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Microsoft 365

product · product:microsoft-365 single-source

Coverage
13
first 2026-07-10 → last 2026-10-19
Latest activity
2026-10-19
Calendar-invite phishing spreads: Outlook and Gmail add the lure on their own and keep it after the email is…
Peak priority
high
5 high · 8 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, finance, technology · regions: europe, us, middle-east
Sources cited
33
22 hosts

Action items (17)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Microsoft 365, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Establish which users, systems and applications in your estate legitimately make HTTPS calls to public blockchain RPC endpoints (for most public-sector estates the honest answer is none) and alert on anything outside that set; chainlist.org enumerates the widely-used endpoints adversaries prefer.
    2026-08-23Dead-drop C2 moved from novelty to routine, and the…
  • Gate new authenticator and passkey enrolment behind out-of-band identity proofing that does not run over the phone channel the request arrives on, this actor's entire initial access depends on an employee completing an enrolment during an unsolicited call, and origin-bound FIDO2 does not defend the enrolment step itself.
    2026-08-07The group behind BlackFile never stopped: GTIG ties…
  • For staff travelling in the next fortnight, issue managed cellular connectivity (hotspot, eSIM data or a managed travel router) instead of venue Wi-Fi, and tell them that any browser or OS update prompt appearing on connecting to a hotel or conference network is the lure, the campaign fires it in response to the automatic connectivity check, before the user has browsed anywhere.
    2026-08-01Microsoft attributes worldwide captive-portal…
  • Enforce always-on, full-tunnel VPN on corporate devices so DNS and web traffic leave through the corporate network before touching a venue gateway, ReliaQuest assesses this single control closes the primary exposure, and it defeats the traffic-manipulation position the whole campaign depends on.
    2026-08-01Microsoft attributes worldwide captive-portal…
  • Restrict the Entra ID device-code authentication flow via Conditional Access, or block it where no device requires it, since a portion of CaptiveCrunch landing pages have been redirecting users into that flow since 16 July.
    2026-08-01Microsoft attributes worldwide captive-portal…
12 older action items

Defender insights

What each entry about Microsoft 365 tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-19NOTABLECalendar-invite phishing spreads: Outlook and Gmail add the lure on their own and keep it after the email is deleted

Exposure · detection

2026-09-08HIGHCloudSEK gained admin access to the panel and found custom code specifically written to defeat the one MFA class that structurally resists this attack

Triage

2026-08-23NOTABLEDead-drop C2 moved from novelty to routine, and the control is an egress baseline rather than a blocklist

Triage

2026-07-21NOTABLEGroup-IB details HOLLOWGRAPH, a .NET implant using a victim's own M365 calendar as two-way C2 over the Graph API, with DNS-tunneled Entra credential refresh

Latest update · triage

2026-08-07HIGHThe group behind BlackFile never stopped: GTIG ties four newer extortion brands to one operator whose lure attacks passkey enrolment, not the passkey

Triage

2026-08-01HIGHMicrosoft attributes worldwide captive-portal traffic manipulation to Storm-2945, delivering the CornFlake RAT and ChocoShell stealer to travellers

Triage

7 earlier entries carry guidance too, listed under the story timeline below.

