CTIPilot
AI-generated · no human review · verify critical claims against the linked source. how it works →

Microsoft Entra ID

product · product:microsoft-entra-id contradictedsingle-source

Coverage
15
first 2026-07-10 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-10-20
ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+ Microsoft 365 tenants; disabling it does not undo planted…
Peak priority
high
7 high · 8 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, finance, technology · regions: europe, us, middle-east
Sources cited
42
27 hosts

Action items (23)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Microsoft Entra ID, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • In every Entra tenant you or your MSP administer, disable without deleting the seven ConnectWise application identities that ConnectWise lists by client ID (Cloud Backup is 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae; the other six are in ConnectWise's advisory), dormant connections included, and keep them disabled until ConnectWise gives restoration instructions; where Graph activity logs were enabled, review them for these apps until at least 90 minutes after you disabled them, because a token issued before the disable stays valid for up to 90 minutes, and preserve the sign-in and audit logs promptly without delaying containment, because Entra ID Free keeps only 7 days.
    2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…
  • In the same tenants list the apps owned by the ConnectWise S-K LLC tenant (3f9cd7a0-127a-4ed4-bf06-2f830d5616b7), and disable each that you do not use or cannot verify as safe.
    2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…
  • In the same tenants review every enterprise application and app registration, MSP management and security tools first but none skipped (Huntress saw the secrets planted on apparently random applications, in one tenant on some of the least privileged ones), for client secrets, certificates and federated credentials added since 2026-10-13 and remove any you did not create; also check the directory roles, owners and consent grants held by ConnectWise and SkyKick service principals, Conditional Access exclusions for them, and mailbox forwarding, inbox and transport rules and delegated access, because disabling the vendor applications does not remove access planted through them.
    2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…
  • Turn Developer Mode off fleet-wide by GPO and scope any enterprise sideloading policy away from AllowAllTrustedApps: that toggle is the single prerequisite the whole chain needs, and without it package registration fails closed.
    2026-09-27Huntress: attacker JavaScript in a signed Windows…
  • Disable application-specific passwords tenant-wide if your identity platform still permits them; they are the one credential class in this research that defeats multi-factor authentication outright, and for most organisations nothing legitimate still depends on them.
    2026-08-23No exploit and no payload, the victim approves the…
18 older action items
  • Restrict the OAuth device-code authorisation flow by policy to the users and locations that genuinely need it, and alert on device-code grants completed from a different network than the sign-in that requested them.
    2026-08-23No exploit and no payload, the victim approves the…
  • Establish which users, systems and applications in your estate legitimately make HTTPS calls to public blockchain RPC endpoints (for most public-sector estates the honest answer is none) and alert on anything outside that set; chainlist.org enumerates the widely-used endpoints adversaries prefer.
    2026-08-23Dead-drop C2 moved from novelty to routine, and the…
  • If your vulnerability process ranks or escalates on ENISA EUVD's exploited-vulnerabilities feed, reconcile CVE-2026-69836 against the MSRC record before treating it as an exploited finding, and check whether anything downstream already raised it.
    2026-08-23CVE-2026-69836
  • Gate new authenticator and passkey enrolment behind out-of-band identity proofing that does not run over the phone channel the request arrives on, this actor's entire initial access depends on an employee completing an enrolment during an unsolicited call, and origin-bound FIDO2 does not defend the enrolment step itself.
    2026-08-07The group behind BlackFile never stopped: GTIG ties…
  • For staff travelling in the next fortnight, issue managed cellular connectivity (hotspot, eSIM data or a managed travel router) instead of venue Wi-Fi, and tell them that any browser or OS update prompt appearing on connecting to a hotel or conference network is the lure, the campaign fires it in response to the automatic connectivity check, before the user has browsed anywhere.
    2026-08-01Microsoft attributes worldwide captive-portal…
  • Enforce always-on, full-tunnel VPN on corporate devices so DNS and web traffic leave through the corporate network before touching a venue gateway, ReliaQuest assesses this single control closes the primary exposure, and it defeats the traffic-manipulation position the whole campaign depends on.
    2026-08-01Microsoft attributes worldwide captive-portal…
  • Restrict the Entra ID device-code authentication flow via Conditional Access, or block it where no device requires it, since a portion of CaptiveCrunch landing pages have been redirecting users into that flow since 16 July.
    2026-08-01Microsoft attributes worldwide captive-portal…
  • Block the OAuth device-authorization (device-code) flow tenant-wide via Conditional Access, or restrict it to the named accounts that genuinely need it, this neutralises device-code phishing regardless of lure quality, because the token is never minted.
    2026-07-10Huntress: device-code phishing and ROPC token-spray…
  • Re-scope every MFA-requiring CA policy to 'All cloud apps' and 'All client app types' (including legacy/other clients), not a per-app or per-group allow-list; an omitted app such as Azure CLI is exactly what ROPC spray rides through.
    2026-07-10Huntress: device-code phishing and ROPC token-spray…
  • Enable client-level strong-auth enforcement (userStrongAuthClientAuthNRequired) to block ROPC flows from succeeding even with valid credentials, and audit for CA policies set to report-only that were never enforced.
    2026-07-10Huntress: device-code phishing and ROPC token-spray…
  • Hunt sign-in logs for successful ROPC/legacy-auth authentications to Azure resource apps with no corresponding interactive MFA challenge, and for device-code completion events not tied to a genuine input-constrained device.
    2026-07-10Huntress: device-code phishing and ROPC token-spray…
  • Block the ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) grant type in Entra ID via legacy-authentication blocking policy; it is the load-bearing fix, since Conditional Access policies scoped to specific applications are bypassed by an unregistered client_id.
    2026-07-15A fake client_id on Entra ID's ROPC token endpoint…
  • Block the OAuth device-authorization flow via Entra Conditional Access (Authentication Flows → Device Code Flow → Block) except where a documented CLI/headless use case requires it, this closes the device-code path Forg365 sells.
    2026-07-10ZeroBEC details Forg365, a Telegram-sold M365 PhaaS…
  • On any account with suspected compromise, run revokeSignInSessions in Entra ID; a password reset alone does not invalidate a device-code-derived refresh token or an AiTM-stolen session cookie.
    2026-07-10ZeroBEC details Forg365, a Telegram-sold M365 PhaaS…
  • Hunt managed endpoints for browser extensions exhibiting SSO-cookie-refresh behavior (ForgCookie class), and alert on new OAuth app consent grants or new mailbox forwarding/inbox rules created immediately after a sign-in.
    2026-07-10ZeroBEC details Forg365, a Telegram-sold M365 PhaaS…
  • Block or tightly scope the Entra ID device-code authentication flow tenant-wide, ReliaQuest names this the single highest-impact control, because it neutralises the session-token capture regardless of how convincing the vishing pretext is.
    2026-07-10ReliaQuest: new 'Helix' extortion cluster…
  • Alert on a new MFA-authenticator registration occurring within minutes of a device-code sign-in from a residential-proxy IP the account has never used, that co-occurrence is Helix's persistence artifact and is otherwise indistinguishable from normal user activity.
    2026-07-10ReliaQuest: new 'Helix' extortion cluster…
  • Hunt SharePoint/Graph access logs for enumeration using contentclass:STS_Site and wildcard search queries at automation speed from a non-browser (python-requests) user-agent, followed by bulk downloads; the automated-collection stage is the most reliable fingerprint.
    2026-07-10ReliaQuest: new 'Helix' extortion cluster…

