ctipilot.ch

Qilin

actor · actor:qilin single-source

Qilin / Agenda — Rust-based ransomware-as-a-service; Q3 2025 German operational tempo tripled (GTIG); 23 Q1 2026 healthcare claims

Aliases: Agenda

Coverage timeline
22
first 2026-05-04 → last 2026-07-12
Peak priority
critical
1 critical · 3 high · 18 notable
Sources cited
36
27 hosts
Sections touched
9
active-threats, deep-dive, research
Co-occurring entities
8
see Related entities below
ATT&CK techniques
11
pinned v19.1 · see below
2026-05-0422 appearances2026-07-12

ATT&CK techniques

11 techniques observed across 5 entries — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · 2026-06-09/check-point-ikev1-vpn-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-50751 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×2

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-07-12/weekly-w28-the-gentlemen-status · 2026-06-09/check-point-ikev1-vpn-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-50751 · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1047Windows Management Instrumentation×1

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.

Evidence: 2026-05-04/akira-playbook-quarterly-context-q1-2026-healthcare-concentr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/mistic-backdoor-signed-defender-dll-sideloading-and-in-memor · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · 2026-06-09/check-point-ikev1-vpn-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-50751 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · 2026-06-09/check-point-ikev1-vpn-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-50751 · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/mistic-backdoor-signed-defender-dll-sideloading-and-in-memor · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · 2026-06-09/check-point-ikev1-vpn-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-50751 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/mistic-backdoor-signed-defender-dll-sideloading-and-in-memor · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-07-12/weekly-w28-the-gentlemen-status · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021Remote Services×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-05-04/akira-playbook-quarterly-context-q1-2026-healthcare-concentr · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-05-04/akira-playbook-quarterly-context-q1-2026-healthcare-concentr · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×2

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-07-12/weekly-w28-the-gentlemen-status · 2026-06-10/dragos-q1-2026-industrial-ransomware-analysis-1-020-industri · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-07-12The Gentlemen (Storm-2697) status update — Unit 42's full profile: 580 victims, a Qilin-affiliate lineage, and a suspected EDR-disable zero-day
    weekly-long-runningThe Gentlemen status update — Unit 42 profiles 580 victims/77 countries, ArmCorp/Qilin lineage, 90% affiliate cut, suspected EDR-disable zero-day
  2. 2026-06-29ESET "Killing me gently" — a de-facto mid-year RaaS-tooling report
    weekly-annual-reports
  3. 2026-06-25"Mistic" backdoor: signed-Defender DLL sideloading and in-memory tradecraft by access broker Woodgnat/KongTuke
    active-threats
  4. 2026-06-22CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway IKEv1 VPN authentication bypass: public PoC, Qilin affiliate use
    weekly-vuln-rollup
  5. 2026-06-22Check Point State of Ransomware Q1 2026 — ecosystem consolidation, with Switzerland and Germany named
    weekly-annual-reports
  6. 2026-06-14CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway: IKEv1 VPN authentication bypass exploited by a Qilin affiliate
    weekly-top-stories
  7. 2026-06-10Dragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis: 1,020 industrial incidents, The Gentleman's 4× surge against Romanian energy, and the IT-adjacent intrusion pattern
    deep-diveDragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis: 1,020 industrial incidents, The Gentleman's 4× surge against Romanian energy, and the IT-adjacent intrusion
  8. 2026-06-09CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway: IKEv1 VPN authentication bypass, actively exploited by a Qilin affiliate
    trending-vulnerabilities
  9. 2026-06-09CVE-2026-42271 — BerriAI LiteLLM: low-privilege command injection to host RCE, added to CISA KEV
    trending-vulnerabilities
  10. 2026-06-09Check Point IKEv1 VPN Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-50751)
    deep-dive
  11. 2026-05-25Check Point Q1 2026 State of Ransomware — ecosystem reconsolidates; LockBit returns with a deliberate Europe pivot
    weekly-annual-reports
  12. 2026-05-23Rapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report: vulnerability exploitation now top initial-access vector at 38 %; KEV median time to listing collapses to 5 days
    research
  13. 2026-05-20Microsoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest malware-signing-as-a-service feeding Rhysida, INC, Qilin and Akira ransomware operations
    active-threats
  14. 2026-05-18Fox Tempest — Microsoft DCU disrupts the malware-signing service feeding Rhysida, INC, Qilin and Akira
    weekly-long-running
  15. 2026-05-11Qilin / Agenda RaaS — April 2026 lead at 15% of global ransomware activity, Germany 5% of global victims
    weekly-long-running
  16. 2026-05-11Check Point April 2026 ransomware analysis — Qilin leads at 15%, Germany at 5% of global victims
    weekly-annual-reports
  17. 2026-05-08Qilin ransomware hits Die Linke (Germany): 1.5 TB claimed, DPA notified (~April 2026, first coverage)
    active-threats
  18. 2026-05-04Qilin / Agenda RaaS — Die Linke confirms Q2 2026 German activity continuity
    weekly-long-running
  19. 2026-05-04Media and political (HU, DE)
    weekly-sector-patterns
  20. 2026-05-04Mandiant M-Trends 2026
    weekly-annual-reports
  21. 2026-05-04Google Threat Intelligence Group — Europe data-leak landscape 2025
    weekly-annual-reports
  22. 2026-05-04Akira playbook quarterly context — Q1 2026 healthcare concentration; Qilin remains the dominant operator on German healthcare victims
    weekly-long-running