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-19Phishing lures sent as ICS calendar invites land in Outlook and Gmail calendars without a click and stay after the email is deleted; EvilTokens used them for Microsoft 365 device-code phishing
    active-threatsCalendar-invite phishing spreads: Outlook and Gmail add the lure on their own and keep it after the email is deleted
  2. 2026-09-08BigBear 2.0, an Evilginx2-based Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service panel that JavaScript-disables FIDO2/WebAuthn to force victims onto phishable MFA, leased to at least five affiliates
    active-threatsCloudSEK gained admin access to the panel and found custom code specifically written to defeat the one MFA class that structurally resists this attack
  3. 2026-08-23Dead-drop command-and-control went commodity: three of four new entrants on Red Canary's monthly list resolve their C2 from a dead drop, two of them from a public blockchain, and the fourth is a GUI for Entra ID device-code phishing
    researchDead-drop C2 moved from novelty to routine, and the control is an egress baseline rather than a blocklist
  4. 2026-08-07UNC6671 kept operating after BlackFile's announced retirement, across four further extortion brands, and its vishing pretext is now an urgent order to enroll a FIDO2 passkey
    deep-diveThe group behind BlackFile never stopped: GTIG ties four newer extortion brands to one operator whose lure attacks passkey enrolment, not the passkey
  5. 2026-08-01CaptiveCrunch: an SVR-linked sub-cluster hijacks hotel and conference captive portals to serve fake update lures, a Go RAT and a token-stealing PowerShell module to travelling staff
    deep-diveMicrosoft attributes worldwide captive-portal traffic manipulation to Storm-2945, delivering the CornFlake RAT and ChocoShell stealer to travellers
  6. 2026-07-29Talos IR Trends Q2 2026: ransomware operators ran their command-and-control through legitimate RMM agents, authentication abuse hit two-thirds of engagements, and missing logs stopped root-cause determination outright
    deep-diveCisco Talos IR's quarterly report puts three named intrusion chains on record, led by Sinobi running its command-and-control through a trojanized MeshAgent
  7. 2026-07-25Microsoft Email Threat Landscape Q2 2026: phishing moves off email into Teams vishing, and attachment lures drift PDF → DOCX
    researchMicrosoft's quarterly email report flags a sustained shift of social engineering into Teams voice-phishing
  8. 2026-07-24German BKA dismantles Kratos, the Sneaky2FA-derived AiTM phishing-as-a-service platform behind ~15,000 monthly Microsoft 365 credential-theft campaigns
    active-threatsA German-led takedown removes Kratos's infrastructure, but the AiTM tradecraft and affiliate base survive, as Tycoon2FA already showed
  9. 2026-07-21HOLLOWGRAPH: a Cavern-framework backdoor that turns a compromised Microsoft 365 calendar into a Graph-API dead-drop C2
    deep-diveGroup-IB details HOLLOWGRAPH, a .NET implant using a victim's own M365 calendar as two-way C2 over the Graph API, with DNS-tunneled Entra credential refresh
  10. 2026-07-18Abbott confirms a Cancer Diagnostics cyber incident; ShinyHunters claims a vished Entra SSO account and 30M+ records
    active-threatsAbbott confirms unauthorized access to its Cancer Diagnostics (Exact Sciences) systems as ShinyHunters claims a helpdesk-vishing to Entra SSO breach
  11. 2026-07-10Two 2026 M365 account-takeover campaigns (Railway device-code phishing, LSHIY ROPC spray) beat Conditional Access without breaking MFA
    researchHuntress: device-code phishing and ROPC token-spray defeat M365 tenants by routing around the auth paths Conditional Access actually inspects
  12. 2026-07-10'Helix' data-extortion cluster pairs manager-impersonation vishing with device-code phishing and automated SharePoint exfiltration
    active-threatsReliaQuest: new 'Helix' extortion cluster (BlackFile/ShinyHunters lineage) vishes staff into device-code sign-ins, then bulk-loots SharePoint
  13. 2026-07-10Forg365: a commercial Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service kit bundling device-code + AiTM phishing, in-panel AI lure drafting, and a browser extension for SSO-cookie persistence
    active-threatsZeroBEC details Forg365, a Telegram-sold M365 PhaaS that survives MFA and keeps operator access alive via a ForgCookie browser extension
ATT&CK techniques (67 across 14 tactics)

67 techniques observed across 13 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissancePhishing for Information · Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Phishing · Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment · Phishing: Spearphishing Link · Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · User Execution: Malicious Link · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Software Extensions · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Indicator Removal: Clear Mailbox Data · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion · Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules · Social Engineering: Impersonation
  • Defense ImpairmentDomain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Disable or Modify Tools
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: NTDS · Input Capture: Keylogging · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Multi-Factor Authentication Interception · Steal Application Access Token · Steal Web Session Cookie · Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Adversary-in-the-Middle · Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
  • DiscoverySystem Information Discovery · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion · Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Remote Services: Windows Remote Management · Internal Spearphishing · Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token · Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie
  • CollectionInput Capture: Keylogging · Screen Capture · Email Collection: Remote Email Collection · Clipboard Data · Audio Capture · Video Capture · Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint · Data from Cloud Storage · Adversary-in-the-Middle
  • Command and ControlFallback Channels · Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Application Layer Protocol: DNS · Proxy: External Proxy · Web Service · Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Web Service: Bidirectional Communication · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools · Dynamic Resolution · Encrypted Channel · Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web Service
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Financial Theft

