Microsoft Entra ID
product · product:microsoft-entra-id contradictedsingle-source
Action items (23)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Microsoft Entra ID, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- In every Entra tenant you or your MSP administer, disable without deleting the seven ConnectWise application identities that ConnectWise lists by client ID (Cloud Backup is 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae; the other six are in ConnectWise's advisory), dormant connections included, and keep them disabled until ConnectWise gives restoration instructions; where Graph activity logs were enabled, review them for these apps until at least 90 minutes after you disabled them, because a token issued before the disable stays valid for up to 90 minutes, and preserve the sign-in and audit logs promptly without delaying containment, because Entra ID Free keeps only 7 days.2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…
- In the same tenants list the apps owned by the ConnectWise S-K LLC tenant (3f9cd7a0-127a-4ed4-bf06-2f830d5616b7), and disable each that you do not use or cannot verify as safe.2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…
- In the same tenants review every enterprise application and app registration, MSP management and security tools first but none skipped (Huntress saw the secrets planted on apparently random applications, in one tenant on some of the least privileged ones), for client secrets, certificates and federated credentials added since 2026-10-13 and remove any you did not create; also check the directory roles, owners and consent grants held by ConnectWise and SkyKick service principals, Conditional Access exclusions for them, and mailbox forwarding, inbox and transport rules and delegated access, because disabling the vendor applications does not remove access planted through them.2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…
- Turn Developer Mode off fleet-wide by GPO and scope any enterprise sideloading policy away from AllowAllTrustedApps: that toggle is the single prerequisite the whole chain needs, and without it package registration fails closed.2026-09-27Huntress: attacker JavaScript in a signed Windows…
- Disable application-specific passwords tenant-wide if your identity platform still permits them; they are the one credential class in this research that defeats multi-factor authentication outright, and for most organisations nothing legitimate still depends on them.2026-08-23No exploit and no payload, the victim approves the…
18 older action items
- Restrict the OAuth device-code authorisation flow by policy to the users and locations that genuinely need it, and alert on device-code grants completed from a different network than the sign-in that requested them.2026-08-23No exploit and no payload, the victim approves the…
- Establish which users, systems and applications in your estate legitimately make HTTPS calls to public blockchain RPC endpoints (for most public-sector estates the honest answer is none) and alert on anything outside that set; chainlist.org enumerates the widely-used endpoints adversaries prefer.2026-08-23Dead-drop C2 moved from novelty to routine, and the…
- If your vulnerability process ranks or escalates on ENISA EUVD's exploited-vulnerabilities feed, reconcile CVE-2026-69836 against the MSRC record before treating it as an exploited finding, and check whether anything downstream already raised it.2026-08-23CVE-2026-69836
- Gate new authenticator and passkey enrolment behind out-of-band identity proofing that does not run over the phone channel the request arrives on, this actor's entire initial access depends on an employee completing an enrolment during an unsolicited call, and origin-bound FIDO2 does not defend the enrolment step itself.2026-08-07The group behind BlackFile never stopped: GTIG ties…
- For staff travelling in the next fortnight, issue managed cellular connectivity (hotspot, eSIM data or a managed travel router) instead of venue Wi-Fi, and tell them that any browser or OS update prompt appearing on connecting to a hotel or conference network is the lure, the campaign fires it in response to the automatic connectivity check, before the user has browsed anywhere.2026-08-01Microsoft attributes worldwide captive-portal…