Defender insights

What each entry about Microsoft Entra ID tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-18HIGHexploitedConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+ Microsoft 365 tenants; disabling it does not undo planted access

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-09-27NOTABLEHuntress: attacker JavaScript in a signed Windows AppX host drives Microsoft's own OAuth broker, so a genuine login yields MFA-surviving refresh tokens

Triage · detection

2026-09-24NOTABLEA public tool automates bulk enumeration of Entra ID accounts, their MFA methods and their admin status through Microsoft's own password-reset portal

Triage · detection

2026-09-08HIGHCloudSEK gained admin access to the panel and found custom code specifically written to defeat the one MFA class that structurally resists this attack

Triage

2026-08-23HIGHNo exploit and no payload, the victim approves the attacker's session, or issues a credential the second factor never sees

Triage

2026-08-23NOTABLEDead-drop C2 moved from novelty to routine, and the control is an egress baseline rather than a blocklist

Triage

9 earlier entries carry guidance too, listed under the story timeline below.

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-18ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick): the vendor's Microsoft 365 application credential was used to sign in to customer tenants, with directory-role self-assignments in about 50 tenants and, Huntress reports, added credentials in two
    active-threatsConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+ Microsoft 365 tenants; disabling it does not undo planted access
  2. 2026-09-27A sideloaded AppX package turns a Microsoft-signed web host into an OAuth token thief: the login dialog is genuine, the MFA is genuine, and the tokens go to the attacker
    researchHuntress: attacker JavaScript in a signed Windows AppX host drives Microsoft's own OAuth broker, so a genuine login yields MFA-surviving refresh tokens
  3. 2026-09-24Microsoft's public Entra ID password-reset portal leaks account existence, registered MFA methods and likely-admin status to any unauthenticated visitor
    researchA public tool automates bulk enumeration of Entra ID accounts, their MFA methods and their admin status through Microsoft's own password-reset portal
  4. 2026-09-08BigBear 2.0, an Evilginx2-based Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service panel that JavaScript-disables FIDO2/WebAuthn to force victims onto phishable MFA, leased to at least five affiliates
    active-threatsCloudSEK gained admin access to the panel and found custom code specifically written to defeat the one MFA class that structurally resists this attack
  5. 2026-08-23Three Russia-nexus espionage clusters compromise European diplomats and academics without malware, by talking targets through app passwords, device-code approvals and WhatsApp device-linking, all of which are legitimate features working as designed
    active-threatsNo exploit and no payload, the victim approves the attacker's session, or issues a credential the second factor never sees
  6. 2026-08-23CVE-2026-69836, Microsoft corrected its own Entra ID CVSS 10.0 record from exploited to not-exploited within a day, and ENISA's exploited feed still says otherwise two days later
    trending-vulnerabilitiesA maximum-severity identity-plane CVE with nothing to patch, and two authorities that disagree about whether it was ever exploited
  7. 2026-08-23Dead-drop command-and-control went commodity: three of four new entrants on Red Canary's monthly list resolve their C2 from a dead drop, two of them from a public blockchain, and the fourth is a GUI for Entra ID device-code phishing
    researchDead-drop C2 moved from novelty to routine, and the control is an egress baseline rather than a blocklist
  8. 2026-08-07UNC6671 kept operating after BlackFile's announced retirement, across four further extortion brands, and its vishing pretext is now an urgent order to enroll a FIDO2 passkey
    deep-diveThe group behind BlackFile never stopped: GTIG ties four newer extortion brands to one operator whose lure attacks passkey enrolment, not the passkey
  9. 2026-08-01CaptiveCrunch: an SVR-linked sub-cluster hijacks hotel and conference captive portals to serve fake update lures, a Go RAT and a token-stealing PowerShell module to travelling staff
    deep-diveMicrosoft attributes worldwide captive-portal traffic manipulation to Storm-2945, delivering the CornFlake RAT and ChocoShell stealer to travellers
  10. 2026-07-21HOLLOWGRAPH: a Cavern-framework backdoor that turns a compromised Microsoft 365 calendar into a Graph-API dead-drop C2
    deep-diveGroup-IB details HOLLOWGRAPH, a .NET implant using a victim's own M365 calendar as two-way C2 over the Graph API, with DNS-tunneled Entra credential refresh
  11. 2026-07-18Abbott confirms a Cancer Diagnostics cyber incident; ShinyHunters claims a vished Entra SSO account and 30M+ records
    active-threatsAbbott confirms unauthorized access to its Cancer Diagnostics (Exact Sciences) systems as ShinyHunters claims a helpdesk-vishing to Entra SSO breach
  12. 2026-07-15Proofpoint: OAuth client ID spoofing validates stolen Entra ID credentials at scale without writing a successful sign-in log
    researchA fake client_id on Entra ID's ROPC token endpoint lets attackers enumerate and validate credentials while leaving a blank application name in the sign-in log
  13. 2026-07-10Two 2026 M365 account-takeover campaigns (Railway device-code phishing, LSHIY ROPC spray) beat Conditional Access without breaking MFA
    researchHuntress: device-code phishing and ROPC token-spray defeat M365 tenants by routing around the auth paths Conditional Access actually inspects
  14. 2026-07-10'Helix' data-extortion cluster pairs manager-impersonation vishing with device-code phishing and automated SharePoint exfiltration
    active-threatsReliaQuest: new 'Helix' extortion cluster (BlackFile/ShinyHunters lineage) vishes staff into device-code sign-ins, then bulk-loots SharePoint
  15. 2026-07-10Forg365: a commercial Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service kit bundling device-code + AiTM phishing, in-panel AI lure drafting, and a browser extension for SSO-cookie persistence
    active-threatsZeroBEC details Forg365, a Telegram-sold M365 PhaaS that survives MFA and keeps operator access alive via a ForgCookie browser extension
ATT&CK techniques (60 across 13 tactics)

