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The Gentlemen

actor · actor:thegentlemen single-sourcesingle-source-victim

Ransomware-as-a-service operation (also tracked as Storm-2697 / Phantom Mantis) that surged in Q1 2026, 192 attacks, +588% QoQ, 32% of victims European, with FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 as the initial-access funnel. ESET (2026-06-18) documents the operators centrally building and maintaining the GentleKiller EDR-killer framework (BYOVD, 48 vendors) for their affiliates.

Aliases: Gentlemen RaaS, Storm-2697, Phantom Mantis

Coverage
18
14 about it · 4 mentions · first 2026-05-10 → last 2026-11-15
Latest activity
2026-11-15
Ransom-ISAC: Gentlemen affiliate, VPN without MFA to Domain Admin in an hour; GPO locker likely lost a…
Peak priority
high
3 high · 9 notable · 2 routine
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, technology, manufacturing · regions: europe, switzerland, dach
Sources cited
43
34 hosts
2026-05-1418 appearances2026-11-15

Action items (2)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about The Gentlemen, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • List every monitoring server, script, scheduled task and connection manager that stores an ESXi, vCenter or Proxmox root password, replace each with a least-privilege monitoring account, and rotate the root passwords that were stored or reused across hosts.
    2026-11-07Kaspersky: ESXi and Proxmox ransomware ran on a…
  • If your organisation bought video-surveillance, alarm or access-control installation or maintenance from Ixa Systems, ask the firm in writing which of your sites and credentials are in the stolen data and rotate every camera, alarm, intercom and remote-maintenance credential it held.
    2026-10-08Site plans, camera locations and some credentials…

Defender insights

What each entry about The Gentlemen tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-15NOTABLERansom-ISAC: Gentlemen affiliate, VPN without MFA to Domain Admin in an hour; GPO locker likely lost a replication race

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-11-07NOTABLEKaspersky: ESXi and Proxmox ransomware ran on a monitoring server's root password and admin notes, no VM escape

Exposure · detection

2026-10-08NOTABLESite plans, camera locations and some credentials of Vaud prisons and banks, and of police premises, reported for sale

Exposure · detection

2026-10-02ROUTINEA file-transfer supplier to authorities had ransomware on one internal server; the vendor says its platform is untouched

Exposure

2026-09-21NOTABLECisco Talos maps The Gentlemen's AD attack chain, including offline credential theft from a mounted VHDX backup image

Triage

2026-07-18NOTABLEMetro Mondego confirms a 6 July ransomware attack on internal systems, transport operation unaffected; TheGentlemen claims data theft

Triage

2 earlier entries carry guidance too, listed under the story timeline below.