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1598Phishing for Information×1

Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from Phishing in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1598.004Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice×2

Adversaries may use voice communications to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×4

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566Phishing×1

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.

Evidence: 2026-07-25/microsoft-email-threat-landscape-q2-2026-teams-vishing-surge · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×2

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-10-19/ics-calendar-invite-phishing-auto-added-outlook-gmail · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link×4

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · 2026-07-24/kratos-phaas-takedown-bka-sneaky2fa-m365-aitm · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · 2026-07-10/forg365-m365-phaas-aitm-devicecode-forgcookie · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.004Phishing: Spearphishing Voice×4

Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-25/microsoft-email-threat-landscape-q2-2026-teams-vishing-surge · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.001User Execution: Malicious Link×1

An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Link. Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via Malicious File.

Evidence: 2026-10-19/ics-calendar-invite-phishing-auto-added-outlook-gmail · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×2

An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×4

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×3

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗

T1176Software Extensions×1

Adversaries may abuse software extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Software extensions are modular components that enhance or customize the functionality of software applications, including web browsers, Integrated Development Environments (IDEs), and other platforms. Extensions are typically installed via official marketplaces, app stores, or manually loaded by users, and they often inherit the permissions and access levels of the host application.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/forg365-m365-phaas-aitm-devicecode-forgcookie · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×2

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.015Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking×1

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×4

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×4

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×3

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×2

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.015Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking×1

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1548.002Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control×1

Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×2

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.008Indicator Removal: Clear Mailbox Data×1

Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Mail application data can be emails, email metadata, or logs generated by the application or operating system, such as export requests.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×4

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion×1

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.008Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules×1

Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> PowerShell cmdlets on Windows systems.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1684.001Social Engineering: Impersonation×1

Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via Phishing for Information, Phishing, or Internal Spearphishing) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary’s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×4
T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×1

Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×1

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication Interception×2

Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.

Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1528Steal Application Access Token×7
T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×4

An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.

Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-24/kratos-phaas-takedown-bka-sneaky2fa-m365-aitm · 2026-07-10/forg365-m365-phaas-aitm-devicecode-forgcookie · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×4
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×5

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · 2026-07-25/microsoft-email-threat-landscape-q2-2026-teams-vishing-surge · 2026-07-24/kratos-phaas-takedown-bka-sneaky2fa-m365-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation×2

Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1082System Information Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion×1

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.006Remote Services: Windows Remote Management×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1534Internal Spearphishing×1

After they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment, adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or compromise other users within the same organization. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where a legitimate account is initially compromised either by controlling the user's device or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries may then attempt to take advantage of the trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking more victims into falling for phish attempts, often incorporating Impersonation.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×2

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1550.004Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie×1

Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.

Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1113Screen Capture×1

Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1114.002Email Collection: Remote Email Collection×1

Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

T1115Clipboard Data×1

Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1123Audio Capture×1

An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1125Video Capture×1

An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1213.002Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint×3

Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗

T1530Data from Cloud Storage×2
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×5

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · 2026-07-25/microsoft-email-threat-landscape-q2-2026-teams-vishing-surge · 2026-07-24/kratos-phaas-takedown-bka-sneaky2fa-m365-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1008Fallback Channels×1

Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1

Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090.002Proxy: External Proxy×1

Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1568Dynamic Resolution×1

Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1573Encrypted Channel×1

Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1573.002Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography×1

Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1657Financial Theft×1

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Microsoft 365 (13)

