2026-05-15NOTABLETeamPCP open-sourced its Shai-Hulud framework; Datadog maps its theft, persistence and npm-poisoning code
Shai-Hulud offensive framework (open-source release)
tool · tool:datadog-shai-hulud-framework-2026-05 single-source
TeamPCP's TypeScript and Bun framework for credential harvesting, supply-chain poisoning and encrypted exfiltration, released on GitHub on 2026-05-12 and statically analysed by Datadog Security Labs on 2026-05-13 (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-05-13).
Aliases: Shai-Hulud Open Source
Coverage
1
first 2026-05-15 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-15
TeamPCP open-sourced its Shai-Hulud framework; Datadog maps its theft, persistence and npm-poisoning code
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology
Sources cited
1
1 hosts
Defender insights
What each entry about Shai-Hulud offensive framework (open-source release) tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · detection
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
used by
- TeamPCPDatadog Security Labs analyses the framework TeamPCP released
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (18 across 11 tactics)
18 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- PersistenceCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service · Event Triggered Execution
- Privilege EscalationCreate or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service · Event Triggered Execution
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem · Steal Application Access Token · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API · Unsecured Credentials: Container API
- DiscoverySystem Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
- Command and ControlWeb Service: Dead Drop Resolver
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Code Repository
- ImpactData Destruction
Initial Access TA0001
T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×1
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×1
Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.002Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1546Event Triggered Execution×1
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.002Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1546Event Triggered Execution×1
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003.007OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem×1
Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc/<PID>/maps` file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And `/proc/<PID>/mem`, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1528Steal Application Access Token×1
Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.005Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API×1
Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1552.007Unsecured Credentials: Container API×1
Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1614.001System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×1
Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
T1567.001Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Code Repository×1
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs is often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1485Data Destruction×1
Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Evidence: 2026-05-15/datadog-security-labs-analyzes-leaked-teampcp-shai-hulud-off · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Shai-Hulud offensive framework (open-source release) (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- securitylabs.datadoghq.com1 (100%)