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

documented in

related to

attributed activity

Story timeline

Every entry that names The Gentlemen, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-11-15The Gentlemen affiliate: an SSL-VPN account without MFA, a Windows Server 2003 host and a dormant local administrator gave Domain Admin in under an hour; the GPO locker most likely lost a replication race, so antivirus was disabled estate-wide but only one host was encrypted (Ransom-ISAC)
    active-threatsRansom-ISAC: Gentlemen affiliate, VPN without MFA to Domain Admin in an hour; GPO locker likely lost a replication race
  2. 2026-11-07Kaspersky GERT: two ESXi and Proxmox ransomware cases in which a monitoring server's reused root password and plaintext administrator notes, not a VM escape, gave the attackers the hypervisor
    active-threatsKaspersky: ESXi and Proxmox ransomware ran on a monitoring server's root password and admin notes, no VM escape
  3. 2026-10-30ANNUAL REPORT: Cisco Talos Incident Response trends Q3 2026: public administration tied with finance as the most targeted sector, help-desk vishing into remote-management tools, and ransomware operators uninstalling and killing EDR
    mentionresearchTalos IR Q3: public administration tied for most targeted; vishing into RMM and EDR killing mark the ransomware cases
  4. 2026-10-28ARA-Region Lyss-Limpachtal (canton Bern, communal wastewater-treatment association): SafePay has put about 49 GB into the darknet, which Risikomonitor's analysis, relayed by Inside IT, finds holds personal records, bank statements, weak passwords and a third party's monitoring credentials; the association declines to comment
    mentionactive-threatsInside IT: SafePay published about 49 GB from a Bernese wastewater association; the association declines to comment
  5. 2026-10-22k0t: Group-IB and NyxLab describe a probable access broker that mass-exploits FortiWeb and PAN-OS GlobalProtect, brute-forces FortiGate and decrypts stolen FortiGate configurations offline with the default key, with victims later listed by Qilin and The Gentlemen
    mentionactive-threatsGroup-IB: k0t takes edge devices in bulk and decrypts FortiGate configurations offline; enable private-data-encryption
  6. 2026-10-08Ixa Systems, a Vaud security integrator serving police, prisons and banks: camera locations, plans and some passwords that TheGentlemen claimed to have stolen are reported on sale on the darknet
    active-threatsSite plans, camera locations and some credentials of Vaud prisons and banks, and of police premises, reported for sale
  7. 2026-10-07A Gentlemen ransomware affiliate ran his own leak site and reached his victims through stolen CI/CD secrets, with attack commands driven through an MCP server (CloudSEK)
    mentionactive-threatsCloudSEK: a Gentlemen affiliate reached victims through stolen GitLab CI/CD secrets and drove attacks over MCP
  8. 2026-10-02FTAPI, a file-transfer vendor whose customers include authorities, confirms ransomware on an internal server; The Gentlemen list it on their leak site
    active-threatsA file-transfer supplier to authorities had ransomware on one internal server; the vendor says its platform is untouched
  9. 2026-09-21The Gentlemen's open-directory attack toolchain: mounting a victim's own VHDX backup files to pull ntds.dit and SAM offline, then chunked-rclone exfil to Wasabi
    active-threatsCisco Talos maps The Gentlemen's AD attack chain, including offline credential theft from a mounted VHDX backup image
  10. 2026-07-18TheGentlemen ransomware hits Portugal's Metro Mondego (Coimbra light-rail); operator confirms attack, notifies CNCS and CNPD
    active-threatsMetro Mondego confirms a 6 July ransomware attack on internal systems, transport operation unaffected; TheGentlemen claims data theft
  11. 2026-06-27"The Gentlemen" ransomware claims 478 victims and adds worm propagation, Switzerland the second-most-targeted European country
    active-threats
  12. 2026-06-20The Gentlemen (Storm-2697) claims OT-adjacent Mackay Sugar attack; operator attributed to a Russian national
    active-threats
  13. 2026-06-19ESET: the Gentlemen RaaS gang centrally builds and maintains its affiliates' EDR-killer framework
    research
  14. 2026-06-12The Gentlemen ransomware: 478 claimed leak-site victims, self-propagating Go encryptor, operator publicly named
    active-threats
  15. 2026-05-29The Gentlemen ransomware, Microsoft publishes full technical dissection of the Storm-2697 Go-encryptor
    active-threats
  16. 2026-05-23Rapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report: vulnerability exploitation now top initial-access vector at 38 %; KEV median time to listing collapses to 5 days
    research
  17. 2026-05-20The Gentlemen ransomware group lists Czech university VSFS and Swiss engineering firm DEVO-Tech AG on its leak site
    active-threatsThe Gentlemen claims a Czech private university and a Swiss engineering firm on its leak site on 2026-05-18
  18. 2026-05-14The Gentlemen RaaS: leaked internal chats show Fortinet and Cisco edge access, NTLM relay, ADCS abuse and EDR-kill tooling, mapped by Check Point Research
    active-threatsLeaked chats of The Gentlemen ransomware group show its edge-device access, NTLM relay and EDR-kill toolkit
ATT&CK techniques (51 across 14 tactics)

51 techniques observed across 10 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceActive Scanning
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · External Remote Services · Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job · Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job · Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · External Remote Services · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job · Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
  • Defense ImpairmentDomain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Disable or Modify Tools · Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs · Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping · OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · OS Credential Dumping: NTDS · Brute Force · Steal Web Session Cookie · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Credentials from Password Stores · Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay · Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting · Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
  • DiscoveryRemote System Discovery · Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups · Account Discovery: Domain Account · Network Share Discovery · Domain Trust Discovery
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services · Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares · Remote Services: SSH · Remote Services: VNC · Remote Services: Windows Remote Management · Exploitation of Remote Services
  • CollectionData from Network Shared Drive · Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
  • Command and ControlWeb Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools · Dynamic Resolution · Protocol Tunneling
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol · Exfiltration Over Web Service · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Inhibit System Recovery · Financial Theft

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1595Active Scanning×1

Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×2

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053Scheduled Task/Job×1

Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.

Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053Scheduled Task/Job×1

Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.

Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-06-19/eset-the-gentlemen-raas-gang-centrally-builds-and-maintains · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053Scheduled Task/Job×1

Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.

Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×2

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-06-19/eset-the-gentlemen-raas-gang-centrally-builds-and-maintains · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×2

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×2

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×4

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685.005Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs×1

Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685.006Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs×1

Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the `/var/log/` directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003OS Credential Dumping×1

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×1

Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110Brute Force×2

Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×1

An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555Credentials from Password Stores×1

Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1557.001Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay×2

By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1558.003Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting×1

Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates×1

Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.

