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Warlock

actor · actor:warlock-storm-2603 single-source

Ransomware operation, tracked by Microsoft as Storm-2603, observed by Cisco Talos Incident Response deploying an installer for the Zoho Assist Unattended Agent (an RMM capability allowing administrative remote control of an endpoint with no user logged in) a tool Talos states it had not previously seen attributed to the group. The engagement in question did not reach encryption but Talos assessed the activity consistent with a Warlock attack it observed in May 2026 that did (Cisco Talos IR, 2026-07-28).

Aliases: Storm-2603, Longlegs

Coverage
2
first 2026-07-29 → last 2026-10-03
Latest activity
2026-10-03
Symantec: Warlock's operator steals SharePoint machine keys, forges signed payloads and ships ransomware via…
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, water, telco · regions: europe, africa, latam
Sources cited
4
4 hosts
2026-07-292 appearances2026-10-03

Action items (3)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Warlock, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • On every on-premises SharePoint Server farm that was reachable from the internet while unpatched, patch it and then rotate the ASP.NET machine keys and restart IIS on all SharePoint servers, as Microsoft's ToolShell guidance says, and look for unexpected .aspx files in the LAYOUTS template directories of every installed SharePoint version and for domain accounts named like SharePoint setup accounts in local Administrators groups.
    2026-10-03Symantec: Warlock's operator steals SharePoint…
  • Cross-check your asset inventory for MeshCentral MeshAgent and Zoho Assist Unattended Agent instances that your own management platform did not provision, treating any such agent running as a SYSTEM auto-start service as an incident rather than a hygiene finding; both were the primary command-and-control mechanism in the ransomware engagements Talos describes.
    2026-07-29Cisco Talos IR's quarterly report puts three named…
  • Raise domain-controller security-log retention and forward it off-device: Talos found DC logs retained for only a few hours, and states the resulting gaps prevented determining the initial access vector or exfiltration scope in real engagements; 90 days of centralised retention is the figure it names.
    2026-07-29Cisco Talos IR's quarterly report puts three named…

Defender insights

What each entry about Warlock tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-03HIGHSymantec: Warlock's operator steals SharePoint machine keys, forges signed payloads and ships ransomware via SYSVOL

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-07-29NOTABLECisco Talos IR's quarterly report puts three named intrusion chains on record, led by Sinobi running its command-and-control through a trojanized MeshAgent

Triage

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

documented in

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-03Longlegs (Storm-2603), the developer of Warlock ransomware, still enters through on-premises SharePoint: a water utility, a telecom, a regional government body and a university hit in two months
    active-threatsSymantec: Warlock's operator steals SharePoint machine keys, forges signed payloads and ships ransomware via SYSVOL
  2. 2026-07-29Talos IR Trends Q2 2026: ransomware operators ran their command-and-control through legitimate RMM agents, authentication abuse hit two-thirds of engagements, and missing logs stopped root-cause determination outright
    deep-diveCisco Talos IR's quarterly report puts three named intrusion chains on record, led by Sinobi running its command-and-control through a trojanized MeshAgent
ATT&CK techniques (34 across 14 tactics)

34 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissancePhishing for Information
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · Account Manipulation · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Server Software Component: Web Shell · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Account Manipulation · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
  • StealthMasquerading: Masquerade Account Name · Valid Accounts · System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec · Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • Defense ImpairmentDomain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Disable or Modify Tools
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: NTDS · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Multi-Factor Authentication Interception · Adversary-in-the-Middle · Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
  • DiscoveryAccount Discovery: Domain Account · Domain Trust Discovery
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Remote Services: Windows Remote Management · Internal Spearphishing · Lateral Tool Transfer
  • CollectionAdversary-in-the-Middle
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Web Service · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools · Remote Access Tools: IDE Tunneling
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web Service
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1598Phishing for Information×1

Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from Phishing in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×2

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as SSH.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098Account Manipulation×1

Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098Account Manipulation×1

Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1036.010Masquerading: Masquerade Account Name×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the names of legitimate accounts to make newly created ones appear benign. This will typically occur during Create Account, although accounts may also be renamed at a later date. This may also coincide with Account Access Removal if the actor first deletes an account before re-creating one with the same name.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.007System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec×1

Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi). The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.008Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules×1

Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> PowerShell cmdlets on Windows systems.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×1

Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×1

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication Interception×1

Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation×1

Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1482Domain Trust Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.006Remote Services: Windows Remote Management×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1534Internal Spearphishing×1

After they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment, adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or compromise other users within the same organization. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where a legitimate account is initially compromised either by controlling the user's device or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries may then attempt to take advantage of the trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking more victims into falling for phish attempts, often incorporating Impersonation.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1570Lateral Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219.001Remote Access Tools: IDE Tunneling×1

Adversaries may abuse Integrated Development Environment (IDE) software with remote development features to establish an interactive command and control channel on target systems within a network. IDE tunneling combines SSH, port forwarding, file sharing, and debugging into a single secure connection, letting developers work on remote systems as if they were local. Unlike SSH and port forwarding, IDE tunneling encapsulates an entire session and may use proprietary tunneling protocols alongside SSH, allowing adversaries to blend in with legitimate development workflows. Some IDEs, like Visual Studio Code, also provide CLI tools (e.g., `code tunnel`) that adversaries may use to programmatically establish tunnels and generate web-accessible URLs for remote access. These tunnels can be authenticated through accounts such as GitHub, enabling the adversary to control the compromised system via a legitimate developer portal.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×2

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-10-03/warlock-longlegs-sharepoint-machinekey-sysvol-ransomware · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Warlock (2)

2026-10-03 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOB2

Longlegs (Storm-2603), the developer of Warlock ransomware, still enters through on-premises SharePoint: a water utility, a telecom, a regional government body and a university hit in two months

Symantec reports that Longlegs, also known as Storm-2603, develops the Warlock ransomware and attacked at least four organizations in two months: a water utility, a telecommunications provider, a regional government body and a university, in Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries (Symantec, 2026-10-01). Symantec says the group typically enters through on-premises SharePoint Server, and that the 2025 ToolShell flaws (CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771) likely remain in its arsenal alongside newer SharePoint flaws (Symantec, 2026-10-01); BleepingComputer relays the report (BleepingComputer, 2026-10-02).

In the intrusion Symantec walks through, the likely entry was SharePoint exploitation, and on 2026-07-22 PowerShell wrote a web shell into the SharePoint LAYOUTS template directory (Symantec, 2026-10-01). The group drops one into the directories of several SharePoint versions at once; it harvests the farm's ASP.NET machine keys, which the attackers use to forge a validly signed payload that runs code in the SharePoint application pool (Symantec, 2026-10-01). From 2026-07-28 PowerShell commands loading the System.Workflow.ComponentModel assembly, the deserialization gadget behind the forged payload, ran at intervals (Symantec, 2026-10-01). The attackers also used DLL sideloading, fetched installers with msiexec from legitimate cloud file-sharing services, enumerated domain accounts and trusts, added a setup-lookalike domain account to local Administrators on three more hosts, installed Visual Studio Code Insiders as a tunnel service, and ran NetExec for enumeration, credential spraying and remote execution (Symantec, 2026-10-01).

On 2026-07-31 a security-tool killer, pushed with one-line commands that copied a tool set from an internal share, ran on at least 40 hosts in about two hours; its driver is unknown, but in other recent attacks the group used the signed K7RKScan driver (CVE-2025-1055) (Symantec, 2026-10-01). Warlock then ran on at least 33 hosts from the domain's SYSVOL scripts share, with the DFS Replication service (dfsrs.exe) as the parent on three hosts, so SYSVOL replication delivered the payload (Symantec, 2026-10-01).

Triage: Visual Studio Code tunnels are ordinary on developer workstations; the observed pattern is a service installed from a system folder on a host in a domain already showing SharePoint exploitation or an unexpected administrator account (Symantec, 2026-10-01).

In the past two months, Longlegs has attacked at least four organizations, including two critical infrastructure operators (a water utility and a telecommunications provider), a regional government body, and a university.

The webshell's function is to harvest the SharePoint farm's ASP.NET machine keys, which the attackers then use to forge a validly signed payload that achieves remote code execution inside the SharePoint application pool.

