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SolarWinds Orion

product · product:solarwinds-orion single-source

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-17 → last 2026-11-17
Latest activity
2026-11-17
Symantec: AI-assisted retailer intrusion pivots through SolarWinds Orion's bundled RabbitMQ Erlang cookie
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
retail
sectors: retail · regions: us
Sources cited
1
1 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about SolarWinds Orion tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-17NOTABLESymantec: AI-assisted retailer intrusion pivots through SolarWinds Orion's bundled RabbitMQ Erlang cookie

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-17Symantec: a September 2026 intrusion at a US retailer shows attackers switching to AI-generated PowerShell and, about ten minutes after first querying SolarWinds Orion, using the RabbitMQ Erlang cookie bundled with it to run a command on a second server
    active-threatsSymantec: AI-assisted retailer intrusion pivots through SolarWinds Orion's bundled RabbitMQ Erlang cookie

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
SolarWinds Orion
ATT&CK techniques (16 across 7 tactics)

16 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ExecutionWindows Management Instrumentation · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceServer Software Component: SQL Stored Procedures · Server Software Component: Web Shell
  • Privilege EscalationExploitation for Privilege Escalation
  • StealthMasquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · OS Credential Dumping: NTDS · OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services
  • Command and ControlProxy · Ingress Tool Transfer · Protocol Tunneling

Execution TA0002

T1047Windows Management Instrumentation×1

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1505.001Server Software Component: SQL Stored Procedures×1

Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted).

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×1

Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.004OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets×1

Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts. LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×1

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021Remote Services×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1090Proxy×1

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×1

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/symantec-ai-assisted-retailer-intrusion-orion-rabbitmq · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about SolarWinds Orion (1)

2026-11-17 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Symantec: a September 2026 intrusion at a US retailer shows attackers switching to AI-generated PowerShell and, about ten minutes after first querying SolarWinds Orion, using the RabbitMQ Erlang cookie bundled with it to run a command on a second server

Symantec's Threat Hunter Team describes a September 2026 intrusion at a US retail organization in which the attackers first worked by hand on a compromised web server, with typing errors and every staged payload terminated by security software, and then, the next day, submitted about 50 long, error-free PowerShell scripts over roughly two hours, with labelled output sections and comments that read as a model's reasoning (Symantec, 2026-11-12). Symantec assesses AI assistance with high confidence and an operator relaying output to an AI tool, not an autonomous agent, with moderate confidence; it could not identify the model (Symantec, 2026-11-12). The initial infection vector is unknown (Symantec, 2026-11-12).

The earliest activity, on 2026-09-18, ran cmd.exe directly under sqlservr.exe on three SQL Servers, which Symantec reads as commands issued through the database service, most likely xp_cmdshell; on one host the attackers compiled the public EfsPotato exploit with csc.exe from base64 text decoded by certutil and saved the SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives (Symantec, 2026-11-12). On a web server compromised through w3wp.exe they side-loaded payloads with a legitimate Bitdefender executable (bdreinit.exe with log.dll) and a G DATA executable (ask.exe with ask.dll) from ProgramData, used a utility called BreakChain to relaunch them so they no longer appeared as children of w3wp.exe, copied one to a file named w3wp.exe, and planted ASP web shells in the application's images folder (Symantec, 2026-11-12). The AI-style scripts then harvested credentials from connection strings, FileZilla, WinSCP and PuTTY settings, saved RDP files and IIS configuration, read the Erlang cookie file of the RabbitMQ broker that ships with Orion; running Orion's bundled erl.exe with that cookie, they called the broker on a second web server to run an encoded operating system command (Symantec, 2026-11-12). Later activity searched a probable domain controller for NTDS.dit, SYSVOL cpassword values and LAPS passwords and ran a Chisel tunnelling tool and a password sprayer (Symantec, 2026-11-12).

Symantec says no second-phase technique was new and suggests a possible link, through a shared address and the retail focus, to the operation Gambit Security described on 2026-09-22 (Symantec, 2026-11-12). No Swiss or public-sector victim is named; the case matters for the transferable chain and its AI-assisted tempo.

Triage: long, labelled PowerShell is not the signal on its own, because administrators write such scripts too; a parent of sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe rather than an administrator session, credential-store targets and a blocked loader returning rebuilt are.

This is one of dozens of AI-assisted attacks that Symantec has investigated since May 2026.

About 10 minutes after first querying the victim's SolarWinds Orion monitoring software, the attackers had used a component bundled with it to run commands on a second server.

Symantec assesses the AI assistance with high confidence and the operator-in-the-loop model with moderate confidence.

Symantec Threat Hunter Team (Broadcom) 2026-11-12

Builds on: Three off-the-shelf AI agents ran almost the entire card-theft campaign, from discovery to…

threat17 Nov 04:39Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • security.com1 (100%)