ctipilot.ch

Hades

tool · tool:hades-implant single-source

Previously-unreported Go-based cross-platform (Windows/Linux) implant providing persistence (Registry Run key + scheduled task on Windows, cron on Linux) with HTTPS C2 disguised as static JavaScript-asset requests and AES-256-GCM-encrypted payloads, plus built-in kill-dates and working-hours scheduling. Recovered alongside Hermes AI-agent tooling targeting Thailand's Ministry of Finance (Hunt.io, 2026-07-23).

Coverage timeline
4
first 2026-06-10 → last 2026-07-25
Peak priority
high
1 high · 3 notable
Sources cited
10
7 hosts
Sections touched
3
active-threats, updates, weekly-multi-day
Co-occurring entities
5
see Related entities below
ATT&CK techniques
9
pinned v19.1 · see below
2026-06-104 appearances2026-07-25

Hunting pivots

Affected products
Apache AmbariApache HiveEclipse GlassFish

ATT&CK techniques

9 techniques observed across 2 entries — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Initial Access TA0001

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-07-25/thailand-mof-hermes-ai-agent-post-exploitation · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-07-25/thailand-mof-hermes-ai-agent-post-exploitation · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/shai-hulud-miasma-supply-chain-worm-jumps-to-pypi-as-hades-3 · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-07-25/thailand-mof-hermes-ai-agent-post-exploitation · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-07-25/thailand-mof-hermes-ai-agent-post-exploitation · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-07-25/thailand-mof-hermes-ai-agent-post-exploitation · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.013Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries×1

Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/shai-hulud-miasma-supply-chain-worm-jumps-to-pypi-as-hades-3 · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-07-25/thailand-mof-hermes-ai-agent-post-exploitation · ATT&CK page ↗

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-07-25/thailand-mof-hermes-ai-agent-post-exploitation · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-07-25/thailand-mof-hermes-ai-agent-post-exploitation · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.013Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries×1

Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/shai-hulud-miasma-supply-chain-worm-jumps-to-pypi-as-hades-3 · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1555Credentials from Password Stores×1

Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-06-10/shai-hulud-miasma-supply-chain-worm-jumps-to-pypi-as-hades-3 · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-07-25/thailand-mof-hermes-ai-agent-post-exploitation · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-07-25Unattended AI agent in 'YOLO mode' automated post-exploitation against Thailand's Finance Ministry — a transferable government-network TTP
    active-threatsExposed operator infrastructure shows an open-source AI agent running privilege-escalation triage with no human in the loop
  2. 2026-06-27Miasma / "Mini Shai-Hulud" npm worm runs a new wave across LeoPlatform/RStreams packages
    updates
  3. 2026-06-14Shai-Hulud / Miasma supply-chain worm lineage — open-sourced, ported to PyPI, and a 1,500-package AUR wave
    weekly-multi-day
  4. 2026-06-10Shai-Hulud/Miasma supply-chain worm jumps to PyPI as "Hades" — 37 malicious wheels across 19 packages
    updates

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry — each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

used by

Where this entity is cited

  • updates2
  • weekly-multi-day1
  • active-threats1

Source distribution

  • thehackernews.com3 (30%)
  • socket.dev2 (20%)
  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (10%)
  • hunt.io1 (10%)
  • isc.sans.edu1 (10%)
  • research.jfrog.com1 (10%)
  • sonatype.com1 (10%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived — referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Entries about Hades (4)

2026-07-25 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Unattended AI agent in 'YOLO mode' automated post-exploitation against Thailand's Finance Ministry — a transferable government-network TTP

Hunt.io (with researcher Bob Diachenko) found three simultaneously-exposed open directories — 585 files, ~470 MB of exploit code, webshells, stolen credentials and operator logs — tied to an intrusion against Thailand's Ministry of Finance, published 2026-07-23 (Hunt.io, 2026-07-23). The distinguishing feature is the automation layer: the operator ran Hermes, an open-source autonomous AI agent, and — per Hunt.io — "the operator ran the agent in unattended or YOLO mode, bypassing approval prompts for commands that could be considered dangerous." Recovered agent logs show it autonomously enumerating ministry hosts, traversing the filesystem, running a custom LinPEAS privilege-escalation script (probing several 2026 Linux-kernel LPE flaws and older sudo/polkit bugs), enumerating SUID/SGID binaries and running services, and recursively harvesting documents from a target office — each step executed without a human approving it. This is the second AI-agent-driven autonomous-attack disclosure this pipeline has tracked in roughly a week, marking a shift from AI-assisted to AI-unattended post-exploitation where an off-the-shelf agent framework, not bespoke attacker code, is the orchestration layer.

