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TanStack Router npm credential-stealing payload, exfiltrated Nx contributor GitHub CLI OAuth token (precursor to CVE-2026-48027 Nx Console compromise); CISA KEV 2026-05-27

cve · CVE-2026-45321

Coverage
2
first 2026-05-13 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-28
Nx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entries
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, public-sector · regions: europe
Sources cited
17
14 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about CVE-2026-45321 tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-28HIGHexploitedNx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entries

Exposure · detection

2026-05-13NOTABLEexploitedA Pwn Request, cache poisoning and runner-memory OIDC theft let attackers publish 84 malicious TanStack npm versions

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-28Nx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entries
    deep-dive
  2. 2026-05-13Mini Shai-Hulud hits TanStack: a pull_request_target Pwn Request, Actions cache poisoning and OIDC token theft from runner memory published 84 malicious @tanstack versions with valid provenance
    deep-diveA Pwn Request, cache poisoning and runner-memory OIDC theft let attackers publish 84 malicious TanStack npm versions
ATT&CK techniques (25 across 11 tactics)

25 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Python · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
  • PersistenceCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service · Event Triggered Execution
  • Privilege EscalationCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service · Event Triggered Execution · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading
  • Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem · Steal Application Access Token · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys · Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API · Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers · Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
  • Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
  • Command and ControlIngress Tool Transfer
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol · Exfiltration Over Web Service · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Code Repository
  • ImpactData Destruction

Initial Access TA0001

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1195.001Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools×2

Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by the original owner. Adversaries may also employ "typosquatting" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×2

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×1

Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×2

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.002Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546Event Triggered Execution×1

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×2

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.002Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546Event Triggered Execution×1

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1548.003Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching×1

Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036Masquerading×1

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing×1

Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.007OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem×1

Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc/<PID>/maps` file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And `/proc/<PID>/mem`, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1528Steal Application Access Token×1

Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×2

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.004Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys×1

Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk, .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API×2

Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.005Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers×1

Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers. Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.006Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×2

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×2

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×2

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/nx-console-tanstack-daemon-tools-supply-chain-cascade-lands · 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567.001Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Code Repository×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs is often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1485Data Destruction×1

Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/mini-shai-hulud-s-github-actions-pwn-request-oidc-token-thef · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about TanStack Router npm credential-stealing payload, exfiltrated Nx contributor GitHub CLI OAuth token (precursor to CVE-2026-48027 Nx Console compromise); CISA KEV 2026-05-27 (2)

2026-05-28 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-48027 +2exploitedupdatedNATOB1

Nx Console / TanStack / DAEMON Tools supply-chain cascade lands three CISA KEV entries

Background. The CISA KEV adds on 2026-05-27 close a chain of disclosures across the preceding three weeks that share a single operational pattern: trusted developer-tooling-publishing pipelines (a maintainer's machine, a vendor build server, a popular VS Code marketplace listing) used to push malicious code to downstream consumers at scale (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27; Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21; GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18; GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx, 2026-05-11; Disc Soft Limited, 2026-05-06; Kaspersky, 2026-05-05; Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). The TanStack compromise was carried out via Mini Shai-Hulud, TeamPCP's self-replicating worm that steals CI/CD credentials and uses them to publish infected versions of more packages (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). Three of the chain's CVEs were added to CISA KEV on the same day (2026-05-27), confirming in-the-wild exploitation (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27), and GitHub's CISO Alexis Wales named the malicious Nx Console extension as the vector for the theft of about 3,800 of GitHub's internal repositories (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21).

The TanStack → Nx Console pivot: CVE-2026-45321 and CVE-2026-48027.

