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GTIG AI Threat Tracker (May 2026): an AI-developed zero-day 2FA bypass prepared for mass exploitation, AI decoy code in Russia-nexus malware and PROMPTSPY's Gemini agent

GTIG finds a criminal zero-day exploit it believes was built with AI; its discovery may have prevented mass exploitation

Analysis

Google Threat Intelligence Group's AI Threat Tracker of 2026-05-11, drawn from Mandiant incident response engagements, Gemini and GTIG's own research, follows its February 2026 report on AI-related threat activity (GTIG, 2026-05-11).

An AI-developed zero-day prepared for mass exploitation

GTIG observed prominent cybercrime actors partnering to plan a mass vulnerability-exploitation operation around a zero-day exploit, implemented in a Python script, that bypasses two-factor authentication on a popular open-source, web-based system administration tool; GTIG worked with the vendor to disclose the flaw and disrupt the activity, and says its counter-discovery may have prevented the exploit's use (GTIG, 2026-05-11). The bypass requires valid user credentials and stems from a high-level semantic logic flaw, a trust assumption the developer hardcoded, rather than from memory corruption or input sanitisation (GTIG, 2026-05-11). GTIG does not believe Gemini was used but has high confidence that an AI model supported the discovery and weaponisation, citing abundant educational docstrings, a hallucinated CVSS score and a textbook Pythonic structure with detailed help menus and a clean _C ANSI colour class (GTIG, 2026-05-11). Google did not name the tool (The Hacker News, 2026-05-11). Contradiction: The Hacker News calls this the first time AI was put to use in the wild for exploit generation (The Hacker News, 2026-05-11), whereas GTIG says the planned mass exploitation may have been prevented (GTIG, 2026-05-11).

State actors using AI for vulnerability research and infrastructure

UNC2814 prompted Gemini with expert security personas to support vulnerability research into embedded targets including TP-Link firmware and Odette File Transfer Protocol (OFTP) implementations, and APT45 sent thousands of repetitive prompts that recursively analyse different CVEs and validate proof-of-concept exploits (GTIG, 2026-05-11). APT27 used Gemini to develop a fleet-management application likely meant for an operational relay box network, with the hop count hardcoded to three and mobile Wi-Fi and router devices among the supported types (GTIG, 2026-05-11). Actors also prompt models for the organisational hierarchies and third-party relationships of large enterprises to tailor phishing lures, one tried to identify the exact computer model a high-value target used, and a suspected PRC-nexus actor ran the agentic tools Hexstrike and Strix against a Japanese technology firm and an East Asian cybersecurity platform (GTIG, 2026-05-11).

Malware with AI-generated decoys and an AI-driven Android backdoor

Russia-nexus activity against Ukrainian organisations delivers CANFAIL and LONGSTREAM, which use LLM-generated decoy code to obfuscate their malicious functionality: CANFAIL's source carries LLM comments labelling unused filler blocks, and LONGSTREAM queries the system's daylight-saving status 32 times to pad the script with benign-looking activity (GTIG, 2026-05-11). PROMPTFLUX and HONESTCUE, which call the Gemini API to generate or obfuscate code, featured in GTIG's earlier reports (GTIG, 2026-05-11). The Android backdoor PROMPTSPY, first identified by ESET, runs an agent module that serialises the visible user interface through the Accessibility API, sends it to the gemini-2.5-flash-lite model in an HTTP POST and turns the JSON reply into simulated taps and swipes; it can replay captured PINs or lock patterns, lays an invisible overlay over the uninstall button and can rotate its Gemini API keys and VNC relay through its C2 (GTIG, 2026-05-11).

Pooled LLM access and attacks on AI components

UNC6201 tried a public script that registers and immediately cancels premium LLM accounts, and UNC5673, a PRC-nexus cluster with notable overlaps with TEMP.Hex that has targeted government sectors mainly in South and Southeast Asia, uses Claude-Relay-Service and CLI-Proxy-API to pool Gemini, Claude and OpenAI accounts (GTIG, 2026-05-11). TeamPCP (UNC6780) gained initial access through compromised PyPI packages and malicious pull requests to GitHub repositories including those of Trivy, Checkmarx, LiteLLM and BerriAI, embedded the SANDCLOCK credential stealer to extract AWS keys and GitHub tokens from build environments and monetised them with ransomware and data-theft extortion groups; GTIG adds that the LiteLLM compromise could expose considerable AI API secrets (GTIG, 2026-05-11).

Cited evidence

For the first time, GTIG has identified a threat actor using a zero-day exploit that we believe was developed with AI. The criminal threat actor planned to use it in a mass exploitation event but our proactive counter discovery may have prevented its use.

The vulnerability can be classified as a 2FA bypass, though it requires valid user credentials in the first place.

Analysis confirms the use of CANFAIL and LONGSTREAM, which utilize LLM-generated decoy code to obfuscate their malicious functionality.

For example, they employ "Claude-Relay-Service" to aggregate multiple Gemini, Claude, and OpenAI accounts, enabling account pooling and cost-sharing.

TeamPCP gained initial access through compromised PyPI packages and malicious pull requests to these GitHub repositories.

Google Threat Intelligence Group 2026-05-11

marking the first time the technology has been put to use in the wild in a malicious context for vulnerability discovery and exploit generation.

The Hacker News 2026-05-11

Updates1

Correction

GTIG reports the first zero-day exploit it believes was developed with AI, prepared by criminals for a planned mass-exploitation event that its counter-discovery may have prevented, not an exploit confirmed in use in the wild; the 2FA bypass also requires valid user credentials (GTIG, 2026-05-11). CANFAIL and LONGSTREAM do not call an LLM at runtime: they carry LLM-generated decoy code to obfuscate their functionality, and the report's example of malware driven by an LLM at runtime is the Android backdoor PROMPTSPY (GTIG, 2026-05-11). UNC5673 overlaps with TEMP.Hex rather than being it, and uses relay tooling to pool LLM accounts; the report does not describe stolen LLM API keys as a primary objective or a criminal market for them, and its only point on AI API secrets is that the LiteLLM compromise could expose them (GTIG, 2026-05-11). TeamPCP entered through compromised PyPI packages and malicious pull requests to GitHub repositories, and embedded SANDCLOCK to take AWS keys and GitHub tokens from build environments (GTIG, 2026-05-11).

Sources5

Revision history

  1. Published 2026-05-12-cd1ab844
  2. Correction 2026-10-21T1148Z-audit

    GTIG reports a zero-day exploit it believes was developed with AI that criminals planned to use in mass exploitation and that its disclosure may have prevented, not one confirmed in use in the wild; it needs valid credentials. CANFAIL and LONGSTREAM embed LLM-generated decoy code as obfuscation rather than calling an LLM at runtime, PROMPTSPY is the report's AI-driven malware, and UNC5673 pools LLM accounts; the report ties neither stolen LLM keys nor SANDCLOCK to a criminal market for AI access, and TeamPCP's entry points were compromised PyPI packages and malicious pull requests.

    Changed: affected_products body classification entities evidence headline priority sources sourcing_note summary techniques title

PROVENANCE

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