2026-10-19 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Phishing lures sent as ICS calendar invites land in Outlook and Gmail calendars without a click and stay after the email is deleted; EvilTokens used them for Microsoft 365 device-code phishing

Netcraft reports that attackers send phishing lures as ICS calendar files because the "text/calendar" type is treated as low risk by major email clients, and that the mail client's normal invite handling then places the lure in the victim's calendar with no user interaction, often keeping it there after the original email is deleted (Netcraft, 2026-10-16). In Netcraft's client table, Outlook desktop, Outlook on the web and Outlook Mobile with Exchange Online and Gmail with Google Calendar add the event automatically, mark it tentative and keep it after the email is deleted, Apple Calendar connected to Exchange Online often does the same, and Apple Mail with iCloud does not add it (Netcraft, 2026-10-16).

Campaigns using the EvilTokens toolkit, which steals Microsoft 365 tokens, used ICS invites disguised as meetings, alerts or voicemail notifications; the link leads to a page that gives the user a device code and tells them to enter it on Microsoft's device authorization page, which grants an attacker's device access to the account through OAuth (Netcraft, 2026-10-16). Netcraft now also sees smaller scams carrying ordinary phishing content inside ICS files (Netcraft, 2026-10-16). Sublime Security reports "exponential growth" in calendar phishing, with lures such as voicemail notices, payment receipts and renewal warnings that link to fake Microsoft, Google or PayPal logins or give a phone number, and Cofense says some senders use legitimate platforms such as Zoom to send the invitations, so filtering those platforms would also block real meetings (The Guardian, 2026-10-11).

Threat actors are using ICS calendar invite files to bypass email security filters and often achieve persistence in targets’ calendars even after the original email is deleted.

Security teams may wish to review their default email client settings to ensure that employees who should not expect invites from outside of the organization would not have those automatically added to their calendars.

Netcraft 2026-10-16

Calendar apps, such as Google Calendar, can add invitations automatically without users even accepting them

The Guardian 2026-10-11

Builds on: Huntress: device-code phishing and ROPC token-spray defeat M365 tenants by routing around the…

threat19 Oct 21:15Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-09-08 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOB2

BigBear 2.0, an Evilginx2-based Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service panel that JavaScript-disables FIDO2/WebAuthn to force victims onto phishable MFA, leased to at least five affiliates

CloudSEK's TRIAD team gained administrator access to the control panel of BigBear 2.0, a rebranded, Evilginx2-based adversary-in-the-middle phishing-as-a-service operation targeting Microsoft 365 exclusively, and published full technical findings on 2026-09-07 (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07). Victims reach the operation by clicking a phishing link typically delivered via email, which proxies them to what appears to be the legitimate Microsoft login page (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07). The panel managed 42 VPS nodes running Evilginx2's reverse-proxy engine on a single phishlet that proxies the entire authentication flow between the victim and Microsoft's own login domain: the victim's password is captured in plaintext as it passes through, and after the victim completes MFA, Microsoft's own session cookie is captured off the wire before it reaches the victim's browser, because the proxy terminates the victim's TLS session before opening its own to Microsoft (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07). That cookie is bound to the browser session but not to any device or location, so importing it into an attacker-controlled browser inherits the fully authenticated session, TOTP, push and SMS MFA are all structurally bypassed this way, since the proxy never has to defeat the second factor, only wait for the legitimate user to clear it (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07; BleepingComputer, 2026-09-07).

What distinguishes this operation from stock Evilginx2 deployments is custom JavaScript injected into every proxied login page that monkey-patches the browser's PublicKeyCredential/navigator.credentials API, forcing a fallback away from FIDO2/WebAuthn, the one MFA class immune to AiTM replay, because its cryptographic assertion is bound to the legitimate origin domain and fails outright when the browser's actual origin is the phishing domain rather than Microsoft's own (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07). The same injected code blocks outbound requests to Microsoft's own anti-phishing telemetry and canary-token endpoints and auto-enables "Keep me signed in" to maximize the stolen session's lifetime (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07). The panel exposes a REST API that automatically replays captured cookies against Microsoft 365, and a keepalive feature abuses captured refresh tokens (typically valid around 90 days on a sliding window) to periodically refresh session cookies well past their nominal expiry (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07). A geo-matched residential-proxy pool spanning 69 countries routes relayed traffic through an IP in the victim's own country, defeating Microsoft's location-anomaly detection and satisfying IP-based Conditional Access checks that key on geolocation rather than device state (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07).

