The Gentlemen
actor · actor:thegentlemen single-sourcesingle-source-victim
Ransomware-as-a-service operation (also tracked as Storm-2697 / Phantom Mantis) that surged in Q1 2026, 192 attacks, +588% QoQ, 32% of victims European, with FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 as the initial-access funnel. ESET (2026-06-18) documents the operators centrally building and maintaining the GentleKiller EDR-killer framework (BYOVD, 48 vendors) for their affiliates.
Aliases: Gentlemen RaaS, Storm-2697, Phantom Mantis
Action items (2)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about The Gentlemen, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- List every monitoring server, script, scheduled task and connection manager that stores an ESXi, vCenter or Proxmox root password, replace each with a least-privilege monitoring account, and rotate the root passwords that were stored or reused across hosts.2026-11-07Kaspersky: ESXi and Proxmox ransomware ran on a…
- If your organisation bought video-surveillance, alarm or access-control installation or maintenance from Ixa Systems, ask the firm in writing which of your sites and credentials are in the stolen data and rotate every camera, alarm, intercom and remote-maintenance credential it held.2026-10-08Site plans, camera locations and some credentials…
Defender insights
What each entry about The Gentlemen tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · detection
Exposure · detection
Exposure
Triage
Triage
2 earlier entries carry guidance too, listed under the story timeline below.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
documented in
related to
- AzazelCloudSEK: Azazel is an affiliate that used the Gentlemen's tooling and ransom-note template but kept the proceeds
- FTAPI ransomware incident and The Gentlemen leak-site claim (September 2026)The Gentlemen listed FTAPI on their leak site; FTAPI confirmed ransomware but has not attributed it, so the edge rests on the actor's own claim and is not attributed-to
- Ixa Systems (Vaud) data theft and darknet sale (August to October 2026)TheGentlemen claimed the theft at the end of August (Le Temps); so the edge rests on the group's own claim and is not attributed-to
attributed activity
Story timeline
Every entry that names The Gentlemen, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-11-15The Gentlemen affiliate: an SSL-VPN account without MFA, a Windows Server 2003 host and a dormant local administrator gave Domain Admin in under an hour; the GPO locker most likely lost a replication race, so antivirus was disabled estate-wide but only one host was encrypted (Ransom-ISAC)
- 2026-11-07Kaspersky GERT: two ESXi and Proxmox ransomware cases in which a monitoring server's reused root password and plaintext administrator notes, not a VM escape, gave the attackers the hypervisor
- 2026-10-30ANNUAL REPORT: Cisco Talos Incident Response trends Q3 2026: public administration tied with finance as the most targeted sector, help-desk vishing into remote-management tools, and ransomware operators uninstalling and killing EDR
- 2026-10-28ARA-Region Lyss-Limpachtal (canton Bern, communal wastewater-treatment association): SafePay has put about 49 GB into the darknet, which Risikomonitor's analysis, relayed by Inside IT, finds holds personal records, bank statements, weak passwords and a third party's monitoring credentials; the association declines to comment
- 2026-10-22k0t: Group-IB and NyxLab describe a probable access broker that mass-exploits FortiWeb and PAN-OS GlobalProtect, brute-forces FortiGate and decrypts stolen FortiGate configurations offline with the default key, with victims later listed by Qilin and The Gentlemen
- 2026-10-08Ixa Systems, a Vaud security integrator serving police, prisons and banks: camera locations, plans and some passwords that TheGentlemen claimed to have stolen are reported on sale on the darknet
- 2026-10-07A Gentlemen ransomware affiliate ran his own leak site and reached his victims through stolen CI/CD secrets, with attack commands driven through an MCP server (CloudSEK)
- 2026-10-02FTAPI, a file-transfer vendor whose customers include authorities, confirms ransomware on an internal server; The Gentlemen list it on their leak site
- 2026-09-21The Gentlemen's open-directory attack toolchain: mounting a victim's own VHDX backup files to pull ntds.dit and SAM offline, then chunked-rclone exfil to Wasabi
- 2026-07-18TheGentlemen ransomware hits Portugal's Metro Mondego (Coimbra light-rail); operator confirms attack, notifies CNCS and CNPD
- 2026-06-27"The Gentlemen" ransomware claims 478 victims and adds worm propagation, Switzerland the second-most-targeted European country
- 2026-06-20The Gentlemen (Storm-2697) claims OT-adjacent Mackay Sugar attack; operator attributed to a Russian national
- 2026-06-19ESET: the Gentlemen RaaS gang centrally builds and maintains its affiliates' EDR-killer framework
- 2026-06-12The Gentlemen ransomware: 478 claimed leak-site victims, self-propagating Go encryptor, operator publicly named
- 2026-05-29The Gentlemen ransomware, Microsoft publishes full technical dissection of the Storm-2697 Go-encryptor
- 2026-05-23Rapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Report: vulnerability exploitation now top initial-access vector at 38 %; KEV median time to listing collapses to 5 days
- 2026-05-20The Gentlemen ransomware group lists Czech university VSFS and Swiss engineering firm DEVO-Tech AG on its leak site
- 2026-05-14The Gentlemen RaaS: leaked internal chats show Fortinet and Cisco edge access, NTLM relay, ADCS abuse and EDR-kill tooling, mapped by Check Point Research
