CVE-2026-0257, Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect: pre-auth authentication bypass via certificate reuse, marked by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns
Qilin and Inc ransomware exploit the GlobalProtect bypass; one intrusion pivoted to vCenter and ESXi past in-guest EDR
Defender actions
- Patch every PAN-OS GlobalProtect portal and gateway to the fixed build in Palo Alto's advisory for its minor release (users then re-authenticate once, because the fixed firewall regenerates the override cookie), or until then disable Authentication Override or give the cookies a certificate that no other feature uses.
- On every GlobalProtect gateway that was internet-reachable and unpatched at any time since 2026-05-17, treat the network behind it as a ransomware compromise-assessment target: review VPN sessions that authenticated by cookie from unexpected sources, check Windows hosts for the artifacts Arctic Wolf describes (a ransomware payload staged under C:\\PerfLogs, a PsExec service, an LSASS dump written through comsvcs.dll to an .odt file, an ntdsutil media copy of the Active Directory database, and cleared event logs), and extend the assessment to the virtualization and backup tier: vCenter and ESXi audit logs for a changed execInstalledOnly setting and for access to a domain controller's virtual disk, and the Veeam backup server, because Unit 42 describes one intrusion that pivoted from the gateway to vCenter and dumped domain credentials offline, which in-guest EDR does not see.
Analysis
Authentication override cookies in PAN-OS GlobalProtect let a portal or gateway issue a cookie that a user presents in place of re-authenticating, and the feature is not enabled by default (Rapid7, 2026-05-29). Palo Alto Networks says the flaw affects firewalls with a GlobalProtect portal or gateway where authentication override cookies are enabled and a specific certificate configuration exists, classes it as CWE-565 (reliance on cookies without validation and integrity checking), and scores it CVSS 4.0 7.8 with exploit maturity Attacked (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). Rapid7's analysis is that when the certificate used for the cookies is reused for another feature such as the HTTPS service of the portal or gateway, a remote unauthenticated attacker can discover that certificate's public key, forge an arbitrary cookie that the server decrypts and trusts, and bypass authentication; Rapid7 Labs published a proof-of-concept script that tests for it (Rapid7, 2026-05-29). Palo Alto Networks says it is aware of limited exploit attempts on unpatched devices without mitigations applied (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13); Rapid7 MDR dates the earliest observed exploitation to 17 May 2026 and saw two waves, on 18 May from Vultr-hosted infrastructure and on 21 May from Dromatics Systems, which it believes are likely the same threat actor because of a consistent MAC address (Rapid7, 2026-05-29). CISA's KEV catalog lists the CVE with a date added of 29 May 2026 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-10-04).
Affected are PAN-OS 12.1, 11.2, 11.1 and 10.2 releases below the fixed builds in Palo Alto's table and Prisma Access 11.2 and 10.2; Panorama and Cloud NGFW are not affected (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). The solution table names the first fixed build for each minor release, for example 12.1.4-h6 or 12.1.7 and later for 12.1.2 through 12.1.4, 11.2.12 or later for 11.2.11, 11.1.15 or later for 11.1.14, and 10.2.18-h6 or later on the 10.2 train, while Prisma Access 11.2 needs 11.2.7-h13 or later and 10.2 needs 10.2.10-h36 or later (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). After the upgrade users must re-authenticate once, because the firewall regenerates the cookie with a more secure method (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). Palo Alto's mitigations are a dedicated certificate used only for authentication override cookies, or disabling Authentication Override (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13).
Triage: cookie logins are routine wherever Authentication Override is enabled, because users present the cookie in lieu of re-authenticating (Rapid7, 2026-05-29). In some intrusions Arctic Wolf saw a cookie-based authentication failure with the error Cannot decrypt cookie, followed quickly by a successful cookie-based authentication from the same source, although the error was not present in every intrusion (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11).
Cited evidence
Palo Alto Networks has become aware of limited exploit attempts on unpatched PAN-OS devices without mitigations applied.
Due to the consistent MAC address, Rapid7 believes both waves of exploitation are likely from the same threat actor (TA).
Arctic Wolf investigated multiple distinct intrusions during June 2026 that resulted in Qilin ransomware deployment, all originating from exploitation of CVE-2026-0257 against Palo Alto Networks firewall appliances.
