Qilin
actor · actor:qilin single-sourcesingle-source-victim
Qilin / Agenda, Rust-based ransomware-as-a-service; Q3 2025 German operational tempo tripled (GTIG); 23 Q1 2026 healthcare claims
Aliases: Agenda
Action items (6)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Qilin, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Patch every PAN-OS GlobalProtect portal and gateway to the fixed build in Palo Alto's advisory for its minor release (users then re-authenticate once, because the fixed firewall regenerates the override cookie), or until then disable Authentication Override or give the cookies a certificate that no other feature uses.2026-05-30CVE-2026-0257
- On every GlobalProtect gateway that was internet-reachable and unpatched at any time since 2026-05-17, treat the network behind it as a ransomware compromise-assessment target: review VPN sessions that authenticated by cookie from unexpected sources, check Windows hosts for the artifacts Arctic Wolf describes (a ransomware payload staged under C:\\PerfLogs, a PsExec service, an LSASS dump written through comsvcs.dll to an .odt file, an ntdsutil media copy of the Active Directory database, and cleared event logs), and extend the assessment to the virtualization and backup tier: vCenter and ESXi audit logs for a changed execInstalledOnly setting and for access to a domain controller's virtual disk, and the Veeam backup server, because Unit 42 describes one intrusion that pivoted from the gateway to vCenter and dumped domain credentials offline, which in-guest EDR does not see.2026-05-30CVE-2026-0257
- Upgrade every Secure FMC to its September 2026 hardening release (7.0 and earlier to 7.0.10, 7.2 to 7.2.12, 7.4 to 7.4.8, 7.6 to 7.6.6, 7.7 to 7.7.13, 10.0 to 10.0.2, 10.1 to 10.1.0). Cisco replaced the earlier per-train hot fixes with these releases on 2026-09-16; there is no workaround, and no configuration makes an FMC non-vulnerable.2026-08-04CVE-2026-20079 +2
- Run Cisco's revised compromise check on every FMC that has been network-reachable since 2026-03-04: in expert mode,2026-08-04CVE-2026-20079 +2
zgrep "package_info.*license" /var/log/messages*, a hit naming /var/tmp/license.tmp means the chain reached the package-install step, and Cisco directs those cases to TAC rather than to self-remediation. - Immediate action: An unauthenticated attacker can forge a Remote Access / Mobile Access VPN session without a valid password on gateways running the deprecated IKEv1 key exchange, and the flaw has been exploited in the wild since 7 May 2026, a month before disclosure, against a few dozen targeted organizations. Check Point confirmed Qilin-affiliate post-compromise activity in one case and assesses with medium confidence that the exploiting actor uses Qilin ransomware. NCSC-CH has issued an advisory flagging the CVE as actively exploited. Apply hotfix sk185033 now, disable legacy IKEv1 remote-access client support, and review gateway logs from 7 May for completed IKEv1 Quick Mode ("Key Install") events before the fix that come from unrecognised users or source IP addresses, as Check Point's sk185033 advises.2026-06-09CVE-2026-50751 +1
1 older action item
- Patch Check Point IKEv1 VPN gateways now (CVE-2026-50751): apply hotfix sk185033, disable deprecated IKEv1 remote-access support or enforce machine-certificate authentication, and review gateway logs from 7 May 2026 for completed IKEv1 Quick Mode ("Key Install") events before the fix that come from unrecognised users or source IP addresses.2026-06-09CVE-2026-50751 +1
Defender insights
What each entry about Qilin tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · triage · detection
Triage
Triage
3 earlier entries carry guidance too, listed under the story timeline below.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
exploits
- Palo Alto Networks PAN-OSArctic Wolf Labs: Qilin ransomware deployments in June 2026 all originated from exploitation of CVE-2026-0257 against PAN-OS GlobalProtect (Arctic Wolf, 2026-07-20)
collaborates with
- Moonstone SleetSekoia/Kudelski Security (2026-09-07): Moonstone Sleet adopted the Qilin ransomware-as-a-service in 2025
- Storm-2570Microsoft: Storm-2570 operates as an affiliate deploying Qilin ransomware as one of its RaaS-brand payloads.
overlaps with
- UAT-11988Cisco Talos: subsequent actions and TTPs were consistent with those of Qilin ransomware affiliates (a TTP-consistency assessment, not a firm identity claim).
