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Nx Console extension compromise

incident · incident:nx-console-vs-code-extension-18-95-0-compromised-stolen-publ

Malicious Nx Console 18.95.0, published on 2026-05-18 with a core contributor's GitHub CLI token stolen in the TanStack npm compromise, was live 12:30 to 12:48 UTC on the Visual Studio Marketplace and 12:33 to 13:09 UTC on Open VSX, shipping a multi-channel credential stealer and a Python backdoor (Nx, 2026-05-21).

Coverage
3
2 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-05-20 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-28
Nx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entries
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, public-sector · regions: europe
Sources cited
17
11 hosts
2026-05-203 appearances2026-05-28

Defender insights

What each entry about Nx Console extension compromise tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-28HIGHexploitedNx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entries

Exposure · detection

2026-05-20NOTABLEMalicious Nx Console 18.95.0 stayed up to 36 minutes on two extension marketplaces, stealing developer credentials

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

Every entry that names Nx Console extension compromise, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-05-28Nx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entries
    deep-dive
  2. 2026-05-20Nx Console VS Code extension version 18.95.0 shipped a credential stealer, published with a contributor token stolen in the TanStack npm compromise
    active-threatsMalicious Nx Console 18.95.0 stayed up to 36 minutes on two extension marketplaces, stealing developer credentials
  3. 2026-05-20actions-cool/issues-helper GitHub Action compromised in Mini Shai-Hulud: 53 tags moved to imposter commits that read Runner.Worker memory, re-enabled in September with the tags intact
    mentionactive-threatsThe compromised actions-cool GitHub Actions were re-enabled in September with malicious tags and ran the payload again
ATT&CK techniques (19 across 9 tactics)

19 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Python · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
  • PersistenceCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent
  • Privilege EscalationCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching
  • Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
  • Credential AccessSteal Application Access Token · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys · Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API · Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers · Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
  • Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
  • Command and ControlWeb Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Ingress Tool Transfer
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel · Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol · Exfiltration Over Web Service

Initial Access TA0001

T1195.001Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools×1

Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by the original owner. Adversaries may also employ "typosquatting" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×2

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×1

Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×2

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×2

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗

T1548.003Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching×2

Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1

Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1528Steal Application Access Token×1

Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×2

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.004Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys×1

Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk, .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API×2

Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.005Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers×2

Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers. Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.006Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×1

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Nx Console extension compromise (2)

2026-05-28 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-48027 +2exploitedupdatedNATOB1

Nx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entries

Background. The CISA KEV adds on 2026-05-27 close a chain of disclosures across the preceding three weeks that share a single operational pattern: trusted developer-tooling-publishing pipelines (a maintainer's machine, a vendor build server, a popular VS Code marketplace listing) used to push malicious code to downstream consumers at scale (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27; Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21; GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18; GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx, 2026-05-11; Disc Soft Limited, 2026-05-06; Kaspersky, 2026-05-05; Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). The TanStack compromise was carried out via Mini Shai-Hulud, TeamPCP's self-replicating worm that steals CI/CD credentials and uses them to publish infected versions of more packages (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). Three of the chain's CVEs were added to CISA KEV on the same day (2026-05-27), confirming in-the-wild exploitation (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27), and GitHub's CISO Alexis Wales named the malicious Nx Console extension as the vector for the theft of about 3,800 of GitHub's internal repositories (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21).

The TanStack → Nx Console pivot: CVE-2026-45321 and CVE-2026-48027.

The chain begins on 2026-05-11 with GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx (CVE-2026-45321): 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* npm packages were published with a credential-stealing payload (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). On a Nx contributor's machine the payload read locally stored credentials and exfiltrated them, including the contributor's GitHub CLI OAuth token. The Nx postmortem names @tanstack/zod-adapter@1.166.15 as the malicious dependency resolved on that machine (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). Seven days later, the attacker published Nx Console v18.95.0 as a legitimate Nx core contributor (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21), tracked as CVE-2026-48027 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27). The malicious version was live on the Visual Studio Marketplace from 12:30 to 12:48 UTC on 2026-05-18 and on Open VSX from 12:33 to 13:09 UTC (GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18). Nx Console is a VS Code extension with 2.2 million installs (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). The payload ran on extension activation in VS Code or a fork such as Cursor and harvested Vault tokens, npm tokens, AWS metadata-service, Secrets Manager, SSM and Web Identity credentials, GitHub tokens, the contents of an active 1Password op CLI session, SSH private keys, .env files and GCP and Docker credentials (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). The advisory describes it as an obfuscated payload that the extension fetched, and says the harvested data was exfiltrated over HTTPS, the GitHub API and DNS (GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18).