In one intrusion against a critical infrastructure operator, the attackers pushed a tool designed to disable security software to at least 40 hosts within about two hours, then deployed Warlock on at least 33 hosts by staging it in the domain's SYSVOL share, where ordinary domain replication delivered it to machines.

Symantec Threat Hunter Team / Carbon Black 2026-10-01

Builds on: Swiss federal SharePoint servers breached mid-patching, ~200 accounts taken, servers now being… · A second Swiss public-sector SharePoint victim in 48 hours, and the intrusion sat unnoticed for…

threat03 Oct 04:41Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-07-29 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Quarterly incident-response reports are usually read for their percentages, which is the least useful thing in them. The Q2 2026 edition from Cisco Talos Incident Response is worth a deep read for a different reason: it puts three specific intrusion chains on the public record with enough sequence to hunt against, and it documents a visibility failure that stopped Talos's own responders from answering the two questions every incident turns on (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28).

Sinobi: the RMM agent was the C2. Talos IR responded to Sinobi ransomware for the first time in April 2026, a ransomware-as-a-service operation active nearly a year with minimal public reporting on its operators. The chain reads as a deliberate exercise in staying inside the shape of normal administration. Rather than deploying a bespoke implant, the operators used a trojanized MeshAgent binary (the agent component of the open-source MeshCentral remote-management platform) as their primary command-and-control mechanism, a tactic Talos states had not previously been associated with the group (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). Installing it as a SYSTEM-level auto-start service collapsed persistence and privilege into the same step: no separate escalation, and boot survival from the outset. The channel was encrypted WebSocket to an attacker-controlled server, which matters because genuine MeshAgent traffic is itself WebSocket-based; Talos's assessment is that this let the actor blend malicious traffic with legitimate remote-management activity and hold undetected access for approximately three days before deploying ransomware (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). Lateral movement was enabled by a service account whose weak password was cracked after being obtained from the domain credential store ntds.dit, and the operators moved through the network over RDP and WinRM. The endgame is the part worth dwelling on: rather than pushing the payload host by host, the actor deployed ransomware across the entire domain using a malicious Group Policy Object logon script, encrypting with the .SINOBI extension alongside exfiltration staging via rclone.exe (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). Talos reads the GPO deployment as evidence of genuine enterprise-architecture understanding, and expects the group to keep weaponising legitimate tools precisely because they bypass signature-based alerting.

Warlock and the unattended agent. In a separate engagement, Talos observed Warlock operators (also tracked as Storm-2603) deploying an installer for the Zoho Assist Unattended Agent, a capability designed to allow administrative remote control of an endpoint with no user logged in, and states it had not previously seen this tool attributed to Warlock (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). That engagement did not reach encryption, but Talos notes the activity was consistent with a Warlock attack it observed in May 2026 that did. The pattern across both ransomware cases is the same substitution: where a defender's model expects a malicious binary, there is a legitimate, signed, commercially supported remote-administration product instead, which is why Talos's own recommendation shifts from signature detection to behavioural monitoring and application allowlisting that prevents unauthorised binaries from running as services.

UAT-11764: phishing that grows its own target list. From April 2026 and still ongoing in late June, Talos tracked a QR-code phishing campaign against primarily Australian organisations, attributing it to a newly designated actor. Delivery is auto-generated, victim-tailored PDF documents carrying embedded QR codes; a shape chosen to sit outside what email-gateway text and link scanning inspects. The codes lead to Microsoft 365 credential-harvesting pages; on success the operator accesses the mailbox, creates inbox rules to hide incoming mail and reduce the victim's visibility of the compromise, stages follow-on malicious documents on SharePoint, and then sends further internal and external phishing using that mailbox's own contact list (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). Talos assesses with high confidence that the actor will almost certainly continue, using each newly compromised mailbox's contacts to expand reach and sustain momentum (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). The tradecraft insight Talos draws is that the operation leans on trusted infrastructure (SharePoint and Microsoft 365) rather than attacker-registered domains, so reputation-based controls have nothing to fire on. The same report profiles ARToken, the phishing-as-a-service panel this pipeline already tracks, noting it exposes over 80 API endpoints covering device-code phishing, primary-refresh-token persistence, mailbox access and SharePoint exfiltration, and bypasses multi-factor authentication through the OAuth device-authorisation flow rather than by stealing a password.