- Enforce always-on, full-tunnel VPN on corporate devices so DNS and web traffic leave through the corporate network before touching a venue gateway, ReliaQuest assesses this single control closes the primary exposure, and it defeats the traffic-manipulation position the whole campaign depends on.2026-08-01Microsoft attributes worldwide captive-portal…
- Restrict the Entra ID device-code authentication flow via Conditional Access, or block it where no device requires it, since a portion of CaptiveCrunch landing pages have been redirecting users into that flow since 16 July.2026-08-01Microsoft attributes worldwide captive-portal…
- Block the OAuth device-authorization (device-code) flow tenant-wide via Conditional Access, or restrict it to the named accounts that genuinely need it, this neutralises device-code phishing regardless of lure quality, because the token is never minted.2026-07-10Huntress: device-code phishing and ROPC token-spray…
- Re-scope every MFA-requiring CA policy to 'All cloud apps' and 'All client app types' (including legacy/other clients), not a per-app or per-group allow-list; an omitted app such as Azure CLI is exactly what ROPC spray rides through.2026-07-10Huntress: device-code phishing and ROPC token-spray…
- Enable client-level strong-auth enforcement (userStrongAuthClientAuthNRequired) to block ROPC flows from succeeding even with valid credentials, and audit for CA policies set to report-only that were never enforced.2026-07-10Huntress: device-code phishing and ROPC token-spray…
- Hunt sign-in logs for successful ROPC/legacy-auth authentications to Azure resource apps with no corresponding interactive MFA challenge, and for device-code completion events not tied to a genuine input-constrained device.2026-07-10Huntress: device-code phishing and ROPC token-spray…
- Block the ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) grant type in Entra ID via legacy-authentication blocking policy; it is the load-bearing fix, since Conditional Access policies scoped to specific applications are bypassed by an unregistered client_id.2026-07-15A fake client_id on Entra ID's ROPC token endpoint…
- Block the OAuth device-authorization flow via Entra Conditional Access (Authentication Flows → Device Code Flow → Block) except where a documented CLI/headless use case requires it, this closes the device-code path Forg365 sells.2026-07-10ZeroBEC details Forg365, a Telegram-sold M365 PhaaS…
- On any account with suspected compromise, run revokeSignInSessions in Entra ID; a password reset alone does not invalidate a device-code-derived refresh token or an AiTM-stolen session cookie.2026-07-10ZeroBEC details Forg365, a Telegram-sold M365 PhaaS…
- Hunt managed endpoints for browser extensions exhibiting SSO-cookie-refresh behavior (ForgCookie class), and alert on new OAuth app consent grants or new mailbox forwarding/inbox rules created immediately after a sign-in.2026-07-10ZeroBEC details Forg365, a Telegram-sold M365 PhaaS…
- Block or tightly scope the Entra ID device-code authentication flow tenant-wide, ReliaQuest names this the single highest-impact control, because it neutralises the session-token capture regardless of how convincing the vishing pretext is.2026-07-10ReliaQuest: new 'Helix' extortion cluster…
- Alert on a new MFA-authenticator registration occurring within minutes of a device-code sign-in from a residential-proxy IP the account has never used, that co-occurrence is Helix's persistence artifact and is otherwise indistinguishable from normal user activity.2026-07-10ReliaQuest: new 'Helix' extortion cluster…
- Hunt SharePoint/Graph access logs for enumeration using contentclass:STS_Site and wildcard search queries at automation speed from a non-browser (python-requests) user-agent, followed by bulk downloads; the automated-collection stage is the most reliable fingerprint.2026-07-10ReliaQuest: new 'Helix' extortion cluster…
Defender insights
What each entry about Microsoft Entra ID tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage · detection
Triage · detection
Triage
Triage
Triage
9 earlier entries carry guidance too, listed under the story timeline below.
