CTIPilot

Mini Shai-Hulud

campaign · campaign:mini-shai-hulud single-source

TeamPCP npm supply-chain worm family (initial wave: SAP CAP packages); the framework was later open-sourced, spawning derivatives including Phantom Gyp.

Aliases: Phantom Gyp

Coverage timeline
8
first 2026-05-06 → last 2026-06-09
Peak priority
high
6 high · 2 notable
Sources cited
28
20 hosts
Sections touched
3
active-threats, deep-dive, trending-vulnerabilities
Co-occurring entities
8
see Co-occurring entities below
ATT&CK techniques
21
pinned v19.2 · see below
2026-05-138 appearances2026-06-09

ATT&CK techniques

21 techniques observed across 6 entries, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1593Search Open Websites/Domains×1

Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Resource Development TA0042

T1583.001Acquire Infrastructure: Domains×1

Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/verizon-2026-dbir-vulnerability-exploitation-overtakes-crede · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×2

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/verizon-2026-dbir-vulnerability-exploitation-overtakes-crede · 2026-05-13/cve-2026-34263-cve-2026-34260-sap-commerce-cloud-pre-auth-rc · ATT&CK page ↗

T1195Supply Chain Compromise×1

Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/verizon-2026-dbir-vulnerability-exploitation-overtakes-crede · ATT&CK page ↗

T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×3

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

Evidence: 2026-06-01/two-concurrent-npm-dependency-confusion-campaigns-target-int · 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1199Trusted Relationship×1

Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/miasma-worm-backdoors-32-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/verizon-2026-dbir-vulnerability-exploitation-overtakes-crede · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.013Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries×1

Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/miasma-worm-backdoors-32-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/verizon-2026-dbir-vulnerability-exploitation-overtakes-crede · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.013Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries×1

Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/miasma-worm-backdoors-32-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/verizon-2026-dbir-vulnerability-exploitation-overtakes-crede · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1

Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.007OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem×1

Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc/<PID>/maps` file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And `/proc/<PID>/mem`, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110Brute Force×1

Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.

Evidence: 2026-05-21/verizon-2026-dbir-vulnerability-exploitation-overtakes-crede · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555Credentials from Password Stores×1

Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/miasma-worm-backdoors-32-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages · ATT&CK page ↗

T1606.002Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens×1

An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate. The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</code> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>. Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1082System Information Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Evidence: 2026-06-01/two-concurrent-npm-dependency-confusion-campaigns-target-int · ATT&CK page ↗

T1083File and Directory Discovery×1

Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-06-01/two-concurrent-npm-dependency-confusion-campaigns-target-int · ATT&CK page ↗

T1614System Location Discovery×1

Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from System Location Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-06-01/two-concurrent-npm-dependency-confusion-campaigns-target-int · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1213Data from Information Repositories×1

Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., Transfer Data to Cloud Account).

Evidence: 2026-05-13/cve-2026-34263-cve-2026-34260-sap-commerce-cloud-pre-auth-rc · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-06-09TeamPCP open-sources its Mini Shai-Hulud framework, spawning a new "Phantom Gyp" derivative
    active-threats
  2. 2026-06-02"Miasma" worm backdoors 32 Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages via OIDC trusted-publishing abuse
    active-threats
  3. 2026-06-01Two concurrent npm dependency-confusion campaigns target internal corporate namespaces
    active-threats
  4. 2026-05-21Verizon 2026 DBIR: vulnerability exploitation overtakes credentials as primary breach vector for the first time in 19 years
    deep-dive
  5. 2026-05-20actions-cool/issues-helper GitHub Action compromised, 53 tags moved to imposter commit reading Runner.Worker /proc/PID/mem; linked to Mini Shai-Hulud
    active-threats
  6. 2026-05-15CVE-2026-45793, PHP Composer: GitHub Actions CI token disclosure in error messages
    active-threats
  7. 2026-05-13Mini Shai-Hulud's GitHub Actions Pwn-Request → OIDC Token Theft Chain
    deep-dive
  8. 2026-05-13CVE-2026-34263 / CVE-2026-34260, SAP Commerce Cloud pre-auth RCE, S/4HANA Enterprise Search SQL injection
    trending-vulnerabilities

