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Qilin

actor · actor:qilin single-sourcesingle-source-victim

Qilin / Agenda, Rust-based ransomware-as-a-service; Q3 2025 German operational tempo tripled (GTIG); 23 Q1 2026 healthcare claims

Aliases: Agenda

Coverage
17
11 about it · 6 mentions · first 2026-05-08 → last 2026-11-06
Latest activity
2026-11-06
Qilin's October build spreads through vCenter and ESXi, reboots into Safe Mode and prints notes on office…
Peak priority
critical
1 critical · 3 high · 6 notable · 1 routine
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, education, healthcare · regions: europe, us, switzerland
Sources cited
50
36 hosts
2026-05-0817 appearances2026-11-06

Action items (6)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Qilin, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Patch every PAN-OS GlobalProtect portal and gateway to the fixed build in Palo Alto's advisory for its minor release (users then re-authenticate once, because the fixed firewall regenerates the override cookie), or until then disable Authentication Override or give the cookies a certificate that no other feature uses.
    2026-05-30CVE-2026-0257
  • On every GlobalProtect gateway that was internet-reachable and unpatched at any time since 2026-05-17, treat the network behind it as a ransomware compromise-assessment target: review VPN sessions that authenticated by cookie from unexpected sources, check Windows hosts for the artifacts Arctic Wolf describes (a ransomware payload staged under C:\\PerfLogs, a PsExec service, an LSASS dump written through comsvcs.dll to an .odt file, an ntdsutil media copy of the Active Directory database, and cleared event logs), and extend the assessment to the virtualization and backup tier: vCenter and ESXi audit logs for a changed execInstalledOnly setting and for access to a domain controller's virtual disk, and the Veeam backup server, because Unit 42 describes one intrusion that pivoted from the gateway to vCenter and dumped domain credentials offline, which in-guest EDR does not see.
    2026-05-30CVE-2026-0257
  • Upgrade every Secure FMC to its September 2026 hardening release (7.0 and earlier to 7.0.10, 7.2 to 7.2.12, 7.4 to 7.4.8, 7.6 to 7.6.6, 7.7 to 7.7.13, 10.0 to 10.0.2, 10.1 to 10.1.0). Cisco replaced the earlier per-train hot fixes with these releases on 2026-09-16; there is no workaround, and no configuration makes an FMC non-vulnerable.
    2026-08-04CVE-2026-20079 +2
  • Run Cisco's revised compromise check on every FMC that has been network-reachable since 2026-03-04: in expert mode, zgrep "package_info.*license" /var/log/messages*, a hit naming /var/tmp/license.tmp means the chain reached the package-install step, and Cisco directs those cases to TAC rather than to self-remediation.
    2026-08-04CVE-2026-20079 +2
  • Immediate action: An unauthenticated attacker can forge a Remote Access / Mobile Access VPN session without a valid password on gateways running the deprecated IKEv1 key exchange, and the flaw has been exploited in the wild since 7 May 2026, a month before disclosure, against a few dozen targeted organizations. Check Point confirmed Qilin-affiliate post-compromise activity in one case and assesses with medium confidence that the exploiting actor uses Qilin ransomware. NCSC-CH has issued an advisory flagging the CVE as actively exploited. Apply hotfix sk185033 now, disable legacy IKEv1 remote-access client support, and review gateway logs from 7 May for completed IKEv1 Quick Mode ("Key Install") events before the fix that come from unrecognised users or source IP addresses, as Check Point's sk185033 advises.
    2026-06-09CVE-2026-50751 +1
1 older action item
  • Patch Check Point IKEv1 VPN gateways now (CVE-2026-50751): apply hotfix sk185033, disable deprecated IKEv1 remote-access support or enforce machine-certificate authentication, and review gateway logs from 7 May 2026 for completed IKEv1 Quick Mode ("Key Install") events before the fix that come from unrecognised users or source IP addresses.
    2026-06-09CVE-2026-50751 +1

Defender insights

What each entry about Qilin tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-06NOTABLEQilin's October build spreads through vCenter and ESXi, reboots into Safe Mode and prints notes on office printers

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-05-30HIGHexploitedQilin and Inc ransomware exploit the GlobalProtect bypass; one intrusion pivoted to vCenter and ESXi past in-guest EDR

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-09-29NOTABLEMicrosoft: the same toolkit rides into victims regardless of which ransomware brand signs the note

Triage

2026-09-21NOTABLECisco Talos: a Qilin intrusion's own staging directory held ransomware deployment scripts the investigators assess were probably written by an AI model

2026-09-08NOTABLEA Swiss research lab co-publishes the DPRK actor-tracking update: two nominally-espionage clusters rented commodity ransomware in the same window

2026-08-10HIGHA European carrier serving 193 public administrations disclosed a two-month-old Qilin intrusion in a right-of-reply, not a press release

Triage

3 earlier entries carry guidance too, listed under the story timeline below.