The chain begins on 2026-05-11 with GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx (CVE-2026-45321): 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* npm packages were published with a credential-stealing payload (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). On a Nx contributor's machine the payload read locally stored credentials and exfiltrated them, including the contributor's GitHub CLI OAuth token. The Nx postmortem names @tanstack/zod-adapter@1.166.15 as the malicious dependency resolved on that machine (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). Seven days later, the attacker published Nx Console v18.95.0 as a legitimate Nx core contributor (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21), tracked as CVE-2026-48027 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27). The malicious version was live on the Visual Studio Marketplace from 12:30 to 12:48 UTC on 2026-05-18 and on Open VSX from 12:33 to 13:09 UTC (GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18). Nx Console is a VS Code extension with 2.2 million installs (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). The payload ran on extension activation in VS Code or a fork such as Cursor and harvested Vault tokens, npm tokens, AWS metadata-service, Secrets Manager, SSM and Web Identity credentials, GitHub tokens, the contents of an active 1Password op CLI session, SSH private keys, .env files and GCP and Docker credentials (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). The advisory describes it as an obfuscated payload that the extension fetched, and says the harvested data was exfiltrated over HTTPS, the GitHub API and DNS (GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18).

The advisory says the leaked credentials "allowed the attacker to run workflows on our GitHub repository as a contributor" (GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18). The postmortem names the gap that let this become a release: until the incident any core contributor could publish a new Nx Console version without a second human's approval, with no required-reviewer rule and no environment gate (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). A stolen developer credential therefore turned into a downstream publish without secondary review.

CVE-2026-8398: DAEMON Tools Lite signed-build trojanisation.

CVE-2026-8398 covers a separate but parallel compromise of Disc Soft Limited's build environment. DAEMON Tools Lite versions 12.5.0.2421 through 12.5.0.2434, circulating since 2026-04-08, contained trojanised DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe binaries signed with a valid AVB Disc Soft digital signature, which contact a command-and-control server at every system start (Kaspersky, 2026-05-05). Disc Soft says it found "unauthorized interference within our infrastructure" and that certain installation packages "were impacted within our build environment and were released in a compromised state". It released the clean version 12.6 on 2026-05-05 (Disc Soft Limited, 2026-05-06). Kaspersky detected several thousand attempts to install additional payloads through infected installations during the roughly four-week distribution window (Kaspersky, 2026-05-05). Safe version: 12.6 or later. CISA added the CVE to KEV on 2026-05-27 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27).

Downstream impact: what GitHub and Grafana Labs publicly confirmed.

GitHub CISO Alexis Wales named the malicious Nx Console v18.95.0 extension, installed by a GitHub employee, as the vector for GitHub's breach in which about 3,800 private repositories were exfiltrated (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). Grafana Labs' CISO Joe McManus traced Grafana's separate GitHub breach to "a TanStack npm supply chain attack via the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign", not to Nx Console, so both breaches trace back to the TanStack compromise by different routes (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). The malicious version was live for less than an hour (about 18 minutes on the Visual Studio Marketplace and 36 on Open VSX) (GHSA-c9j4-9m59-847w, 2026-05-18); the postmortem's summary gives about 11 minutes for the Marketplace, counted from the maintainers' first alert (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21), and one install by a GitHub employee was enough for the attackers to reach GitHub's private repositories (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21).

Detection and hardening: what to push to operators today.

Hardening: enforce an organisational policy controls list for VS Code / Cursor / Windsurf extensions (the malicious upload passed the Visual Studio Marketplace's automated signing, manifest and malware checks (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21)); pin npm dependencies with lockfile + --ignore-scripts for CI/CD builds; require human approval for any package that adds or modifies postinstall / preinstall / install scripts; rotate every CI/CD secret, npm token, GitHub PAT, and AWS access key accessible from any host that ran an affected Nx Console version between 2026-05-18 12:30 and 13:09 UTC. Treat any host that installed Nx Console 18.95.0, or had Nx Console installed with auto-update enabled in VS Code or a fork such as Cursor during that window, as potentially compromised (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21).

TanStack contains an unspecified vulnerability that allowed malicious versions of the product to be published to the npm registry to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity.

CISA KEV catalog 2026-05-27
Correctionrun 2026-09-30T0639Z-auditsourcesbodyevidencesourcing_noteclassificationtechniquestagssummaryentitiesaffected_products

CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog marks both CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console) and CVE-2026-45321 (TanStack) as used in known ransomware campaigns (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27). The attackers who stole Grafana Labs' codebase through the TanStack compromise demanded payment not to release or sell it, and Grafana did not pay (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). Credentials exposed through either compromise are best handled on the assumption that an extortion group holds them.