Story timeline
- 2026-10-18ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick): the vendor's Microsoft 365 application credential was used to sign in to customer tenants, with directory-role self-assignments in about 50 tenants and, Huntress reports, added credentials in two
- 2026-09-27A sideloaded AppX package turns a Microsoft-signed web host into an OAuth token thief: the login dialog is genuine, the MFA is genuine, and the tokens go to the attacker
- 2026-09-24Microsoft's public Entra ID password-reset portal leaks account existence, registered MFA methods and likely-admin status to any unauthenticated visitor
- 2026-09-08BigBear 2.0, an Evilginx2-based Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service panel that JavaScript-disables FIDO2/WebAuthn to force victims onto phishable MFA, leased to at least five affiliates
- 2026-08-23Three Russia-nexus espionage clusters compromise European diplomats and academics without malware, by talking targets through app passwords, device-code approvals and WhatsApp device-linking, all of which are legitimate features working as designed
- 2026-08-23CVE-2026-69836, Microsoft corrected its own Entra ID CVSS 10.0 record from exploited to not-exploited within a day, and ENISA's exploited feed still says otherwise two days later
- 2026-08-23Dead-drop command-and-control went commodity: three of four new entrants on Red Canary's monthly list resolve their C2 from a dead drop, two of them from a public blockchain, and the fourth is a GUI for Entra ID device-code phishing
- 2026-08-07UNC6671 kept operating after BlackFile's announced retirement, across four further extortion brands, and its vishing pretext is now an urgent order to enroll a FIDO2 passkey
- 2026-08-01CaptiveCrunch: an SVR-linked sub-cluster hijacks hotel and conference captive portals to serve fake update lures, a Go RAT and a token-stealing PowerShell module to travelling staff
- 2026-07-21HOLLOWGRAPH: a Cavern-framework backdoor that turns a compromised Microsoft 365 calendar into a Graph-API dead-drop C2
- 2026-07-18Abbott confirms a Cancer Diagnostics cyber incident; ShinyHunters claims a vished Entra SSO account and 30M+ records
- 2026-07-15Proofpoint: OAuth client ID spoofing validates stolen Entra ID credentials at scale without writing a successful sign-in log
- 2026-07-10Two 2026 M365 account-takeover campaigns (Railway device-code phishing, LSHIY ROPC spray) beat Conditional Access without breaking MFA
- 2026-07-10'Helix' data-extortion cluster pairs manager-impersonation vishing with device-code phishing and automated SharePoint exfiltration
- 2026-07-10Forg365: a commercial Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service kit bundling device-code + AiTM phishing, in-panel AI lure drafting, and a browser extension for SSO-cookie persistence
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (60 across 13 tactics)
60 techniques observed across 15 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ReconnaissanceGather Victim Identity Information: Credentials · Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice
- Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Trusted Relationship · Phishing: Spearphishing Link · Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
- ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · User Execution: Malicious File · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Software Extensions · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
- Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Indicator Removal: Clear Mailbox Data · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · System Binary Proxy Execution · System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion · Social Engineering: Impersonation
- Defense ImpairmentModify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Disable or Modify Tools
- Credential AccessInput Capture: Keylogging · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Brute Force: Credential Stuffing · Multi-Factor Authentication Interception · Steal Application Access Token · Steal Web Session Cookie · Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Adversary-in-the-Middle · Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
- DiscoverySystem Information Discovery · Account Discovery: Cloud Account · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion · Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
- Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token · Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie
- CollectionInput Capture: Keylogging · Screen Capture · Email Collection: Remote Email Collection · Clipboard Data · Audio Capture · Video Capture · Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint · Data from Cloud Storage · Adversary-in-the-Middle
- Command and ControlFallback Channels · Application Layer Protocol: DNS · Proxy: External Proxy · Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Web Service: Bidirectional Communication · Ingress Tool Transfer · Dynamic Resolution · Encrypted Channel · Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
- ImpactFinancial Theft
Reconnaissance TA0043
T1589.001Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials×1
Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.
Evidence: 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1598.004Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice×2
Adversaries may use voice communications to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×6
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-08-23/cve-2026-69836-entra-id-exploited-flag-corrected · ATT&CK page ↗
T1199Trusted Relationship×1
Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.
Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link×4
Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · 2026-07-10/forg365-m365-phaas-aitm-devicecode-forgcookie · ATT&CK page ↗
T1566.004Phishing: Spearphishing Voice×3
Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1
An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.
Evidence: 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · ATT&CK page ↗
T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×2
An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.
Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×6
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials×1
Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.003Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles×1
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).
Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×2
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗
T1176Software Extensions×1
Adversaries may abuse software extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Software extensions are modular components that enhance or customize the functionality of software applications, including web browsers, Integrated Development Environments (IDEs), and other platforms. Extensions are typically installed via official marketplaces, app stores, or manually loaded by users, and they often inherit the permissions and access levels of the host application.