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

exploits

collaborates with

overlaps with

related to

attributed activity

Story timeline

Every entry that names Qilin, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-11-06Seqrite: reverse engineering of two Qilin builds shows the October 2026 variant adding a vCenter and ESXi spreading engine, Restart Manager lock release, a Safe Mode reboot loop and ransom notes printed to office printers
    active-threatsQilin's October build spreads through vCenter and ESXi, reboots into Safe Mode and prints notes on office printers
  2. 2026-10-30ANNUAL REPORT: Cisco Talos Incident Response trends Q3 2026: public administration tied with finance as the most targeted sector, help-desk vishing into remote-management tools, and ransomware operators uninstalling and killing EDR
    mentionresearchTalos IR Q3: public administration tied for most targeted; vishing into RMM and EDR killing mark the ransomware cases
  3. 2026-10-22k0t: Group-IB and NyxLab describe a probable access broker that mass-exploits FortiWeb and PAN-OS GlobalProtect, brute-forces FortiGate and decrypts stolen FortiGate configurations offline with the default key, with victims later listed by Qilin and The Gentlemen
    mentionactive-threatsGroup-IB: k0t takes edge devices in bulk and decrypts FortiGate configurations offline; enable private-data-encryption
  4. 2026-09-29Storm-2570: a ransomware affiliate reuses a consistent commodity RMM/tunnelling/credential-theft toolkit across four separate RaaS brands, with government agencies among its confirmed victims
    active-threatsMicrosoft: the same toolkit rides into victims regardless of which ransomware brand signs the note
  5. 2026-09-21Talos finds AI-generated Python wiper and mass-deployment scripts in a Qilin-affected environment, identified by step-numbered comments and consistent per-step logging
    active-threatsCisco Talos: a Qilin intrusion's own staging directory held ransomware deployment scripts the investigators assess were probably written by an AI model
  6. 2026-09-08Sekoia and Kudelski Security split the 'Lazarus umbrella' into six named DPRK clusters, and document two of them adopting commodity ransomware-as-a-service within two months of each other
    researchA Swiss research lab co-publishes the DPRK actor-tracking update: two nominally-espionage clusters rented commodity ransomware in the same window
  7. 2026-08-24Rapid7's Q2 2026 quarterly report: high- and critical-severity disclosures doubled year on year to 8,539 while the number newly exploited held flat at 40, and 62% of what was exploited needed no user interaction at all
    mentionresearchRapid7 Q2 2026: disclosure volume doubled, exploitation did not, and missing-authentication disclosures rose 247%
  8. 2026-08-10Qilin compromised Italian telecommunications and cloud operator Retelit on 8 June, the company confirmed it only after an investigation forced the question, and one of the three affected data centres was its certified backup site
    active-threatsA European carrier serving 193 public administrations disclosed a two-month-old Qilin intrusion in a right-of-reply, not a press release
  9. 2026-08-04CVE-2026-20079, Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center: unauthenticated authentication bypass to root, unpatched for five months and only exploitable in a post-boot window (CVSS 10.0)
    trending-vulnerabilitiesCisco has replaced the hot fixes for its CVSS 10.0 Secure FMC authentication bypass with the September hardening releases
  10. 2026-07-29Romanian public university UVVG Arad confirms a cyberattack on its IT infrastructure; a Qilin leak-site listing is the only thing linking an actor to it
    active-threatsWest University Vasile Goldis Arad notifies DNSC, the data-protection authority and prosecutors after an attack on academic and administrative systems
  11. 2026-06-25"Mistic" backdoor: signed-Defender DLL sideloading and in-memory tradecraft by access broker Woodgnat/KongTuke
    mentionactive-threats
  12. 2026-06-10Dragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis: 1,020 industrial incidents, The Gentleman's 4× surge against Romanian energy, and the IT-adjacent intrusion pattern
    mentiondeep-diveDragos Q1 2026 Industrial Ransomware Analysis: 1,020 industrial incidents, The Gentleman's 4× surge against Romanian energy, and the IT-adjacent intrusion
  13. 2026-06-09CVE-2026-50751: Check Point Security Gateway IKEv1 VPN authentication bypass, actively exploited, actor assessed with medium confidence to use Qilin ransomware
    trending-vulnerabilitiesCheck Point IKEv1 VPN auth bypass exploited since 7 May, actor assessed with medium confidence to use Qilin. CISA KEV, public PoC, apply sk185033
  14. 2026-05-30CVE-2026-0257, Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect: pre-auth authentication bypass via certificate reuse, marked by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns
    trending-vulnerabilitiesQilin and Inc ransomware exploit the GlobalProtect bypass; one intrusion pivoted to vCenter and ESXi past in-guest EDR
  15. 2026-05-23Rapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report: vulnerability exploitation now top initial-access vector at 38 %; KEV median time to listing collapses to 5 days
    mentionresearch
  16. 2026-05-20Microsoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service that enabled Rhysida deployments and is linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliates
    active-threatsMicrosoft disrupts Fox Tempest, a signing service used for Rhysida attacks and linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliates
  17. 2026-05-08Qilin claims a ransomware attack on the German party Die Linke; the party has not confirmed data theft
    active-threatsDie Linke took parts of its IT infrastructure offline after a suspected Qilin attack; Qilin listed it without samples
ATT&CK techniques (38 across 13 tactics)

