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Microsoft SQL Server

product · product:microsoft-sql-server single-source

Coverage
2
first 2026-07-22 → last 2026-10-09
Latest activity
2026-10-09
ReliaQuest: AI agents took a Tomcat server to SYSTEM in under a day through an exposed job-submission feature
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
finance
sectors: finance · regions: latam
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Microsoft SQL Server tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-09NOTABLEReliaQuest: AI agents took a Tomcat server to SYSTEM in under a day through an exposed job-submission feature

Exposure · detection

2026-07-22NOTABLEBitLocker-for-impact extortion via exposed RDP, MSSQL and RMM/GPO; no encryptor ships, and one crew brands itself 'XEntry Team'

Triage

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-09ReliaQuest: LLM-driven agents run most of an intrusion through one unauthenticated Spring Batch job-submission feature on Apache Tomcat, from in-process JavaScript to SYSTEM in under 24 hours
    active-threatsReliaQuest: AI agents took a Tomcat server to SYSTEM in under a day through an exposed job-submission feature
  2. 2026-07-22Kaspersky documents living-off-the-land BitLocker extortion across two Latin America incidents; the second self-identifies as 'XEntry Team'
    active-threatsBitLocker-for-impact extortion via exposed RDP, MSSQL and RMM/GPO; no encryptor ships, and one crew brands itself 'XEntry Team'

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
Microsoft SQL Server ×2
ATT&CK techniques (15 across 9 tactics)

15 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessExternal Remote Services · Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
  • PersistenceExternal Remote Services · Create Account: Local Account · Server Software Component: SQL Stored Procedures · Server Software Component: Web Shell
  • Privilege EscalationAccess Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft · Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification
  • StealthIndicator Removal: File Deletion · Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
  • Defense ImpairmentDomain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
  • Command and ControlIngress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact

Initial Access TA0001

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-07-22/xentry-team-bitlocker-lotl-extortion-rmm-gpo · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/reliaquest-llm-agents-spring-batch-tomcat-nashorn-system · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/reliaquest-llm-agents-spring-batch-tomcat-nashorn-system · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-07-22/xentry-team-bitlocker-lotl-extortion-rmm-gpo · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/reliaquest-llm-agents-spring-batch-tomcat-nashorn-system · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.001Server Software Component: SQL Stored Procedures×2

Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted).

Evidence: 2026-10-09/reliaquest-llm-agents-spring-batch-tomcat-nashorn-system · 2026-07-22/xentry-team-bitlocker-lotl-extortion-rmm-gpo · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-07-22/xentry-team-bitlocker-lotl-extortion-rmm-gpo · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1134.001Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft×1

Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`. The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/reliaquest-llm-agents-spring-batch-tomcat-nashorn-system · ATT&CK page ↗

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-07-22/xentry-team-bitlocker-lotl-extortion-rmm-gpo · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/reliaquest-llm-agents-spring-batch-tomcat-nashorn-system · ATT&CK page ↗

T1134.001Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft×1

Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`. The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/reliaquest-llm-agents-spring-batch-tomcat-nashorn-system · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/reliaquest-llm-agents-spring-batch-tomcat-nashorn-system · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-07-22/xentry-team-bitlocker-lotl-extortion-rmm-gpo · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/reliaquest-llm-agents-spring-batch-tomcat-nashorn-system · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-10-09/reliaquest-llm-agents-spring-batch-tomcat-nashorn-system · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-10-09/reliaquest-llm-agents-spring-batch-tomcat-nashorn-system · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-07-22/xentry-team-bitlocker-lotl-extortion-rmm-gpo · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-07-22/xentry-team-bitlocker-lotl-extortion-rmm-gpo · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Microsoft SQL Server (2)

2026-10-09 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

ReliaQuest: LLM-driven agents run most of an intrusion through one unauthenticated Spring Batch job-submission feature on Apache Tomcat, from in-process JavaScript to SYSTEM in under 24 hours