60 techniques observed across 15 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceGather Victim Identity Information: Credentials · Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Trusted Relationship · Phishing: Spearphishing Link · Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · User Execution: Malicious File · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Software Extensions · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Indicator Removal: Clear Mailbox Data · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · System Binary Proxy Execution · System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion · Social Engineering: Impersonation
  • Defense ImpairmentModify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Disable or Modify Tools
  • Credential AccessInput Capture: Keylogging · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Brute Force: Credential Stuffing · Multi-Factor Authentication Interception · Steal Application Access Token · Steal Web Session Cookie · Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Adversary-in-the-Middle · Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
  • DiscoverySystem Information Discovery · Account Discovery: Cloud Account · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion · Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
  • Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token · Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie
  • CollectionInput Capture: Keylogging · Screen Capture · Email Collection: Remote Email Collection · Clipboard Data · Audio Capture · Video Capture · Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint · Data from Cloud Storage · Adversary-in-the-Middle
  • Command and ControlFallback Channels · Application Layer Protocol: DNS · Proxy: External Proxy · Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Web Service: Bidirectional Communication · Ingress Tool Transfer · Dynamic Resolution · Encrypted Channel · Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
  • ImpactFinancial Theft

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1589.001Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials×1

Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.

Evidence: 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · ATT&CK page ↗

T1598.004Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Voice×2

Adversaries may use voice communications to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×6

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/cve-2026-69836-entra-id-exploited-flag-corrected · ATT&CK page ↗

T1199Trusted Relationship×1

Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.

Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link×4

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · 2026-07-10/forg365-m365-phaas-aitm-devicecode-forgcookie · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.004Phishing: Spearphishing Voice×3

Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×2

An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×6

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials×1

Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.

Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.003Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles×1

An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).

Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×2

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗

T1176Software Extensions×1

Adversaries may abuse software extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Software extensions are modular components that enhance or customize the functionality of software applications, including web browsers, Integrated Development Environments (IDEs), and other platforms. Extensions are typically installed via official marketplaces, app stores, or manually loaded by users, and they often inherit the permissions and access levels of the host application.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/forg365-m365-phaas-aitm-devicecode-forgcookie · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.015Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking×1

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×5

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×6

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials×1

Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.

Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.003Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles×1

An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).

Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×2

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.015Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking×1

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1548.002Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control×1

Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×2

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.008Indicator Removal: Clear Mailbox Data×1

Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Mail application data can be emails, email metadata, or logs generated by the application or operating system, such as export requests.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×6

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218System Binary Proxy Execution×1

Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.

Evidence: 2026-09-27/wwahost-appx-webauthbroker-oauth-token-theft · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.005System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta×1

Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code

Evidence: 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion×1

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1684.001Social Engineering: Impersonation×1

Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via Phishing for Information, Phishing, or Internal Spearphishing) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary’s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×5
T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×2

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.004Brute Force: Credential Stuffing×1

Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.

Evidence: 2026-07-15/proofpoint-oauth-client-id-spoofing-entra-id-evasion · ATT&CK page ↗

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication Interception×1

Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.

Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · ATT&CK page ↗

T1528Steal Application Access Token×7
T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×3

An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.

Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-10/forg365-m365-phaas-aitm-devicecode-forgcookie · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×5
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×2

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation×1

Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1082System Information Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.004Account Discovery: Cloud Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/microsoft-entra-id-sspr-enumeration-resetspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion×1

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×3

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Evidence: 2026-09-27/wwahost-appx-webauthbroker-oauth-token-theft · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · 2026-07-10/m365-conditional-access-gaps-railway-lshiy-campaigns · ATT&CK page ↗

T1550.004Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie×1

Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.