Ransomware operators exploiting the May 2026 CVE-2026-0257 include Spikey Scorpius (aka Qilin) and Tarnished Scorpius (aka Inc).
The most significant evolution in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) following successful exploitation of CVE-2026-0257 is the direct pivot to the virtualization layer.
This tactic bypasses in-guest endpoint detection and response (EDR) and security controls, representing a highly sophisticated method for obtaining domain-wide credentials.
Updates7
Unit 42's 9 June update on CVE-2026-0257 confirms that a limited number of probed PAN-OS GlobalProtect devices had attacker-established, gateway-connected VPN sessions, moving this from "exploit attempts observed" to confirmed successful exploitation (Unit 42, 2026-06-09). The bug is CWE-565, reliance on cookies without validation and integrity checking (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13); when the cookie certificate is shared with another function, an attacker can discover its public key and forge authentication-override cookies, and Rapid7 dates successful exploitation to 17 May from low-cost hosting IPs (Rapid7, 2026-05-29).
Affected: PAN-OS 10.2/11.1/11.2/12.1 and Prisma Access where authentication override is enabled with a shared certificate; patched in 12.1.7+, 11.2.12+, 11.1.15+, 10.2.18-h6+ and corresponding Prisma builds (Palo Alto Networks, 2026-05-13). After the upgrade users must re-authenticate once, because the fixed firewall regenerates the cookie with a more secure method; as a workaround disable authentication override or assign it a dedicated certificate (Palo Alto Networks, 2026-05-13). Hunt GlobalProtect gateway logs for cookie-based authentications from unexpected source addresses; Rapid7's log of the attack shows the authentication method recorded as a cookie (Rapid7, 2026-05-29).
Palo Alto's Unit 42 confirms an active exploitation campaign against the GlobalProtect cookie authentication-bypass (CVE-2026-0257) (Unit 42, 2026-06-09). The flaw (CWE-565, reliance on cookies without validation and integrity checking) lets an attacker forge a session and establish a VPN tunnel without credentials when the override feature is enabled (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT).
Arctic Wolf saw exploitation attempts across insurance, finance, manufacturing, education, engineering and healthcare targets in North America and Europe, and in a subset of intrusions automated internal SMB reconnaissance consistent with Impacket tooling (anonymous NTLM logon, share enumeration and domain-user discovery); it says the follow-on activity did not progress substantially beyond the initial SMB session setup and lightweight reconnaissance (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11). NCSC-CH refreshed its Security Hub advisory on 2026-06-16 to flag the Unit 42 confirmation (NCSC-CH Security Hub, 2026-06-16). Defenders: disable "Authentication Override" if not required, patch to fixed PAN-OS builds, and audit sessions since 17 May for anonymous NTLM logons and SMB share enumeration from VPN-assigned addresses.
CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (version 2026.10.04) now marks CVE-2026-0257 as used in known ransomware campaigns; the record names no group and its date of addition remains 2026-05-29 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-10-04). Arctic Wolf Labs' report of 2026-07-20 says it investigated multiple distinct intrusions in June 2026 that ended in Qilin ransomware deployment, all originating from exploitation of CVE-2026-0257 against Palo Alto Networks firewalls, and that the post-exploitation tradecraft ranged from rapid encryption-only operations to double extortion, possibly suggesting several affiliates of the Qilin ransomware-as-a-service operation (Arctic Wolf, 2026-07-20).
The chain Arctic Wolf describes starts with a GlobalProtect VPN session obtained through the cookie bypass, in some cases from systems that identified themselves as kali, and continues with registry Run-key persistence that points at a ransomware payload staged under C:\PerfLogs, remote-access tools (AnyDesk, Ngrok, LogMeIn and, in one case, a scheduled task consistent with MeshAgent), LSASS credential theft through rundll32 and comsvcs.dll into a file with an .odt extension, a full copy of the Active Directory database with ntdsutil, lateral movement with PsExec over administrative shares and RDP, a PowerShell routine that clears every Windows event log with records, and Microsoft Defender real-time protection disabled in some cases (Arctic Wolf, 2026-07-20). In the double-extortion cases data went to the MEGA cloud storage service with Rclone before encryption, and the attackers targeted the Veeam backup infrastructure before deploying the ransomware; some intrusions involved no data theft before encryption (Arctic Wolf, 2026-07-20). A gateway that was reachable and unpatched therefore needs a compromise assessment of the Windows estate behind it, not only the patch.