38 techniques observed across 11 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Malvertising · Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates · Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · External Remote Services · Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · User Execution: Malicious File · System Services: Service Execution
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · External Remote Services · Server Software Component: Web Shell · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthMasquerading: Invalid Code Signature · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
  • Defense ImpairmentDomain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing · Disable or Modify Tools · Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs · Safe Mode Boot
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · OS Credential Dumping: NTDS · Credentials from Password Stores
  • DiscoveryRemote System Discovery · Network Service Discovery
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares · Remote Services: SSH · Lateral Tool Transfer
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: DNS · Remote Access Tools · Protocol Tunneling
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Service Stop · Inhibit System Recovery · Financial Theft

Resource Development TA0042

T1583.008Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising×1

Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements. Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1588.003Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates×1

Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1608.006Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning×1

Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/retelit-qilin-italian-telco-cloud-operator-public-sector · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×2

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-06-09/cve-2026-50751-check-point-security-gateway-ikev1-vpn-authen · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×3

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · 2026-06-09/cve-2026-50751-check-point-security-gateway-ikev1-vpn-authen · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1569.002System Services: Service Execution×3

Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and Net.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/retelit-qilin-italian-telco-cloud-operator-public-sector · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×2

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-06-09/cve-2026-50751-check-point-security-gateway-ikev1-vpn-authen · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/retelit-qilin-italian-telco-cloud-operator-public-sector · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/qilin-ai-generated-wiper-locker-scripts-forensic-markers · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1036.001Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature×1

Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/retelit-qilin-italian-telco-cloud-operator-public-sector · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/qilin-ai-generated-wiper-locker-scripts-forensic-markers · ATT&CK page ↗

T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1

Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/microsoft-dcu-disrupts-fox-tempest-malware-signing-as-a-serv · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×3

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685.005Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs×1

Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1688Safe Mode Boot×1

Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×2

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×2

Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555Credentials from Password Stores×1

Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1018Remote System Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · ATT&CK page ↗

T1046Network Service Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×2

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares×2

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.004Remote Services: SSH×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · ATT&CK page ↗

T1570Lateral Tool Transfer×2

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1

Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×2

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×2

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×2

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×8

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-09-21/qilin-ai-generated-wiper-locker-scripts-forensic-markers · 2026-09-08/sekoia-kudelski-dprk-lazarus-umbrella-six-cluster-split · 2026-08-10/retelit-qilin-italian-telco-cloud-operator-public-sector · 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · 2026-07-29/uvvg-arad-romania-university-cyberattack-qilin-claim +2 more · ATT&CK page ↗

T1489Service Stop×2

Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-09-21/qilin-ai-generated-wiper-locker-scripts-forensic-markers · ATT&CK page ↗

T1490Inhibit System Recovery×3

Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/qilin-october-2026-build-vcenter-esxi-safe-mode-printers · 2026-09-21/qilin-ai-generated-wiper-locker-scripts-forensic-markers · 2026-05-30/cve-2026-0257-palo-alto-pan-os-globalprotect-pre-auth-authen · ATT&CK page ↗

T1657Financial Theft×1

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.

Evidence: 2026-09-08/sekoia-kudelski-dprk-lazarus-umbrella-six-cluster-split · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Qilin (11)

2026-11-06 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB3

Seqrite: reverse engineering of two Qilin builds shows the October 2026 variant adding a vCenter and ESXi spreading engine, Restart Manager lock release, a Safe Mode reboot loop and ransom notes printed to office printers

Seqrite's reverse engineering of a March 2026 and an October 2026 Qilin (Agenda) sample finds that the Rust code was reworked into a modular workspace of 22 internal crates, that the command line grew from 6 to 42 switches, and that the October build carries subsystems the baseline lacked (Seqrite Labs, 2026-11-03). It uses the Windows Restart Manager API to shut down the processes that lock SQL Server, Exchange and virtual-machine disk files, instead of the brute-force process termination of the March sample, so that the files can be encrypted (Seqrite Labs, 2026-11-03). An embedded PowerShell engine, started with --spread-vcenter, authenticates to vCenter, disables HA and DRS, extracts the ESXi host addresses, opens SSH and SCP sessions, uploads Linux ransomware payloads to /tmp on the hosts and runs esxcli to power off virtual machines and encrypt .vmdk volumes (Seqrite Labs, 2026-11-03).