The Nx postmortem does not describe token scopes, a tag push or hosted-runner publish secrets. It says any core contributor could publish without a second approval (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). The harvested credentials are Vault, npm, AWS service, GitHub, 1Password op session, SSH, .env, GCP and Docker secrets (Nx postmortem, 2026-05-21). GitHub named Nx Console only for its own breach, while Grafana Labs traced its breach to the TanStack npm attack (Help Net Security, 2026-05-21). The DAEMON Tools trojanised builds circulated for about four weeks, from 2026-04-08 until the clean 12.6 release on 2026-05-05 (Kaspersky, 2026-05-05; Disc Soft Limited, 2026-05-06).

vulnerability28 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-05-13 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2026-45321exploitedupdatedNATOA1

Mini Shai-Hulud hits TanStack: a pull_request_target Pwn Request, Actions cache poisoning and OIDC token theft from runner memory published 84 malicious @tanstack versions with valid provenance

On 2026-05-11 between 19:20 and 19:26 UTC an attacker published 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* npm packages by chaining a pull_request_target "Pwn Request", GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork and base-repository trust boundary, and extraction of an OIDC token from the runner's memory; no npm token was stolen and the publish workflow itself was not modified (TanStack, 2026-05-11). StepSecurity, which detected the publishes, and Wiz attribute the wave to TeamPCP's Mini Shai-Hulud worm, which hit UiPath, Mistral AI and other npm packages the same day, though Wiz found a payload bug that leaves the malware non-functional in the @uipath and @mistralai packages (StepSecurity, 2026-05-11; Wiz, 2026-05-12). The worm's first wave had compromised four official SAP npm packages on 2026-04-29 through malicious preinstall scripts (The Register, 2026-04-30). The TanStack compromise is CVE-2026-45321, scored 9.6 (TanStack advisory, 2026-05-11), which CISA added to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-05-27 with known ransomware campaign use (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27).

The chain, from TanStack's timeline (TanStack, 2026-05-11):

  1. Staging. On 2026-05-10 the attacker forked TanStack/router into a repository renamed to evade fork-list searches and committed a roughly 30,000-line bundled JavaScript payload under the history package, with a fabricated author identity and a commit message that suppressed CI on push; the post-mortem names two attacker GitHub accounts.
  2. Pwn Request. On 2026-05-11 at about 10:49 a pull request titled as a work-in-progress build simplification triggered the bundle-size and labeler workflows, both on pull_request_target, which needs no first-time-contributor approval. At 11:11 the benchmark job checked out the PR's merge ref and ran pnpm install and the bundle-size build, executing the payload.
  3. Cache poisoning. The payload wrote into the pnpm store under the key the release workflow computes, and the cache action's post-job save stored the 1.1 GB poisoned store in the base repository's cache scope; the job's read-only permissions: did not stop it, because cache writes use a runner-internal token. At 11:31 the attacker force-pushed the PR back to the main branch head, leaving a zero-file change, and closed it.
  4. Detonation. At 19:15 a re-run of the release workflow, and at 19:16 a fresh run triggered by a legitimate merge, restored the poisoned store. Attacker binaries run during the build located the Runner.Worker process, read its memory through /proc/<pid>/maps and /proc/<pid>/mem, took the OIDC token the runner mints in memory for a job with id-token: write, and posted the packages directly to the npm registry, using the same memory-dump script as the tj-actions/changed-files compromise of March 2025. Tests failed, so the workflow's own Publish Packages step was skipped.

The packages carry valid SLSA provenance tied to TanStack's release workflow; provenance proves which pipeline built a package, not that the pipeline behaved, so a compromised build step yields a validly attested malicious package (StepSecurity, 2026-05-11).

