DAEMON Tools Lite
product · product:daemon-tools-lite
Defender insights
What each entry about DAEMON Tools Lite tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · detection
Story timeline
- 2026-05-28Nx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entries
- 2026-05-09DAEMON Tools Lite supply-chain compromise: signed installers deliver a profiler worldwide, with a backdoor and QUIC RAT reserved for a dozen targets in Russia, Belarus and Thailand
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (19 across 11 tactics)
19 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- PersistenceCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent
- Privilege EscalationProcess Injection · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching
- StealthProcess Injection
- Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
- Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys · Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API · Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers · Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
- DiscoverySystem Information Discovery
- Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
- Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol · Ingress Tool Transfer
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol · Exfiltration Over Web Service
Initial Access TA0001
T1195.001Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools×1
Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by the original owner. Adversaries may also employ "typosquatting" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×2
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-09/daemon-tools-lite-supply-chain-quic-rat-deployed-via-signed · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Evidence: 2026-05-09/daemon-tools-lite-supply-chain-quic-rat-deployed-via-signed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×1
Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1055Process Injection×1
Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Evidence: 2026-05-09/daemon-tools-lite-supply-chain-quic-rat-deployed-via-signed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1548.003Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching×1
Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1055Process Injection×1
Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Evidence: 2026-05-09/daemon-tools-lite-supply-chain-quic-rat-deployed-via-signed · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1
Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.004Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys×1
Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk, .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API×1
Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.005Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers×1
Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers. Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.006Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores×1
Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1082System Information Discovery×1
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.
Evidence: 2026-05-09/daemon-tools-lite-supply-chain-quic-rat-deployed-via-signed · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×1
Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1071Application Layer Protocol×1
Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-05-09/daemon-tools-lite-supply-chain-quic-rat-deployed-via-signed · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×2
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-09/daemon-tools-lite-supply-chain-quic-rat-deployed-via-signed · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about DAEMON Tools Lite (2)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- DAEMON Tools supply-chain compromise×2
- DAEMON Tools Lite signed-build trojanisation (12.5.0.2421–12.5.0.2434) via Disc Soft Limited build infrastructure; CISA KEV 2026-05-27×1
- Mini Shai-Hulud×1
- Nx Console×1
- Nx Console extension compromise×1
- Nx Console v18.95.0 VS Code extension supply-chain compromise, credential-stealing payload harvested 1Password, Claude Code config, npm, GitHub, AWS creds; CISA KEV 2026-05-27×1
- TanStack Router npm credential-stealing payload, exfiltrated Nx contributor GitHub CLI OAuth token (precursor to CVE-2026-48027 Nx Console compromise); CISA KEV 2026-05-27×1
- TeamPCP×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- euvd.enisa.europa.eu2 (17%)
- github.com2 (17%)
- helpnetsecurity.com2 (17%)
- blog.daemon-tools.cc1 (8%)
- cisa.gov1 (8%)
- kaspersky.com1 (8%)
- nx.dev1 (8%)
- securelist.com1 (8%)
- other1 (8%)
All cited sources (12)
- blog.daemon-tools.ccDisc Soft Limited security incident noticehttps://blog.daemon-tools.cc/post/security-incident
- cisa.govCISA KEV cataloghttps://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
- euvd.enisa.europa.euENISA EU Vulnerability Database, EUVD-2026-30514 (CVE-2026-8398)https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-30514
- euvd.enisa.europa.euENISA EU Vulnerability Database, EUVD-2026-32550 (CVE-2026-48027)https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-32550
- github.comTanStack Router GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpxhttps://github.com/TanStack/router/security/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx
- github.comGitHub Security Advisory GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847whttps://github.com/nrwl/nx-console/security/advisories/GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w
- helpnetsecurity.comHelp Net Securityhttps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/05/06/daemon-tools-compromised-backdoors-supply-chain-attack/
- helpnetsecurity.comHelp Net Security on GitHub root causehttps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/05/21/github-grafana-breach-root-cause-nx-console/
- kaspersky.comKaspersky bloghttps://www.kaspersky.com/blog/daemon-tools-supply-chain-attack/55691/
- nx.devNx postmortemhttps://nx.dev/blog/nx-console-v18-95-0-postmortem
- securelist.comKaspersky Securelisthttps://securelist.com/tr/daemon-tools-backdoor/119654/
- therecord.mediaThe Recordhttps://therecord.media/hackers-compromise-daemon-tools-global-supply-chain-attack