The build also installs the RSAT Active Directory module itself with DISM before enumerating computers, embeds 32-bit and 64-bit PsExec to spread over the ADMIN$ and C$ shares with harvested credentials, and sets a Safe Mode boot with bcdedit plus an AutoAdminLogon registry value so that it reboots into Safe Mode, where EDR drivers do not load (Seqrite Labs, 2026-11-03). A raw-printing module scans local subnets for TCP port 9100 and sends cleartext ransom notes to office printers, and the October binary masquerades as resmon.exe with a forged Microsoft code-signing overlay (Seqrite Labs, 2026-11-03). Seqrite lists healthcare, manufacturing, education and technology as the victim sectors in its telemetry (Seqrite Labs, 2026-11-03).

Triage: the Restart Manager and a DISM-installed RSAT component are normal in patching and administration, so each is weak alone; the combination with the print fan-out, the Safe Mode change and the vCenter actions is the signal.

the evolved binary contains a modular 20.8 KB PowerShell automation suite (–spread-vcenter). It authenticates to VMware vCenter servers, disables High Availability (HA) and Distributed Resource Scheduler (DRS), extracts ESXi hypervisor IP addresses, and establishes SSH/SCP sessions.

Detection of both Qilin strains is possible using static and behavior-based signatures, such as bcdedit Safe Mode modification and rstrtmgr.dll process termination.

Seqrite Labs 2026-11-03

Builds on: Cisco Talos: a Qilin intrusion's own staging directory held ransomware deployment scripts the…

threat06 Nov 03:50Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Seqrite Labs

2026-05-30 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-0257exploitedupdatedNATOA1

CVE-2026-0257, Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect: pre-auth authentication bypass via certificate reuse, marked by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns

Authentication override cookies in PAN-OS GlobalProtect let a portal or gateway issue a cookie that a user presents in place of re-authenticating, and the feature is not enabled by default (Rapid7, 2026-05-29). Palo Alto Networks says the flaw affects firewalls with a GlobalProtect portal or gateway where authentication override cookies are enabled and a specific certificate configuration exists, classes it as CWE-565 (reliance on cookies without validation and integrity checking), and scores it CVSS 4.0 7.8 with exploit maturity Attacked (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). Rapid7's analysis is that when the certificate used for the cookies is reused for another feature such as the HTTPS service of the portal or gateway, a remote unauthenticated attacker can discover that certificate's public key, forge an arbitrary cookie that the server decrypts and trusts, and bypass authentication; Rapid7 Labs published a proof-of-concept script that tests for it (Rapid7, 2026-05-29). Palo Alto Networks says it is aware of limited exploit attempts on unpatched devices without mitigations applied (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13); Rapid7 MDR dates the earliest observed exploitation to 17 May 2026 and saw two waves, on 18 May from Vultr-hosted infrastructure and on 21 May from Dromatics Systems, which it believes are likely the same threat actor because of a consistent MAC address (Rapid7, 2026-05-29). CISA's KEV catalog lists the CVE with a date added of 29 May 2026 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-10-04).

Affected are PAN-OS 12.1, 11.2, 11.1 and 10.2 releases below the fixed builds in Palo Alto's table and Prisma Access 11.2 and 10.2; Panorama and Cloud NGFW are not affected (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). The solution table names the first fixed build for each minor release, for example 12.1.4-h6 or 12.1.7 and later for 12.1.2 through 12.1.4, 11.2.12 or later for 11.2.11, 11.1.15 or later for 11.1.14, and 10.2.18-h6 or later on the 10.2 train, while Prisma Access 11.2 needs 11.2.7-h13 or later and 10.2 needs 10.2.10-h36 or later (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). After the upgrade users must re-authenticate once, because the firewall regenerates the cookie with a more secure method (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). Palo Alto's mitigations are a dedicated certificate used only for authentication override cookies, or disabling Authentication Override (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13).

Triage: cookie logins are routine wherever Authentication Override is enabled, because users present the cookie in lieu of re-authenticating (Rapid7, 2026-05-29). In some intrusions Arctic Wolf saw a cookie-based authentication failure with the error Cannot decrypt cookie, followed quickly by a successful cookie-based authentication from the same source, although the error was not present in every intrusion (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11).

Palo Alto Networks has become aware of limited exploit attempts on unpatched PAN-OS devices without mitigations applied.

Palo Alto Networks PSIRT

Due to the consistent MAC address, Rapid7 believes both waves of exploitation are likely from the same threat actor (TA).

