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MeshCentral MeshAgent

product · product:meshcentral-meshagent single-source

Coverage
2
first 2026-07-29 → last 2026-10-22
Latest activity
2026-10-22
Group-IB: k0t takes edge devices in bulk and decrypts FortiGate configurations offline; enable…
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
healthcare
sectors: healthcare, public-sector, manufacturing
Sources cited
6
5 hosts

Action items (3)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about MeshCentral MeshAgent, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • On every FortiGate (FortiOS 5.6.11, 6.0.7, 6.2.1 or later; check the FortiManager and HA note in Fortinet's FG-IR-19-007 first where it applies), enable private-data-encryption with an operator-defined key, and for any device that was internet-reachable with a brute-forceable administrator login or an unpatched exposed service, treat the LDAP and Active Directory bind and administrator credentials stored in its configuration as known to the attacker and rotate them, bind accounts first.
    2026-10-22CVE-2025-64446 +2
  • Cross-check your asset inventory for MeshCentral MeshAgent and Zoho Assist Unattended Agent instances that your own management platform did not provision, treating any such agent running as a SYSTEM auto-start service as an incident rather than a hygiene finding; both were the primary command-and-control mechanism in the ransomware engagements Talos describes.
    2026-07-29Cisco Talos IR's quarterly report puts three named…
  • Raise domain-controller security-log retention and forward it off-device: Talos found DC logs retained for only a few hours, and states the resulting gaps prevented determining the initial access vector or exfiltration scope in real engagements; 90 days of centralised retention is the figure it names.
    2026-07-29Cisco Talos IR's quarterly report puts three named…

Defender insights

What each entry about MeshCentral MeshAgent tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-22NOTABLEexploitedGroup-IB: k0t takes edge devices in bulk and decrypts FortiGate configurations offline; enable private-data-encryption

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-07-29NOTABLECisco Talos IR's quarterly report puts three named intrusion chains on record, led by Sinobi running its command-and-control through a trojanized MeshAgent

Triage

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-22k0t: Group-IB and NyxLab describe a probable access broker that mass-exploits FortiWeb and PAN-OS GlobalProtect, brute-forces FortiGate and decrypts stolen FortiGate configurations offline with the default key, with victims later listed by Qilin and The Gentlemen
    active-threatsGroup-IB: k0t takes edge devices in bulk and decrypts FortiGate configurations offline; enable private-data-encryption
  2. 2026-07-29Talos IR Trends Q2 2026: ransomware operators ran their command-and-control through legitimate RMM agents, authentication abuse hit two-thirds of engagements, and missing logs stopped root-cause determination outright
    deep-diveCisco Talos IR's quarterly report puts three named intrusion chains on record, led by Sinobi running its command-and-control through a trojanized MeshAgent

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
MeshCentral MeshAgent
ATT&CK techniques (47 across 14 tactics)

47 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceSearch Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases · Phishing for Information
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · External Remote Services · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · System Services: Service Execution
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · External Remote Services · Create Account: Local Account · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
  • StealthValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules
  • Defense ImpairmentDomain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · OS Credential Dumping: NTDS · OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets · OS Credential Dumping: DCSync · Brute Force: Password Guessing · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Multi-Factor Authentication Interception · Forced Authentication · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Adversary-in-the-Middle · Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting · Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
  • DiscoveryRemote System Discovery · Network Service Discovery · Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups · File and Directory Discovery · Network Share Discovery · Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Remote Services: Windows Remote Management · Internal Spearphishing · Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash · Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie
  • CollectionAdversary-in-the-Middle · Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Web Service · Remote Access Tools
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web Service · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1596.005Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases×1

Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1598Phishing for Information×1

Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from Phishing in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×2

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1569.002System Services: Service Execution×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and Net.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.008Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules×1

Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> PowerShell cmdlets on Windows systems.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×1

Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.004OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets×1

Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts. LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.006OS Credential Dumping: DCSync×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.001Brute Force: Password Guessing×1

Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×1

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication Interception×1

Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1187Forced Authentication×1

Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1558.003Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting×1

Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation×1

Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1018Remote System Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1046Network Service Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups×1

Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1083File and Directory Discovery×1

Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1135Network Share Discovery×1

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.006Remote Services: Windows Remote Management×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1534Internal Spearphishing×1

After they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment, adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or compromise other users within the same organization. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where a legitimate account is initially compromised either by controlling the user's device or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries may then attempt to take advantage of the trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking more victims into falling for phish attempts, often incorporating Impersonation.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1550.002Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash×1

Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1550.004Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie×1

Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle×1

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1602.002Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump×1

Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×2

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-07-29/talos-ir-trends-q2-2026-rmm-weaponization-auth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about MeshCentral MeshAgent (2)

2026-10-22 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2025-64446 +2exploitedNATOB2

k0t: Group-IB and NyxLab describe a probable access broker that mass-exploits FortiWeb and PAN-OS GlobalProtect, brute-forces FortiGate and decrypts stolen FortiGate configurations offline with the default key, with victims later listed by Qilin and The Gentlemen

Group-IB and NyxLab describe a campaign by an operator they track as k0t (Group-IB lists CryptoFeel as a potential alias, and Scrooge as a likely collaborator and possible alias) that enumerates internet-facing VPN and firewall appliances in bulk and attacks the product directly, chiefly Fortinet firewalls and Palo Alto GlobalProtect portals (Group-IB, 2026-10-21). A custom script exploits CVE-2025-64446 against FortiWeb, a relative path traversal that lets an unauthenticated attacker run administrative commands, or brute-forces exposed Fortinet devices as a fallback (Group-IB, 2026-10-21; CISA KEV, 2026-10-21). Against PAN-OS it exploits CVE-2026-0257, the GlobalProtect authentication bypass, with a forged authentication-override cookie (Group-IB, 2026-10-21). On a compromised FortiGate the tool downloads the configuration and decrypts its secrets locally with the default FortiOS key, the weakness tracked as CVE-2019-6693, recovering LDAP and Active Directory bind and, Group-IB says, administrator credentials, although Fortinet's advisory excludes the administrator's password and says FIPS-CC devices are not impacted; unless private-data-encryption is set, the device falls back to that known key (Group-IB, 2026-10-21; Fortinet, 2019-11-19).

After access the operators work by hand with NetExec, Impacket, Kerbrute, relayed PetitPotam and Mimikatz, keep access through OpenConnect, MeshCentral agents, AdaptixC2, Atera and AnyDesk, and exfiltrate with Rclone to Wasabi and MEGA (Group-IB, 2026-10-21). Group-IB sees victim overlap with the Qilin and The Gentlemen leak sites and assesses the operators are probably initial-access brokers, but says no relationship is confirmed, and it found indications of a possible connection with the FortiBleed cluster alongside negligible overlap in the compromised credentials (Group-IB, 2026-10-21). CISA lists all three CVEs in KEV, with ransomware use marked known for CVE-2026-0257 and CVE-2019-6693 (CISA KEV, 2026-10-21).

Triage: OpenConnect, MeshCentral, Atera, AnyDesk and Rclone are legitimate tools, so Group-IB advises judging execution context, installation source, operator account, destination and timing rather than tool names (Group-IB, 2026-10-21).

Large-scale campaign involving vulnerability exploitation and brute-forcing of exposed network devices

Many victims seen in this campaign have also been observed to be later listed by ransomware groups, Qilin and the Gentlemen, on their Data Leak Sites (DLS).

Because this decryption is performed against a copy of the configuration held by the operator, it is not detectable on the appliance itself and cannot be prevented by access control alone

Enable the ‘private-data-encryption’ setting on FortiGate appliances and supply an operator-defined key.

Group-IB (with NyxLab) 2026-10-21

Builds on: Qilin and Inc ransomware exploit the GlobalProtect bypass; one intrusion pivoted to vCenter and… · FBI and Secret Service: FortiBleed is still active, locks admins out of FortiGates and feeds…

threat22 Oct 03:46Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-07-29 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Quarterly incident-response reports are usually read for their percentages, which is the least useful thing in them. The Q2 2026 edition from Cisco Talos Incident Response is worth a deep read for a different reason: it puts three specific intrusion chains on the public record with enough sequence to hunt against, and it documents a visibility failure that stopped Talos's own responders from answering the two questions every incident turns on (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28).