related to
- Microsoft DCU Fox Tempest disruptiondownstream user of the disrupted signing service
attributed activity
- Retelit / Qilin extortion attackRetelit's own right-of-reply attributes the 8 June 2026 attack to Qilin, matching Qilin's leak-site claim of 11 July
Story timeline
Every entry that names Qilin, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-11-06Seqrite: reverse engineering of two Qilin builds shows the October 2026 variant adding a vCenter and ESXi spreading engine, Restart Manager lock release, a Safe Mode reboot loop and ransom notes printed to office printers
- 2026-10-30ANNUAL REPORT: Cisco Talos Incident Response trends Q3 2026: public administration tied with finance as the most targeted sector, help-desk vishing into remote-management tools, and ransomware operators uninstalling and killing EDR
- 2026-10-22k0t: Group-IB and NyxLab describe a probable access broker that mass-exploits FortiWeb and PAN-OS GlobalProtect, brute-forces FortiGate and decrypts stolen FortiGate configurations offline with the default key, with victims later listed by Qilin and The Gentlemen
- 2026-09-29Storm-2570: a ransomware affiliate reuses a consistent commodity RMM/tunnelling/credential-theft toolkit across four separate RaaS brands, with government agencies among its confirmed victims
- 2026-09-21Talos finds AI-generated Python wiper and mass-deployment scripts in a Qilin-affected environment, identified by step-numbered comments and consistent per-step logging
- 2026-09-08Sekoia and Kudelski Security split the 'Lazarus umbrella' into six named DPRK clusters, and document two of them adopting commodity ransomware-as-a-service within two months of each other
- 2026-08-24Rapid7's Q2 2026 quarterly report: high- and critical-severity disclosures doubled year on year to 8,539 while the number newly exploited held flat at 40, and 62% of what was exploited needed no user interaction at all
- 2026-08-10Qilin compromised Italian telecommunications and cloud operator Retelit on 8 June, the company confirmed it only after an investigation forced the question, and one of the three affected data centres was its certified backup site
- 2026-08-04CVE-2026-20079, Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center: unauthenticated authentication bypass to root, unpatched for five months and only exploitable in a post-boot window (CVSS 10.0)
- 2026-07-29Romanian public university UVVG Arad confirms a cyberattack on its IT infrastructure; a Qilin leak-site listing is the only thing linking an actor to it
- 2026-06-25"Mistic" backdoor: signed-Defender DLL sideloading and in-memory tradecraft by access broker Woodgnat/KongTuke
- 2026-06-10Dragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis: 1,020 industrial incidents, The Gentleman's 4× surge against Romanian energy, and the IT-adjacent intrusion pattern
- 2026-06-09CVE-2026-50751: Check Point Security Gateway IKEv1 VPN authentication bypass, actively exploited, actor assessed with medium confidence to use Qilin ransomware
- 2026-05-30CVE-2026-0257, Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect: pre-auth authentication bypass via certificate reuse, marked by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns
- 2026-05-23Rapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report: vulnerability exploitation now top initial-access vector at 38 %; KEV median time to listing collapses to 5 days
- 2026-05-20Microsoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service that enabled Rhysida deployments and is linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliates
- 2026-05-08Qilin claims a ransomware attack on the German party Die Linke; the party has not confirmed data theft
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (38 across 13 tactics)
38 techniques observed across 11 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Malvertising · Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates · Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
- Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · External Remote Services · Exploit Public-Facing Application
- ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · User Execution: Malicious File · System Services: Service Execution
- PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · External Remote Services · Server Software Component: Web Shell · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- StealthMasquerading: Invalid Code Signature · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
- Defense ImpairmentDomain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing · Disable or Modify Tools · Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs · Safe Mode Boot
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · OS Credential Dumping: NTDS · Credentials from Password Stores
- DiscoveryRemote System Discovery · Network Service Discovery
- Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares · Remote Services: SSH · Lateral Tool Transfer
- Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: DNS · Remote Access Tools · Protocol Tunneling
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Service Stop · Inhibit System Recovery · Financial Theft
Resource Development TA0042
T1583.008Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising×1
Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements. Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1588.003Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates×1
Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1608.006Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning×1
Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/retelit-qilin-italian-telco-cloud-operator-public-sector · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.
Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗
T1133External Remote Services×2
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.
Evidence: 2026-06-09/cve-2026-50751-check-point-security-gateway-ikev1-vpn-authen · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×3
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · 2026-06-09/cve-2026-50751-check-point-security-gateway-ikev1-vpn-authen · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1569.002System Services: Service Execution×3
Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and Net.
Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/retelit-qilin-italian-telco-cloud-operator-public-sector · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.
Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗
T1133External Remote Services×2
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.
Evidence: 2026-06-09/cve-2026-50751-check-point-security-gateway-ikev1-vpn-authen · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1
Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.
Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/retelit-qilin-italian-telco-cloud-operator-public-sector · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.
Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗
T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1
Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/qilin-ai-generated-wiper-locker-scripts-forensic-markers · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1036.001Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature×1
Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.
Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-10/retelit-qilin-italian-telco-cloud-operator-public-sector · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.
Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1
Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/qilin-ai-generated-wiper-locker-scripts-forensic-markers · ATT&CK page ↗
T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1
Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗
T1685Disable or Modify Tools×3
Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.
Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1685.005Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs×1
Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.
Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1688Safe Mode Boot×1
Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.
Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×2
Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.
Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×2
Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.
Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555Credentials from Password Stores×1
Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.
Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1018Remote System Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.
Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · ATT&CK page ↗
T1046Network Service Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.
Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×2
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares×2
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1021.004Remote Services: SSH×1
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · ATT&CK page ↗
T1570Lateral Tool Transfer×2
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.
Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1
Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗
T1219Remote Access Tools×2
An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1572Protocol Tunneling×2
Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.
Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×2
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.
Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×8
Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.
Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-09-21/qilin-ai-generated-wiper-locker-scripts-forensic-markers · 2026-09-08/sekoia-kudelski-dprk-lazarus-umbrella-six-cluster-split · 2026-08-10/retelit-qilin-italian-telco-cloud-operator-public-sector · 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · 2026-07-29/uvvg-arad-romania-university-cyberattack-qilin-claim +2 more · ATT&CK page ↗
T1489Service Stop×2
Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.
Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-09-21/qilin-ai-generated-wiper-locker-scripts-forensic-markers · ATT&CK page ↗
T1490Inhibit System Recovery×3
Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.
Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-09-21/qilin-ai-generated-wiper-locker-scripts-forensic-markers · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗
T1657Financial Theft×1
Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.
Evidence: 2026-09-08/sekoia-kudelski-dprk-lazarus-umbrella-six-cluster-split · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Qilin (11)
Earlier coverage (8)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Akira×3
- Rclone×3
- INC Ransom×2
- Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS×2
- PAN-OS GlobalProtect pre-auth authentication bypass×2
- Rhysida×2
- AdaptixC2×1
- Andariel×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- sec.cloudapps.cisco.com5 (10%)
- rapid7.com4 (8%)
- blog.talosintelligence.com3 (6%)
- arcticwolf.com2 (4%)
- fortiguard.fortinet.com2 (4%)
- microsoft.com2 (4%)
- security-hub.ncsc.admin.ch2 (4%)
- therecord.media2 (4%)
- other28 (56%)
All cited sources (50)
- advisories.ncsc.nlNCSC-NL advisory NCSC-2026-0179, 2026-06-16https://advisories.ncsc.nl/advisory?id=NCSC-2026-0179
- aradon.roAradon.rohttps://www.aradon.ro/aradon-stirile-judetului-arad/atac-cibernetic-la-uvvg-arad-2225370/
- arcticwolf.comArctic Wolf, 2026-06-11https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-increase-in-palo-alto-networks-globalprotect-authentication-bypass-exploitation-via-cve-2026-0257/
- arcticwolf.comArctic Wolf Labshttps://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/exploitation-of-cve-2026-0257-leads-to-qilin-ransomware/
- bismark.itBismark.ithttps://www.bismark.it/9139/retelit-nel-mirino-del-ransomware-qilin-colpito-uno-dei-principali-operatori-italiani-delle-telecomunicazioni/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/die-linke-german-political-party-confirms-data-stolen-by-qilin-ransomware/
- blog.checkpoint.comCheck Point advisoryhttps://blog.checkpoint.com/security/check-point-releases-important-hotfix-for-vulnerabilities-in-deprecated-ikev1-vpn-protocol/
- blog.talosintelligence.comCisco Taloshttps://blog.talosintelligence.com/fmc-ongoing-exploitation/
- blog.talosintelligence.comCisco Taloshttps://blog.talosintelligence.com/ir-trends-q3-2026/
- blog.talosintelligence.comCisco Taloshttps://blog.talosintelligence.com/ransomware-incidents-in-japan-in-the-first-half-of-2026/
- blogs.microsoft.comMicrosoft On the Issues, DCU legal action, 2026-05-19https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2026/05/19/disrupting-fox-tempest-a-cybercrime-service/
- broadcom.comBroadcom/Symantec protection bulletinhttps://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/protection-bulletin/backdoor-mistic-new-backdoor-may-be-linked-to-ransomware-access-broker
- cisa.govCISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities cataloghttps://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