Rapid7

Arctic Wolf investigated multiple distinct intrusions during June 2026 that resulted in Qilin ransomware deployment, all originating from exploitation of CVE-2026-0257 against Palo Alto Networks firewall appliances.

Arctic Wolf Labs 2026-07-20

Ransomware operators exploiting the May 2026 CVE-2026-0257 include Spikey Scorpius (aka Qilin) and Tarnished Scorpius (aka Inc).

The most significant evolution in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) following successful exploitation of CVE-2026-0257 is the direct pivot to the virtualization layer.

This tactic bypasses in-guest endpoint detection and response (EDR) and security controls, representing a highly sophisticated method for obtaining domain-wide credentials.

Unit 42
Updaterun 2026-06-10-c84347b2actionsevidencesectorssourcesbody

Unit 42's 9 June update on CVE-2026-0257 confirms that a limited number of probed PAN-OS GlobalProtect devices had attacker-established, gateway-connected VPN sessions, moving this from "exploit attempts observed" to confirmed successful exploitation (Unit 42, 2026-06-09). The bug is CWE-565, reliance on cookies without validation and integrity checking (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13); when the cookie certificate is shared with another function, an attacker can discover its public key and forge authentication-override cookies, and Rapid7 dates successful exploitation to 17 May from low-cost hosting IPs (Rapid7, 2026-05-29).

Affected: PAN-OS 10.2/11.1/11.2/12.1 and Prisma Access where authentication override is enabled with a shared certificate; patched in 12.1.7+, 11.2.12+, 11.1.15+, 10.2.18-h6+ and corresponding Prisma builds (Palo Alto Networks, 2026-05-13). After the upgrade users must re-authenticate once, because the fixed firewall regenerates the cookie with a more secure method; as a workaround disable authentication override or assign it a dedicated certificate (Palo Alto Networks, 2026-05-13). Hunt GlobalProtect gateway logs for cookie-based authentications from unexpected source addresses; Rapid7's log of the attack shows the authentication method recorded as a cookie (Rapid7, 2026-05-29).

Updaterun 2026-06-17-e102009cevidenceregionssectorssourcesbody

Palo Alto's Unit 42 confirms an active exploitation campaign against the GlobalProtect cookie authentication-bypass (CVE-2026-0257) (Unit 42, 2026-06-09). The flaw (CWE-565, reliance on cookies without validation and integrity checking) lets an attacker forge a session and establish a VPN tunnel without credentials when the override feature is enabled (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT).

Arctic Wolf saw exploitation attempts across insurance, finance, manufacturing, education, engineering and healthcare targets in North America and Europe, and in a subset of intrusions automated internal SMB reconnaissance consistent with Impacket tooling (anonymous NTLM logon, share enumeration and domain-user discovery); it says the follow-on activity did not progress substantially beyond the initial SMB session setup and lightweight reconnaissance (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11). NCSC-CH refreshed its Security Hub advisory on 2026-06-16 to flag the Unit 42 confirmation (NCSC-CH Security Hub, 2026-06-16). Defenders: disable "Authentication Override" if not required, patch to fixed PAN-OS builds, and audit sessions since 17 May for anonymous NTLM logons and SMB share enumeration from VPN-assigned addresses.

Updaterun 2026-10-06T0405Z-inteltitleheadlinesummarypriorityimmediate_actiontagsentitiestechniquesaffected_productssourcesevidencesourcing_noteclassificationactionsbody

CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (version 2026.10.04) now marks CVE-2026-0257 as used in known ransomware campaigns; the record names no group and its date of addition remains 2026-05-29 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-10-04). Arctic Wolf Labs' report of 2026-07-20 says it investigated multiple distinct intrusions in June 2026 that ended in Qilin ransomware deployment, all originating from exploitation of CVE-2026-0257 against Palo Alto Networks firewalls, and that the post-exploitation tradecraft ranged from rapid encryption-only operations to double extortion, possibly suggesting several affiliates of the Qilin ransomware-as-a-service operation (Arctic Wolf, 2026-07-20).

The chain Arctic Wolf describes starts with a GlobalProtect VPN session obtained through the cookie bypass, in some cases from systems that identified themselves as kali, and continues with registry Run-key persistence that points at a ransomware payload staged under C:\PerfLogs, remote-access tools (AnyDesk, Ngrok, LogMeIn and, in one case, a scheduled task consistent with MeshAgent), LSASS credential theft through rundll32 and comsvcs.dll into a file with an .odt extension, a full copy of the Active Directory database with ntdsutil, lateral movement with PsExec over administrative shares and RDP, a PowerShell routine that clears every Windows event log with records, and Microsoft Defender real-time protection disabled in some cases (Arctic Wolf, 2026-07-20). In the double-extortion cases data went to the MEGA cloud storage service with Rclone before encryption, and the attackers targeted the Veeam backup infrastructure before deploying the ransomware; some intrusions involved no data theft before encryption (Arctic Wolf, 2026-07-20). A gateway that was reachable and unpatched therefore needs a compromise assessment of the Windows estate behind it, not only the patch.

Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-auditbodyevent_date

Arctic Wolf's June telemetry shows automated SMB reconnaissance consistent with Impacket tooling (anonymous NTLM logon, share enumeration, domain-user discovery) in a subset of intrusions, and Arctic Wolf states the activity did not progress substantially beyond the initial SMB session setup and lightweight reconnaissance (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11); the 2026-06-17 note had called it lateral movement. Before the Qilin reporting, Rapid7 saw no indication of successful lateral movement from the compromised devices (Rapid7, 2026-05-29), and Unit 42 reported no post-access behavior or lateral movement as of 9 June (Unit 42, 2026-06-09). Rapid7 saw the same spoofed MAC address on the attacker's client in both May waves, a pivot for VPN session logs (Rapid7, 2026-05-29), although Arctic Wolf found MAC spoofing was not consistent across later intrusions (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11). Rapid7 Labs published a public proof of concept on 29 May, the same day CISA added the flaw to its catalog (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11).

Updaterun 2026-10-21T0256Z-intelheadlinesummaryentitiessourcesevidencesourcing_noteactionsbody

Unit 42 updated its threat brief on 2026-10-19 and 2026-10-20: it continues to see attempted exploitation by ransomware operators, naming Spikey Scorpius (Qilin) and Tarnished Scorpius (Inc), and says it is aware of public reporting that attributes exploitation to actors using Settra ransomware (Unit 42, 2026-10-20). Its investigations have run since early June 2026 and span industries including government (Unit 42, 2026-10-20). The attackers use the flaw for an initial foothold, bypass multi-factor authentication to establish a VPN session, then run reconnaissance with dual-use remote monitoring and management tools, move over RDP and SMB and stage credential harvesting, exfiltration and ransomware (Unit 42, 2026-10-20).

The change Unit 42 stresses is a direct pivot to the virtualization layer: in one case the attackers went from the compromised VPN gateway to the vCenter management appliance, disabled the execInstalledOnly security control on ESXi hosts and used a custom tool for offline credential dumping from a domain controller's virtual disk, which bypasses in-guest EDR; it also saw this access chained with exploit tools aimed at Veeam backup infrastructure (Unit 42, 2026-10-20). The brief adds that GlobalProtect profiles mapped to HTTP or HTTPS services on management interfaces can expose the management interface on ports 4443 and 3879 without the administrators knowing, and that an out-of-band HTTPS connection to the management address on those ports shows whether it is exposed (Unit 42, 2026-10-20). The brief dates the flaw's addition to CISA's catalog to 13 May 2026, whereas the catalog's own record says 29 May 2026 (Unit 42, 2026-10-20; CISA KEV catalog, 2026-10-04).

Correctionrun 2026-10-21T0800Z-auditactionscvesbody

The one-time re-authentication is a consequence of the upgrade, not a step to force: with the fix, a firewall that uses authentication override cookies regenerates the cookie with a more secure method, so GlobalProtect users re-authenticate once after the upgrade even when they hold a valid cookie (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). Cookie logins are routine where Authentication Override is enabled; in some intrusions Arctic Wolf saw a cookie-based authentication failure with the error Cannot decrypt cookie, followed quickly by a successful cookie-based authentication from the same source (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11).

Correctionrun 2026-10-25T1308Z-auditbodyevidence

The CWE-565 classification (reliance on cookies without validation and integrity checking) is Palo Alto Networks' (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). Rapid7 describes the attacker discovering the public key of a certificate shared with another function and forging authentication-override cookies with it, and its proof of concept takes the key from the certificate chain the HTTPS service presents (Rapid7, 2026-05-29).

vulnerability30 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-09-29 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

Storm-2570: a ransomware affiliate reuses a consistent commodity RMM/tunnelling/credential-theft toolkit across four separate RaaS brands, with government agencies among its confirmed victims

