actions-cool/issues-helper compromise
incident · incident:actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tag
GitHub Action actions-cool/issues-helper compromised: 53 tags moved to an imposter commit reading Runner.Worker /proc/PID/mem for secrets; linked to the Mini Shai-Hulud cluster.
Action items (1)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about actions-cool/issues-helper compromise, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Find every workflow in your GitHub organisations that references actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment by tag; where either ran successfully on 2026-05-18 to 05-19 or 2026-09-16 to 09-25, rotate every secret that workflow could read and check the repository's commits since 2026-09-16 for added Claude Code or VS Code hook files, then remove the action or pin it to a full commit SHA from before 2026-05-18.2026-05-20The compromised actions-cool GitHub Actions were…
Defender insights
What each entry about actions-cool/issues-helper compromise tells a defender to do, newest first.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
part of
- Mini Shai-HuludSocket (2026-09-24) says both actions-cool actions were compromised in the May 2026 Mini Shai-Hulud campaign
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (6 across 5 tactics)
6 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Python · User Execution: Malicious File
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem
- Command and ControlIngress Tool Transfer
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel
Initial Access TA0001
T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×1
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×1
Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003.007OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem×1
Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc/<PID>/maps` file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And `/proc/<PID>/mem`, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about actions-cool/issues-helper compromise (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- thehackernews.com2 (40%)
- cybersecuritynews.com1 (20%)
- socket.dev1 (20%)
- stepsecurity.io1 (20%)
All cited sources (5)
- cybersecuritynews.comCybersecurityNewshttps://cybersecuritynews.com/compromised-github-action-exfiltrates-workflow-credentials/
- socket.devSockethttps://socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-actions
- stepsecurity.ioStepSecurityhttps://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-all-tags-point-to-imposter-commit-that-exfiltrates-ci-cd-credentials
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/05/github-actions-supply-chain-attack.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/09/compromised-github-actions-came-back.html