Sinobi: the RMM agent was the C2. Talos IR responded to Sinobi ransomware for the first time in April 2026, a ransomware-as-a-service operation active nearly a year with minimal public reporting on its operators. The chain reads as a deliberate exercise in staying inside the shape of normal administration. Rather than deploying a bespoke implant, the operators used a trojanized MeshAgent binary (the agent component of the open-source MeshCentral remote-management platform) as their primary command-and-control mechanism, a tactic Talos states had not previously been associated with the group (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). Installing it as a SYSTEM-level auto-start service collapsed persistence and privilege into the same step: no separate escalation, and boot survival from the outset. The channel was encrypted WebSocket to an attacker-controlled server, which matters because genuine MeshAgent traffic is itself WebSocket-based; Talos's assessment is that this let the actor blend malicious traffic with legitimate remote-management activity and hold undetected access for approximately three days before deploying ransomware (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). Lateral movement was enabled by a service account whose weak password was cracked after being obtained from the domain credential store ntds.dit, and the operators moved through the network over RDP and WinRM. The endgame is the part worth dwelling on: rather than pushing the payload host by host, the actor deployed ransomware across the entire domain using a malicious Group Policy Object logon script, encrypting with the .SINOBI extension alongside exfiltration staging via rclone.exe (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). Talos reads the GPO deployment as evidence of genuine enterprise-architecture understanding, and expects the group to keep weaponising legitimate tools precisely because they bypass signature-based alerting.

Warlock and the unattended agent. In a separate engagement, Talos observed Warlock operators (also tracked as Storm-2603) deploying an installer for the Zoho Assist Unattended Agent, a capability designed to allow administrative remote control of an endpoint with no user logged in, and states it had not previously seen this tool attributed to Warlock (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). That engagement did not reach encryption, but Talos notes the activity was consistent with a Warlock attack it observed in May 2026 that did. The pattern across both ransomware cases is the same substitution: where a defender's model expects a malicious binary, there is a legitimate, signed, commercially supported remote-administration product instead, which is why Talos's own recommendation shifts from signature detection to behavioural monitoring and application allowlisting that prevents unauthorised binaries from running as services.

UAT-11764: phishing that grows its own target list. From April 2026 and still ongoing in late June, Talos tracked a QR-code phishing campaign against primarily Australian organisations, attributing it to a newly designated actor. Delivery is auto-generated, victim-tailored PDF documents carrying embedded QR codes; a shape chosen to sit outside what email-gateway text and link scanning inspects. The codes lead to Microsoft 365 credential-harvesting pages; on success the operator accesses the mailbox, creates inbox rules to hide incoming mail and reduce the victim's visibility of the compromise, stages follow-on malicious documents on SharePoint, and then sends further internal and external phishing using that mailbox's own contact list (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). Talos assesses with high confidence that the actor will almost certainly continue, using each newly compromised mailbox's contacts to expand reach and sustain momentum (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). The tradecraft insight Talos draws is that the operation leans on trusted infrastructure (SharePoint and Microsoft 365) rather than attacker-registered domains, so reputation-based controls have nothing to fire on. The same report profiles ARToken, the phishing-as-a-service panel this pipeline already tracks, noting it exposes over 80 API endpoints covering device-code phishing, primary-refresh-token persistence, mailbox access and SharePoint exfiltration, and bypasses multi-factor authentication through the OAuth device-authorisation flow rather than by stealing a password.