Evidence: 2026-09-08/bigbear-2-0-phaas-m365-aitm-fido2-bypass · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1113Screen Capture×1

Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1114.002Email Collection: Remote Email Collection×1

Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

T1115Clipboard Data×1

Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1123Audio Capture×2

An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1125Video Capture×2

An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/gtig-russia-clusters-app-passwords-whatsapp-linking · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1213.002Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint×3

Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-07-18/abbott-exact-sciences-shinyhunters-entra-sso-vishing · 2026-07-10/helix-data-extortion-devicecode-vishing-sharepoint-exfil · ATT&CK page ↗

T1530Data from Cloud Storage×2
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×2

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1008Fallback Channels×1

Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1

Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090.002Proxy: External Proxy×1

Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1568Dynamic Resolution×1

Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1573Encrypted Channel×1

Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗

T1573.002Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography×1

Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal.

Evidence: 2026-08-01/captivecrunch-storm-2945-hospitality-captive-portal-rat · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1657Financial Theft×1

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.

Evidence: 2026-08-07/unc6671-blackfile-multi-brand-passkey-vishing-aitm · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Microsoft Entra ID (15)

2026-10-18 · view entry permalink →

HIGHexploitedupdatedNATOA1

ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick): the vendor's Microsoft 365 application credential was used to sign in to customer tenants, with directory-role self-assignments in about 50 tenants and, Huntress reports, added credentials in two

ConnectWise says it identified unauthorized access to application identities within its Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) environment; on 2026-10-17 it disabled seven application identities, suspended the service, says the shared Cloud Backup credentials are no longer valid, and warns that disabling does not reverse changes already made in a tenant (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). As of ConnectWise's update of 2026-10-19 01:15 UTC, Cloud Backup, SaaS Security and Cloud Management remained suspended with no confirmed restoration time, which also took ConnectWise's SaaS Security monitoring and alerting out of service (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19); ConnectWise reports no successful threat activity in the environments it monitors since it implemented mitigations (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19) and says it cannot independently determine whether a given partner or customer tenant was affected (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). Huntress and Todyl report that on 2026-10-15 the app's identity signed in to customer Microsoft 365 tenants from one hosting-provider address and received app-only Microsoft Graph tokens; the credential sits in the vendor's own tenant, so no user, MFA prompt or user Conditional Access was involved, and the app's consent covers read and write access to mail, files and Teams chats (Huntress, 2026-10-16; Todyl, 2026-10-15). Huntress confirmed unauthorized sign-ins in 162 tenants by 2026-10-16 and later counted almost 1,000 tenants with sign-in activity from that address, over 300 successful, after password spraying against four law-firm tenants on 13 and 14 October, and a separate failed wave targeted 16 tenants in policy and national-security sectors (Huntress, 2026-10-16). In about 50 of its tenants, ConnectWise Cloud Management apps assigned themselves directory roles, mostly Exchange Administrator; in one the Teams app added itself to Global Administrator and client secrets were added to an MSP management application and to Huntress's own application within about five minutes, the credential additions from private Azure space (Huntress, 2026-10-16). Huntress later identified a second tenant with the same sequence, the application granting itself Global Administrator and then planting a new secret on a small number of other applications, within two minutes of the first around 03:45 UTC on 2026-10-15, with the choice of applications apparently random (Huntress, 2026-10-16). It says the unauthorized sign-ins with the credential were bunched across the morning of 2026-10-15 UTC, that the last successful one it observed was at 08:44 UTC that day with only failed attempts afterwards in the tenants where it can read sign-in logs, and that in the two tenants it reviewed it found no mailbox or file manipulation and no user or policy changes (Huntress, 2026-10-16). Microsoft Threat Intelligence, as BleepingComputer relays it, called it an active supply-chain attack and assessed likely abuse of existing permissions including Directory.ReadWrite.All (BleepingComputer, 2026-10-17). How the credential was obtained, who is behind it and what was read remain unknown (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19; BleepingComputer, 2026-10-17).

Triage: the vendor's apps sign in from Azure addresses with a .NET SDK user agent, while the credential additions used a Python user agent; Python and curl are common in administration, so Huntress says the combination of actor, operation and user agent is the signal (Huntress, 2026-10-16). Role self-assignments carrying the vendor's own user agent are not proven benign, since Huntress has not confirmed vendor automation (Huntress, 2026-10-16).

We recently identified unauthorized access to application identities within the ConnectWise Cloud Backup environment.

Disabling the affected connections prevents new authentication through those connections; it does not reverse changes previously made inside a tenant.

Whether a product vulnerability contributed has not been established

ConnectWise Trust Center (advisory) 2026-10-19

As of 19:00 UTC on October 16, Huntress has confirmed unauthorized sign-ins in 162 tenants.

The credential type was a client assertion, which means the credential lives in the vendor's own tenant.

These tenants are in the policy, national security, trade, and critical mineral sectors.

Huntress 2026-10-16

Because the application already held broad, previously granted permissions in each tenant, those sign-ins gave the attacker the technical ability to read and write mail and attachments, OneDrive and SharePoint files, and Teams chats.

Revoking user sessions does not end this access.

Todyl 2026-10-15

Previously issued access tokens may remain usable until they expire or are otherwise invalidated.

ConnectWise Trust Center (advisory) 2026-10-19

Disabling the app in a tenant stops new tokens from being issued there, though tokens already issued stay valid for up to 90 minutes.

Todyl 2026-10-15

Older tenants may list them under SkyKick names.

SpecterOps 2026-10-17

Since implementing mitigations, we have not observed successful threat activity in the environments we monitor.

ConnectWise Trust Center (advisory) 2026-10-19

the last confirmed successful sign-in we observed with this credential was at 08:44 UTC on October 15

Huntress has identified a second tenant with post-compromise activity

the application granted itself Global Administrator, then planted a new secret on a small number of other applications in the tenant to keep a foothold

The choice of which applications to backdoor appeared to be random in the two tenants we reviewed.

The access may have been used for Microsoft Graph directory reads, which leave no audit record.

we also found no evidence of mailbox or file manipulation, or user or policy changes

Huntress 2026-10-16

Tenants were accessed in strictly ascending tenant GUID order.