The hands-on tradecraft leaned on default-configuration weaknesses rather than zero-days: a script abusing Apache HiveServer2's default no-validation SASL PLAIN authentication on its service port to register a malicious Java UDF and run shell commands; an Ambari REST-API payload against the Hadoop management layer; and headless-browser automation logging into a GlassFish admin console with default credentials to deploy a JSP webshell via WAR upload (Hunt.io, 2026-07-23). A previously-unreported Go implant, "Hades," provided cross-platform persistence (Registry Run key and scheduled task on Windows, cron on Linux) and beaconed over HTTPS using request paths designed to blend with static JavaScript-asset traffic, with AES-256-GCM-encrypted payloads carried in HTTP bodies and built-in kill-dates and working-hours scheduling to blunt detection. Critically, "the Ministry of Finance has not confirmed that its systems were breached, and some of the recovered artifacts only show that particular systems were targeted rather than successfully compromised" (BleepingComputer, 2026-07-24); ThaiCERT and NCSA were notified 2026-07-15.

the operator ran the agent in unattended or YOLO mode, bypassing approval prompts for commands that could be considered dangerous.

Hunt.io

However, the Ministry of Finance has not confirmed that its systems were breached, and some of the recovered artifacts only show that particular systems were targeted rather than successfully compromised.

BleepingComputer, citing Hunt.io
incident25 Jul 04:38Zsingle-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-27 · view entry permalink →

HIGHupdate

Miasma / "Mini Shai-Hulud" npm worm runs a new wave across LeoPlatform/RStreams packages

UPDATE · originally covered TeamPCP open-sources its Mini Shai-Hulud framework, spawning a new "Phantom Gyp" derivative (2026-06-09)

The Miasma / Mini Shai-Hulud / Hades supply-chain worm — last seen backdooring @redhat-cloud-services packages and the TeamPCP "Phantom Gyp" framework — ran a fresh wave on 2026-06-24: 23+ malicious versions across the LeoPlatform and RStreams serverless-data-pipeline npm ecosystems (leo-sdk, leo-auth, leo-aws, leo-cli) after the czirker publisher account was compromised, plus a Go-module compromise of Verana Blockchain (Socket Security, 2026-06-25).

The wave reuses the previously documented binding.gyp/node-gyp install-time execution to stage a Bun runtime that harvests .env files, npm/GitHub/cloud tokens, SSH keys and IDE/AI-agent configs, scraping GitHub Actions CI secrets (JFrog, 2026-06-26), and again carries the RevokeAndItGoesKaboom campaign marker that Socket ties to the earlier codfish/semantic-release-action compromise (documented by StepSecurity), where the malicious action searched GitHub commit messages bearing that string as an operator dead-drop channel (Socket Security, 2026-06-25). Any CH/EU team consuming these packages in CI should rotate all exposed CI/cloud credentials since 2026-06-20 and alert on node-gyp evaluating JavaScript from binding.gyp.

threat27 Jun 05:17Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-14 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

Shai-Hulud / Miasma supply-chain worm lineage — open-sourced, ported to PyPI, and a 1,500-package AUR wave

The supply-chain-worm family the W23 weekly consolidated under the Miasma/IronWorm banner spent this week proliferating across ecosystems and operators. On 9 June a SANS ISC handler tracked TeamPCP open-sourcing its Mini Shai-Hulud framework, immediately spawning a "Phantom Gyp" derivative (SANS ISC; daily 06-09). On 10 June the lineage opened a PyPI front dubbed "Hades" — 37 malicious wheels across 19 packages (The Hacker News; daily 06-10).

The week's largest wave hit the Arch User Repository. "Atomic Arch" began with roughly 400 orphaned AUR packages adopted and re-pointed to a Rust credential-stealer plus eBPF rootkit (The Hacker News; Sonatype; daily 06-13); a second wave around 12 June expanded the count further (tracker estimates range from the 400+ in primary reporting to ~1,500) and swapped some PKGBUILD delivery from npm dependency injection to bun install js-digest — active operator iteration against detection. The npm delivery mechanism has been linked by SANS ISC and subsequent reporting to the broader Shai-Hulud supply-chain family. Official Arch core/extra repositories were not affected; only adopted AUR packages. For defenders the through-line is constant: install-time script execution is the kill chain, and npm/bun/AUR build steps need to be treated as untrusted code execution in CI/CD.

synthesis14 Jun 23:57Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

Earlier coverage (1)