- csoonline.comCSO Onlinehttps://www.csoonline.com/article/4189132/be-on-the-lookout-for-mistic-a-new-backdoor-used-by-ransomware-broker.html
- die-linke.deDie Linke (statement by federal managing director Janis Ehling, German)https://www.die-linke.de/start/presse/detail/news/cyberangriff-auf-die-partei-die-linke/
- dragos.comDragos, 2026-06-03https://www.dragos.com/dragos-industrial-ransomware-analysis-q1-2026
- fortiguard.fortinet.comFortinet PSIRT (FG-IR-19-007, Hardcoded symmetric key in fips.c)https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-19-007
- fortiguard.fortinet.comFortinet PSIRT (FG-IR-25-910, Path confusion vulnerability in GUI)https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-25-910
- globenewswire.comGlobeNewswire press releasehttps://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/05/21/3299378/36514/en/Rapid7-Q1-2026-Threat-Landscape-Report-Finds-Vulnerability-Exploitation-Overtakes-Social-Engineering-as-the-Top-Initial-Access-Vector.html
- group-ib.comGroup-IB (with NyxLab)https://www.group-ib.com/blog/stray-cat-network-edge/
- heise.deHeise Onlinehttps://www.heise.de/en/news/Qilin-Left-Party-reports-Russian-ransomware-attack-11227232.html
- helpnetsecurity.comHelp Net Security, 2026-06-12https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/06/12/cve-2026-50751-poc-exploit/
- irpimedia.irpi.euIrpiMediahttps://irpimedia.irpi.eu/retelit-operatore-cloud-e-telecomunicazioni-attacco-informatico/
- kudelskisecurity.comKudelski Security (Switzerland)https://kudelskisecurity.com/research/beyond-lazarus-organization-of-dprk-cyber-capabilities
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Threat Intelligence, Exposing Fox Tempest, 2026-05-19https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/19/exposing-fox-tempest-a-malware-signing-service-operation/
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Security Blog / Microsoft Threat Intelligencehttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/24/beyond-ransomware-tracking-storm-2570-consistent-tradecraft-across-deployments/
- radioromania.roRadio Româniahttps://www.radioromania.ro/stiri-locale/arad-universitatea-de-vest-tinta-unui-atac-cibernetic-id203468.html
- ransomware.liveRansomware.live (Qilin leak-site mirror)https://www.ransomware.live/id/VW5pdmVyc2l0YXRlYSBkZSBWZXN0IOKAnlZhc2lsZSBHb2xkaciZ4oCdIGRpbiBBcmFkQHFpbGlu
- rapid7.comRapid7https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-critical-check-point-vpn-zero-day-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-50751/
- rapid7.comRapid7 ETRhttps://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-rapid7-observed-exploitation-of-pan-os-globalprotect-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-cve-2026-0257/
- rapid7.comRapid7 Labshttps://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-new-report-ai-threats-q2-2026-ends-traditional-patch-cycles
- rapid7.comRapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Reporthttps://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-q1-2026-threat-landscape-report-geopolitics-ransomware/
- retelit.itRetelithttps://www.retelit.it/it/stampa/comunicati-stampa
- sec.cloudapps.cisco.comCisco PSIRT (CVE-2026-20242 advisory)https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-fmc-javarce-y2NypXwk
- sec.cloudapps.cisco.comCisco PSIRT (CVE-2026-20324 advisory)https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-fmc-sftunn-codex-c3O4Jft2
- sec.cloudapps.cisco.comCisco PSIRThttps://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-fmc-static-cred-BET3Cjh
- sec.cloudapps.cisco.comCisco PSIRT (advance notification)https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-notice-jfxK98ZP
- sec.cloudapps.cisco.comCisco PSIRThttps://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-onprem-fmc-authbypass-5JPp45V2
- security-hub.ncsc.admin.chNCSC-CH Security Hub, 2026-06-16https://security-hub.ncsc.admin.ch/#/posts/12605
- security-hub.ncsc.admin.chNCSC-CH Security Hubhttps://security-hub.ncsc.admin.ch/#/posts/12615
- security.paloaltonetworks.comPalo Alto Networks PSIRThttps://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0257
- securityweek.comSecurityWeekhttps://www.securityweek.com/new-mistic-rat-opens-door-to-several-ransomware-families/
- sekoia.comSekoiahttps://www.sekoia.com/blog/beyond-lazarus-organization-of-dprk-cyber-capabilities
- seqrite.comSeqrite Labshttps://www.seqrite.com/blog/the-evolution-of-qilin-agenda-a-comparative-reverse-engineering-analysis-of-qilin-agenda-ransomware-across-2026/
- sportarad.roSportarad.rohttps://www.sportarad.ro/2026/07/28/universitatea-de-vest-vasile-goldis-din-arad-ofera-informatii-cu-privire-la-incidentul-de-securitate-cibernetica-ce-a-vizat-infrastructura-it-a-institutiei/
- support.checkpoint.comCheck Point sk185033https://support.checkpoint.com/results/sk/sk185033
- therecord.mediaThe Recordhttps://therecord.media/hackers-threaten-to-leak-german-political-party-data
- therecord.mediaThe Record, 2026-05-19https://therecord.media/microsoft-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-service
- unit42.paloaltonetworks.comUnit 42, 2026-06-09 (threat brief, updated 2026-10-19 and 2026-10-20)https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/active-exploitation-of-pan-os-cve-2026-0257/
- vulncheck.comVulnCheckhttps://www.vulncheck.com/blog/cisco-fmc-auth-bypass-cve-2026-20079