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (51 across 14 tactics)
51 techniques observed across 10 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ReconnaissanceActive Scanning
- Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · External Remote Services · Exploit Public-Facing Application
- ExecutionScheduled Task/Job · Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- PersistenceScheduled Task/Job · Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · External Remote Services · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job · Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- StealthValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
- Defense ImpairmentDomain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Disable or Modify Tools · Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs · Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping · OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · OS Credential Dumping: NTDS · Brute Force · Steal Web Session Cookie · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Credentials from Password Stores · Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay · Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting · Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
- DiscoveryRemote System Discovery · Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups · Account Discovery: Domain Account · Network Share Discovery · Domain Trust Discovery
- Lateral MovementRemote Services · Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares · Remote Services: SSH · Remote Services: VNC · Remote Services: Windows Remote Management · Exploitation of Remote Services
- CollectionData from Network Shared Drive · Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
- Command and ControlWeb Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools · Dynamic Resolution · Protocol Tunneling
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol · Exfiltration Over Web Service · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
- ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Inhibit System Recovery · Financial Theft
Reconnaissance TA0043
T1595Active Scanning×1
Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1078Valid Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗
T1133External Remote Services×1
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×2
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1053Scheduled Task/Job×1
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1053Scheduled Task/Job×1
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078Valid Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗
T1133External Remote Services×1
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Evidence: 2026-06-19/eset-the-gentlemen-raas-gang-centrally-builds-and-maintains · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1053Scheduled Task/Job×1
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.
Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078Valid Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗
T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×2
Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Evidence: 2026-06-19/eset-the-gentlemen-raas-gang-centrally-builds-and-maintains · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1078Valid Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×2
Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1685Disable or Modify Tools×4
Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1685.005Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs×1
Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1685.006Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs×1
Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the `/var/log/` directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:
Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003OS Credential Dumping×1
Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×1
Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.
Evidence: 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1
Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×1
Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1110Brute Force×2
Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×1
An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.
Evidence: 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555Credentials from Password Stores×1
Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1557.001Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay×2
By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1558.003Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting×1
Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1649Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates×1
Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.
Evidence: 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1018Remote System Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups×1
Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1135Network Share Discovery×2
Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1482Domain Trust Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1021Remote Services×1
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗
T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares×2
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · 2026-06-12/the-gentlemen-ransomware-478-claimed-leak-site-victims-self · ATT&CK page ↗
T1021.004Remote Services: SSH×1
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗
T1021.005Remote Services: VNC×1
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.
Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · ATT&CK page ↗
T1021.006Remote Services: Windows Remote Management×2
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1210Exploitation of Remote Services×1
Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
Collection TA0009
T1039Data from Network Shared Drive×1
Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1557.001Adversary-in-the-Middle: Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay×2
By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS/mDNS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1219Remote Access Tools×2
An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Evidence: 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1568Dynamic Resolution×1
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1572Protocol Tunneling×2
Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/metro-mondego-thegentlemen-ransomware-portugal-transit · ATT&CK page ↗
T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×1
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.
Evidence: 2026-09-21/the-gentlemen-open-directory-vhdx-backup-ntds-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×5
Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-11-07/kaspersky-esxi-proxmox-ransomware-monitoring-root-password · 2026-10-02/ftapi-ransomware-the-gentlemen-supplier-to-authorities · 2026-07-18/metro-mondego-thegentlemen-ransomware-portugal-transit · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1490Inhibit System Recovery×2
Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
T1657Financial Theft×3
Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.
Evidence: 2026-10-08/ixa-systems-vaud-security-integrator-thegentlemen-sale · 2026-05-20/thegentlemen-raas-lists-czech-university-and-swiss-engineeri · 2026-05-14/the-gentlemen-raas-backend-rocket-database-leaked-16-22-gb-c · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about The Gentlemen (14)
Earlier coverage (11)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- AdaptixC2×2
- EtherRAT×2
- Akira×1
- ARA-Region Lyss-Limpachtal data publication, October 2026×1
- Azazel×1
- BlackNevas×1
- FortiBleed×1
- Fortinet FortiGate×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- attack.mitre.org3 (7%)
- dexpose.io3 (7%)
- inside-it.ch3 (7%)
- blog.talosintelligence.com2 (5%)
- fortiguard.fortinet.com2 (5%)
- github.com2 (5%)
- bankinfosecurity.com1 (2%)
- campeaoprovincias.pt1 (2%)
- other26 (60%)
All cited sources (43)
- attack.mitre.orgT1021.002https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/
- attack.mitre.orgT1053.005https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
- attack.mitre.orgT1562.001https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
- bankinfosecurity.comBankInfoSecurityhttps://www.bankinfosecurity.com/tables-turned-gentlemen-ransomware-group-suffers-data-leak-a-31654
- blog.talosintelligence.comCisco Taloshttps://blog.talosintelligence.com/ir-trends-q3-2026/
- blog.talosintelligence.comCisco Taloshttps://blog.talosintelligence.com/ransomware-incidents-in-japan-in-the-first-half-of-2026/
- campeaoprovincias.ptCampeão das Províncias (relaying Metro Mondego's statement)https://www.campeaoprovincias.pt/2026/07/17/metro-mondego-foi-alvo-de-ataque-informatico-que-afectou-sistemas-internos/
- cash.chAWP via cash.chhttps://www.cash.ch/news/top-news/hacker-erbeuten-schweizer-sicherheitsdaten-von-gefangnissen-und-banken-974664
- cisa.govCISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (version 2026.10.21)https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
- cloudsek.comCloudSEK TRIADhttps://www.cloudsek.com/blog/caught-in-4k-the-gentlemen-files
- cybernews.comCybernewshttps://cybernews.com/security/ftapi-eu-data-transfer-platform-data-breach/
- dexpose.ioDeXpose (leak-site tracker, claim record)https://www.dexpose.io/safepay-ransomware-attack-on-ara-lyss-in-switzerland/
- dexpose.ioDeXposehttps://www.dexpose.io/thegentlemen-ransomware-group-targets-swiss-engineering-firm-devo-tech-ag/