Evidence: 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1018Remote System Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups×1

Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1135Network Share Discovery×2

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1482Domain Trust Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021Remote Services×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares×2

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.004Remote Services: SSH×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.005Remote Services: VNC×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.006Remote Services: Windows Remote Management×2

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1210Exploitation of Remote Services×1

Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1039Data from Network Shared Drive×1

Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1557.001Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay×2

By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×2

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1568Dynamic Resolution×1

Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×2

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

Evidence: 2026-07-18/metro-mondego-thegentlemen-ransomware-portugal-transit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×5

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · 2026-10-02/ftapi-ransomware-the-gentlemen-supplier-to-authorities · 2026-07-18/metro-mondego-thegentlemen-ransomware-portugal-transit · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1490Inhibit System Recovery×2

Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

T1657Financial Theft×3

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.

Evidence: 2026-10-08/ixa-systems-vaud-security-integrator-thegentlemen-sale · 2026-05-20/thegentlemen-raas-lists-czech-university-and-swiss-engineeri · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about The Gentlemen (14)

2026-11-15 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOC2

The Gentlemen affiliate: an SSL-VPN account without MFA, a Windows Server 2003 host and a dormant local administrator gave Domain Admin in under an hour; the GPO locker most likely lost a replication race, so antivirus was disabled estate-wide but only one host was encrypted (Ransom-ISAC)

Ransom-ISAC reconstructs an early-August 2026 intrusion into a small company by a Gentlemen ransomware affiliate from forensic images of two domain controllers, event logs of 41 hosts and firewall logs (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13). Entry was an SSL-VPN account without MFA that succeeded on the first attempt from an unusual country; neither egress address appears in any earlier failed login, so the credential was most likely held beforehand. Within the hour the actor ran an anonymous SMB sweep, three Kerberoast-style service-ticket requests (the KDC logged an RC4 and DES downgrade against an AES-only account) and hundreds of failed SMB logons against a domain controller, then used a dormant, weak-password local administrator on an end-of-life Windows Server 2003 SQL host that allowed null sessions. A Domain Admin session opened on the domain controller less than an hour after the first login; Ransom-ISAC could not prove how and says the credentials were most likely taken from that host. The actor then pushed a Rust credential harvester, which takes the DPAPI domain backup key, and EtherRAT, a Node.js implant that reads its command address from an Ethereum smart contract and never reached it; data left through the VPN tunnel over about two days of a weekend (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13).

The locker, run on a domain controller in domain-wide mode, built a GPO linked enforced at the domain root and the Domain Controllers container, with eight registry values that disable antivirus and a Preferences scheduled task in SYSVOL. The call that declares the Preferences extension reached a domain controller the GPO had not replicated to, the script suppressed the error and no client read the task: antivirus was off estate-wide but the locker ran on one host, which wiped its logs (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13).

Triage: scanners and inventory tools also sweep SMB anonymously and legacy applications use null sessions (the finding is a dormant account logging on right after); developers resolve Ethereum RPC providers, so scope that rule to servers; administrators edit GPOs, so correlate with the change calendar (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13).

Everything here comes from a single incident response engagement.

The GPO still turned off the antivirus across the estate, but the locker ran on only one host.

Ransom-ISAC 2026-11-13
threat15 Nov 04:28Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Ransom-ISAC

2026-11-07 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Kaspersky GERT: two ESXi and Proxmox ransomware cases in which a monitoring server's reused root password and plaintext administrator notes, not a VM escape, gave the attackers the hypervisor

In the first case, Kaspersky's investigation began with BlackNevas ransomware activity on a Windows system in a virtualised domain-controller segment, where the execution of the AnyDesk remote tool and the GMER binary was recorded (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06). The environment used PRTG Network Monitor, whose deployment had broad access to the ESXi hosts, and the same root password was reused across several nodes; after obtaining access to the monitoring environment the attacker used the ESXi credential to connect over SSH to the hosts that shared the password (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06). On the first host, a file was uploaded during a root SSH session and its first execution failed with "Execution of non-installed file prevented"; the actor then disabled the execInstalledOnly policy with esxcli and ran it, while on a second host in another subnet with the same password the binary ran and the logs were cleared (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06).

In the second case, a ransomware incident by The Gentlemen, the actor used information it had collected between initial access and visible impact: on a compromised system administrator's workstation it found Proxmox root credentials and access details in plain-text notes and logged in as root (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06). It then activated the VNC web socket through the root account, which gave it control of the Proxmox environment, and used that access to download and run the ransomware in the cluster, encrypting the whole virtual environment (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06). Kaspersky says a fully patched hypervisor can still be compromised through a shared password, an overprivileged monitoring account, an open SSH path or an administrator interface reachable from a general server network (Kaspersky GERT, 2026-11-06).