As of this publication, there is no evidence that the application created new secrets, applications, consents, or role assignments in the reviewed tenants.

Sophos X-Ops 2026-10-19
Improvementrun 2026-10-19T0256Z-intelactionssourcesevidencesourcing_notebody

ConnectWise's update of 2026-10-18 01:00 UTC took SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline in addition to Cloud Backup, which had been suspended since 2026-10-17, so ConnectWise SaaS Security monitoring and alerting is out of service as well, and the update of 2026-10-19 01:15 UTC still gives no restoration time (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). Disabling an app stops new tokens only: Todyl and SpecterOps each state that tokens already issued stay valid for up to 90 minutes, and ConnectWise says that after it revoked the Cloud Backup certificates previously issued tokens may remain usable until they expire (Todyl, 2026-10-15; SpecterOps, 2026-10-17; ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). Todyl says to find every SkyKick and ConnectWise app in a tenant, inherited ones included, and that all SkyKick apps are published from one vendor tenant, and SpecterOps hunts for apps owned by that tenant, noting that older tenants may list them under SkyKick names (Todyl, 2026-10-15; SpecterOps, 2026-10-17).

Updaterun 2026-10-20T0256Z-inteltitlesummaryactionssourcesevidencesourcing_notebody

Huntress's update of 2026-10-19 13:30 ET identified a second tenant with post-compromise activity, a tenant Huntress did not originally protect, where it got deployed to collect telemetry (Huntress, 2026-10-16). In both tenants the activity was fast and scripted, within two minutes of each other around 03:45 UTC on 2026-10-15: the application granted itself Global Administrator and then planted a new secret on a small number of other applications to keep a foothold (Huntress, 2026-10-16). The choice of applications appeared random: the same flow picked two different sets, one application present in both was backdoored in only one, and in one tenant the applications that received secrets were among the least privileged in the environment while far more powerful ones were untouched (Huntress, 2026-10-16).

Huntress says the unauthorized sign-ins with the credential were tightly bunched across the morning of 2026-10-15 UTC, the last confirmed successful sign-in it observed was at 08:44 UTC, and it saw only failed attempts afterwards in the tenants where it can read sign-in logs (Huntress, 2026-10-16). The access may have been used for Microsoft Graph directory reads, which leave no audit record, and in the two tenants Huntress reviewed it found no evidence of mailbox or file manipulation or of user or policy changes (Huntress, 2026-10-16). The check for planted credentials therefore has to cover every application registration and enterprise application in the tenant, and a clean audit log does not exclude directory reads. ConnectWise's latest readable update (2026-10-19 01:15 UTC) gives no restoration time (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19).

Improvementrun 2026-10-21T0256Z-intelsourcesevidencesourcing_notebody

Sophos X-Ops independently observed the token requests: on 2026-10-15 a single virtual private server authenticated as the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application and requested app-only Microsoft Graph tokens for about 96 minutes, from 07:11 UTC, in strictly ascending tenant-ID order, one to six minutes apart, using Python HTTP-library user agents, and the sweep included tenants with no active backup subscription (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-10-19). Sophos found no hands-on-keyboard activity and no evidence that the application created new secrets, applications, consents or role assignments in the tenants it reviewed, which differs from the role grants and added secrets Huntress reports in other tenants; Sophos says it is unclear how the credential was obtained and what was done with the tokens (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-10-19). The two vendors' sweep timings differ: Huntress puts the first app sign-ins at 06:13 to 08:34 UTC on 2026-10-15 with tenants taken in sorted GUID order a few seconds apart (Huntress, 2026-10-16), where Sophos gives about 96 minutes from 07:11 UTC, one to six minutes apart; the vantage points differ, so both are reported as stated.

incident18 Oct 03:30Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-09-27 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

A sideloaded AppX package turns a Microsoft-signed web host into an OAuth token thief: the login dialog is genuine, the MFA is genuine, and the tokens go to the attacker

Huntress researcher Andrew Schwartz went looking for a Microsoft-signed binary already present on every Windows machine that would fetch remote code and run it, and found the AppX web-host family (Huntress, 2026-09-23). WWAHost.exe, the Windows Web App Host, renders whatever web content an AppX package points it at. The manifest flag is what turns that into an attack: when a package's ContentUriRules entry carries WindowsRuntimeAccess="all", the remote JavaScript loaded from that origin "doesn't just run, it inherits the full Windows Runtime API surface, including the API that drives OAuth sign-in" (Huntress, 2026-09-23). The API in question is the legacy WebAuthenticationBroker, which Microsoft has steered developers away from in favour of the Web Account Manager but which remains present and reachable from inside the AppX host.

The chain is short. A standard user registers a minimal sideloaded package with Add-AppxPackage -Register; attacker JavaScript then calls WebAuthenticationBroker.authenticateAsync() with Microsoft Office's own first-party client ID and the urn:ietf:wg:oauth:2.0:oob redirect URI, which is the part that matters, because an out-of-band redirect returns the authorization code to the calling application rather than to a browser. The user sees a real Microsoft sign-in dialog served from login.microsoftonline.com, rendered by a signed Microsoft process with no address bar and no browser chrome, completes the password and the MFA prompt, and the code lands in the attacker's listener to be exchanged for an access token and a refresh token. Huntress's summary of the victim's position is the whole point of the technique: "The user does everything right and it changes nothing" (Huntress, 2026-09-23).

