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Symantec: a September 2026 intrusion at a US retailer shows attackers switching to AI-generated PowerShell and, about ten minutes after first querying SolarWinds Orion, using the RabbitMQ Erlang cookie bundled with it to run a command on a second server

Symantec: AI-assisted retailer intrusion pivots through SolarWinds Orion's bundled RabbitMQ Erlang cookie

Analysis

Symantec's Threat Hunter Team describes a September 2026 intrusion at a US retail organization in which the attackers first worked by hand on a compromised web server, with typing errors and every staged payload terminated by security software, and then, the next day, submitted about 50 long, error-free PowerShell scripts over roughly two hours, with labelled output sections and comments that read as a model's reasoning (Symantec, 2026-11-12). Symantec assesses AI assistance with high confidence and an operator relaying output to an AI tool, not an autonomous agent, with moderate confidence; it could not identify the model (Symantec, 2026-11-12). The initial infection vector is unknown (Symantec, 2026-11-12).

The earliest activity, on 2026-09-18, ran cmd.exe directly under sqlservr.exe on three SQL Servers, which Symantec reads as commands issued through the database service, most likely xp_cmdshell; on one host the attackers compiled the public EfsPotato exploit with csc.exe from base64 text decoded by certutil and saved the SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives (Symantec, 2026-11-12). On a web server compromised through w3wp.exe they side-loaded payloads with a legitimate Bitdefender executable (bdreinit.exe with log.dll) and a G DATA executable (ask.exe with ask.dll) from ProgramData, used a utility called BreakChain to relaunch them so they no longer appeared as children of w3wp.exe, copied one to a file named w3wp.exe, and planted ASP web shells in the application's images folder (Symantec, 2026-11-12). The AI-style scripts then harvested credentials from connection strings, FileZilla, WinSCP and PuTTY settings, saved RDP files and IIS configuration, read the Erlang cookie file of the RabbitMQ broker that ships with Orion; running Orion's bundled erl.exe with that cookie, they called the broker on a second web server to run an encoded operating system command (Symantec, 2026-11-12). Later activity searched a probable domain controller for NTDS.dit, SYSVOL cpassword values and LAPS passwords and ran a Chisel tunnelling tool and a password sprayer (Symantec, 2026-11-12).

Symantec says no second-phase technique was new and suggests a possible link, through a shared address and the retail focus, to the operation Gambit Security described on 2026-09-22 (Symantec, 2026-11-12). No Swiss or public-sector victim is named; the case matters for the transferable chain and its AI-assisted tempo.

Triage: long, labelled PowerShell is not the signal on its own, because administrators write such scripts too; a parent of sqlservr.exe or w3wp.exe rather than an administrator session, credential-store targets and a blocked loader returning rebuilt are.

Cited evidence

This is one of dozens of AI-assisted attacks that Symantec has investigated since May 2026.

About 10 minutes after first querying the victim's SolarWinds Orion monitoring software, the attackers had used a component bundled with it to run commands on a second server.

Symantec assesses the AI assistance with high confidence and the operator-in-the-loop model with moderate confidence.

Symantec Threat Hunter Team (Broadcom) 2026-11-12

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