2026-08-15NOTABLESOCRadar's row-level re-analysis moves the blast radius upstream to a compromised security scanner, which changes what a CI/CD estate has to audit
TeamPCP
actor · actor:teampcp single-source
Cybercrime actor targeting software supply chains, tracked by Google GTIG as UNC6780: the March 2026 Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM and BerriAI compromises, the Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm, and a claimed compromise of the Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin in May 2026.
Aliases: UNC6780
Coverage
16
14 about it · 2 mentions · first 2026-05-06 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-08-28
A law-enforcement disruption of the Shai-Hulud npm-worm operator, with AFP's own scale estimate now on the…
Peak priority
high
5 high · 9 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, public-sector, education · regions: europe
Sources cited
76
39 hosts
2026-05-1216 appearances2026-08-28
Action items (2)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about TeamPCP, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Re-scope any audit that was closed on the question 'did we install litellm 1.82.7 or 1.82.8 on 24 March': check instead whether CI workflows referenced aquasecurity/trivy-action or aquasecurity/setup-trivy by mutable version tag rather than a full commit SHA in the second half of March 2026, and whether any host pulled the aquasec/trivy image tags 0.69.4, 0.69.5, 0.69.6 or latest between 19 March 18:24 UTC and 23 March 01:36 UTC per Docker's own stated window. Treat credentials reachable from those runners as exposed.2026-08-15SOCRadar's row-level re-analysis moves the blast…
- Inventory Model Context Protocol endpoints in your cloud estate and confirm each one requires authentication, Wiz found unauthenticated MCP endpoints across hundreds of environments, and each is a pre-authenticated proxy already holding the backend credentials it bridges.2026-08-08The AI toolchain became a cloud attack surface with…
Defender insights
What each entry about TeamPCP tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage
Triage
Exposure · detection
Detection
Exposure · detection
3 earlier entries carry guidance too, listed under the story timeline below.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
uses
- Shai-Hulud offensive framework (open-source release)Datadog Security Labs analyses the framework TeamPCP released
attributed activity
- Checkmarx Jenkins plugin backdoor
- Miasma
- Mini Shai-HuludStepSecurity and Wiz attribute the TanStack wave to TeamPCP
Story timeline
Every entry that names TeamPCP, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-08-28AFP-FBI-WAPF disrupt TeamPCP: two Western Australia men charged over the npm/GitHub supply-chain worm operation AFP estimates compromised 1,000+ organisations, 500,000+ credentials and 300+ GB of data
- 2026-08-15The '2,500-organisation LiteLLM breach' was mostly not LiteLLM: 95% of the identified victims were collected before the poisoned packages existed, through the Trivy scanner their pipelines pulled unpinned
- 2026-08-08Wiz Cloud Threat Highlights H1 2026: LiteLLM had four separate security events in six months, unauthenticated MCP endpoints turned up across hundreds of environments, and a new extortion actor goes after service accounts rather than people
- 2026-07-14Cisco Talos maps the full taxonomy of Python-package build-time and import-time code execution ("The Serpent's Tongue")
- 2026-06-12npm v12 will disable install scripts by default, audit CI/CD pipelines before July
- 2026-06-09TeamPCP open-sources its Mini Shai-Hulud framework, spawning a new "Phantom Gyp" derivative
- 2026-06-02"Miasma" worm backdoors 32 Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages via OIDC trusted-publishing abuse
- 2026-05-28Nx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entries
- 2026-05-24Packagist supply-chain wave: Laravel-Lang autoloader backdoor and the cross-ecosystem postinstall strand
- 2026-05-24npm ships 2FA-gated "staged publishing" GA in response to the 2026 supply-chain worm waves
- 2026-05-21Verizon 2026 DBIR: vulnerability exploitation overtakes stolen credentials as the leading initial access vector for the first time in 19 years
- 2026-05-19Grafana Labs confirms GitHub breach claimed by CoinbaseCartel: a workflow token missed after the TanStack npm compromise let attackers download its code and internal repositories
- 2026-05-15Datadog analyses TeamPCP's open-sourced Shai-Hulud framework: credential and runner-memory theft, IDE and Claude Code hook persistence, OIDC npm publishing and a wipe-on-revocation daemon
- 2026-05-13Mini Shai-Hulud hits TanStack: a pull_request_target Pwn Request, Actions cache poisoning and OIDC token theft from runner memory published 84 malicious @tanstack versions with valid provenance
- 2026-05-12Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin backdoored: rogue build 2026.5.09 swept build hosts for credentials on 2026-05-09/10, the third wave of malicious Checkmarx artifacts since March (TeamPCP claimed)
- 2026-05-12GTIG AI Threat Tracker (May 2026): an AI-developed zero-day 2FA bypass prepared for mass exploitation, AI decoy code in Russia-nexus malware and PROMPTSPY's Gemini agent
Hunting pivots
CVEs (exploited first)
Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (49 across 14 tactics)
49 techniques observed across 11 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ReconnaissanceGather Victim Org Information · Gather Victim Host Information: Hardware
- Resource DevelopmentDevelop Capabilities: Exploits · Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence
- Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Supply Chain Compromise · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript · User Execution · User Execution: Malicious File · Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
- PersistenceValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service · Event Triggered Execution · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries
- Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service · Event Triggered Execution · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Obfuscated Files or Information: Junk Code Insertion · Masquerading · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
- Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem · Steal Application Access Token · Unsecured Credentials · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys · Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API · Unsecured Credentials: Container API · Credentials from Password Stores · Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers · Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
- DiscoveryFile and Directory Discovery · System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
- Command and ControlProxy: Multi-hop Proxy · Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Ingress Tool Transfer
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel · Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol · Exfiltration Over Web Service · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Code Repository
- ImpactData Destruction
Reconnaissance TA0043
T1591Gather Victim Org Information×1
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.
Evidence: 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
T1592.001Gather Victim Host Information: Hardware×1
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.).
Evidence: 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
Resource Development TA0042
T1587.004Develop Capabilities: Exploits×1
Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits. Adversaries may use information acquired via Vulnerabilities to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.
Evidence: 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
T1588.007Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence×1
Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks, including creating scripts, assisting social engineering, developing payloads, and to Query Public AI Services in support of Reconnaissance.
Evidence: 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1078Valid Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-05-12/teampcp-unc6780-pcpjack-ecosystem-backdoors-the-checkmarx-je · 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×3
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-28/teampcp-afp-fbi-disruption-shai-hulud-arrests · 2026-08-15/trivy-not-litellm-behind-2500-org-credential-collection · 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · ATT&CK page ↗
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×3
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
T1195Supply Chain Compromise×1
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Evidence: 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗
T1195.001Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools×5
Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by the original owner. Adversaries may also employ "typosquatting" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.
Evidence: 2026-08-28/teampcp-afp-fbi-disruption-shai-hulud-arrests · 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · 2026-07-14/talos-serpents-tongue-python-package-code-execution-taxonomy · 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×7
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Evidence: 2026-08-15/trivy-not-litellm-behind-2500-org-credential-collection · 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · 2026-05-12/teampcp-unc6780-pcpjack-ecosystem-backdoors-the-checkmarx-je +1 more · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter×1
Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.
Evidence: 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×2
Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.
Evidence: 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×2
Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.
Evidence: 2026-07-14/talos-serpents-tongue-python-package-code-execution-taxonomy · 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×3
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.
Evidence: 2026-06-02/miasma-worm-backdoors-32-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages · 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204User Execution×1
An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.
Evidence: 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Evidence: 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574.007Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable×1
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line.
Evidence: 2026-07-14/talos-serpents-tongue-python-package-code-execution-taxonomy · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078Valid Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-05-12/teampcp-unc6780-pcpjack-ecosystem-backdoors-the-checkmarx-je · 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×3
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-28/teampcp-afp-fbi-disruption-shai-hulud-arrests · 2026-08-15/trivy-not-litellm-behind-2500-org-credential-collection · 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×3
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.002Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service×2
Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1546Event Triggered Execution×2
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.013Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries×1
Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.
Evidence: 2026-06-02/miasma-worm-backdoors-32-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1078Valid Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-05-12/teampcp-unc6780-pcpjack-ecosystem-backdoors-the-checkmarx-je · 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×3
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-28/teampcp-afp-fbi-disruption-shai-hulud-arrests · 2026-08-15/trivy-not-litellm-behind-2500-org-credential-collection · 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×3
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.002Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service×2
Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1546Event Triggered Execution×2
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.013Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: XDG Autostart Entries×1
Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.