The prerequisite is the constraint. Registration fails with 0x80073CFF unless Developer Mode is enabled or an enterprise sideloading policy is in force, and enabling Developer Mode itself requires local administrator rights. Huntress is explicit that the enterprise AllowAllTrustedApps path is the more likely way a managed fleet ends up in the vulnerable state at scale, and notes Developer Mode is common on development machines, CI/CD runners and cloud VMs. Past that one toggle, the remaining steps run as a standard user with no further admin, no UAC prompt, no SmartScreen check and no code-signing requirement. The technique is therefore post-compromise or post-social-engineering, not an initial-access vector on its own.

What the tokens carry is what makes it worth the effort. The captured token arrived with the delegated scope set attached to Microsoft Office's client ID, spanning mail read, write and send, files across OneDrive and SharePoint, the Teams surface including channels, chats, messages and membership, directory and group read and write, and calendar and contacts, plus AuditLog.Create, which Huntress singles out as an unexpected capability with obvious value for muddying an investigation. Because these are delegated scopes, the effective power is the intersection of the scope and what the signed-in user could already do, so the blast radius scales with the victim's own privilege rather than granting tenant administration automatically. Huntress states the consequence plainly: "It is, in effect, the victim's entire Microsoft 365 working life in one token, and unlike the session it was stolen from, it keeps working from anywhere until the refresh token is revoked." New access tokens were obtained hours later from a different machine on a different network with no re-authentication and no MFA prompt; the refresh token survives password changes until an administrator revokes it, a revocation event fires, or Continuous Access Evaluation intervenes.

The defensive framing Huntress argues for is a class, not a binary. WWAHost.exe is the one host proven end to end, but the reachable surface lives in the shared Windows Runtime activation layer that every AppX host loads, and the set of hosts varies by Windows build, with at least one shipping from the packaged store rather than a system directory so that an inventory searching only system directories under-counts. "That is why patching individual binaries won't fix the problem, and why an EDR rule for WWAHost.exe alone is futile" (Huntress, 2026-09-23). The researcher deliberately publishes neither the working manifest nor an enumeration of the other hosts, and separates what was proven end to end (token theft via the OAuth broker, on Windows 11 24H2 build 26100) from what was only shown to be reachable: a native credential dialog returning plaintext credentials, DPAPI operations in the user's own key context, and protocol-handler launching, all demonstrated on an earlier build and not re-confirmed. A silent, no-interaction variant of the broker call is described as documented and expected behaviour that the author did not confirm, and should be read as an open avenue rather than a result.

Triage: MSAppHost/3.0 reaching Microsoft-owned infrastructure is ordinary AppX behaviour and not a finding; the same user agent reaching an origin outside Microsoft is what has no benign explanation. Likewise, an Office sign-in from a managed device is unremarkable on its own, so the discriminator is the pairing: a successful Office-client-ID sign-in on a host that also produced outbound EdgeHTML-engine traffic to a non-Microsoft origin in the same window.

and the remote JavaScript it renders doesn't just run, it inherits the full Windows Runtime API surface, including the API that drives OAuth sign-in

The user does everything right and it changes nothing

It is, in effect, the victim's entire Microsoft 365 working life in one token, and unlike the session it was stolen from, it keeps working from anywhere until the refresh token is revoked.

No modern browser produces that string.

Huntress 2026-09-23
research27 Sep 13:28Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Huntress

2026-09-24 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

Microsoft's public Entra ID password-reset portal leaks account existence, registered MFA methods and likely-admin status to any unauthenticated visitor

Microsoft's Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) portal, publicly reachable at passwordreset.microsoftonline.com with no prior authentication, discloses more than it is meant to about the accounts behind it (LevelBlue SpiderLabs, 2026-09-23). Submitting an email address triggers an ASP.NET UpdatePanel POST, and the server's reply carries a hidden CurrentViewName field that tells an attacker exactly what happened server-side: ViewMultigateUserControl means the account exists and SSPR advanced to method selection, while a genuine not-found bounces back to ViewUserIdentifierVerification. Every other named view, including the documented error codes SSPR_0011 (no password reset policy defined for the user) and SSPR_0013 (the user is not a member of the group enabled for SSPR); still confirms the account exists, because the server only reaches those policy checks after resolving the username in the directory: "The server only reaches those policy checks after successfully resolving the username in the directory" (LevelBlue SpiderLabs, 2026-09-23). For an account that reaches the method-selection screen, the response HTML lists every registered second factor as visible radio buttons, with unregistered methods present in the DOM but hidden, so an attacker also learns whether a target relies on an authenticator app, SMS, or a more easily phished alternate-email one-time code.

The technique's sharpest edge is administrator identification. Microsoft enforces SSPR for admin accounts regardless of the tenant-wide SSPR policy, so in a tenant that has disabled SSPR for standard users, any account that still reaches method selection is likely a privileged role account, and its registered factors are exposed the same way: "Admin accounts bypass this check entirely and proceed to method enumeration regardless" (LevelBlue SpiderLabs, 2026-09-23). This turns a list of candidate email addresses harvested from a company website, LinkedIn, or a data breach into a confirmed target list, ranked by which accounts have the weakest second factor, before any credential attack begins. Microsoft removed the portal's visual CAPTCHA in August 2026, replacing it with backend throttling and behavioural abuse detection rather than a challenge the user must solve (LevelBlue SpiderLabs, 2026-09-23). The researcher released a public automation tool, ResetSpy, that scripts bulk lookups with rotating user agents and randomised timing to reduce fingerprinting.

Importantly, every non-"ViewUserIdentifierVerification" response (including "SSPR_0011", "SSPR_0013", and the guest/federated not-available response) is confirmation that the account exists. The server only reaches those policy checks after successfully resolving the username in the directory.

Microsoft enforces SSPR for administrator accounts regardless of the tenant-wide SSPR policy. If an organization has disabled SSPR for standard users, standard accounts return "ViewSsprNotEnabledInUserPolicy" (SSPR_0011). Admin accounts bypass this check entirely and proceed to method enumeration regardless.