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry — each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

overlaps with

related to

attributed activity

Where this entity is cited

  • weekly-annual-reports6
  • weekly-long-running5
  • active-threats3
  • deep-dive2
  • trending-vulnerabilities2
  • weekly-sector-patterns1
  • research1
  • weekly-top-stories1
  • weekly-vuln-rollup1

Source distribution

  • attack.mitre.org4 (11%)
  • blog.checkpoint.com3 (8%)
  • cloud.google.com2 (6%)
  • helpnetsecurity.com2 (6%)
  • rapid7.com2 (6%)
  • therecord.media2 (6%)
  • advisories.ncsc.nl1 (3%)
  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (3%)
  • other19 (53%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived — referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

All cited sources (36)

Entries about Qilin (22)

2026-07-12 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdateNATOB2

The Gentlemen (Storm-2697) status update — Unit 42's full profile: 580 victims, a Qilin-affiliate lineage, and a suspected EDR-disable zero-day

UPDATE · originally covered The Gentlemen (2026-06-29)

Palo Alto Unit 42 published the first full technical profile of The Gentlemen (Microsoft: Storm-2697; also Phantom Mantis), consolidating and extending the picture this pipeline built from ESET's GentleKiller research and the FortiBleed nexus. The delta worth carrying: Unit 42 counts 580 claimed victims across 77 countries through 3 July 2026 (103 in manufacturing) and a "slightly more than 6x" victim increase from H2 2025 to H1 2026, and assesses the ~20 operators "likely morphed from a private entity into a RaaS model on or about September 2025," previously operating as "ArmCorp," an affiliate of Qilin, now offering an "unprecedented 90% payout" versus the typical 70-80% (Unit 42, 2026-07-10). Two operationally relevant additions: the initial-access set now explicitly names Erlang/OTP SSH-server and Windows SMB-client flaws alongside the already-tracked FortiOS/FortiProxy edge path, and Unit 42 cites Expel describing a suspected zero-day the group uses specifically to disable target EDR agents — distinct from the BYOVD-based GentleKiller framework and not previously in this pipeline's coverage. The Go/C dual-language encryptor and Curve25519/XChaCha20 per-file key scheme are unchanged.

The operators (roughly 20 of them) likely morphed from a private entity into a RaaS model on or about September 2025. While traditional RaaS models typically offer affiliates a 70% to 80% cut of paid ransoms, The Gentlemen offer an unprecedented 90% payout.

When comparing the last six months of 2025 to the first six months of 2026, the number of victims claimed by The Gentlemen increased by slightly more than 6x.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42
synthesis12 Jul 23:46Zsingle-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-29 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

ESET "Killing me gently" — a de-facto mid-year RaaS-tooling report

Background. The Gentlemen emerged in late 2025 as a RaaS operation founded by "hastalamuerte" (a former Qilin affiliate per Group-IB, previously affiliated with Embargo, LockBit, Medusa and BlackLock per PRODAFT). ESET first hypothesised an in-house EDR-killer in February 2026; Group-IB and Check Point independently corroborated before the gang's own internal data leaked. By April 2026 the group accounted for ~10% of global ransomware activity, and Krebs (06-10) linked the alias to a named individual in Izhevsk, Russia.