Evidence: 2026-06-02/miasma-worm-backdoors-32-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages · ATT&CK page ↗
T1548.003Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching×1
Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×2
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1027.016Obfuscated Files or Information: Junk Code Insertion×1
Adversaries may use junk code / dead code to obfuscate a malware’s functionality. Junk code is code that either does not execute, or if it does execute, does not change the functionality of the code. Junk code makes analysis more difficult and time-consuming, as the analyst steps through non-functional code instead of analyzing the main code. It also may hinder detections that rely on static code analysis due to the use of benign functionality, especially when combined with Compression or Software Packing.
Evidence: 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036Masquerading×2
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.
Evidence: 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078Valid Accounts×2
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-05-12/teampcp-unc6780-pcpjack-ecosystem-backdoors-the-checkmarx-je · 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×3
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-08-28/teampcp-afp-fbi-disruption-shai-hulud-arrests · 2026-08-15/trivy-not-litellm-behind-2500-org-credential-collection · 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · ATT&CK page ↗
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1
Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Evidence: 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574.007Hijack Execution Flow: Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable×1
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line.
Evidence: 2026-07-14/talos-serpents-tongue-python-package-code-execution-taxonomy · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1
Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003.007OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem×2
Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc/<PID>/maps` file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And `/proc/<PID>/mem`, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1528Steal Application Access Token×2
Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552Unsecured Credentials×4
Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Shell History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).
Evidence: 2026-08-28/teampcp-afp-fbi-disruption-shai-hulud-arrests · 2026-08-08/wiz-cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026-ai-toolchain-exposure · 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×6
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
Evidence: 2026-08-15/trivy-not-litellm-behind-2500-org-credential-collection · 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · 2026-05-12/teampcp-unc6780-pcpjack-ecosystem-backdoors-the-checkmarx-je · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.004Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys×1
Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk, .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API×3
Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.007Unsecured Credentials: Container API×1
Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555Credentials from Password Stores×1
Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.
Evidence: 2026-06-02/miasma-worm-backdoors-32-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.005Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers×1
Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers. Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.006Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores×1
Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1083File and Directory Discovery×1
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-05-24/packagist-supply-chain-wave-laravel-lang-autoloader-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗
T1614.001System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×3
Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy×1
Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.
Evidence: 2026-05-12/gtig-ai-threat-tracker-may-2026-first-confirmed-ai-generated · ATT&CK page ↗
T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×2
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×2
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
T1567.001Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Code Repository×2
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs is often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1485Data Destruction×2
Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about TeamPCP (14)
Earlier coverage (11)