ReliaQuest says the attacker needed no zero-day and no new malware: an internet-facing Apache Tomcat application used Spring Batch, in which a task definition names the code to run, and accepted and ran task descriptions without a login (ReliaQuest, 2026-10-07). The decisive step was submitting tasks that invoked Nashorn, the JavaScript engine in the application's Java environment, so the code ran inside the application with its account privileges and created no child process until a shell was spawned later; results came back through deliberately triggered error messages, in fixed 1,800-byte chunks reassembled over hundreds of requests (ReliaQuest, 2026-10-07). The application's configuration files held plaintext credentials with SQL Server sysadmin rights; the attacker enabled xp_cmdshell, found SeImpersonatePrivilege, uploaded PrintSpoofer and GodPotato in base64 fragments through the same channel and reached SYSTEM when the first tool failed on file permissions and the second worked (ReliaQuest, 2026-10-07). With SYSTEM it saved the SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY registry hives for offline extraction, created two local administrator accounts and deleted only one, and removed artifacts after the actions that produced them (ReliaQuest, 2026-10-07).

The agent-driven reading rests on a live, unauthenticated Cairn agent-orchestration dashboard (an open-source platform for coordinating AI agents; no source says whether it is the Cairn exploitation engine of Gambit Security's reporting, and it is not Talos' CAIRN toolkit) on the address that sent the opening requests, on command timing (roughly half the gaps five seconds or less), on job names that tracked read offsets and upload parts without a gap, on machine-readable pipe-delimited output, and on payloads whose next version repaired the fault the previous one returned; ReliaQuest says no single indicator establishes it and that it could not determine how many agents ran, which model drove them or how much a person approved (ReliaQuest, 2026-10-07). Submission and collection ran from different addresses, so blocking the submitting address alone would not have stopped retrieval, and the tool assembly is not a fingerprint for any group (ReliaQuest, 2026-10-07).

The attacker entered through an internet-facing application feature on an Apache Tomcat server that accepted and ran task descriptions without requiring a login.

No single one establishes that an LLM agent was involved; a human directing scripts could produce several of them.

ReliaQuest Threat Research 2026-10-07

Builds on: Three off-the-shelf AI agents ran almost the entire card-theft campaign, from discovery to…

threat09 Oct 03:45Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-07-22 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Kaspersky documents living-off-the-land BitLocker extortion across two Latin America incidents; the second self-identifies as 'XEntry Team'

Kaspersky's GERT incident-response team documented two 2026 extortion incidents in Latin America that abuse native Windows BitLocker for encryption-for-impact rather than deploying a conventional ransomware family; a living-off-the-land model that leaves no bespoke encryptor for signature-based detection (Kaspersky, 2026-07-21). In the first case (Colombia, June), initial access was an internet-exposed RDP service on a host attached to an 8 TB store of mission-critical data; after manipulating credentials the attacker enabled BitLocker on the drive and demanded roughly USD 3,000. In the second case (Mexico, May) (whose victims' screens displayed "Hacked by XEntry Team") initial access was a misconfigured Microsoft SQL Server whose xp_cmdshell extended stored procedure allowed OS command execution; the operators established persistence through legitimate RMM suites (ManageEngine Endpoint Central, Mesh Agent, Tactical RMM) and web shells, then used Group Policy Objects to push BitLocker activation and encryption tasks across domain-joined systems. Both incidents delivered ransom notes through victims' office printers. Kaspersky notes similarities in the ransom-note wording and delivery method that may link the two cases but states the notes "do not reveal a clear connection between the actors", so treat them as a shared technique cluster, with "XEntry Team" naming the Mexico intrusion specifically. Kaspersky places the approach in the ShrinkLocker BitLocker-abuse lineage, driven here by an RDP or MSSQL foothold and, in the branded case, an RMM-and-GPO admin workflow rather than a self-contained binary.

The attackers exploited an internet-exposed RDP service on a machine connected to an 8 TB storage device containing mission-critical data.

Finally, in mid-May, the attackers managed to execute a Group Policy Object (GPO) used to deploy activation and encryption tasks, as well as other policies responsible for continued deployment of RMM applications via scheduled tasks.

Although the ransom notes do not reveal a clear connection between the actors, certain words used in the messages, as well as the method of delivery and communication, may confirm a link

Kaspersky (Securelist / GERT) 2026-07-21
threat22 Jul 04:34Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats2

Source distribution

  • reliaquest.com1 (50%)
  • securelist.com1 (50%)