ESET's 06-26 deep-dive into the leaked internal data is the most substantive published-in-window documentation of RaaS tooling structure, and reads as a mid-year complement to the W25 Check Point State of Ransomware Q1 2026. Three structural findings a detection engineer should register: (1) GentleKiller is a modular in-house framework with at least eight BYOVD variants, each impersonating a different vendor and abusing a different kernel driver — driver allow-listing alone is insufficient without process-injection-chain detection; (2) the group integrates rival gangs' EDR killers (HexKiller from Warlock, ThrottleBlood shared with MedusaLocker/DragonForce, HavocKiller), so tooling overlap no longer implies operational overlap; (3) victims are selected centrally on FortiGate misconfiguration rather than geography, tying the Gentlemen victim pipeline directly to FortiBleed-style reconnaissance (§ 8). New BYOVD PoCs are operationalised within days of public release. (daily 06-27)

annual-report29 Jun 00:21Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-25 · view entry permalink →

HIGH

"Mistic" backdoor: signed-Defender DLL sideloading and in-memory tradecraft by access broker Woodgnat/KongTuke

Symantec disclosed Backdoor.Mistic (also tracked as MLTBackdoor), deployed since April 2026 by initial-access broker Woodgnat (a.k.a. KongTuke) that sells footholds to ransomware affiliates including Qilin, Interlock, Rhysida, Akira, 8Base and Black Basta (Symantec, 2026-06-24 · SecurityWeek, 2026-06-24). Mistic achieves DLL sideloading via a digitally-signed Microsoft Defender executable (MpExtMs.exe) loading a malicious EndpointDlp.dll (T1574.002, T1036.005), so its activity reads as legitimate Defender behaviour to EDR. Per Symantec it also supports in-memory tradecraft and file manipulation/arbitrary code execution with a kill switch for stealth. Delivery uses ClickFix / FileFix / CrashFix lures (fake CAPTCHAs, browser-crash pages, Teams IT-helpdesk impersonation directing victims to run PowerShell). Why it matters to us: The downstream affiliates are all active public-sector ransomware actors. Detection is precise: legitimate Defender DLPs load from %ProgramFiles%\Windows Defender\ under a Microsoft certificate — any EndpointDlp.dll loaded from a user-writable path or with a non-Microsoft signature is high-confidence (Sysmon EID 7). Pair with EID 1 parent-chains for PowerShell spawned by Teams/Office clients.

Mistic achieves DLL sideloading via a digitally-signed Microsoft Defender executable (MpExtMs.exe) loading a malicious DLL named EndpointDlp.dll

CSO Online citing Symantec

Woodgnat maintains relationships with six ransomware families including Qilin, Interlock, Rhysida, Akira, 8Base, and Black Basta

SecurityWeek
threat25 Jun 04:59Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

Earlier coverage (19)