The two cross-cutting findings. Authentication abuse was the most prevalent weakness Talos recorded, in 65% of its engagements against 35% the previous quarter, and the composition is more useful than the share: adversaries defeated or bypassed multi-factor authentication using adversary-in-the-middle proxies and session-token theft, MFA-fatigue attacks, registration of attacker-controlled devices for authentication, and legacy authentication protocols that circumvent MFA altogether (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). Three of those four defeat a correctly configured push-based MFA deployment, which is the deployment most organisations have. The second finding is the one to take to a budget conversation. Insufficient logging and visibility appeared in 42% of engagements against 18% the previous quarter, and Talos enumerates what that meant in practice: domain-controller security logs retained for only a few hours, host event logs truncated or overwritten before capture, absent NetFlow preventing reconstruction of external authentication and exfiltration, on-device-only logs that adversaries deleted, and cloud telemetry whose retention did not reach back to the true initial-access date. Talos states plainly that in several engagements these gaps prevented definitive determination of the initial access vector or the scope of data exfiltration (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). That is not a hygiene observation; it is a statement that the questions a board, a regulator and a data-protection authority all ask first were unanswerable. Talos's remediation names 90 days of centralised retention as a minimum, logs forwarded off-device so they survive tampering and rebuilds, and process-creation, command-line and cloud-API auditing enabled.

Also recorded: exposed or unpatched internet-facing infrastructure was the third-ranked weakness at 31%, with ToolShell, an older Telerik UI deserialization flaw and SD-WAN/VPN appliance CVEs among the named examples; and unlimited outbound email thresholds enabled propagation in almost 15% of engagements, illustrated by a single compromised mailbox that sent over 6,600 phishing and spam messages before containment, a concrete number worth borrowing as an alerting threshold, since Talos rightly calls outbound rate-limiting low-effort and high-impact. On targeting, healthcare led for the second consecutive quarter at 17% of engagements, with public administration and manufacturing at 14% each; Talos's read is that the three share a critical lack of downtime tolerance, and it notes that almost all targeted public-administration organisations were local governments and that targeted manufacturers were high-value industrial-supply-chain entities where disruption cascades downstream. For a constituency built around cantonal and communal administration and critical-infrastructure operators, that is the sentence in the report with the most direct read-across; the segment being hit is not central government but the municipal tier, and the reason given is operational intolerance of downtime rather than data value.

Triage: every mechanism in the ransomware chains is normal administration, and Talos's explicit position is that this is why they were chosen, so no single event discriminates and the correlation has to carry it. For remote-management agents the discriminator is provenance against inventory: a genuine MeshAgent or Zoho Assist deployment is provisioned by your own management server onto an asset of record and appears as an expected service, whereas the malicious instance is an agent-named SYSTEM service on a host with no deployment of record. For the lateral movement, the discriminator is the identity rather than the protocol: RDP and WinRM between servers is routine, but a service account interactively authenticating across hosts is not what service accounts are for, and that is the question an access review can settle in advance. For the GPO step, the discriminator is change provenance; a logon-script modification is a discrete, auditable act with an expected author and change window, so an unattributed edit to a domain-wide policy object is high-fidelity on its own.

Notably, we observed the threat actors use a trojanized MeshAgent binary as their primary C2 mechanism during this engagement, a tactic that has not been previously associated with the group in public reporting.

The actor ultimately deployed the ransomware across the entire domain using a malicious Group Policy Object (GPO) logon script. The incident resulted in the encryption of systems with the .SINOBI file extension, alongside observed data exfiltration staging activity conducted via rclone.exe.

In one engagement, we observed Warlock ransomware operators (also known as Storm-2603) deploying an installer for the RMM tool Zoho Assist Unattended Agent, which is designed to allow administrative remote control of an endpoint without a user logged in.

We assess with high confidence that the threat actor, who we have dubbed UAT-11764, will almost certainly continue leveraging this QR code phishing operation, using each newly compromised mailbox's contact lists to expand its reach and sustain the campaign's momentum.

In several engagements these gaps prevented definitive determination of the initial access vector or the scope of data exfiltration.

Cisco Talos Incident Response 2026-07-28
annual-report29 Jul 05:55Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

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