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Microsoft IIS

product · product:microsoft-iis single-source

Coverage
2
first 2026-05-20 → last 2026-11-06
Latest activity
2026-11-06
Storm-2603-linked SharePoint intrusion: memory-only VirtualPathProvider shell in w3wp.exe, then Velociraptor…
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, media · regions: apac
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Microsoft IIS tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-06NOTABLEStorm-2603-linked SharePoint intrusion: memory-only VirtualPathProvider shell in w3wp.exe, then Velociraptor and tunnels

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-05-20NOTABLECisco Talos: commodity "demo.pdb" BadIIS module for SEO fraud survives IIS restarts through a hidden backup copy

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-06Kaspersky reconstructs an intrusion through SharePoint ToolShell, attributed to Storm-2603 with moderate confidence, whose implant lived only inside w3wp.exe: an ASP.NET VirtualPathProvider memory shell with a suo5 tunnel, then Velociraptor, several tunnelling mechanisms and Warlock's AV killer
    active-threatsStorm-2603-linked SharePoint intrusion: memory-only VirtualPathProvider shell in w3wp.exe, then Velociraptor and tunnels
  2. 2026-05-20Cisco Talos: the "demo.pdb" BadIIS variant is commodity IIS-module malware for SEO fraud, likely sold among Chinese-speaking crime groups and built by the author "lwxat"
    researchCisco Talos: commodity "demo.pdb" BadIIS module for SEO fraud survives IIS restarts through a hidden backup copy

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
Microsoft IIS ×2
ATT&CK techniques (22 across 8 tactics)

22 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceCreate Account: Local Account · Server Software Component: Web Shell · Server Software Component: IIS Components · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
  • Privilege EscalationAccess Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service · Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft · System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL · Reflective Code Loading
  • Defense ImpairmentSubvert Trust Controls · Disable or Modify Tools
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Proxy · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools: IDE Tunneling · Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software · Protocol Tunneling
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation

Initial Access TA0001

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as SSH.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/cisco-talos-demo-pdb-badiis-variant-now-a-commodity-maas-iis · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.004Server Software Component: IIS Components×1

Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: <code>Get{Extension/Filter}Version</code>, <code>Http{Extension/Filter}Proc</code>, and (optionally) <code>Terminate{Extension/Filter}</code>. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/cisco-talos-demo-pdb-badiis-variant-now-a-commodity-maas-iis · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/cisco-talos-demo-pdb-badiis-variant-now-a-commodity-maas-iis · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1134.001Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft×1

Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`. The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/cisco-talos-demo-pdb-badiis-variant-now-a-commodity-maas-iis · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/cisco-talos-demo-pdb-badiis-variant-now-a-commodity-maas-iis · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.004Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service×1

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description. Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/cisco-talos-demo-pdb-badiis-variant-now-a-commodity-maas-iis · ATT&CK page ↗

T1134.001Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft×1

Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`. The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.007System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec×1

Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi). The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

T1620Reflective Code Loading×1

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1553Subvert Trust Controls×1

Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/cisco-talos-demo-pdb-badiis-variant-now-a-commodity-maas-iis · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090Proxy×1

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×2

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · 2026-05-20/cisco-talos-demo-pdb-badiis-variant-now-a-commodity-maas-iis · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219.001Remote Access Tools: IDE Tunneling×1

Adversaries may abuse Integrated Development Environment (IDE) software with remote development features to establish an interactive command and control channel on target systems within a network. IDE tunneling combines SSH, port forwarding, file sharing, and debugging into a single secure connection, letting developers work on remote systems as if they were local. Unlike SSH and port forwarding, IDE tunneling encapsulates an entire session and may use proprietary tunneling protocols alongside SSH, allowing adversaries to blend in with legitimate development workflows. Some IDEs, like Visual Studio Code, also provide CLI tools (e.g., `code tunnel`) that adversaries may use to programmatically establish tunnels and generate web-accessible URLs for remote access. These tunnels can be authenticated through accounts such as GitHub, enabling the adversary to control the compromised system via a legitimate developer portal.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219.002Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software×1

An adversary may use legitimate desktop support software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. Desktop support software provides a graphical interface for remotely controlling another computer, transmitting the display output, keyboard input, and mouse control between devices using various protocols. Desktop support software tools, such as `VNC`, `Team Viewer`, `AnyDesk`, `ScreenConnect`, `LogMein`, `AmmyyAdmin`, and other remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×1

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-11-06/storm-2603-fileless-toolshell-virtualpathprovider-shell · ATT&CK page ↗

T1565.002Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation×1

Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.

Evidence: 2026-05-20/cisco-talos-demo-pdb-badiis-variant-now-a-commodity-maas-iis · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Microsoft IIS (2)

2026-11-06 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Kaspersky reconstructs an intrusion through SharePoint ToolShell, attributed to Storm-2603 with moderate confidence, whose implant lived only inside w3wp.exe: an ASP.NET VirtualPathProvider memory shell with a suo5 tunnel, then Velociraptor, several tunnelling mechanisms and Warlock's AV killer

Kaspersky's retrospective analysis of a December intrusion at a customer's on-premises SharePoint server found activity consistent with Storm-2603, with the access and control layer held entirely inside the IIS worker process w3wp.exe and nothing written to disk (Kaspersky, 2026-11-05). On December 20 a single request to a SharePoint administrative endpoint tied to the ToolPane component fingerprinted the host for ToolShell (CVE-2025-53770); the full exploit chain ran on December 24 against the same endpoint, and the gap kept the probe from being correlated with it (Kaspersky, 2026-11-05). The payload was loaded into the ASP.NET runtime and lost when the application pool recycled or IIS restarted (Kaspersky, 2026-11-05).

