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actions-cool/issues-helper compromise

incident · incident:actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tag

GitHub Action actions-cool/issues-helper compromised: 53 tags moved to an imposter commit reading Runner.Worker /proc/PID/mem for secrets; linked to the Mini Shai-Hulud cluster.

Coverage
1
first 2026-05-20 → last 2026-10-20
Latest activity
2026-10-20
The compromised actions-cool GitHub Actions were re-enabled in September with malicious tags and ran the…
Peak priority
high
1 high
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, public-sector
Sources cited
5
4 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about actions-cool/issues-helper compromise, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Find every workflow in your GitHub organisations that references actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment by tag; where either ran successfully on 2026-05-18 to 05-19 or 2026-09-16 to 09-25, rotate every secret that workflow could read and check the repository's commits since 2026-09-16 for added Claude Code or VS Code hook files, then remove the action or pin it to a full commit SHA from before 2026-05-18.
    2026-05-20The compromised actions-cool GitHub Actions were…

Defender insights

What each entry about actions-cool/issues-helper compromise tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-20HIGHThe compromised actions-cool GitHub Actions were re-enabled in September with malicious tags and ran the payload again

Exposure · triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

part of

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-20actions-cool/issues-helper GitHub Action compromised in Mini Shai-Hulud: 53 tags moved to imposter commits that read Runner.Worker memory, re-enabled in September with the tags intact
    active-threatsThe compromised actions-cool GitHub Actions were re-enabled in September with malicious tags and ran the payload again
ATT&CK techniques (6 across 5 tactics)

6 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Python · User Execution: Malicious File
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem
  • Command and ControlIngress Tool Transfer
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel

Initial Access TA0001

T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×1

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×1

Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.007OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem×1

Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc/<PID>/maps` file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And `/proc/<PID>/mem`, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-53-tags · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about actions-cool/issues-helper compromise (1)

2026-05-20 · view entry permalink →

HIGHupdatedNATOB2

actions-cool/issues-helper GitHub Action compromised in Mini Shai-Hulud: 53 tags moved to imposter commits that read Runner.Worker memory, re-enabled in September with the tags intact

StepSecurity disclosed on 2026-05-18 that every existing tag of the actions-cool/issues-helper GitHub Action, 53 in total, had been moved to its own imposter commit that is not reachable from the action's default branch, and that all 15 tags of the companion actions-cool/maintain-one-comment action were moved the same way (StepSecurity, 2026-05-18). The payload downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime to the runner, then a python3 child process reads the memory of the Runner.Worker process, which holds the workflow's decrypted secrets, filters the captured bytes for values flagged as secret and sends them over HTTPS to an attacker-controlled domain (StepSecurity, 2026-05-18). The 53 imposter commits carry fake "Build action for vX.Y.Z" messages in the maintainer's style and were all created within 3 minutes 16 seconds on 2026-05-18 (StepSecurity, 2026-05-18). Socket's head of threat intelligence told The Hacker News that the @antv npm compromise in the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign is likely linked to the actions-cool hack because the two share an exfiltration domain, and that "the overlap is strong enough that we're treating them as related" (The Hacker News, 2026-05-19). GitHub's security team disabled both repositories on 2026-05-19 but left the malicious tags in place; both became reachable again on 2026-09-16, so every workflow referencing either action by tag ran the payload again until GitHub disabled them a second time by 2026-09-25 (Socket, 2026-09-24). SafeDep found six more repositories infected through issues-helper between 2026-09-20 and 09-24, with the payload also committing Claude Code and VS Code hooks that run on a developer's machine when the project is opened (The Hacker News, 2026-09-25).

Triage: an issue-housekeeping action has no reason to install a separate JavaScript runtime or run a multi-minute script; a scheduled workflow that switches from failing in seconds to running for minutes without any change to its own code means the tagged action became downloadable again (Socket, 2026-09-24).

GitHub security team disabled both repositories on May 19, 2026, one day after the malicious content was introduced.

On September 16, 2026, both repositories became accessible again. Their release tags were not cleaned up first.

have been disabled on GitHub again, so workflows referencing them now fail at job setup instead of running the payload.

Socket 2026-09-24

The payload steals the CI secrets. Then it commits Claude Code and VS Code hooks into the repository.

The Hacker News (quoting SafeDep)
Correctionrun 2026-09-30T0639Z-auditbodyclassificationtechniquestitleheadlinesummaryevent_date

The Hacker News reports that GitHub disabled access to the companion maintain-one-comment repository, and Socket described the link to the Mini Shai-Hulud npm campaign as likely, based on the shared exfiltration domain, rather than confirmed; no cited source ties it to PyPI (The Hacker News, 2026-05-19). The Nx Console extension compromise named in the earlier summary is a separate incident, and no cited source says EU or Swiss organisations were affected.

Updaterun 2026-10-20T0835Z-auditactionsbodyevidenceheadlinesourcessummarytechniquestitle

Socket reported on 2026-09-24 that GitHub's security team had disabled both actions-cool/issues-helper and actions-cool/maintain-one-comment on 2026-05-19, not only maintain-one-comment, and that both became reachable again on 2026-09-16, between 09:09 and 16:16 UTC, with every release tag still pointing at the content introduced on 2026-05-18, so any workflow referencing either action by tag ran the payload again on its next run; Socket could not determine why they were re-enabled (Socket, 2026-09-24). Socket places the compromise in the May 2026 Mini Shai-Hulud campaign and notes that GitHub's dependency graph lists about 15,000 dependent repositories for issues-helper alone (Socket, 2026-09-24). SafeDep found six more repositories infected through issues-helper between 2026-09-20 and 09-24, and says the payload steals the CI secrets and then commits Claude Code and VS Code hooks into the repository, which run the malware on the machine of a developer who pulls the change and opens the project (The Hacker News, 2026-09-25). GitHub disabled both repositories again by 2026-09-25, so referencing workflows now fail at job setup (Socket, 2026-09-24; The Hacker News, 2026-09-25).

threat20 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • thehackernews.com2 (40%)
  • cybersecuritynews.com1 (20%)
  • socket.dev1 (20%)
  • stepsecurity.io1 (20%)