Groupe 3R (Réseau Radiologique Romand): Akira ransomware attack on 20 Swiss imaging centres, administrative data stolen and published, medical data encrypted
Akira ransomware hits Swiss imaging network Groupe 3R; administrative data stolen and published, medical data encrypted
Analysis
Groupe 3R (Réseau Radiologique Romand), which runs 20 medical-imaging centres in seven Swiss cantons (ICTjournal.ch, 2026-05-06), lists its centres in Vaud, Valais, Fribourg, Geneva, Neuchâtel, Berne and Zurich (Groupe 3R). It was hit on Thursday 2026-04-30 by a ransomware attack with data encryption; patient care was affected above all on 1 and 2 May, all centres stayed open, the attack was reported to the Federal Office for Cybersecurity, a criminal complaint was filed and no ransom will be paid (Groupe 3R). Akira listed the operator on its leak site, where ransomware.live recorded it on 2026-05-08 with an estimated attack date of 2026-04-30 (ransomware.live, 2026-05-08), announcing it would upload 48 GB of corporate data including employee identity documents, patient information, payment details and NDAs (DeXpose, 2026-05-09).
Groupe 3R now states that administrative data, including personal information of current and former employees, was encrypted and stolen, that medical data (exam results) was encrypted and made unusable, and that it is not possible to say with certainty whether patient medical data was also stolen (Groupe 3R). It acknowledged that internal documents stolen in the attack were published on the darknet, and attributes the attack to Akira because the gang's methods match what its specialist cybersecurity partners observed (ICTjournal.ch, 2026-07-06). This is its second attack in about a year: in April 2025 attackers stole medical and administrative data without disrupting operations (SwissCybersecurity.net, 2026-05-07), and Groupe 3R says the two attacks have different perpetrators and methods (Groupe 3R). Since 2026-06-26 all centres run on a rebuilt IT infrastructure with RIS, PACS, telephony and teleradiology restored, although some past examination data was still inaccessible in the operator's update of 2026-09-22 (Groupe 3R). No source states how the attackers got in; CISA's Akira advisory describes initial access mostly through VPN services using known CVEs, and encryption that is full or partial depending on file type and size (CISA AA24-109A).
Cited evidence
Administrative data of the company was encrypted and stolen, including personal information of current and former employees. (translated from French)
However, it is not possible to say with certainty whether this patient medical data was also stolen. (translated from French)
the attack is attributed to the Akira gang, whose methods match the elements observed by its specialist cybersecurity partners (translated from French)
At the time, the attackers stole medical and administrative data, but without disrupting operations. (translated from German)
We will upload 48gb of corporate data soon.
obtaining initial access to organizations through a virtual private network (VPN) service
Updates2
Groupe 3R (Réseau Radiologique Romand), the network of 20 medical-imaging centres in seven Swiss cantons, attributes the 30 April 2026 ransomware attack to Akira, saying the gang's methods match what its specialist cybersecurity partners observed, and has acknowledged that internal documents stolen in the attack were published on the darknet (SwissCybersecurity.net, 2026-07-07; ICTjournal.ch, 2026-07-06). The operator confirms that company administrative data was stolen and that medical data was encrypted and temporarily unusable; no publication of medical data has been observed so far, but whether it was also exfiltrated may never be established with certainty (ICTjournal.ch, 2026-07-06).
Groupe 3R refused to pay the ransom, filed a criminal complaint with the Valais cantonal police on 30 April, forwarded to the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland on 12 May, and reported the attack to the Federal Office for Cybersecurity (ICTjournal.ch, 2026-07-06). As of 2026-07-06 all 20 centres run on a fully rebuilt infrastructure secured with ISO 27001-certified cybersecurity partners, with RIS, PACS, telephony and teleradiology restored, while the portal for referring physicians was still in security testing (ICTjournal.ch, 2026-07-06).
Exfiltration is confirmed by the operator, not only claimed by Akira: administrative data including personal information of current and former employees was encrypted and stolen, while whether patient medical data was also stolen cannot be said with certainty (Groupe 3R), and internal documents were published on the darknet (ICTjournal.ch, 2026-07-06). The attribution to Akira rests on methods matching what Groupe 3R's specialist partners observed (ICTjournal.ch, 2026-07-06), and Akira's leak-site listing was recorded on 2026-05-08 (ransomware.live, 2026-05-08). The seventh canton is Zurich (Groupe 3R). The April 2025 attack stole medical and administrative data without disrupting operations, so 2026 is the first outage rather than the second (SwissCybersecurity.net, 2026-05-07). No source states how the attackers got in; CISA describes Akira's usual access as VPN services exploited mostly through known CVEs (CISA AA24-109A), and the operator's concrete advice is to verify any invoice that appears to come from it (Groupe 3R).
Sources8
Revision history
- Published 2026-05-10-001
- Update 2026-07-09T1211Z-intel
Groupe 3R (Réseau Radiologique Romand), a 20-site medical-imaging network across seven Romandie cantons, has now confirmed through its own forensic investigation that the 2026-04-30 ransomware attack was carried out by Akira and that stolen corporate/administrative documents have since been published on the darknet, closing the attribution gap left when Akira first listed the victim on 2026-05-08. The operator refused to pay, rebuilt all 20 sites, and acknowledged it may never establish with certainty whether medical data was exfiltrated.
Changed: actions sources body
- Correction 2026-10-21T1148Z-audit
Groupe 3R confirmed that administrative data including employee personal information was stolen and internal documents published, so exfiltration is no longer only Akira's claim; whether patient medical data was taken cannot be established. Its 20 centres span seven cantons including Zurich, the 2025 attack stole data without disrupting operations, and Groupe 3R attributes the 2026 attack to Akira on the basis of methods its partners observed rather than a forensic finding. No source states the access vector.
Changed: actions body classification event_date evidence headline priority sources sourcing_note summary techniques title
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