A monitoring system that could reach the virtualization layer also exposed a reusable root credential.

No VM escape was required.

Password reuse converted one recovered secret into farm-wide access.

Kaspersky Global Emergency Response Team (Securelist) 2026-11-06
threat07 Nov 04:00Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-10-08 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

Ixa Systems, a Vaud security integrator serving police, prisons and banks: camera locations, plans and some passwords that TheGentlemen claimed to have stolen are reported on sale on the darknet

Le Temps reports that data stolen in a ransomware attack on a Vaud security-technology firm is now on sale on the darknet, and that the loot includes the locations of surveillance cameras, passwords and plans of security installations (Le Temps, 2026-10-06). The AWP agency names the firm as Ixa Systems of Crissier, which specialises in video surveillance, access control and burglary protection and whose customers include police authorities, banks, hospitals, schools and prisons (AWP via cash.ch, 2026-10-07). ICTjournal lists the Établissements de la plaine de l'Orbe and other judicial entities, gendarmerie premises, several banks including the Banque cantonale vaudoise and several dozen companies among the organisations concerned, and says exposure varies: for some clients the documents are limited to tenders or consultations, for others they give the location of cameras or the layout of alert buttons (ICTjournal, 2026-10-07).

Le Temps says the group TheGentlemen announced and claimed the theft on the darknet at the end of August (Le Temps, 2026-10-06). Inside IT dates the claim to 28 August and says the group made good on its threat to publish the data at the end of September (Inside IT, 2026-10-07), while ICTjournal says the documents were put on sale on 25 September and that, according to an expert's analysis seen by Le Temps, some of the data has begun to circulate (ICTjournal, 2026-10-07). The firm says it never lost use of its data, paid no ransom and that the attack gave no direct access to camera images; the canton's cybersecurity delegate says checks so far have found nothing that would compromise the security of the establishments concerned or give access to the State's IT environment, and that knowing a camera model is not enough to exploit it because the device must be reachable (ICTjournal, 2026-10-07). None of the reports states how the attackers got in.

Correctionrun 2026-10-21T0800Z-auditsummary

The organisations ICTjournal names as concerned by the stolen data are the Établissements de la plaine de l'Orbe and other judicial entities, gendarmerie premises, several banks including the Banque cantonale vaudoise, and several dozen companies (ICTjournal, 2026-10-07). Police authorities, banks, hospitals, schools and prisons are the firm's customers as AWP describes them (AWP via cash.ch, 2026-10-07); neither report names a hospital or a school among the organisations concerned.

incident08 Oct 04:52Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Earlier coverage (11)