2026-06-22NOTABLECheck Point State of Ransomware Q1 2026 — ecosystem consolidation, with Switzerland and Germany namedSurfaced this week for its CH/EU-specific findings, Check Point's Q1 2026 ransomware report (published 11 May, not covered in the dailies) documents a structural consolidation: the top 10 groups now hold 71.1% of all leak-site victims, the highest concentration since early 2024 and a reversal of two years of …2026-06-22NOTABLECVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway IKEv1 VPN authentication bypass: public PoC, Qilin affiliate useStatus update on the W24 § 1 item: NCSC-NL updated its advisory on 2026-06-16 to note public proof-of-concept code is now available for the IKEv1 VPN authentication bypass, which a Qilin ransomware affiliate has used for initial access (Help Net Security; NCSC-NL NCSC-2026-0179; daily 06-17).2026-06-14NOTABLEexploitedCVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway: IKEv1 VPN authentication bypass exploited by a Qilin affiliateIf you did nothing this week: a Remote Access VPN gateway running the deprecated IKEv1 path is an active ransomware entry point — a Qilin affiliate is using this bypass for initial access.2026-06-10NOTABLEDragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis: 1,020 industrial incidents, The Gentleman's 4× surge against Romanian energy, and the IT-adjacent intrusion patternDragos' quarterly industrial-ransomware report (published 3 June) is the single periodic landscape report treated in this brief; the focus below is only on what changes a Swiss/EU public-sector and critical-infrastructure SOC's posture, not the full survey (Dragos, 2026-06-03).2026-06-09NOTABLEexploitedCheck Point IKEv1 VPN Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-50751)On 8 June 2026 Check Point disclosed and shipped a hotfix for CVE-2026-50751 (CVSS 9.3), an authentication bypass affecting Remote Access VPN and Mobile Access gateways configured for the deprecated IKEv1 key exchange (Check Point, 2026-06-08).2026-06-09HIGHexploitedCVE-2026-42271 — BerriAI LiteLLM: low-privilege command injection to host RCE, added to CISA KEVLiteLLM AI-gateway command injection (CVE-2026-42271) added to CISA KEV — host RCE via the MCP test endpoints, unauthenticated when chained with CVE-2026-48710; fixed in 1.83.7 (GitHub Advisory).2026-06-09CRITICALexploitedCVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway: IKEv1 VPN authentication bypass, actively exploited by a Qilin affiliateCheck Point IKEv1 VPN auth bypass (CVE-2026-50751, CVSS 9.3) actively exploited by a Qilin affiliate since 7 May — a month before disclosure. Unauthenticated session forgery on Remote Access / Mobile Access gateways; NCSC-CH issued an Action-Required advisory and CISA added it to KEV (Check Point, 2026-06-08).2026-05-25NOTABLECheck Point Q1 2026 State of Ransomware — ecosystem reconsolidates; LockBit returns with a deliberate Europe pivotHorizon research surfaced a quarterly report the dailies did not cover: Check Point's Q1 2026 State of Ransomware (published 2026-05-11).2026-05-23NOTABLERapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report: vulnerability exploitation now top initial-access vector at 38 %; KEV median time to listing collapses to 5 daysRapid7 Labs published its Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report on 2026-05-21 covering January–March 2026 IR data; the GlobeNewswire release accompanied the post the same day. The findings that change what a Swiss/EU public-sector SOC should prioritise:2026-05-20HIGHMicrosoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest malware-signing-as-a-service feeding Rhysida, INC, Qilin and Akira ransomware operationsMicrosoft Digital Crimes Unit disrupts Fox Tempest malware-signing-as-a-service. 1,000+ fraudulent short-lived Microsoft Artifact Signing certificates revoked; signspace[.]cloud seized via SDNY court order. Downstream customers include Vanilla Tempest (Rhysida), Storm-0501, Storm-2561, Storm-0249; ransomware families served include Rhysida, INC, Qilin, Akira (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-19). Detection: hunt for Microsoft-signed PE binaries with cert validity ≤72h from Trusted Signing issuers.2026-05-18NOTABLEFox Tempest — Microsoft DCU disrupts the malware-signing service feeding Rhysida, INC, Qilin and AkiraMicrosoft Threat Intelligence and the Digital Crimes Unit disrupted Fox Tempest, a malware-signing-as-a-service operation that supplied code-signing to multiple ransomware operations (daily 2026-05-20). Status: disrupted via combined intelligence exposure and a sealed US legal action.2026-05-11NOTABLEQilin / Agenda RaaS — April 2026 lead at 15% of global ransomware activity, Germany 5% of global victimsW19 long-running record (item:qilin-agenda-raas-die-linke-confirms-q2-2026-german-activity) tracked Qilin's continued German activity.2026-05-11NOTABLECheck Point April 2026 ransomware analysis — Qilin leads at 15%, Germany at 5% of global victimsCheck Point's April 2026 monthly threat report (published early May 2026) confirms Qilin / Agenda leading all ransomware operators with 15% of 707 published attacks in April; Germany is the third-most-targeted country globally at 5.0% of victims (US 41.6%); Europe accounts for 27% of ransomware victims globally.2026-05-08NOTABLEQilin ransomware hits Die Linke (Germany): 1.5 TB claimed, DPA notified (~April 2026, first coverage)The German federal party Die Linke confirmed in April 2026 that the Qilin ransomware group (also known as Agenda, a Rust-based RaaS platform known for double extortion) encrypted and exfiltrated its systems, with the gang claiming 1.5 TB of internal data.2026-05-04NOTABLEAkira playbook quarterly context — Q1 2026 healthcare concentration; Qilin remains the dominant operator on German healthcare victimsW1 horizon research added Q1 2026 healthcare quarterly context to the Groupe 3R item in § 1.2026-05-04NOTABLEQilin / Agenda RaaS — Die Linke confirms Q2 2026 German activity continuityCurrent state: GTIG's Europe data-leak landscape (§ 6) documented Qilin tripling Q3 2025 operational tempo in Germany; Die Linke (Germany federal political party) confirmed Qilin encryption with 1.5 TB exfiltrated (covered 2026-05-08), state DPA notified — Qilin German activity continues into 2026-Q2.2026-05-04NOTABLEGoogle Threat Intelligence Group — Europe data-leak landscape 2025GTIG's Europe data-leak landscape analysis (published 2026-04-15, first covered 2026-05-07) is the second-tier annual reference that materially affects DACH defender posture and merits cross-week synthesis: Germany is the primary European ransomware target with SAFEPAY accounting for 25% of German data-leak-site …2026-05-04NOTABLEMandiant M-Trends 2026M-Trends 2026 (published 2026-03-23, first covered 2026-05-07) reinforces three cross-cutting trends visible in this week's incidents: voice phishing surged to the second most prevalent initial-access vector at 11% (overtaking email phishing at 6%) driven by IT help-desk impersonation and SaaS OAuth token theft …2026-05-04NOTABLEMedia and political (HU, DE)Two European political / media targets in the week: Mediaworks Kft (Hungary) — World Leaks claimed 8.5 TB of exfiltrated data including payroll, contracts, and internal editorial communications; Mediaworks confirmed "a significant amount of illegally obtained data may have come into the possession of unauthorized …