At the time of CloudSEK's writing the panel had captured 5,137 credential records (474 complete MFA-bypassed sessions, 1,032 plaintext passwords, and 4,148 session cookies) from 3,331 unique victim IPs across more than 40 countries (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07). BleepingComputer's own review of CloudSEK's dataset gives the organizational scale directly: 258 distinct organizations had at least one completed MFA-bypass compromise, out of 461 organizations that appear in the broader targeting dataset (BleepingComputer, 2026-09-07). CloudSEK describes the operation as still active as of its report, but also records that the threat actor has deleted 26 of the panel's 42 observed VPS nodes since late July 2026 as apparent counter-forensic activity following detection (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07); BleepingComputer separately reports that, as of its own writing, BigBear's administration panel remains reachable while the phishing infrastructure itself has been offline for nearly three weeks (BleepingComputer, 2026-09-07), consistent with an operator tearing down active phishing nodes under pressure while the panel and its captured-credential dataset persist. The service is leased to at least five identified affiliate operators, each receiving stolen credentials in real time through dedicated Telegram bots (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07; BleepingComputer, 2026-09-07). IT-services and managed-service-provider organizations were the single largest targeted sector, which CloudSEK notes is disproportionate because a compromised IT provider's privileged access to client Azure AD, on-premises AD, RMM tooling and password managers enables downstream supply-chain compromise of its customers (CloudSEK, 2026-09-07).

Triage: the vendor-neutral tell is a session-cookie-authenticated action with no matching interactive MFA challenge in the same session lineage, or a token-issuance event immediately followed by activity from a network location or device-compliance state inconsistent with the device that originally enrolled; a legitimate user re-using a cached session from a known device does not produce this mismatch, which is what separates the AiTM replay from ordinary session persistence.

The panel has exfiltrated 5,137 credential records (including 474 complete MFA-bypassed authentications, 1,032 plaintext passwords, and 4,148 session cookies) affecting 3,331 unique victim IPs across 40+ countries

Since late July 2026 the threat actor has deleted 26 of the 42 observed VPS nodes from the panel, evidence of active counter-forensic operations in response to detection.

CloudSEK

At the time of writing, the administration panel remains online, while the phishing infrastructure has been offline for nearly three weeks.

BleepingComputer (Bill Toulas) 2026-09-07

FIDO2 (hardware security keys, platform authenticators like Apple Face ID / Windows Hello) uses origin-bound credentials. The cryptographic assertion is tied to the origin domain (e.g., login.microsoftonline.com). When Evilginx2 proxies traffic, the origin seen by the browser is the phishing domain (login.evil-domain.com), not the real Microsoft domain. The FIDO2 assertion fails because the origin does not match the credential's registered origin. This is the only MFA method that structurally prevents AiTM phishing.

CloudSEK

Researchers at cybersecurity company CloudSEK gained administrator access to the control panel and found that the service managed 42 VPS nodes, all configured to target Microsoft 365 as part of the observed operation.

BleepingComputer
threat08 Sep 04:45Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-08-23 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Dead-drop command-and-control went commodity: three of four new entrants on Red Canary's monthly list resolve their C2 from a dead drop, two of them from a public blockchain, and the fourth is a GUI for Entra ID device-code phishing

Red Canary's monthly threat round-up, published 2026-08-20 against July 2026 telemetry, is useful here not for its rankings but for what the new arrivals have in common: three of the four resolve their command-and-control address from a dead drop rather than from a hardcoded domain or IP, and two of those read that dead drop off a public blockchain (Red Canary, 2026-08-20). The technique, querying a smart contract whose stored value is the current C2 URL, which Red Canary calls EtherHiding and dates to first reporting in 2023; has been documented for a while; what this round-up records is its arrival in commodity tooling, Red Canary counts three of its top ten using it this month, two of them new arrivals.