The advisory says the leaked credentials "allowed the attacker to run workflows on our GitHub repository as a contributor" (GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18). The postmortem names the gap that let this become a release: until the incident any core contributor could publish a new Nx Console version without a second human's approval, with no required-reviewer rule and no environment gate (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). A stolen developer credential therefore turned into a downstream publish without secondary review.

CVE-2026-8398: DAEMON Tools Lite signed-build trojanisation.

CVE-2026-8398 covers a separate but parallel compromise of Disc Soft Limited's build environment. DAEMON Tools Lite versions 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434, circulating since 2026-04-08, contained trojanised DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe binaries signed with a valid AVB Disc Soft digital signature, which contact a command-and-control server at every system start (Kaspersky, 2026-05-05). Disc Soft says it found "unauthorized interference within our infrastructure" and that certain installation packages "were impacted within our build environment and were released in a compromised state". It released the clean version 12.6 on 2026-05-05 (Disc Soft Limited, 2026-05-06). Kaspersky detected several thousand attempts to install additional payloads through infected installations during the roughly four-week distribution window (Kaspersky, 2026-05-05). Safe version: 12.6 or later. CISA added the CVE to KEV on 2026-05-27 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27).

Downstream impact: what GitHub and Grafana Labs publicly confirmed.

GitHub CISO Alexis Wales named the malicious Nx Console v18.95.0 extension, installed by a GitHub employee, as the vector for GitHub's breach in which about 3,800 private repositories were exfiltrated (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). Grafana Labs' CISO Joe McManus traced Grafana's separate GitHub breach to "a TanStack npm supply chain attack via the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign", not to Nx Console, so both breaches trace back to the TanStack compromise by different routes (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). The malicious version was live for less than an hour (about 18 minutes on the Visual Studio Marketplace and 36 on Open VSX) (GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18); the postmortem's summary gives about 11 minutes for the Marketplace, counted from the maintainers' first alert (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21), and one install by a GitHub employee was enough for the attackers to reach GitHub's private repositories (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21).

Detection and hardening: what to push to operators today.

Hardening: enforce an organisational policy controls list for VS Code / Cursor / Windsurf extensions (the malicious upload passed the Visual Studio Marketplace's automated signing, manifest and malware checks (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21)); pin npm dependencies with lockfile + --ignore-scripts for CI/CD builds; require human approval for any package that adds or modifies postinstall / preinstall / install scripts; rotate every CI/CD secret, npm token, GitHub PAT, and AWS access key accessible from any host that ran an affected Nx Console version between 2026-05-18 12:30 and 13:09 UTC. Treat any host that installed Nx Console 18.95.0, or had Nx Console installed with auto-update enabled in VS Code or a fork such as Cursor during that window, as potentially compromised (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21).

TanStack contains an unspecified vulnerability that allowed malicious versions of the product to be published to the npm registry to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity.

CISA KEV catalog 2026-05-27
Correctionrun 2026-09-30T0639Z-auditsourcesbodyevidencesourcing_noteclassificationtechniquestagssummaryentitiesaffected_products

CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog marks both CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console) and CVE-2026-45321 (TanStack) as used in known ransomware campaigns (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27). The attackers who stole Grafana Labs' codebase through the TanStack compromise demanded payment not to release or sell it, and Grafana did not pay (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). Credentials exposed through either compromise are best handled on the assumption that an extortion group holds them.

