The Gentlemen RaaS: leaked internal chats show Fortinet and Cisco edge access, NTLM relay, ADCS abuse and EDR-kill tooling, mapped by Check Point Research
Leaked chats of The Gentlemen ransomware group show its edge-device access, NTLM relay and EDR-kill toolkit
Analysis
On 2026-05-04 the administrator of The Gentlemen ransomware-as-a-service programme acknowledged on underground forums that the group's internal backend database, Rocket, had leaked; a seller offered the data for 10,000 USD, and Check Point Research obtained a 44.4 MB partial copy of the internal chats while the seller's screenshot showed about 16.22 GB in total (Check Point Research, 2026-05-13). DynaRisk's analyst counted 8,200 lines of internal chat text with timestamps largely matching Moscow working hours (BankInfoSecurity, 2026-05-11).
The chats describe initial access usually through exposed edge devices, with a focus on Fortinet FortiGate and Cisco, by brute-forcing web and VPN panels, exploiting known vulnerabilities and buying access; the group tracks CVE-2024-55591 in the FortiOS management interface without the chats showing exploitation steps, evaluates a proof of concept for CVE-2025-32433 in Erlang SSH, and scans domains for NTLM relay paths including CVE-2025-33073 to feed relay tooling (Check Point Research, 2026-05-13). After access the operators seek domain administrator rights through Active Directory discovery, certificate-services abuse (enumerating ADCS misconfigurations ESC1 to ESC17) and local privilege escalation, dump LSASS and browser sessions, tamper with EDR using tools that block or delay security processes at start-up and bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver techniques, keep access through Cloudflare tunnels and the ZeroPulse and Velociraptor remote-access frameworks, and exfiltrate from NAS, backup and virtualisation systems; the administrator also announced locker upgrades that unhook NTDLL and patch ETW (Check Point Research, 2026-05-13). DynaRisk adds that the group regularly discussed ways to disable endpoint security tools, modify Group Policy Objects and gain domain admin privileges, and targeted NAS, Exchange, storage and backup systems to prevent recovery (BankInfoSecurity, 2026-05-11).
Check Point counts about 332 victims published on the leak site in the first five months of 2026 and 412 in total, and links 29 campaigns to 8 affiliate contact IDs, including the administrator's, who also carries out infections himself; a separate, earlier Check Point investigation of one affiliate's intrusion found a SystemBC command-and-control server holding more than 1,570 victims (Check Point Research, 2026-05-13).
Cited evidence
While the chats do not show detailed exploitation steps, the presence of this CVE alongside their FortiGate targeting suggests it is part of the set of vulnerabilities they track for potential use against exposed management interfaces.
In that case, the affiliate used SystemBC, and the associated command-and-control (C&C) server revealed more than 1,570 victims.
The compromised communications included 8,200 lines of text from an internal chat tool
There is no master or skeleton key.
The keys are lost soon after the process exits.
Updates1
The decryptor Bedrock Safeguard released in April 2026 does not let victims recover without payment in general: it extracts per-file keys from a memory image of the ransomware process captured while it was running, is best-effort and may be partial, and without such an image cannot recover files, because there is no master key (Bedrock Safeguard, 2026-04-21); the group issued a same-day patch (BankInfoSecurity, 2026-05-11). The 1,570 figure is the victim count on one affiliate's SystemBC command-and-control server from an earlier Check Point investigation, and Check Point draws no under-reporting conclusion from it (Check Point Research, 2026-05-13).
The chats describe initial access usually, not almost exclusively, through edge devices, by brute force, known vulnerabilities and bought access; CVE-2024-55591 is one of the CVEs the group tracks for potential use without the chats showing exploitation, no CWMP or TR-069 vector appears, ETW patching and NTDLL unhooking are locker upgrades rather than functions of the EDR-blocking tools, and the certificate-services enumeration runs through NetExec rather than certutil (Check Point Research, 2026-05-13). The 8,200 chat lines are DynaRisk's count (BankInfoSecurity, 2026-05-11), and Check Point lists ZeroPulse as a remote-access framework the group uses without describing its internals (Check Point Research, 2026-05-13).
Sources3
Revision history
- Published 2026-05-14-e05c6e6e
- Correction 2026-10-21T1148Z-audit
The free Gentlemen decryptor released in April 2026 recovers files only from a memory image of the ransomware process captured while it ran, has no master key and predates the leak, so trying decryption before negotiating does not help most victims; capturing the running locker's memory does. The 1,570 figure is victims of one affiliate's SystemBC server from an earlier Check Point investigation, not hidden ransomware victims, and the group tracks CVE-2024-55591 among other CVEs without the chats showing exploitation. Initial access usually runs through Fortinet and Cisco edge devices by brute force, known vulnerabilities and bought access, the ETW and NTDLL tampering belongs to the locker, and the 8,200 chat lines are DynaRisk's count.
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