As of August 2026, Microsoft removed this CAPTCHA entirely and replaced it with backend throttling and behavior-based abuse detection

LevelBlue
Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-auditsummarybody

LevelBlue recommends scoping SSPR to a security group but also finds that "Scoped SSPR, counterintuitively, leaks more information about the accounts that are inside the group than a blanket disabled policy does", because those accounts proceed to method enumeration (LevelBlue SpiderLabs, 2026-09-23). Scoping limits method disclosure for accounts outside the group; every account still has its existence confirmed, and accounts inside the group, including those with no registered method, are exposed in full.

research24 Sep 04:40Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Earlier coverage (12)

2026-09-08HIGHNATOB2BigBear 2.0, an Evilginx2-based Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service panel that JavaScript-disables FIDO2/WebAuthn to force victims onto phishable MFA, leased to at least five affiliatesCloudSEK gained administrator access to the control panel of BigBear 2.0, an Evilginx2-based adversary-in-the-middle phishing-as-a-service operation exclusively targeting Microsoft 365 across 42 VPS nodes. Custom JavaScript injected into every proxied login page disables FIDO2/WebAuthn to force victims onto phishable MFA methods; the panel has captured 5,137 credential records, including 474 fully MFA-bypassed sessions, from 3,331 victim IPs across 40+ countries, with IT-services/MSP organizations the single largest targeted sector.2026-08-23HIGHNATOB2Three Russia-nexus espionage clusters compromise European diplomats and academics without malware, by talking targets through app passwords, device-code approvals and WhatsApp device-linking, all of which are legitimate features working as designedGoogle Threat Intelligence Group published research on 2026-08-20 on three distinct suspected Russia-nexus clusters whose primary access method is abuse of legitimate authentication workflows rather than malware. UNC6293 talks targets into creating an application-specific password and sharing it back, which grants access without ever triggering the second factor. UNC7005 (the cluster this store already tracks as Storm-2945) runs device-code phishing through spoofed conference sites that fingerprint the browser to evade automated scanners before showing the code, and separately abuses WhatsApp device-linking by generating a genuine link request against a victim-supplied phone number, then instructing the victim to approve it; a fake voice call on the same page captures microphone and camera through the browser under cover of the call. UNC5976 stands up a cloud project per phishing domain and harvests OAuth tokens after a real consent flow. The target set is academia, aerospace and defence, governments and think tanks across Europe.2026-08-23NOTABLENATOB2Dead-drop command-and-control went commodity: three of four new entrants on Red Canary's monthly list resolve their C2 from a dead drop, two of them from a public blockchain, and the fourth is a GUI for Entra ID device-code phishingRed Canary's monthly threat round-up, published 2026-08-20 on July 2026 telemetry, records four new entrants to its most-prevalent list (GraphSpy, Phexia, CastleRAT and EtherRAT) of which three resolve their command-and-control address from a dead drop rather than from a hardcoded domain, and two of those three read it from a public blockchain smart contract. The technique defeats domain and IP blocking because the operator rewrites the contract value and every installation picks up the change. The fourth, GraphSpy, is an open-source Entra ID and Microsoft 365 attack tool with a browser GUI that centralises device-code phishing, primary refresh token theft, Windows Hello for Business key registration and MFA method manipulation, the third device-code phishing tool to reach that list in 2026.2026-08-23NOTABLEupdatedNATOA2CVE-2026-69836, Microsoft corrected its own Entra ID CVSS 10.0 record from exploited to not-exploited within a day, and ENISA's exploited feed still says otherwise two days laterMicrosoft published CVE-2026-69836 on 2026-08-20, a CWE-502 deserialization flaw in Entra ID rated CVSS 3.1 base 10.0 and described only as letting an unauthorized attacker execute code over a network. It is a cloud-service CVE issued under Microsoft's transparency programme: the fix was applied to Microsoft's own infrastructure before disclosure, so no tenant has anything to install. The operationally relevant part is the exploitation field, MSRC's revision 1.1 of 2026-08-21 corrected the record to state the flaw was not exploited in the wild, while ENISA's EU Vulnerability Database, re-synced on 2026-08-22, still carries it on the exploited feed with an exploited-since date of 2026-08-21. Any vulnerability process that ranks on the EUVD exploited feed will treat this CVE as exploited; the vendor that owns the record says it was not.2026-07-21NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2HOLLOWGRAPH: a Cavern-framework backdoor that turns a compromised Microsoft 365 calendar into a Graph-API dead-drop C2Group-IB documented (2026-07-20) HOLLOWGRAPH, a NativeAOT .NET backdoor it links with high confidence to the Cavern C2 framework (previously tied to the Iran-nexus Cavern Manticore actor). HOLLOWGRAPH never contacts attacker infrastructure directly: it uses the Microsoft Graph API to plant and read tasking as attachments on far-future calendar events in a compromised M365 mailbox, and tunnels Entra ID credential refresh over IPv6 DNS. Current victimology is narrow (Israeli organisations), but the Graph-API-calendar-as-C2 technique is directly transferable to any Microsoft 365 tenant, the platform at the centre of most CH/EU public-sector estates.2026-08-07HIGHNATOB2UNC6671 kept operating after BlackFile's announced retirement, across four further extortion brands, and its vishing pretext is now an urgent order to enroll a FIDO2 passkeyGoogle Threat Intelligence Group reports that UNC6671 (the actor behind the BlackFile extortion brand, whose retirement was announced in May 2026) continued operating across four further brands (Redact, Pink, Helix, Falcon) linked by shared root domains, identical phishing templates and overlapping victim targeting. The intrusion chain is unchanged and identity-centric: a call to an