The mechanics are worth stating precisely because they determine what a defender can and cannot block. Phexia, a macOS remote-access tool and stealer delivered through malicious copy-and-paste lures, queries public Polygon RPC endpoints for a smart contract's value, decodes the ABI-encoded response to extract a URL, posts to it and pipes the reply into osascript; it keeps Telegram and Steam profiles as redundant dead-drop channels and persists with a LaunchAgent that sets both KeepAlive and RunAtLoad. EtherRAT is "a Node.js-based remote access trojan observed targeting Windows workstations via social engineering and Linux servers via exploitation of server-side vulnerabilities", polling one or more public Ethereum RPC endpoints for a C2 URL held at a predefined contract address, with modules for credential theft, lateral movement and web-server hijacking. CastleRAT resolves its dead drop through steamcommunity.com or adversary-controlled domains. Red Canary's own summary of why this matters operationally: "The technique makes traditional C2 blocking challenging, since the URL can be updated dynamically by adversaries", the operator rewrites one contract value and the change propagates to every installation without redistributing the malware.

The fourth entrant is a different problem. GraphSpy is an open-source initial-access and post-exploitation tool for Entra ID and Microsoft 365 that, in Red Canary's words, "runs a local web server that presents a browser-based GUI, which enables less technical adversaries to engage in Entra ID attacks". It centralises device-code phishing, primary refresh token theft and abuse, Windows Hello for Business key registration, MFA method manipulation, and exfiltration from SharePoint, OneDrive, Outlook and Teams. Red Canary notes it is the third device-code phishing tool to reach its top ten in 2026, after GraphRunner in May and Kali365 in June, three separate toolkits in four months packaging the same identity attack behind progressively lower skill requirements.

Detection concepts, telemetry class first. For the dead-drop families the signal is in egress telemetry: an outbound HTTPS session from an endpoint or server to a public blockchain RPC endpoint, made by a process that has no business speaking to one; the request itself is ordinary-looking JSON-RPC to a widely used, reputable host, so the discriminator is the process and the host role, not the destination's reputation. On macOS, correlate it with process-lineage telemetry showing osascript executing content received from a network read, and with persistence artifacts; a newly written LaunchAgent whose program arguments carry an encoded payload. For GraphSpy the surface is identity telemetry rather than endpoint: device-code authentication events for users and locations that have no workflow requiring that flow, primary refresh token issuance followed by access from an unfamiliar device, and new Windows Hello for Business key or MFA method registration on an account that did not request it. Red Canary's own mitigation for the device-code half is to revoke the affected user's refresh tokens and active sessions, reset credentials, force re-authentication, and restrict the device-code flow through Conditional Access policies "for users and locations that do not require it".

GraphSpy runs a local web server that presents a browser-based GUI, which enables less technical adversaries to engage in Entra ID attacks.

The technique makes traditional C2 blocking challenging, since the URL can be updated dynamically by adversaries

the public blockchain RPC endpoints highlighted on chainlist.org are a good place to start, as adversaries are more likely to leverage widely-used URLs instead of standing up their own infrastructure

Red Canary 2026-08-20
research23 Aug 04:46Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Red Canary

Earlier coverage (10)