The payload. Installing an affected version resolves an optional dependency on a github: URL naming the TanStack repository, which GitHub serves from an orphan commit in the fork network; npm installs that commit's dependencies, including the Bun runtime, and runs its prepare lifecycle script, which executes a 2.3 MB obfuscated JavaScript file shipped at the tarball root and then exits with an error so npm silently discards the optional install (TanStack advisory, 2026-05-11). Behind three obfuscation layers, it queries the AWS instance metadata service with the IMDSv2 flow and the ECS credential endpoint, reads the local Vault agent, reads files from more than 100 hardcoded paths, and in CI pipes a memory-reading script to sudo python3 to pull every value the runner marks as secret (StepSecurity, 2026-05-11); NCSC-CH groups the paths as cloud credentials, SSH, Git, developer and AI tools, crypto wallets, VPN configurations, messaging apps, shell history and Kubernetes (NCSC-CH, 2026-05-12). It exfiltrates encrypted data through the Session messenger's file-upload network and through GitHub commits on branches named to look like Dependabot's, spreads by finding npm tokens that bypass two-factor checks, enumerating the maintainer's other packages and, in CI, exchanging the OIDC token for per-package publish tokens, and writes workflows disguised as CodeQL analysis that serialise all repository secrets (StepSecurity, 2026-05-11). Persistence is a Claude Code SessionStart hook, a VS Code folder-open task, and a LaunchAgent on macOS or systemd user service on Linux that checks the GitHub API every 60 seconds and deletes the user's home directory once the stolen token is revoked (NCSC-CH, 2026-05-12).

No npm tokens were stolen and the npm publish workflow itself was not compromised.

Cache writes use a runner-internal token

TanStack 2026-05-11

Yet the packages were published during the same window.

A compromised build step can produce a validly-attested but malicious package.

Do not revoke these tokens before isolating and imaging the machine

StepSecurity 2026-05-11

On April 29, TeamPCP compromised four official npm packages from the SAP JavaScript and cloud application development ecosystem and published the poisoned releases between 09:55 and 12:14 UTC.

The Register 2026-04-30
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditaffected_productsbodyclassificationcvesevent_dateevidenceheadlinesectorssourcessourcing_notesummarytagstechniquestitle

Mini Shai-Hulud's first wave hit four official SAP npm packages on 2026-04-29 with malicious preinstall scripts (The Register, 2026-04-30). In the TanStack compromise no reconnaissance step is reported; the pull request added a bundled payload file that the pull_request_target benchmark job executed when it checked out and built the PR's merge ref, rather than slipping in lockfile, dependency or .github changes, and the release job never reached its publish step: tests failed, Publish Packages was skipped, and the malware published directly with the OIDC token it read from runner memory (TanStack, 2026-05-11). No npm token was needed for that publish, but the payload itself steals credentials and spreads with them (StepSecurity, 2026-05-11).

The SLSA provenance on the malicious packages is genuine, an attestation of a compromised pipeline rather than a forgery, and no source ties it to EU procurement (StepSecurity, 2026-05-11). The payload runs from the prepare script of an optional git dependency, not from postinstall (TanStack advisory, 2026-05-11), and its memory scraper runs as sudo python3, so a filter for non-root readers of /proc/<pid>/mem misses it (StepSecurity, 2026-05-11). The compromise is CVE-2026-45321, scored 9.6 (TanStack advisory, 2026-05-11) and listed by CISA as known exploited on 2026-05-27 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-05-27). The cache action has no save: false input; restore-only caching is the separate restore action (actions/cache README), npm verifies attestations with npm audit signatures (npm Docs), and GitHub Security Lab warns that combining the pull_request_target trigger with an explicit checkout of an untrusted pull request may lead to repository compromise (GitHub Security Lab, 2021-08-03).

threat13 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Deep dive2

Source distribution

  • github.com3 (18%)
  • euvd.enisa.europa.eu2 (12%)
  • blog.daemon-tools.cc1 (6%)
  • cisa.gov1 (6%)
  • docs.npmjs.com1 (6%)
  • helpnetsecurity.com1 (6%)
  • kaspersky.com1 (6%)
  • nx.dev1 (6%)
  • other6 (35%)

External references

NVD · cve.org · CISA KEV

All cited sources (17)