employee's personal mobile impersonating the IT helpdesk, now sometimes spoofing the real helpdesk number, demanding an urgent FIDO2 passkey or MFA re-enrolment, into an adversary-in-the-middle panel that takes credentials and MFA tokens, then scripted bulk exfiltration from Microsoft 365 and Okta-fronted SaaS. Targeting narrowed by July 2026 onto financial services, private equity, law firms and rating agencies.2026-08-01HIGHNATOB2CaptiveCrunch: an SVR-linked sub-cluster hijacks hotel and conference captive portals to serve fake update lures, a Go RAT and a token-stealing PowerShell module to travelling staffMicrosoft Threat Intelligence disclosed CaptiveCrunch on 2026-07-31, a campaign it attributes to Storm-2945, assessed as an operational sub-cluster of the SVR-attributed actor Midnight Blizzard. Since early May 2026 the actor has manipulated DNS and HTTP traffic on hospitality networks served by captive portals worldwide, redirecting users through its own infrastructure and answering browser connectivity checks with ClickFix-style fake browser and OS update prompts. The payloads are CornFlake, a Go Windows RAT with redundant persistence and a watchdog that restores anything defenders remove, and ChocoShell, an in-memory PowerShell stealer that takes browser cookies, saved passwords, Microsoft 365 SSO tokens and Wi-Fi credentials. Since 16 July some landing pages also drive Entra ID device-code phishing. Travelling government and diplomatic staff are named target populations.2026-07-10HIGHupdatedNATOB2Two 2026 M365 account-takeover campaigns (Railway device-code phishing, LSHIY ROPC spray) beat Conditional Access without breaking MFAHuntress published a comparative root-cause analysis of two 2026 Microsoft 365 account-takeover campaigns that both bypassed Conditional Access policies requiring MFA; not by defeating MFA but by using auth flows CA rarely covers. "Railway" (March 2026, 344 orgs incl. Germany) used device-code phishing to harvest 90-day OAuth tokens; "LSHIY" (June 2026, 78 accounts across 64 orgs) ran 81M+ ROPC login attempts against Azure CLI through the /token endpoint. Of the 78 LSHIY-compromised accounts, 55 had active CA policies requiring MFA that failed because of scoping gaps. Every M365 tenant should block the device-code flow and ensure CA covers all cloud apps and all client app types including legacy auth.2026-07-18NOTABLEupdatedNATOA3Abbott confirms a Cancer Diagnostics cyber incident; ShinyHunters claims a vished Entra SSO account and 30M+ recordsAbbott Laboratories confirmed (2026-07-16) unauthorized access to a limited number of internal systems in its Cancer Diagnostics business (the acquired Exact Sciences unit) only. Separately, the ShinyHunters extortion group claims the intrusion began with a vishing call that compromised a Microsoft Entra ID single-sign-on account, then used it to pull 30M+ records from Entra, ServiceNow, SharePoint, Databricks and Coupa; a claim Abbott has neither confirmed nor attributed. The confirmed incident plus the same vishing-to-cloud-SSO tradecraft this actor uses against SaaS-integrated enterprises makes it relevant to healthcare and any SharePoint/Entra-dependent estate.2026-07-15NOTABLENATOB2Proofpoint: OAuth client ID spoofing validates stolen Entra ID credentials at scale without writing a successful sign-in logProofpoint (2026-07-13) documented OAuth client ID spoofing against Microsoft Entra ID, independently weaponised by two clusters. An attacker POSTs credentials to the /common/oauth2/token endpoint using the legacy ROPC flow with an arbitrary unregistered GUID as client_id; Entra ID's differential AADSTS error responses leak username and password validity, and AADSTS700016 ("application not found") is returned when the credentials are BOTH correct, turning a code defenders read as a harmless misconfiguration into a credential-validity oracle. Because the client_id is unregistered, the sign-in log entry (where one appears at all) carries a blank application name, defeating detections that correlate authentication spikes by app. The concrete fix is to block the ROPC grant type outright, because Conditional Access policies scoped to specific applications are the exact control this technique sidesteps.2026-07-10NOTABLENATOB2Forg365: a commercial Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service kit bundling device-code + AiTM phishing, in-panel AI lure drafting, and a browser extension for SSO-cookie persistenceZeroBEC documented Forg365, a Telegram-distributed, subscription-priced Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service platform that pairs an OAuth device-code phishing path with an adversary-in-the-middle session-theft path, an in-panel AI lure generator, and a companion browser extension (ForgCookie) that silently refreshes the stolen Microsoft SSO cookie so access persists without the victim re-authenticating. Both paths yield a valid, MFA-satisfied token because the victim completes the real Microsoft login. It is a distinct kit and operator from the Railway/EvilTokens device-code campaign covered earlier, same primitive, productized.2026-07-10HIGHNATOB2'Helix' data-extortion cluster pairs manager-impersonation vishing with device-code phishing and automated SharePoint exfiltrationReliaQuest documented a previously unreported data-extortion cluster it calls Helix, assessed as a likely continuation of the BlackFile (UNC6671) and ShinyHunters ecosystems on shared registrar and hosting infrastructure. Operators phone a target impersonating their named manager (spoofed caller-ID), walk them through an Entra ID device-code sign-in that captures a session token without a password and sidesteps Conditional Access, register a new Authenticator within minutes for persistence, then run automated SharePoint enumeration and bulk exfiltration. SharePoint + Entra ID is the default identity/collaboration stack across Swiss and EU public-sector tenants, so the playbook is directly reachable; disabling the device-code flow is the single highest-impact control.

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats6
  • Research5
  • Deep dive3
  • Vulns1

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com8 (19%)
  • huntress.com5 (12%)
  • cloud.google.com2 (5%)
  • reliaquest.com2 (5%)
  • securelist.com2 (5%)
  • thehackernews.com2 (5%)
  • abbott.com1 (2%)
  • api.first.org1 (2%)
  • other19 (45%)
All cited sources (42)