2026-07-21NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2HOLLOWGRAPH: a Cavern-framework backdoor that turns a compromised Microsoft 365 calendar into a Graph-API dead-drop C2Group-IB documented (2026-07-20) HOLLOWGRAPH, a NativeAOT .NET backdoor it links with high confidence to the Cavern C2 framework (previously tied to the Iran-nexus Cavern Manticore actor). HOLLOWGRAPH never contacts attacker infrastructure directly: it uses the Microsoft Graph API to plant and read tasking as attachments on far-future calendar events in a compromised M365 mailbox, and tunnels Entra ID credential refresh over IPv6 DNS. Current victimology is narrow (Israeli organisations), but the Graph-API-calendar-as-C2 technique is directly transferable to any Microsoft 365 tenant, the platform at the centre of most CH/EU public-sector estates.2026-08-07HIGHNATOB2UNC6671 kept operating after BlackFile's announced retirement, across four further extortion brands, and its vishing pretext is now an urgent order to enroll a FIDO2 passkeyGoogle Threat Intelligence Group reports that UNC6671 (the actor behind the BlackFile extortion brand, whose retirement was announced in May 2026) continued operating across four further brands (Redact, Pink, Helix, Falcon) linked by shared root domains, identical phishing templates and overlapping victim targeting. The intrusion chain is unchanged and identity-centric: a call to an employee's personal mobile impersonating the IT helpdesk, now sometimes spoofing the real helpdesk number, demanding an urgent FIDO2 passkey or MFA re-enrolment, into an adversary-in-the-middle panel that takes credentials and MFA tokens, then scripted bulk exfiltration from Microsoft 365 and Okta-fronted SaaS. Targeting narrowed by July 2026 onto financial services, private equity, law firms and rating agencies.2026-08-01HIGHNATOB2CaptiveCrunch: an SVR-linked sub-cluster hijacks hotel and conference captive portals to serve fake update lures, a Go RAT and a token-stealing PowerShell module to travelling staffMicrosoft Threat Intelligence disclosed CaptiveCrunch on 2026-07-31, a campaign it attributes to Storm-2945, assessed as an operational sub-cluster of the SVR-attributed actor Midnight Blizzard. Since early May 2026 the actor has manipulated DNS and HTTP traffic on hospitality networks served by captive portals worldwide, redirecting users through its own infrastructure and answering browser connectivity checks with ClickFix-style fake browser and OS update prompts. The payloads are CornFlake, a Go Windows RAT with redundant persistence and a watchdog that restores anything defenders remove, and ChocoShell, an in-memory PowerShell stealer that takes browser cookies, saved passwords, Microsoft 365 SSO tokens and Wi-Fi credentials. Since 16 July some landing pages also drive Entra ID device-code phishing. Travelling government and diplomatic staff are named target populations.2026-07-10HIGHupdatedNATOB2Two 2026 M365 account-takeover campaigns (Railway device-code phishing, LSHIY ROPC spray) beat Conditional Access without breaking MFAHuntress published a comparative root-cause analysis of two 2026 Microsoft 365 account-takeover campaigns that both bypassed Conditional Access policies requiring MFA; not by defeating MFA but by using auth flows CA rarely covers. "Railway" (March 2026, 344 orgs incl. Germany) used device-code phishing to harvest 90-day OAuth tokens; "LSHIY" (June 2026, 78 accounts across 64 orgs) ran 81M+ ROPC login attempts against Azure CLI through the /token endpoint. Of the 78 LSHIY-compromised accounts, 55 had active CA policies requiring MFA that failed because of scoping gaps. Every M365 tenant should block the device-code flow and ensure CA covers all cloud apps and all client app types including legacy auth.2026-07-18NOTABLEupdatedNATOA3Abbott confirms a Cancer Diagnostics cyber incident; ShinyHunters claims a vished Entra SSO account and 30M+ recordsAbbott Laboratories confirmed (2026-07-16) unauthorized access to a limited number of internal systems in its Cancer Diagnostics business (the acquired Exact Sciences unit) only. Separately, the ShinyHunters extortion group claims the intrusion began with a vishing call that compromised a Microsoft Entra ID single-sign-on account, then used it to pull 30M+ records from Entra, ServiceNow, SharePoint, Databricks and Coupa; a claim Abbott has neither confirmed nor attributed. The confirmed incident plus the same vishing-to-cloud-SSO tradecraft this actor uses against SaaS-integrated enterprises makes it relevant to healthcare and any SharePoint/Entra-dependent estate.2026-07-29NOTABLENATOB2Talos IR Trends Q2 