2026-10-02ROUTINENATOB2FTAPI, a file-transfer vendor whose customers include authorities, confirms ransomware on an internal server; The Gentlemen list it on their leak siteFTAPI of Munich, whose secure file-transfer service is used by authorities and companies, told heise that unauthorised parties installed ransomware on a single internal server, detected on 2026-09-14, and says its platform, customer systems and exchanged data were not affected. The Gentlemen ransomware group listed FTAPI on its leak site with a countdown that heise read as about five days on 2026-09-29.2026-09-21NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2The Gentlemen's open-directory attack toolchain: mounting a victim's own VHDX backup files to pull ntds.dit and SAM offline, then chunked-rclone exfil to WasabiCisco Talos reconstructed a six-phase Active Directory attack chain used by an operator associated with the ransomware-as-a-service brand The Gentlemen, recovered from an exposed open directory's own command history. The chain tunnels through Chisel/Ligolo-ng, enumerates AD with NetExec (Talos says RustHound/BloodHound-related tools may also have been used), attempts to exploit a public-facing GLPI SQL injection, leaves traces suggesting Zerologon and MS17-010 exploitation while expanding into the network, then extracts ntds.dit and SAM offline from a CIFS-mounted VHDX backup image, and leaves traces indicating it exfiltrated the VHDX backup images themselves in 256MiB chunks to Wasabi cloud storage via rclone.2026-07-18NOTABLENATOB2TheGentlemen ransomware hits Portugal's Metro Mondego (Coimbra light-rail); operator confirms attack, notifies CNCS and CNPDMetro Mondego, the public operator of the Metrobus light-rail service between Lousã and Coimbra (Portugal), confirmed on 2026-07-17 that a ransomware attack on 6 July affected part of its internal systems without compromising transport operation. The RaaS group TheGentlemen (Microsoft: Storm-2697) claimed the attack and data theft on its leak site. Metro Mondego activated incident response with external experts and notified Portugal's national cyber authority (CNCS), the data-protection authority (CNPD) and criminal investigators; it cannot yet confirm whether personal data was copied, but says passenger payment data was not affected. A clean EU public-transport incident showing IT/OT segmentation holding.2026-06-27HIGH"The Gentlemen" ransomware claims 478 victims and adds worm propagation, Switzerland the second-most-targeted European country"The Gentlemen" ransomware: Switzerland is the second-most-targeted European country (Check Point data via Swiss press), against a group profile of 478 claimed victims and an SMB --spread worm capability (inside-it.ch, 2026-06-26).2026-06-20NOTABLEThe Gentlemen (Storm-2697) claims OT-adjacent Mackay Sugar attack; operator attributed to a Russian nationalUPDATE (originally covered 2026-06-19): Following ESET's 2026-06-19 documentation of the group's GentleKiller EDR-killer framework, The Gentlemen ransomware group has claimed an OT-adjacent attack on Mackay Sugar (Australia's second-largest sugar producer), which confirmed on 2026-06-18 that an external party …2026-06-19NOTABLEESET: the Gentlemen RaaS gang centrally builds and maintains its affiliates' EDR-killer frameworkESET's months-long investigation into the Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service operation reveals a structural departure from the affiliate norm: rather than each affiliate sourcing its own evasion tooling, the operators build, maintain and distribute a modular EDR-killing framework (GentleKiller) centrally (ESET …2026-06-12HIGHThe Gentlemen ransomware: 478 claimed leak-site victims, self-propagating Go encryptor, operator publicly namedThe Gentlemen RaaS claims 478 leak-site victims (concentrated in Thailand, the UK, Brazil, Germany and India per THN); Krebs publishes an operator deanonymisation, and Microsoft's dissection details the encryptor's --spread worm mode (KrebsOnSecurity, 2026-06-10).2026-05-29NOTABLEexploitedThe Gentlemen ransomware, Microsoft publishes full technical dissection of the Storm-2697 Go-encryptorUPDATE (originally covered 2026-05-20; consolidated in weekly W21): Microsoft Threat Intelligence published a full dissection of The Gentlemen ransomware on 2026-05-28, giving Storm-2697 a much sharper technical profile than the victim-list reporting available in week 21.2026-05-23NOTABLERapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report: vulnerability exploitation now top initial-access vector at 38 %; KEV median time to listing collapses to 5 daysRapid7 Labs published its Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report on 2026-05-21 covering January–March 2026 IR data; the GlobeNewswire release accompanied the post the same day. The findings that change what a Swiss/EU public-sector SOC should prioritise:2026-05-20ROUTINEupdatedNATOC3The Gentlemen ransomware group lists Czech university VSFS and Swiss engineering firm DEVO-Tech AG on its leak siteThe Gentlemen ransomware group claimed the University of Finance and Administration (VSFS) in the Czech Republic and the Swiss engineering firm DEVO-Tech AG on its leak site on 2026-05-18, threatening to publish stolen data unless the victims made contact or negotiated. The listings carry no technical detail; Check Point Research describes the group's usual entry as exposed VPN appliances and firewalls, chiefly Fortinet FortiGate and Cisco.2026-05-14HIGHupdatedNATOB2The Gentlemen RaaS: leaked internal chats show Fortinet and Cisco edge access, NTLM relay, ADCS abuse and EDR-kill tooling, mapped by Check Point ResearchThe Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service administrator acknowledged on 2026-05-04 that the group's internal Rocket backend had leaked, and Check Point Research analysed a 44.4 MB part of a leak a seller's screenshot put at about 16.22 GB. The chats show access through Fortinet and Cisco edge devices by brute force, known vulnerabilities and bought access, NTLM relay and certificate-services abuse, tools that block EDR at start-up, ZeroPulse and Velociraptor for remote access and Cloudflare tunnels for persistence; Check Point counts about 332 leak-site victims in the first five months of 2026. A free decryptor released in April recovers files only from a memory image of the ransomware process captured while it was running.

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats15
  • Research3

Source distribution

  • attack.mitre.org3 (7%)
  • dexpose.io3 (7%)
  • inside-it.ch3 (7%)
  • blog.talosintelligence.com2 (5%)
  • fortiguard.fortinet.com2 (5%)
  • github.com2 (5%)
  • bankinfosecurity.com1 (2%)
  • campeaoprovincias.pt1 (2%)
  • other26 (60%)
All cited sources (43)