The Nx postmortem does not describe token scopes, a tag push or hosted-runner publish secrets. It says any core contributor could publish without a second approval (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). The harvested credentials are Vault, npm, AWS service, GitHub, 1Password op session, SSH, .env, GCP and Docker secrets (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). GitHub named Nx Console only for its own breach, while Grafana Labs traced its breach to the TanStack npm attack (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). The DAEMON Tools trojanised builds circulated for about four weeks, from 2026-04-08 until the clean 12.6 release on 2026-05-05 (Kaspersky, 2026-05-05; Disc Soft Limited, 2026-05-06).

vulnerability28 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-05-20 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOA1

Nx Console VS Code extension version 18.95.0 shipped a credential stealer, published with a contributor token stolen in the TanStack npm compromise

An attacker published Nx Console version 18.95.0 to the Visual Studio Marketplace at 12:30 UTC on 2026-05-18, where it stayed until 12:48 UTC, and to Open VSX from 12:33 to 13:09 UTC (Nx GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18), times StepSecurity's account puts at 12:36 UTC for the Marketplace publication (StepSecurity, 2026-05-18); the Marketplace upload passed Microsoft's automated verification, and a maintainer caught it from the routine publisher-notification e-mail (Nx, 2026-05-21). The attacker published as a legitimate core contributor whose GitHub CLI OAuth token had been exfiltrated seven days earlier by a credential stealer that arrived through the 2026-05-11 TanStack npm supply-chain compromise, and no approval gate stopped a single contributor from releasing (Nx, 2026-05-21). The attacker had also planted an unsigned orphan commit in the nrwl/nx repository; the code injected into the extension runs when any workspace opens, fetches the 498 KB obfuscated payload from that commit (StepSecurity, 2026-05-18) and installs the Bun JavaScript runtime to run it (The Hacker News, 2026-05-19). The payload harvests Vault, npm, AWS (including the instance and ECS metadata services), GitHub, 1Password and filesystem secrets, exfiltrates them over HTTPS, the GitHub API and DNS, writes a Python backdoor with a macOS LaunchAgent for persistence and on Linux attempts a sudoers change (Nx, 2026-05-21); the macOS backdoor takes commands signed with a 4096-bit RSA key through the GitHub Search API as a dead drop (StepSecurity, 2026-05-18). Microsoft counts 28 Marketplace installs and Open VSX 41 downloads, while Nx's own analytics registered about 6,000 activations; the Nx CLI, the official plugins and Nx Cloud were not affected (Nx, 2026-05-21).

A malicious version of Nx Console 18.95.0 was published at 12:30 PM UTC and removed soon after at 12:48 PM UTC

Nx (GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w) 2026-05-18

The attacker published the malicious version as a legitimate Nx core contributor.

Anyone who installed v18.95.0 during the exposure window (2026-05-18, 12:30-13:09 UTC) should treat their machine as compromised and rotate credentials.

Nx (postmortem) 2026-05-21

It also installs a persistent Python backdoor on macOS that uses the GitHub Search API as a dead-drop for receiving further commands signed with a 4096-bit RSA key.

StepSecurity 2026-05-18
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditaffected_productsbodyclassificationentitiesevent_dateevidenceheadlinesourcessourcing_notesummarytechniquestitle

The malicious version was live on the Visual Studio Marketplace from 12:30 to 12:48 UTC and on Open VSX from 12:33 to 13:09 UTC (Nx GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18); 12:36 to 12:47 UTC is only the span from the maintainer's alert e-mail to the Marketplace unpublish, and Nx gives the exposure window as 12:30 to 13:09 UTC (Nx, 2026-05-21). The publishing credential was a core contributor's GitHub CLI OAuth token, stolen a week earlier through the TanStack npm compromise (Nx, 2026-05-21). The 2.2 million installs are the extension's total (StepSecurity, 2026-05-18); only 18.95.0 was malicious, with 28 Marketplace installs by Microsoft's count and about 6,000 activations by Nx's, and the upload was not too short-lived to scan: it passed Microsoft's automated checks, basic malware scans included (Nx, 2026-05-21).

threat20 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats2
  • Deep dive1

Source distribution

  • thehackernews.com3 (18%)
  • cybersecuritynews.com2 (12%)
  • euvd.enisa.europa.eu2 (12%)
  • github.com2 (12%)
  • stepsecurity.io2 (12%)
  • blog.daemon-tools.cc1 (6%)
  • cisa.gov1 (6%)
  • helpnetsecurity.com1 (6%)
  • other3 (18%)
All cited sources (17)