Evidence: 2026-07-10/forg365-m365-phaas-aitm-devicecode-forgcookie · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1546.015Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking×1
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×5
Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.
Evidence: 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×6
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials×1
Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.003Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles×1
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).
Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×2
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1
Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.
Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1546.015Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking×1
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1548.002Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control×1
Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×2
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1070.008Indicator Removal: Clear Mailbox Data×1
Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Mail application data can be emails, email metadata, or logs generated by the application or operating system, such as export requests.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×6
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗
T1218System Binary Proxy Execution×1
Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.
Evidence: 2026-09-27/wwahost-appx-webauthbroker-oauth-token-theft · ATT&CK page ↗
T1218.005System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta×1
Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code
Evidence: 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion×1
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1684.001Social Engineering: Impersonation×1
Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via Phishing for Information, Phishing, or Internal Spearphishing) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary’s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×5
Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.
Evidence: 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗
T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1
Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×2
Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.
Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗
T1110.004Brute Force: Credential Stuffing×1
Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.
Evidence: 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · ATT&CK page ↗
T1111Multi-Factor Authentication Interception×1
Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.
Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · ATT&CK page ↗
T1528Steal Application Access Token×7
Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.
Evidence: 2026-09-27/wwahost-appx-webauthbroker-oauth-token-theft · 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil +1 more · ATT&CK page ↗
T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×3
An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.
Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-10/forg365-m365-phaas-aitm-devicecode-forgcookie · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1
Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×5
Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.
Evidence: 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×2
Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation×1
Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1082System Information Discovery×1
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1087.004Account Discovery: Cloud Account×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/microsoft-entra-id-sspr-enumeration-resetspy · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion×1
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×3
Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.
Evidence: 2026-09-27/wwahost-appx-webauthbroker-oauth-token-theft · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗
T1550.004Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie×1
Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.
Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · ATT&CK page ↗
Collection TA0009
T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1113Screen Capture×1
Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1114.002Email Collection: Remote Email Collection×1
Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗
T1115Clipboard Data×1
Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1123Audio Capture×2
An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.
Evidence: 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1125Video Capture×2
An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.
Evidence: 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
T1213.002Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint×3
Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗
T1530Data from Cloud Storage×2
Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · ATT&CK page ↗
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×2
Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1008Fallback Channels×1
Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1
Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1090.002Proxy: External Proxy×1
Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗
T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗
T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1568Dynamic Resolution×1
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1573Encrypted Channel×1
Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1573.002Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography×1
Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal.
Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1657Financial Theft×1
Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.
Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Microsoft Entra ID (15)
Earlier coverage (12)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Microsoft 365×9
- CaptiveCrunch×2
- EvilTokens×2
- Helix×2
- Microsoft SharePoint×2
- Midnight Blizzard×2
- Okta×2
- ShinyHunters×2
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- bleepingcomputer.com8 (19%)
- huntress.com5 (12%)
- cloud.google.com2 (5%)
- reliaquest.com2 (5%)
- securelist.com2 (5%)
- thehackernews.com2 (5%)
- abbott.com1 (2%)
- api.first.org1 (2%)
- other19 (45%)
All cited sources (42)
- abbott.comAbbott Laboratories (own statement)https://www.abbott.com/en-us/corpnewsroom/diagnostics-testing/abbott-statement-on-cyber-incident-in-cancer-diagnostics-business
- api.first.orgFIRST.org EPSS API, value as of 2026-08-22https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-69836&date=2026-08-22
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/abbott-laboratories-probes-two-cyber-incidents-amid-extortion-claims/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputer (Bill Toulas)https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/bigbear-microsoft-365-phishing-service-bypassed-mfa-at-258-organizations/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-breach-microsoft-365-tenants-via-connectwise-supply-chain-attack/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/health-isac-warns-of-rising-shinyhunters-data-theft-attacks-on-healthcare/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hedge-fund-cyberattacks-tied-to-blackfile-linked-unc6671-extortion-group/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-forg365-phishing-platform-uses-ai-to-target-microsoft-365-accounts/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-helix-vishing-group-emerges-in-sharepoint-data-theft-attacks/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/shinyhunters-claims-brinks-home-breach-threatens-to-leak-stolen-data/
- cloud.google.comGoogle Threat Intelligence Grouphttps://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/distinct-clusters-target-individuals-of-interest-to-russia
- cloud.google.comGoogle Threat Intelligence Group / Mandianthttps://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc6671-targets-financial-services-and-enterprise-cloud-environments/
- cloudsek.comCloudSEK (Gagan Aggarwal / TRIAD)https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/tracking-bigbear-2-0-evilginx2-phishing-campaign
- connectwise.comConnectWise Trust Center (advisory)https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories
- euvd.enisa.europa.euENISA EU Vulnerability Databasehttps://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-63693
- group-ib.comGroup-IB Threat Intelligencehttps://www.group-ib.com/blog/hollowgraph-microsoft-365/
- health-isac.orgHealth-ISAChttps://health-isac.org/shiny-hunters-impact-to-health-sector-and-recommended-mitigation-strategies/
- helpnetsecurity.comHelp Net Securityhttps://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/07/13/entra-id-oauth-client-id-spoofing/
- huntress.comHuntresshttps://www.huntress.com/blog/conditional-access-misconfigurations
- huntress.comHuntresshttps://www.huntress.com/blog/device-code-phishing-evolving-threats
- huntress.comHuntresshttps://www.huntress.com/blog/lshiy-password-spray-attack
- huntress.comHuntresshttps://www.huntress.com/blog/stealing-oauth-tokens-through-microsofts-front-door
- huntress.comHuntresshttps://www.huntress.com/blog/vendor-credential-enables-unauthorized-access
- infosecurity-magazine.comInfosecurity Magazinehttps://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/hollowgraph-microsoft-calendars/
- labs.cloudsecurityalliance.orgCloud Security Alliance (CSA Labs)https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-forg365-ai-phishing-service-20260710-csa-s/
- levelblue.comLevelBlue (Trustwave) SpiderLabshttps://www.levelblue.com/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/enumerating-users-and-mfa-via-microsofts-password-reset-portal
- medtechdive.comMedTech Divehttps://www.medtechdive.com/news/abbott-discloses-cyberattack-on-cancer-diagnostics-business/825529/
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Threat Intelligencehttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/07/31/captivecrunch-midnight-blizzard-targets-travelers-worldwide-for-malware-delivery-and-credential-theft/
- msrc.microsoft.comMicrosoft Security Response Centerhttps://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-69836
- proofpoint.comProofpoint Threat Researchhttps://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/oauth-client-id-spoofing-why-fake-client-ids-are-gaining-traction-stealthy
- redcanary.comRed Canaryhttps://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/intelligence-insights-august-2026/
- reliaquest.comReliaQuesthttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-dns-poisoning-tactics-expand-to-hospitality/
- reliaquest.comReliaQuesthttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-helix-new-name-in-data-extortion-ecosystem
- research.checkpoint.comCheck Point Researchhttps://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/
- securelist.comKaspersky Securelist (GReAT)https://securelist.com/project-cav3rn-continues/120991/
- securelist.comKaspersky (Securelist / GReAT)https://securelist.com/project-cav3rn-cyberespionage-framework-using-outlook-and-dns/120757/
- sophos.comSophos X-Opshttps://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/connectwise-cloud-backup-application-abused-in-token-sweep
- specterops.ioSpecterOpshttps://specterops.io/blog/2026/10/17/connectwise-skykick-breach-microsoft-365/
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/07/azure-cli-password-spray-hits-at-least.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/07/oauth-client-id-spoofing-lets-attackers.html
- todyl.comTodylhttps://www.todyl.com/blog/investigation-unauthorized-access-through-the-connectwise-cloud-backup-microsoft-365-app
- zerobec.comZeroBEChttps://zerobec.com/blog/inside-forg365-telegram-distributed-sneaky2fa-style-phaas