Where this entity is cited

  • active-threats5
  • deep-dive2
  • trending-vulnerabilities1

Source distribution

  • thehackernews.com4 (14%)
  • socket.dev3 (11%)
  • security-hub.ncsc.admin.ch2 (7%)
  • stepsecurity.io2 (7%)
  • wiz.io2 (7%)
  • aikido.dev1 (4%)
  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (4%)
  • blog.packagist.com1 (4%)
  • other12 (43%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

All cited sources (28)

Entries about Mini Shai-Hulud (8)

2026-06-09 · view entry permalink →

HIGHupdated

TeamPCP open-sources its Mini Shai-Hulud framework, spawning a new "Phantom Gyp" derivative

UPDATE (originally covered 2026-06-06): A SANS ISC handler diary tracking the TeamPCP supply-chain campaign through 7 June reports the operators have open-sourced their Mini Shai-Hulud framework on GitHub, triggering a second wave of derivative campaigns (SANS ISC, 2026-06-08). Beyond the previously-covered Miasma worm, which compromised npm packages including Red Hat's @redhat-cloud-services scope (Wiz, 2026-06-01), the diary names a newly-tracked Phantom Gyp campaign that abuses node-gyp / binding.gyp install-time script execution in compromised npm packages; both inject malicious CI/CD hooks (SANS ISC, 2026-06-08).

The diary's load-bearing detection-engineering point: valid SLSA provenance attestations do not protect against supply-chain injection when the build environment itself is subverted from the inside. The recommended shift is from attestation-verification to build-pipeline integrity, monitor GitHub Actions runner process trees for unexpected outbound network from within a build, alert on actions/upload-artifact shipping signed-but-anomalous binaries, and cross-check published package checksums against CI logs via independent transparency ledgers (e.g. Sigstore Rekor). EU/Swiss public-sector teams running npm-based automation or Red Hat tooling should audit CI/CD pipeline definitions for unexpected workflow-step insertions.

Updaterun 2026-06-27-40e791d4entitiessourcestagsbody

The Miasma / Mini Shai-Hulud / Hades supply-chain worm (last seen backdooring @redhat-cloud-services packages and the TeamPCP "Phantom Gyp" framework) ran a fresh wave on 2026-06-24: 23+ malicious versions across the LeoPlatform and RStreams serverless-data-pipeline npm ecosystems (leo-sdk, leo-auth, leo-aws, leo-cli) after the czirker publisher account was compromised, plus a Go-module compromise of Verana Blockchain (Socket Security, 2026-06-25).

The wave reuses the previously documented binding.gyp/node-gyp install-time execution to stage a Bun runtime that harvests .env files, npm/GitHub/cloud tokens, SSH keys and IDE/AI-agent configs, scraping GitHub Actions CI secrets (JFrog, 2026-06-26), and again carries the RevokeAndItGoesKaboom campaign marker that Socket ties to the earlier codfish/semantic-release-action compromise (documented by StepSecurity), where the malicious action searched GitHub commit messages bearing that string as an operator dead-drop channel (Socket Security, 2026-06-25). Any CH/EU team consuming these packages in CI should rotate all exposed CI/cloud credentials since 2026-06-20 and alert on node-gyp evaluating JavaScript from binding.gyp.

threat09 Jun 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-02 · view entry permalink →

HIGHupdated

"Miasma" worm backdoors 32 Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages via OIDC trusted-publishing abuse

Threat actor cluster TeamPCP used a compromised Red Hat maintainer GitHub account to inject malicious CI/CD workflows into 32 packages in the @redhat-cloud-services npm namespace, poisoning 96 releases across high-traffic packages, Wiz puts the combined weekly downloads at roughly 80,000, while Aikido counts closer to 117,000 (Wiz, 2026-06-01 · Aikido Security, 2026-06-01). Rather than compromising developer machines directly, the attack abused GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publishing so the CI/CD pipeline itself republished backdoored packages carrying obfuscated preinstall hooks. The "Miasma" payload (a new variant in the Mini Shai-Hulud / Shai-Hulud lineage) sweeps for GitHub Actions secrets, npm tokens, AWS keys, SSH keys, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials, and now adds dedicated collectors for GCP service-account and Azure managed-identity tokens, signalling a pivot from developer-host theft toward cloud-account takeover (Socket, 2026-06-01). Wiz notes the new variant's cloud-identity focus explicitly.