The two cross-cutting findings. Authentication abuse was the most prevalent weakness Talos recorded, in 65% of its engagements against 35% the previous quarter, and the composition is more useful than the share: adversaries defeated or bypassed multi-factor authentication using adversary-in-the-middle proxies and session-token theft, MFA-fatigue attacks, registration of attacker-controlled devices for authentication, and legacy authentication protocols that circumvent MFA altogether (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). Three of those four defeat a correctly configured push-based MFA deployment, which is the deployment most organisations have. The second finding is the one to take to a budget conversation. Insufficient logging and visibility appeared in 42% of engagements against 18% the previous quarter, and Talos enumerates what that meant in practice: domain-controller security logs retained for only a few hours, host event logs truncated or overwritten before capture, absent NetFlow preventing reconstruction of external authentication and exfiltration, on-device-only logs that adversaries deleted, and cloud telemetry whose retention did not reach back to the true initial-access date. Talos states plainly that in several engagements these gaps prevented definitive determination of the initial access vector or the scope of data exfiltration (Cisco Talos Incident Response, 2026-07-28). That is not a hygiene observation; it is a statement that the questions a board, a regulator and a data-protection authority all ask first were unanswerable. Talos's remediation names 90 days of centralised retention as a minimum, logs forwarded off-device so they survive tampering and rebuilds, and process-creation, command-line and cloud-API auditing enabled.

Also recorded: exposed or unpatched internet-facing infrastructure was the third-ranked weakness at 31%, with ToolShell, an older Telerik UI deserialization flaw and SD-WAN/VPN appliance CVEs among the named examples; and unlimited outbound email thresholds enabled propagation in almost 15% of engagements, illustrated by a single compromised mailbox that sent over 6,600 phishing and spam messages before containment, a concrete number worth borrowing as an alerting threshold, since Talos rightly calls outbound rate-limiting low-effort and high-impact. On targeting, healthcare led for the second consecutive quarter at 17% of engagements, with public administration and manufacturing at 14% each; Talos's read is that the three share a critical lack of downtime tolerance, and it notes that almost all targeted public-administration organisations were local governments and that targeted manufacturers were high-value industrial-supply-chain entities where disruption cascades downstream. For a constituency built around cantonal and communal administration and critical-infrastructure operators, that is the sentence in the report with the most direct read-across; the segment being hit is not central government but the municipal tier, and the reason given is operational intolerance of downtime rather than data value.

Triage: every mechanism in the ransomware chains is normal administration, and Talos's explicit position is that this is why they were chosen, so no single event discriminates and the correlation has to carry it. For remote-management agents the discriminator is provenance against inventory: a genuine MeshAgent or Zoho Assist deployment is provisioned by your own management server onto an asset of record and appears as an expected service, whereas the malicious instance is an agent-named SYSTEM service on a host with no deployment of record. For the lateral movement, the discriminator is the identity rather than the protocol: RDP and WinRM between servers is routine, but a service account interactively authenticating across hosts is not what service accounts are for, and that is the question an access review can settle in advance. For the GPO step, the discriminator is change provenance; a logon-script modification is a discrete, auditable act with an expected author and change window, so an unattributed edit to a domain-wide policy object is high-fidelity on its own.

Notably, we observed the threat actors use a trojanized MeshAgent binary as their primary C2 mechanism during this engagement, a tactic that has not been previously associated with the group in public reporting.

The actor ultimately deployed the ransomware across the entire domain using a malicious Group Policy Object (GPO) logon script. The incident resulted in the encryption of systems with the .SINOBI file extension, alongside observed data exfiltration staging activity conducted via rclone.exe.

In one engagement, we observed Warlock ransomware operators (also known as Storm-2603) deploying an installer for the RMM tool Zoho Assist Unattended Agent, which is designed to allow administrative remote control of an endpoint without a user logged in.

We assess with high confidence that the threat actor, who we have dubbed UAT-11764, will almost certainly continue leveraging this QR code phishing operation, using each newly compromised mailbox's contact lists to expand its reach and sustain the campaign's momentum.

In several engagements these gaps prevented definitive determination of the initial access vector or the scope of data exfiltration.

Cisco Talos Incident Response 2026-07-28
annual-report29 Jul 05:55Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Deep dive1
  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • fortiguard.fortinet.com2 (33%)
  • blog.talosintelligence.com1 (17%)
  • cisa.gov1 (17%)
  • group-ib.com1 (17%)
  • security.paloaltonetworks.com1 (17%)