Cisco Talos maps the full taxonomy of Python-package build-time and import-time code execution ("The Serpent's Tongue")Cisco Talos published a lifecycle survey of code-execution paths in Python packaging (from setup.py running at install time to persistent .pth files, site-hook modules and PYTHONPATH hijacking that fire on every subsequent Python invocation) tying the taxonomy to real TeamPCP supply-chain compromises (litellm, lightning). It is a reference for supply-chain defenders and a concrete hunt surface for teams running Python build/CI pipelines.TeamPCP open-sources its Mini Shai-Hulud framework, spawning a new "Phantom Gyp" derivativeTeamPCP open-sources its Mini Shai-Hulud supply-chain framework on GitHub, spawning a new "Phantom Gyp" derivative and underscoring that valid SLSA provenance does not survive a subverted build environment (SANS ISC, 2026-06-08).npm v12 will disable install scripts by default, audit CI/CD pipelines before JulyGitHub announced that npm v12 (expected July 2026) disables dependency lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall, including implicit node-gyp builds) by default, requires npm approve-scripts for explicit opt-in, and blocks Git/remote-URL dependencies without --allow-git/--allow-remote (GitHub …"Miasma" worm backdoors 32 Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages via OIDC trusted-publishing abuse"Miasma" supply-chain worm compromised 32 @redhat-cloud-services npm packages via a hijacked maintainer GitHub account and OIDC trusted-publishing abuse, adding new GCP and Azure cloud-identity collectors (Wiz, 2026-06-01).Nx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entriesCISA added three supply-chain CVEs to KEV on 2026-05-27, the Nx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools cascade. The Nx Console v18.95.0 VS Code extension compromise (CVE-2026-48027) traces to the TanStack npm supply-chain compromise (CVE-2026-45321), whose payload exfiltrated a contributor's GitHub CLI OAuth token. GitHub's CISO named the extension as the vector for the theft of about 3,800 GitHub internal repositories, and Grafana Labs traced its own breach to the upstream TanStack compromise. Separately, CVE-2026-8398 covers a roughly four-week trojanisation of signed DAEMON Tools Lite builds 12.5.0.2421 to 12.5.0.2434 from the vendor's build environment.Packagist supply-chain wave: Laravel-Lang autoloader backdoor and the cross-ecosystem postinstall strandA Packagist (PHP/Composer) supply-chain wave hit the Laravel-Lang ecosystem, 700+ version tags rewritten to point at attacker forks, an autoload.files backdoor that executes on every request, and a separate 8-package package.json postinstall strand dropping a Linux implant. Full mechanics in today's deep dive (Socket, 2026-05-23).npm ships 2FA-gated "staged publishing" GA in response to the 2026 supply-chain worm wavesUPDATE (supply-chain worm wave, originally covered 2026-05-23): GitHub announced on 2026-05-22 that npm staged publishing is now Generally Available; a maintainer must run npm stage publish (npm CLI 11.15.0+), which uploads the version to a consumer-invisible staging queue, then pass a separate 2FA …Datadog analyses TeamPCP's open-sourced Shai-Hulud framework: credential and runner-memory theft, IDE and Claude Code hook persistence, OIDC npm publishing and a wipe-on-revocation daemonOn 2026-05-12 a GitHub repository signed "Love - TeamPCP" published what Datadog Security Labs assesses as the complete source of the Shai-Hulud offensive framework; GitHub removed it soon after, but not before it was forked. Datadog's static analysis of 2026-05-13 finds a TypeScript and Bun toolkit that harvests more than 100 credential file paths, cloud, Kubernetes and Vault secrets and GitHub Actions runner memory, poisons repositories with VS Code and Claude Code hooks and npm packages with stolen tokens or a workflow's OIDC token, exits on Russian-locale systems, and installs a daemon that deletes the home directory when a stolen GitHub token is revoked.Mini Shai-Hulud hits TanStack: a pull_request_target Pwn Request, Actions cache poisoning and OIDC token theft from runner memory published 84 malicious @tanstack versions with valid provenanceOn 2026-05-11 between 19:20 and 19:26 UTC an attacker published 84 malicious versions of 42 @tanstack/* npm packages through TanStack's own release workflow by chaining a pull_request_target Pwn Request, GitHub Actions cache poisoning and extraction of the workflow's OIDC token from runner memory; no npm token was stolen (TanStack). The install-time payload steals cloud, GitHub, npm and SSH credentials, spreads to its victims' other packages and plants a service that wipes the home directory when the stolen token is revoked (StepSecurity, NCSC-CH). The compromise is CVE-2026-45321 (CVSS 9.6), in CISA's KEV catalog since 2026-05-27.GTIG AI Threat Tracker (May 2026): an AI-developed zero-day 2FA bypass prepared for mass exploitation, AI decoy code in Russia-nexus malware and PROMPTSPY's Gemini agentGoogle Threat Intelligence Group's AI Threat Tracker of 2026-05-11 reports the first zero-day exploit it believes was developed with AI: a Python 2FA bypass for a popular open-source web-based system administration tool that needs valid credentials, which criminals planned to use in mass exploitation before GTIG's coordinated disclosure may have prevented it. The report also documents LLM-generated decoy code in the Russia-nexus CANFAIL and LONGSTREAM malware, the Android backdoor PROMPTSPY driving devices through Gemini, PRC and DPRK actors using Gemini for vulnerability research, pooled LLM access, and TeamPCP's supply-chain compromises of AI components.Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin backdoored: rogue build 2026.5.09 swept build hosts for credentials on 2026-05-09/10, the third wave of malicious Checkmarx artifacts since March (TeamPCP claimed)A modified build 2026.5.09 of the Checkmarx Jenkins AST plugin, published to the Jenkins Marketplace outside the plugin's release pipeline, was live from 2026-05-09 01:25 to 2026-05-10 08:47 UTC; its payload walks an OS-specific list of file paths looking for credentials of crypto wallets, VPNs, AWS and GitHub (Checkmarx). Checkmarx says the attacker reused access obtained in the March 2026 Trivy compromise, and TeamPCP claimed the attack, the third wave of malicious Checkmarx artifacts since late March. Checkmarx recommends rotating every credential a pipeline that ran the build could reach.