2026: ransomware operators ran their command-and-control through legitimate RMM agents, authentication abuse hit two-thirds of engagements, and missing logs stopped root-cause determination outrightCisco Talos Incident Response published its Q2 2026 quarterly report on 2026-07-28. Three named chains carry the operational value: Sinobi ransomware, in Talos IR's first engagement with the group, used a trojanized MeshAgent binary installed as a SYSTEM auto-start service for encrypted-WebSocket C2, held access for about three days, cracked a weak service-account password from ntds.dit, moved by RDP and WinRM, and deployed ransomware across the entire domain through a malicious GPO logon script with rclone staging exfiltration; Warlock (Storm-2603) was seen deploying the Zoho Assist Unattended Agent, a tool Talos had not previously attributed to it; and UAT-11764 runs a QR-code-in-PDF phishing operation that propagates through each compromised mailbox's own contact list. Two findings cut across all of it, authentication abuse appeared in 65% of engagements, and in several cases logging gaps prevented Talos from determining the initial access vector or the scope of exfiltration at all.2026-07-25NOTABLENATOB2Microsoft Email Threat Landscape Q2 2026: phishing moves off email into Teams vishing, and attachment lures drift PDF → DOCXMicrosoft's Q2 2026 email-threat report quantifies two operationally relevant shifts for M365 tenants: Teams-based voice-phishing (vishing) reached roughly ten times its mid-2025 weekly baseline by quarter-end, and phishing attachment delivery drifted from PDF toward DOC/DOCX as a detection-evasion move. Credential theft remained the objective of 94-96% of payload-based attacks. Includes two concrete campaigns: an automated BEC via Python-scripted Amazon SES and an EML/OAuth-redirect chain delivering a BAT dropper.2026-07-24NOTABLENATOA1German BKA dismantles Kratos, the Sneaky2FA-derived AiTM phishing-as-a-service platform behind ~15,000 monthly Microsoft 365 credential-theft campaignsGermany's BKA, with US and Indonesian partners, seized the infrastructure of Kratos (an adversary-in-the-middle phishing-as-a-service platform evolved from Sneaky2FA that generated deceptive Microsoft 365 login pages, including browser-in-the-browser fake windows) and arrested its administrator. Roughly 1,800 subscribers ran an estimated 15,000 campaigns a month. The tradecraft and affiliate base, not just infrastructure, are the risk.2026-07-10NOTABLENATOB2Forg365: a commercial Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service kit bundling device-code + AiTM phishing, in-panel AI lure drafting, and a browser extension for SSO-cookie persistenceZeroBEC documented Forg365, a Telegram-distributed, subscription-priced Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service platform that pairs an OAuth device-code phishing path with an adversary-in-the-middle session-theft path, an in-panel AI lure generator, and a companion browser extension (ForgCookie) that silently refreshes the stolen Microsoft SSO cookie so access persists without the victim re-authenticating. Both paths yield a valid, MFA-satisfied token because the victim completes the real Microsoft login. It is a distinct kit and operator from the Railway/EvilTokens device-code campaign covered earlier, same primitive, productized.2026-07-10HIGHNATOB2'Helix' data-extortion cluster pairs manager-impersonation vishing with device-code phishing and automated SharePoint exfiltrationReliaQuest documented a previously unreported data-extortion cluster it calls Helix, assessed as a likely continuation of the BlackFile (UNC6671) and ShinyHunters ecosystems on shared registrar and hosting infrastructure. Operators phone a target impersonating their named manager (spoofed caller-ID), walk them through an Entra ID device-code sign-in that captures a session token without a password and sidesteps Conditional Access, register a new Authenticator within minutes for persistence, then run automated SharePoint enumeration and bulk exfiltration. SharePoint + Entra ID is the default identity/collaboration stack across Swiss and EU public-sector tenants, so the playbook is directly reachable; disabling the device-code flow is the single highest-impact control.

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats6
  • Deep dive4
  • Research3

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com7 (21%)
  • huntress.com3 (9%)
  • microsoft.com2 (6%)
  • reliaquest.com2 (6%)
  • securelist.com2 (6%)
  • abbott.com1 (3%)
  • bka.de1 (3%)
  • blog.talosintelligence.com1 (3%)
  • other14 (42%)
All cited sources (33)