The memory shell registers a custom VirtualPathProvider through a non-public method of the ASP.NET HostingEnvironment class, subverts trust controls so that the registration works even in a precompiled application, intercepts requests at the GetCacheKey() hook and stays dormant unless a specific User-Agent header arrives (Kaspersky, 2026-11-05). It speaks a custom XOR-obfuscated binary protocol, and the open-source suo5 tool proxies traffic so connections from the command server reach arbitrary hosts inside the network through the SharePoint server (Kaspersky, 2026-11-05). It reaches SYSTEM by named-pipe token impersonation adapted from EfsPotato and creates administrative accounts through native SAM RPC calls (Kaspersky, 2026-11-05).

Shortly after the injection w3wp.exe started msiexec.exe to install a remote MSI that was Velociraptor 0.73.4.0, vulnerable to CVE-2025-6264, which the actor used for persistence, discovery, data collection and payload execution and to deploy Zoho Assist unattended access, a VS Code CLI tunnel, Cloudflare Tunnel and a reverse proxy, so access no longer depended on the IIS process (Kaspersky, 2026-11-05). The actor then uploaded a vulnerable driver that is used to terminate EDR products and sideloaded a DLL that Kaspersky identified as Warlock ransomware's AV killer, possibly meant to use that driver; Kaspersky's endpoint product blocked the ransomware process (Kaspersky, 2026-11-05).

Triage: App_Web_* assemblies come from ordinary ASP.NET page compilation and Microsoft.GeneratedCode from legitimate XmlSerializer use, so neither is a signal alone; the signal is the pair in one application domain right after a ToolPane request, and any VirtualPathProvider that is not on the application's inventory (Kaspersky, 2026-11-05). The December 20 probe came from infrastructure associated with ONYPHE, an attack-surface discovery platform whose vulnerability checks use non-intrusive probes, so a probe alone looks like a benign scanner; Kaspersky's retrospective analysis established the probe as the initial phase of the intrusion that followed on the same endpoint (Kaspersky, 2026-11-05).

This activity involved the attacker using the IIS worker process as an in-memory bridge to the customer’s infrastructure, keeping the access and control layer entirely within w3wp.exe without writing anything to disk.

Consequently, the presence of positive events 25 and 47 combined with the absence of the expected events 17, 18, 19, and 21 for the same path forms a reliable detection pattern

this allows us to attribute this case to Storm-2603 with moderate confidence.

Kaspersky (Securelist) 2026-11-05

Builds on: Symantec: Warlock's operator steals SharePoint machine keys, forges signed payloads and ships…

threat06 Nov 03:44Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-05-20 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

Cisco Talos: the "demo.pdb" BadIIS variant is commodity IIS-module malware for SEO fraud, likely sold among Chinese-speaking crime groups and built by the author "lwxat"

Since 2024 Talos has investigated attacks, mainly in the Asia-Pacific region and a few in South Africa, Europe and North America, that use a BadIIS variant marked by "demo.pdb" strings, which it assesses with moderate confidence is commodity malware sold privately or shared among several Chinese-speaking cybercrime groups under a malware-as-a-service model (Cisco Talos, 2026-05-19). The BadIIS variants of the DragonRank and UAT-8099 groups Talos documented before relied on hardcoded C2 and statically compiled payloads, whereas this variant is configured with a recovered builder that injects parameters for JavaScript redirection of visitors to illicit sites, reverse proxying of illicit content to search-engine crawlers, site-wide content hijacking and backlink injection, and that encodes the C2 address with single-byte XOR (Cisco Talos, 2026-05-19). Service-based installers from the same author impersonate Windows services such as Winlogin, FaxService or AudiosService, authenticate to a C2 server, download further payloads, hide their command lines with custom Base64 and register the BadIIS DLL in the globalModules and modules sections of the IIS configuration, and the latest copies the DLL to a hidden backup location so it is restored every time IIS restarts (Cisco Talos, 2026-05-19). Talos ties development from at least September 2021 to January 2026, including a build to bypass Norton, to the alias "lwxat" with moderate-to-high confidence, from the builder's authentication string, a configuration parameter and a custom user agent seen in samples (Cisco Talos, 2026-05-19). Talos does not describe how the attackers first gain access to the IIS servers.

Based on the recovered builder and PDB strings, Talos assesses with moderate confidence that this "demo.pdb" variant is commodity malware, likely sold privately or shared within underground markets.

This ensures that the malicious BadIIS is automatically restored and launched every time the compromised IIS server is restarted.

Talos assesses with moderate-to-high confidence that the string "lwxat" is the author's alias or handle.

Cisco Talos 2026-05-19
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditaffected_productsbodyclassificationentitiesevent_dateevidenceheadlinesourcessourcing_notesummarytechniquestitle

The variant is not an ISAPI filter or extension: its installers register the malicious DLL in the globalModules and modules sections of the IIS configuration at server level, and the latest one keeps a hidden backup copy that restores it every time IIS restarts, so the place to look is the server module list and the backup location (Cisco Talos, 2026-05-19). Talos does not place it in DragonRank or UAT-8099 activity; it contrasts it with those groups' BadIIS variants, which used hardcoded C2 and static payloads, assesses it as commodity malware likely sold or shared among several Chinese-speaking cybercrime groups, and says the attacks are difficult to attribute to a single actor (Cisco Talos, 2026-05-19). The "lwxat" alias rests on the builder's authentication string, a configuration parameter and a custom user agent, and Talos does not say how attackers first reach the IIS servers (Cisco Talos, 2026-05-19).

research20 May 05:00Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Cisco Talos

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Research1
  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • blog.talosintelligence.com1 (50%)
  • securelist.com1 (50%)