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Mini Shai-Hulud×6
- Miasma×3
- Megalodon×2
- TanStack Router npm credential-stealing payload, exfiltrated Nx contributor GitHub CLI OAuth token (precursor to CVE-2026-48027 Nx Console compromise); CISA KEV 2026-05-27×2
- Aqua Security Trivy×1
- Checkmarx Jenkins AST Plugin×1
- Checkmarx Jenkins plugin backdoor×1
- CoinbaseCartel×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- thehackernews.com10 (13%)
- attack.mitre.org7 (9%)
- socket.dev5 (7%)
- bleepingcomputer.com4 (5%)
- github.com4 (5%)
- helpnetsecurity.com3 (4%)
- securityweek.com3 (4%)
- wiz.io3 (4%)
- other37 (49%)
All cited sources (76)
- afp.gov.auAustralian Federal Police (joint AFP/FBI/WAPF release)https://www.afp.gov.au/news-centre/media-release/two-wa-men-charged-following-afp-fbi-wapf-disruption-alleged-global
- aikido.devAikido Securityhttps://www.aikido.dev/blog/red-hat-npm-packages-compromised-credential-stealing-worm
- aikido.devAikido, 2026-05-23https://www.aikido.dev/blog/supply-chain-attack-targets-laravel-lang-packages-with-credential-stealer
- aquasec.comAqua Securityhttps://www.aquasec.com/blog/trivy-supply-chain-attack-what-you-need-to-know/
- attack.mitre.org`T1036.005`https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/
- attack.mitre.org`T1059.004`https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/
- attack.mitre.org`T1083`https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083/
- attack.mitre.org`T1140`https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140/
- attack.mitre.org`T1195.002`https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/
- attack.mitre.org`T1204.002`https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/
- attack.mitre.org`T1552.001`https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/github-announces-npm-security-changes-to-tackle-supply-chain-attacks/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/grafana-says-stolen-github-token-let-hackers-steal-codebase/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/official-checkmarx-jenkins-package-compromised-with-infostealer/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/red-hat-npm-packages-compromised-to-steal-developer-credentials/
- blog.daemon-tools.ccDisc Soft Limited security incident noticehttps://blog.daemon-tools.cc/post/security-incident
- blog.talosintelligence.comCisco Taloshttps://blog.talosintelligence.com/the-serpents-tongue-luring-the-python-out-of-its-den/
- cert.europa.euCERT-EUhttps://cert.europa.eu/blog/european-commission-cloud-breach-trivy-supply-chain
- checkmarx.comCheckmarxhttps://checkmarx.com/blog/ongoing-security-updates/
- cisa.govCISA KEV cataloghttps://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
- cloud.google.comGoogle Threat Intelligence Grouphttps://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/ai-vulnerability-exploitation-initial-access
- docker.comDockerhttps://www.docker.com/blog/trivy-supply-chain-compromise-what-docker-hub-users-should-know/
- docs.litellm.aiLiteLLM (BerriAI)https://docs.litellm.ai/blog/security-update-march-2026
- docs.npmjs.comnpm Docshttps://docs.npmjs.com/generating-provenance-statements
- euvd.enisa.europa.euENISA EU Vulnerability Database, EUVD-2026-30514 (CVE-2026-8398)https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-30514
- euvd.enisa.europa.euENISA EU Vulnerability Database, EUVD-2026-32550 (CVE-2026-48027)https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-32550
- github.blogGitHub Changelog, 2026-05-22https://github.blog/changelog/2026-05-22-staged-publishing-and-new-install-time-controls-for-npm/
- github.blogGitHub Changeloghttps://github.blog/changelog/2026-06-09-upcoming-breaking-changes-for-npm-v12/
- github.comTanStack (GitHub Security Advisory)https://github.com/TanStack/router/security/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx
- github.comGitHub (actions/cache README)https://github.com/actions/cache
- github.comGitHub Advisory Database (Aqua Security Trivy)https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-69fq-xp46-6x23
- github.comGitHub Security Advisory GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847whttps://github.com/nrwl/nx-console/security/advisories/GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w
- globenewswire.comVerizon (press release via GlobeNewswire)https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2026/05/19/3297614/0/en/Vulnerability-Exploitation-Top-Breach-Entry-Point-2026-Industry-Wide-DBIR-Finds.html
- grafana.comGrafana Labshttps://grafana.com/blog/grafana-labs-security-update-latest-on-tanstack-npm-supply-chain-ransomware-incident/
- helpnetsecurity.comHelp Net Securityhttps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/05/11/google-ai-vulnerability-exploitation/