- dexpose.ioDeXposehttps://www.dexpose.io/thegentlemen-target-university-of-finance-and-administration-in-czech-republic/
- fortiguard.fortinet.comFortinet PSIRT (FG-IR-19-007, Hardcoded symmetric key in fips.c)https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-19-007
- fortiguard.fortinet.comFortinet PSIRT (FG-IR-25-910, Path confusion vulnerability in GUI)https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-25-910
- github.comBedrock Safeguard (gentlemen-decryptor)https://github.com/Bedrock-Safeguard/gentlemen-decryptor
- github.comGLPI (GitHub security advisory)https://github.com/glpi-project/glpi/security/advisories/GHSA-jv89-g7f7-jwfg
- globenewswire.comGlobeNewswire press releasehttps://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/05/21/3299378/36514/en/Rapid7-Q1-2026-Threat-Landscape-Report-Finds-Vulnerability-Exploitation-Overtakes-Social-Engineering-as-the-Top-Initial-Access-Vector.html
- group-ib.comGroup-IB (with NyxLab)https://www.group-ib.com/blog/stray-cat-network-edge/
- heise.deheise onlinehttps://www.heise.de/en/news/Cyber-attack-on-data-exchange-service-FTAPI-11469688.html
- helpnetsecurity.comHelp Net Securityhttps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/06/18/eset-gentlemen-edr-killers/
- huntress.comHuntress Labshttps://www.huntress.com/blog/the-gentlemen-ransomware-defense-evasion-ttps
- ictjournal.chICTjournalhttps://www.ictjournal.ch/news/2026-10-07/une-cyberattaque-expose-des-donnees-de-securite-de-sites-vaudois
- inside-it.chinside-it.chhttps://www.inside-it.ch/aufstrebende-ransomware-bande-findet-mehr-schweizer-opfer-20260626
- inside-it.chInside IThttps://www.inside-it.ch/daten-von-westschweizer-gefaengnissen-und-banken-im-darknet-20261007
- inside-it.chInside IT (article with Risikomonitor's analysis)https://www.inside-it.ch/kritische-schweizer-infrastrukturen-attackiert-20261027
- kantonale-verwaltung.lu.chKanton Luzern (portal data-protection page)https://www.kantonale-verwaltung.lu.ch/datenschutz
- krebsonsecurity.comKrebsOnSecurityhttps://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/06/who-runs-the-ransomware-group-the-gentlemen/
- learn.microsoft.comASR rules referencehttps://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference
- letemps.chLe Tempshttps://www.letemps.ch/suisse/vaud/une-cyberattaque-fait-fuiter-des-informations-de-securite-de-prisons-vaudoises-de-banques-et-de-dizaines-de-societes
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Threat Intelligence, The Gentlemen dissectionhttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/05/28/the-gentlemen-ransomware-dissecting-a-self-propagating-go-encryptor/
- ransom-isac.orgRansom-ISAChttps://ransom-isac.org/blog/the-gentlemen-incident-locked-out/
- ransomware.liveransomware.livehttps://ransomware.live/id/REVWTy1UZWNoQHRoZWdlbnRsZW1lbg
- rapid7.comRapid7 Q1 2026 Threat Landscape Reporthttps://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-q1-2026-threat-landscape-report-geopolitics-ransomware/
- research.checkpoint.comCheck Point Researchhttps://research.checkpoint.com/2026/thus-spoke-the-gentlemen/
- securelist.comKaspersky Global Emergency Response Team (Securelist)https://securelist.com/virtualization-security-esxi-and-proxmox-ransomware-cases/121819/
- security.paloaltonetworks.comPalo Alto Networks PSIRT (CVE-2026-0257 advisory)https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0257
- thedfirreport.comThe DFIR Report, flash alerthttps://thedfirreport.com/2026/05/11/flash-alert-etherrat-and-tuktuk-c2-end-in-the-gentleman-ransomware/
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/06/the-gentlemen-ransomware-claims-478.html
- therecord.mediaThe Recordhttps://therecord.media/mackay-sugar-cyberattack-claimed-gentlemen
- tugatech.com.ptTugaTechhttps://tugatech.com.pt/t87569-metro-mondego-e-alvo-de-alegado-ataque-informatico-com-roubo-de-dados
- welivesecurity.comESET WeLiveSecurityhttps://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/killing-me-gently-inside-gentlemens-edr-killer-framework/