Microsoft Threat Intelligence profiles Storm-2570, a ransomware affiliate it has tracked since April 2025 that operates across multiple ransomware-as-a-service ecosystems rather than committing to one brand, deploying Qilin, DragonForce, Anubis and BERT payloads interchangeably against victims in healthcare, education, government agencies and services, financial services, energy, retail, IT and food/agriculture across the US, Canada, UK, Spain, the Netherlands and Puerto Rico (Microsoft Security Blog, 2026-09-24). Post-compromise, the affiliate routinely conducts internal network discovery using NetScan, SoftPerfect Network Scanner Portable and Nmap alongside native discovery commands and file-searching activity, to identify reachable hosts and services, map internal networks and locate systems, shares and files of interest ahead of credential access or encryption (Microsoft Security Blog, 2026-09-24). Regardless of the final ransomware brand, Microsoft describes a recurring commodity toolchain across deployments: MeshAgent/MeshCentral, frequently renamed per-victim (for example meshagent64-[org].exe) and one of the affiliate's most frequently observed tools, as an operational bridge between initial hands-on-keyboard activity and later-stage actions such as account manipulation, discovery and credential access (Microsoft says the initial access method remains unconfirmed); Atera plus Splashtop, ScreenConnect, NinjaRMM, and, in one intrusion, a persistent LocalSystem-service Cloudflared.exe tunnel, and ngrok exposing RDP for remote access; ntdsutil-driven Install-From-Media dumps of ntds.dit for offline domain-credential extraction; Mimikatz, LaZagne and pypykatz for credential harvesting; systematic Windows Defender tampering (disabling real-time monitoring, adding C:\PerfLogs exclusions, direct WinDefend registry edits) ahead of deployment; PsExec-driven lateral movement using @ip.txt host lists, including an rdp.bat script that force-enables RDP, alongside Impacket and NetExec over SMB; and s5cmd- or Rclone-based exfiltration to attacker-controlled S3 buckets ahead of double-extortion (Microsoft Security Blog, 2026-09-24).

Because the toolkit, not the ransomware brand, is what recurs, defenders who alert only on a known ransomware binary or a specific RaaS brand's indicators will miss the affiliate entirely on its next engagement under a different payload. The consistent tradecraft gives a detection surface that survives a brand switch: a renamed MeshAgent binary establishing outbound C2, an ntdsutil IFM snapshot followed by offline credential extraction, a persistent-service Cloudflared.exe process, discovery-scanner activity (NetScan/Nmap) ahead of lateral movement, and s5cmd/Rclone processes initiating outbound transfers to cloud object storage are the behaviors Microsoft's reporting keys on across Storm-2570 engagements, independent of which ransomware note appears at the end. Microsoft's own post closes with Defender XDR detections and mitigations for the affiliate's toolchain (Microsoft Security Blog, 2026-09-24).

Triage: MeshAgent, Atera, ScreenConnect and NinjaRMM are legitimate tools many organizations already run for IT support; the discriminator is not the tool's presence but its provenance and configuration: Microsoft describes a renamed executable (meshagent64-[org].exe rather than the vendor's own binary name) and a Cloudflared.exe tunnel registered as a persistent LocalSystem service; an RMM agent that appeared outside a change-managed deployment window is a further discriminator a responder can apply.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed Storm-2570 in multiple investigated intrusions affecting organizations in United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands, and Puerto Rico, including healthcare and public health, education, government agencies and services, financial services, energy, consumer retail, Information technology (IT), food and agriculture, consumer services, commercial facilities, non-government organization (NGO), chemicals, critical manufacturing, and transportation.

Microsoft Security Blog / Microsoft Threat Intelligence 2026-09-24
Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-auditprioritysourcing_notebody

Microsoft places MeshAgent and MeshCentral as an operational bridge between initial hands-on-keyboard activity and later-stage actions, and states that the method through which Storm-2570 gains initial access remains unconfirmed (Microsoft Security Blog, 2026-09-24); the analysis had described the bridge as running from initial access. The change-window check in the Triage line is a responder's discriminator, not one Microsoft states.

Builds on: Cisco Talos: a Qilin intrusion's own staging directory held ransomware deployment scripts the…

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Earlier coverage (8)