- helpnetsecurity.comHelp Net Securityhttps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/05/20/verizon-2026-dbir-findings/
- helpnetsecurity.comHelp Net Security on GitHub root causehttps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/05/21/github-grafana-breach-root-cause-nx-console/
- isc.sans.eduSANS ISC diaryhttps://isc.sans.edu/diary/33060
- kaspersky.comKaspersky DAEMON Tools analysishttps://www.kaspersky.com/blog/daemon-tools-supply-chain-attack/55691/
- krebsonsecurity.comKrebsOnSecurityhttps://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/08/two-alleged-teampcp-hackers-arrested-in-australia/
- nx.devNx postmortemhttps://nx.dev/blog/nx-console-v18-95-0-postmortem
- opensourcemalware.comOpenSourceMalware, The Blight Reaches Microsofthttps://opensourcemalware.com/blog/miasma-reaches-azure
- research.jfrog.comJFrog Security Researchhttps://research.jfrog.com/post/shai-hulud-miasma-alright-lets-see-if-this-works/
- security-hub.ncsc.admin.chNCSC-CH Security Hubhttps://security-hub.ncsc.admin.ch/#/posts/12558
- securitylab.github.comGitHub Security Labhttps://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/
- securitylabs.datadoghq.comDatadog Security Labshttps://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/shai-hulud-open-source-framework-static-analysis/
- securityweek.comSecurityWeekhttps://www.securityweek.com/google-detects-first-ai-generated-zero-day-exploit/
- securityweek.comSecurityWeekhttps://www.securityweek.com/grafana-confirms-breach-after-hackers-claim-they-stole-data/
- securityweek.comSecurityWeekhttps://www.securityweek.com/trivy-not-litellm-behind-the-2500-org-compromise/
- sentinelone.comSentinelLABShttps://www.sentinelone.com/labs/cloud-worm-evicts-teampcp-and-steals-credentials-at-scale/
- socket.devSocket, Laravel-Lang, 2026-05-23https://socket.dev/blog/laravel-lang-compromise
- socket.devSocket, postinstall strand, 2026-05-22https://socket.dev/blog/malicious-postinstall-hook-found-across-700-github-repos
- socket.devSocket Securityhttps://socket.dev/blog/miasma-mini-shai-hulud-hits-leoplatform-npm-packages-go-ecosystem
- socket.devSockethttps://socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-campaign-hits-red-hat-cloud-services-npm-packages
- socket.devSocket, 2026-06-07https://socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-descends-to-hades-miasma-pypi-wave
- socradar.ioSOCRadarhttps://socradar.io/blog/checkmarx-jenkins-plugin-teampcp-backdoor/
- socradar.ioSOCRadarhttps://socradar.io/blog/litellm-supply-chain-attack/
- stepsecurity.ioStepSecurity, 2026-05-22https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/laravel-lang-supply-chain-attack
- stepsecurity.ioStepSecurityhttps://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-a-self-spreading-supply-chain-attack-hits-the-npm-ecosystem
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- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/05/grafana-github-token-breach-led-to.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/05/hackers-used-ai-to-develop-first-known.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker News, 2026-05-23https://thehackernews.com/2026/05/npm-adds-2fa-gated-publishing-and.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker News, 2026-05-23https://thehackernews.com/2026/05/packagist-supply-chain-attack-infects-8.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/05/teampcp-compromises-checkmarx-jenkins.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/06/github-to-disable-npm-install-scripts.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker News, 2026-06-09https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/hades-pypi-attack-19-packages-poisoned.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/06/miasma-malware-targets-npm-packages-and.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker News, 2026-06-06https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/miasma-worm-hits-73-microsoft-github.html
- theregister.comThe Registerhttps://www.theregister.com/2026/04/30/supply_chain_attacks_sap_npm_packages/
- theregister.comThe Registerhttps://www.theregister.com/ai-ml/2026/05/11/google-says-criminals-used-ai-built-zero-day-in-planned-mass-hack-spree/5237982
- verizon.comVerizon 2026 DBIRhttps://www.verizon.com/business/resources/T1f0/reports/2026-dbir-data-breach-investigations-report.pdf
- wiz.ioWiz Researchhttps://www.wiz.io/blog/cloud-threat-highlights-h1-2026
- wiz.ioWiz Researchhttps://www.wiz.io/blog/miasma-supply-chain-attack-targeting-redhat-npm-packages
- wiz.ioWizhttps://www.wiz.io/blog/mini-shai-hulud-strikes-again-tanstack-more-npm-packages-compromised