Why it matters to us: Red Hat tooling has a broad EU public-sector DevOps footprint (OpenShift/OpenStack estates). Inventory installed @redhat-cloud-services/* versions across build agents and developer endpoints, alert on preinstall scripts spawning obfuscated node -e chains from npm/npx parent trees, and rotate any CI/CD cloud-identity tokens reachable from affected pipelines.

Updaterun 2026-06-06-d01b95fesourcesbody

The Miasma worm (the TeamPCP-spawned descendant of the Mini Shai-Hulud lineage first covered against the Red Hat @redhat-cloud-services npm namespace) recompromised the durabletask package and propagated into the Microsoft GitHub estate. On 2026-06-05 GitHub disabled 73 repositories across the Azure, Azure-Samples, Microsoft and MicrosoftDocs organisations in a 105-second automated terms-of-service sweep, taking the entire Azure Durable Task family (.NET, Go, Java, JS, MSSQL, Netherite, protobuf) offline (OpenSourceMalware, 2026-06-05; The Hacker News, 2026-06-06).

The material delta from the 2026-06-02 coverage: the variant adds Azure CLI auth-cache and managed-identity token collectors (earlier Shai-Hulud strains targeted AWS and GitHub), and the recompromise traces to the same durabletask credential foothold from the May TeamPCP incident, i.e. credentials taken in May were never fully revoked. Azure Durable Task is a foundational dependency for Azure Functions / serverless workflows widely consumed in EU public-sector cloud deployments, so the downstream exposure is cloud infrastructure, not just developer machines.

Defender takeaway: audit ~/.azure/ credential stores on developer workstations and CI/CD runners that installed any affected @azure/* package; rotate Azure managed-identity tokens and Kubernetes service-account tokens on those systems; monitor GitHub audit logs for unexpected public-repo creation (the worm's secret-exfil-as-public-repo behaviour is what trips GitHub's automated sweep). Note the worm-vs-defender naming overlap is real here; "Miasma" is the attacker worm, not a tool.

Updaterun 2026-06-10-c84347b2sectorssourcestagsbody

The Miasma/Mini-Shai-Hulud supply-chain lineage previously tracked across npm and GitHub has opened a PyPI front dubbed "Hades": Socket and others identified 37 malicious wheel artifacts across 19 packages abusing Python's .pth site-module startup mechanism to auto-execute on interpreter start without an import (The Hacker News, 2026-06-09). The payload downloads the Bun runtime from GitHub and runs triple-encrypted JavaScript that sweeps GitHub/CI tokens, npm/PyPI/cloud (AWS/GCP/Azure) keys, Kubernetes and Vault configs, SSH keys and AI-tool configs, and plants backdoor config in AI coding-assistant workspaces so future agent sessions execute attacker instructions (Socket, 2026-06-07).

Affected packages spanned developer tooling and a bioinformatics cluster (relevant to university/research compute), all since removed. Hunt for *-setup.pth creation under site-packages, Bun binary downloads from github.com/oven-sh/bun, and the $TMPDIR/.bun_ran sentinel via Sysmon EID 1 with parent python/pip (T1547.013, T1059.007, T1555). Pin dependencies and install with --ignore-scripts; audit recently-installed PyPI packages on research endpoints.

threat02 Jun 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-01 · view entry permalink →

HIGH

Two concurrent npm dependency-confusion campaigns target internal corporate namespaces

Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Sonatype each documented coordinated npm dependency-confusion campaigns in the window, both distinct from the Mini Shai-Hulud / TrapDoor typosquat activity covered last week. Microsoft (published 2026-05-30) detailed malicious packages pushed in two bursts on 28–29 May by three maintainer aliases (mr.4nd3r50n, ce-rwb, t-in-one); its post is titled for the initial 33, while the body enumerates 45 across the two waves (26 + 7 + 12 by alias), impersonating internal packages across nine organisational scopes and spoofing internal-infrastructure URLs (GitHub Enterprise, Jira, docs portals) in package.json homepage/repository/bugs fields to survive manual review (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-30). The vector is classic dependency confusion: packages published to the public registry under inflated versions (100.100.100, 3.5.22) win npm's resolution race against private-registry equivalents whenever the consuming project's .npmrc is not scope-locked. The postinstall stager (obfuscator.io, ~7–13 KB across the two waves) carries a kill switch (T_IN_ONE_NO_TELEMETRY) and a run-once marker (~/.cache/._t-in-one_init/), fingerprints OS, and specifically detects CI/CD environments before pulling a second-stage reconnaissance payload, a two-phase design that profiles before any credential theft, frustrating payload-signature detection. Microsoft reports the offending repositories and accounts were taken down.

Separately, Sonatype documented a larger 176-package campaign (tracked Sonatype-2026-003429) using version 99.99.99 to beat private-registry precedence, with postinstall scripts likewise targeting developer and CI/CD environments; Sonatype reported Russian-language comments and coordinated infrastructure across the package set (Sonatype, 2026-05-28). The language artefact is Sonatype's observation, not an attribution. Mapped to T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain with discovery TTPs (T1082, T1083, T1614) in the recon payload.

Why it matters to us: Any organisation that consumes private npm packages internally and has not scope-locked .npmrc is in scope, Swiss/EU eGovernment software factories and research institutions maintaining internal Node.js tooling included, and the CI/CD-detection logic specifically flags build pipelines as higher-value follow-on targets.

threat01 Jun 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

Earlier coverage (5)

2026-05-21HIGHVerizon 2026 DBIR: vulnerability exploitation overtakes credentials as primary breach vector for the first time in 19 yearsVerizon 2026 DBIR (today's deep dive): vulnerability exploitation overtakes credentials as the leading breach initial-access vector for the first time in the report's 19-year history, 31 % per Verizon's press release (Verizon, 2026-05-19) vs 13 % credentials per Help Net Security's reading of the full DBIR (Help Net Security, 2026-05-20); only 26 % of CISA KEV entries fully remediated (down from 38 %); supply-chain breaches +60 % YoY.2026-05-20HIGHactions-cool/issues-helper GitHub Action compromised, 53 tags moved to imposter commit reading Runner.Worker /proc/PID/mem; linked to Mini Shai-HuludTwo more CI/CD supply-chain incidents, actions-cool/issues-helper GitHub Action (exfil infrastructure overlapping with the Mini Shai-Hulud cluster per Socket) and Nx Console VS Code extension (stolen publisher credentials, no cluster attribution). 53 issues-helper tags moved to imposter commit 1c9e803 reading /proc/<PID>/mem of Runner.Worker for secrets exfil (StepSecurity, 2026-05-18). Nx Console 18.95.0 (2.2 M installs) compromised via stolen publisher credentials for an 11-minute window 2026-05-18 12:36–12:47 UTC (The Hacker News, 2026-05-19).2026-05-15NOTABLECVE-2026-45793, PHP Composer: GitHub Actions CI token disclosure in error messagesCVE-2026-45793 is a token disclosure in PHP Composer (the PHP package manager) patched and disclosed by the Packagist team on 2026-05-13 (Packagist blog, 2026-05-13).2026-05-13NOTABLEMini Shai-Hulud's GitHub Actions Pwn-Request → OIDC Token Theft ChainBackground. Mini Shai-Hulud (the TeamPCP self-propagating npm worm) first surfaced in coverage on 2026-05-10 as a SAP CAP-package compromise.2026-05-13HIGHCVE-2026-34263 / CVE-2026-34260, SAP Commerce Cloud pre-auth RCE, S/4HANA Enterprise Search SQL injectionSAP Commerce Cloud pre-auth RCE plus S/4HANA Enterprise Search SQLi. CVE-2026-34263 (CVSS 9.6) is unauthenticated arbitrary code injection via overly permissive Spring Security ordering on the cloud-config endpoint; CVE-2026-34260 (CVSS 9.6) is post-auth SQL injection in the Enterprise Search ABAP component, enabled by default. SAP Commerce and S/4HANA are core to Swiss federal procurement (NOVE/SUPERB programmes) and EU institutional ERP (Onapsis, 2026-05-12; SecurityWeek, 2026-05-12).