager) account names when integrated with Microsoft Active Directory

SonicWall SNWLID-2025-0001 2025-01-07

The sess="CLI" session type indicates scripted or automated VPN authentication.

The voluntary logouts, combined with re-entry attempts days later using different accounts in some environments, are consistent with initial access broker (IAB) activity.

ReliaQuest 2026-05-19

Researchers could not provide direct attribution for the attacks, but the threat activity was consistent with ransomware activity from the Akira group.

Cybersecurity Dive 2026-05-19

Updates1

Correction

SonicWall scores CVE-2024-12802 CVSS 6.5 with a vector that requires a low-privileged account (PR:L), not 9.1 for an unauthenticated attacker; 9.1 is the assessment of CISA's Authorized Data Publisher (SonicWall SNWLID-2025-0001) (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19), and the attacker needs valid credentials, which here were brute-forced. The attacks are not attributed: ReliaQuest describes a likely initial access broker using tools of the ransomware ecosystem, and the researchers could not attribute them, only compare them with Akira's 2025 activity (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19) (Cybersecurity Dive, 2026-05-19).

The six remediation steps come from SonicWall's advisory as BleepingComputer lists them (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-20). The detection signal ReliaQuest found is the sess="CLI" session type with Event IDs 238 and 1080 and a CLI-to-GMS transition, not UPN-format login names (ReliaQuest, 2026-05-19).

Sources4

Revision history

  1. Published 2026-05-21-77cdc4cd
  2. Correction 2026-10-21T1148Z-audit

    SonicWall scores CVE-2024-12802 CVSS 6.5 for an attacker with valid credentials, 9.1 being CISA ADP's score, and the February to March 2026 attacks are unattributed: ReliaQuest sees a likely initial access broker using ransomware-ecosystem tools, with Akira only a comparison. The six Gen6 remediation steps come from SonicWall's advisory as reported, and ReliaQuest's sess="CLI" signal marks the abuse.

    Changed: affected_products body classification cves entities event_date evidence headline regions sectors sources sourcing_note summary tags techniques title

PROVENANCE

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