2026-09-21NOTABLENATOB2Talos finds AI-generated Python wiper and mass-deployment scripts in a Qilin-affected environment, identified by step-numbered comments and consistent per-step loggingCisco Talos found Python post-exploitation scripts in a Qilin ransomware-affected environment (a GPO-deployed time-triggered wiper, a Veeam-backup-destruction script and a mass ransomware deployment launcher) that Talos assesses with medium-to-high confidence were AI-generated, based on step-numbered code comments, consistent per-step logging and specification-style docstrings, plus a bash-history reference to a local "llm_chatbot" tool.2026-08-04HIGHexploitedupdatedNATOA1CVE-2026-20079, Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center: unauthenticated authentication bypass to root, unpatched for five months and only exploitable in a post-boot window (CVSS 10.0)CVE-2026-20079 is a CVSS 10.0 authentication bypass in the web interface of Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center that lets an unauthenticated remote attacker execute script files and obtain root on the firewall management plane. Cisco disclosed it on 2026-03-04 with no patch and no workaround, added per-train hot fixes and a compromise check on 2026-07-31, and has revised that check three times since, most recently on 2026-08-03. VulnCheck built a working exploit and published the chain in March, and the same management interface carries the separate, KEV-listed and actively exploited static-credential flaw CVE-2026-20316 that Cisco says can be combined with other Secure FMC flaws to elevate privileges. CISA added this CVE to its own KEV catalog on 2026-09-09, confirming active exploitation Cisco had not previously reported.2026-09-08NOTABLENATOB2Sekoia and Kudelski Security split the 'Lazarus umbrella' into six named DPRK clusters, and document two of them adopting commodity ransomware-as-a-service within two months of each otherSekoia and Kudelski Security (a Switzerland-based firm) jointly reassessed DPRK's offensive-cyber organization on 2026-09-07, replacing the historical "Lazarus umbrella" with six tracked sub-clusters and documenting that Andariel and Moonstone Sleet each adopted a commodity ransomware-as-a-service (Play and Qilin respectively) within two months of one another, a single observed timing overlap the authors call notable, consistent with the general possibility that nominally espionage-focused DPRK units rent criminal ransomware infrastructure alongside bespoke tooling.2026-08-10HIGHNATOB1Qilin compromised Italian telecommunications and cloud operator Retelit on 8 June, the company confirmed it only after an investigation forced the question, and one of the three affected data centres was its certified backup siteIrpiMedia reported on 2026-08-04 that Retelit, one of Italy's largest business telecommunications and cloud operators, had been compromised in an extortion attack claimed by Qilin, with roughly 270,000 files listed on the leak site and an estimated 300 GB published across two dumps. Retelit made no announcement through its own channels; after the article ran it sent the outlet a right-of-reply confirming an 8 June 2026 attack attributed to Qilin, notified to Italy's national cybersecurity agency, CSIRT-ITA, the postal police and the data-protection authority, and scoping the damage to virtualisation infrastructure in 3 of its 38 national data centres, around 7% of distributed systems. IrpiMedia names those three as Verona, Rome and Milan (Milan being the site certified for Retelit's own backup and service continuity) and reports customers complaining of backup-recovery failure.2026-07-29NOTABLENATOB2Romanian public university UVVG Arad confirms a cyberattack on its IT infrastructure; a Qilin leak-site listing is the only thing linking an actor to itUniversitatea de Vest "Vasile Goldis" din Arad, a Romanian public university, issued a press release on 2026-07-28 confirming that a recently identified cyberattack affected its IT infrastructure and the digital services used in academic and administrative work, that it notified the national cybersecurity directorate DNSC, the data-protection authority ANSPDCP and organised-crime prosecutors DIICOT, and that technical teams are working with external specialists on gradual restoration. The university does not say which systems are unavailable, whether personal data was accessed or exfiltrated, when the attack occurred, or who was responsible. Separately, the Qilin ransomware operation listed the university on its leak site with an estimated attack date of 2026-07-26, a claim carried only by a leak-site mirror, which none of the Romanian reporting mentions at all.2026-06-09CRITICALexploitedupdatedNATOA1CVE-2026-50751: Check Point Security Gateway IKEv1 VPN authentication bypass, actively exploited, actor assessed with medium confidence to use Qilin ransomwareCheck Point IKEv1 VPN auth bypass (CVE-2026-50751, CVSS 9.3) exploited in the wild since 7 May, a month before disclosure, against a few dozen targeted organizations. Check Point confirmed post-compromise activity associated with a Qilin ransomware affiliate in one case and assesses with medium confidence that the actor behind the exploitation is financially motivated and uses Qilin ransomware (Check Point, 2026-06-08). Unauthenticated session forgery on Remote Access / Mobile Access gateways. NCSC-CH flagged it as actively exploited (NCSC-CH, 2026-06-08) and CISA added it to KEV (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-06-08).2026-05-20NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2Microsoft DCU disrupts Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service that enabled Rhysida deployments and is linked to INC, Qilin and Akira affiliatesMicrosoft's Digital Crimes Unit disrupted Fox Tempest, a malware-signing service active since May 2025 that abused Microsoft Artifact Signing to obtain code-signing certificates valid for 72 hours, seizing its website under a case unsealed in the Southern District of New York and revoking over a thousand certificates. Microsoft links it to Vanilla Tempest (which in some cases deployed Rhysida), Storm-0501, Storm-2561 and Storm-0249, and through cryptocurrency analysis to affiliates delivering INC, Qilin and Akira ransomware. The signed malware posed as AnyDesk, Teams, PuTTY and Webex installers.2026-05-08ROUTINEupdatedNATOB2Qilin claims a ransomware attack on the German party Die Linke; the party has not confirmed data theftDie Linke disclosed on 2026-03-27 that it had taken parts of its IT infrastructure offline after a suspected ransomware attack it attributes to Qilin. Qilin listed the party on its leak site on 2026-04-01 without publishing samples. The party says its member database was not affected and that it cannot assess whether the attackers' aim of publishing internal data will succeed or has already occurred, and Heise reported that which internal data was compromised had not yet been definitively clarified.

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