Nx Console extension compromise
incident · incident:nx-console-vs-code-extension-18-95-0-compromised-stolen-publ
Malicious Nx Console 18.95.0, published on 2026-05-18 with a core contributor's GitHub CLI token stolen in the TanStack npm compromise, was live 12:30 to 12:48 UTC on the Visual Studio Marketplace and 12:33 to 13:09 UTC on Open VSX, shipping a multi-channel credential stealer and a Python backdoor (Nx, 2026-05-21).
Defender insights
What each entry about Nx Console extension compromise tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · detection
Story timeline
Every entry that names Nx Console extension compromise, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-05-28Nx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entries
- 2026-05-20Nx Console VS Code extension version 18.95.0 shipped a credential stealer, published with a contributor token stolen in the TanStack npm compromise
- 2026-05-20actions-cool/issues-helper GitHub Action compromised in Mini Shai-Hulud: 53 tags moved to imposter commits that read Runner.Worker memory, re-enabled in September with the tags intact
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (19 across 9 tactics)
19 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Python · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- PersistenceCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent
- Privilege EscalationCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching
- Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
- Credential AccessSteal Application Access Token · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys · Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API · Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers · Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
- Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
- Command and ControlWeb Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Ingress Tool Transfer
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel · Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol · Exfiltration Over Web Service
Initial Access TA0001
T1195.001Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools×1
Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by the original owner. Adversaries may also employ "typosquatting" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×2
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×1
Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×2
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×2
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗
T1548.003Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching×2
Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1
Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1528Steal Application Access Token×1
Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×2
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.004Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys×1
Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk, .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API×2
Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.005Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers×2
Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers. Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.006Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores×1
Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×1
Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Evidence: 2026-05-20/nx-console-vs-code-extension-2-2-m-installs-compromised-via · ATT&CK page ↗
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Nx Console extension compromise (2)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Mini Shai-Hulud×2
- Nx Console×2
- actions-cool/issues-helper compromise×1
- DAEMON Tools Lite×1
- DAEMON Tools Lite signed-build trojanisation (12.5.0.2421–12.5.0.2434) via Disc Soft Limited build infrastructure; CISA KEV 2026-05-27×1
- DAEMON Tools supply-chain compromise×1
- Nx Console v18.95.0 VS Code extension supply-chain compromise, credential-stealing payload harvested 1Password, Claude Code config, npm, GitHub, AWS creds; CISA KEV 2026-05-27×1
- TanStack Router npm credential-stealing payload, exfiltrated Nx contributor GitHub CLI OAuth token (precursor to CVE-2026-48027 Nx Console compromise); CISA KEV 2026-05-27×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- thehackernews.com3 (18%)
- cybersecuritynews.com2 (12%)
- euvd.enisa.europa.eu2 (12%)
- github.com2 (12%)
- stepsecurity.io2 (12%)
- blog.daemon-tools.cc1 (6%)
- cisa.gov1 (6%)
- helpnetsecurity.com1 (6%)
- other3 (18%)
All cited sources (17)
- blog.daemon-tools.ccDisc Soft Limited security incident noticehttps://blog.daemon-tools.cc/post/security-incident
- cisa.govCISA KEV cataloghttps://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
- cybersecuritynews.comCybersecurityNewshttps://cybersecuritynews.com/compromised-github-action-exfiltrates-workflow-credentials/
- cybersecuritynews.comCybersecurityNewshttps://cybersecuritynews.com/nx-console-vs-code-extension-compromised/
- euvd.enisa.europa.euENISA EU Vulnerability Database, EUVD-2026-30514 (CVE-2026-8398)https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-30514
- euvd.enisa.europa.euENISA EU Vulnerability Database, EUVD-2026-32550 (CVE-2026-48027)https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-32550
- github.comTanStack Router GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpxhttps://github.com/TanStack/router/security/advisories/GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx
- github.comNx (GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w)https://github.com/nrwl/nx-console/security/advisories/GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w
- helpnetsecurity.comHelp Net Security on GitHub root causehttps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/05/21/github-grafana-breach-root-cause-nx-console/
- kaspersky.comKaspersky DAEMON Tools analysishttps://www.kaspersky.com/blog/daemon-tools-supply-chain-attack/55691/
- nx.devNx (postmortem)https://nx.dev/blog/nx-console-v18-95-0-postmortem
- socket.devSockethttps://socket.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-actions
- stepsecurity.ioStepSecurityhttps://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/actions-cool-issues-helper-github-action-compromised-all-tags-point-to-imposter-commit-that-exfiltrates-ci-cd-credentials
- stepsecurity.ioStepSecurityhttps://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/nx-console-vs-code-extension-compromised
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/05/compromised-nx-console-18950-targeted.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/05/github-actions-supply-chain-attack.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/09/compromised-github-actions-came-back.html