Arctic Wolf's June telemetry shows automated SMB reconnaissance consistent with Impacket tooling (anonymous NTLM logon, share enumeration, domain-user discovery) in a subset of intrusions, and Arctic Wolf states the activity did not progress substantially beyond the initial SMB session setup and lightweight reconnaissance (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11); the 2026-06-17 note had called it lateral movement. Before the Qilin reporting, Rapid7 saw no indication of successful lateral movement from the compromised devices (Rapid7, 2026-05-29), and Unit 42 reported no post-access behavior or lateral movement as of 9 June (Unit 42, 2026-06-09). Rapid7 saw the same spoofed MAC address on the attacker's client in both May waves, a pivot for VPN session logs (Rapid7, 2026-05-29), although Arctic Wolf found MAC spoofing was not consistent across later intrusions (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11). Rapid7 Labs published a public proof of concept on 29 May, the same day CISA added the flaw to its catalog (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11).
Unit 42 updated its threat brief on 2026-10-19 and 2026-10-20: it continues to see attempted exploitation by ransomware operators, naming Spikey Scorpius (Qilin) and Tarnished Scorpius (Inc), and says it is aware of public reporting that attributes exploitation to actors using Settra ransomware (Unit 42, 2026-10-20). Its investigations have run since early June 2026 and span industries including government (Unit 42, 2026-10-20). The attackers use the flaw for an initial foothold, bypass multi-factor authentication to establish a VPN session, then run reconnaissance with dual-use remote monitoring and management tools, move over RDP and SMB and stage credential harvesting, exfiltration and ransomware (Unit 42, 2026-10-20).
The change Unit 42 stresses is a direct pivot to the virtualization layer: in one case the attackers went from the compromised VPN gateway to the vCenter management appliance, disabled the execInstalledOnly security control on ESXi hosts and used a custom tool for offline credential dumping from a domain controller's virtual disk, which bypasses in-guest EDR; it also saw this access chained with exploit tools aimed at Veeam backup infrastructure (Unit 42, 2026-10-20). The brief adds that GlobalProtect profiles mapped to HTTP or HTTPS services on management interfaces can expose the management interface on ports 4443 and 3879 without the administrators knowing, and that an out-of-band HTTPS connection to the management address on those ports shows whether it is exposed (Unit 42, 2026-10-20). The brief dates the flaw's addition to CISA's catalog to 13 May 2026, whereas the catalog's own record says 29 May 2026 (Unit 42, 2026-10-20; CISA KEV catalog, 2026-10-04).
The one-time re-authentication is a consequence of the upgrade, not a step to force: with the fix, a firewall that uses authentication override cookies regenerates the cookie with a more secure method, so GlobalProtect users re-authenticate once after the upgrade even when they hold a valid cookie (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). Cookie logins are routine where Authentication Override is enabled; in some intrusions Arctic Wolf saw a cookie-based authentication failure with the error Cannot decrypt cookie, followed quickly by a successful cookie-based authentication from the same source (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-11).
The CWE-565 classification (reliance on cookies without validation and integrity checking) is Palo Alto Networks' (Palo Alto Networks PSIRT, 2026-05-13). Rapid7 describes the attacker discovering the public key of a certificate shared with another function and forging authentication-override cookies with it, and its proof of concept takes the key from the certificate chain the HTTPS service presents (Rapid7, 2026-05-29).
Sources7
Revision history
- Published 2026-05-30-aca445cc
- Update 2026-06-10-c84347b2
UPDATE (originally covered 2026-05-30): Unit 42's 9 June update on CVE-2026-0257 confirms that a limited number of probed PAN-OS GlobalProtect devices had attacker-established, gateway-connected VPN sessions, moving this from "exploit attempts observed" to confirmed successful exploitation (Unit 42, 2026-06-09).
Changed: actions evidence sectors sources body
- Update 2026-06-17-e102009c
PAN-OS GlobalProtect CVE-2026-0257 exploitation wave hits European targets, Arctic Wolf documents Impacket-style SMB lateral movement post-auth-bypass; NCSC-CH refreshed its advisory on 2026-06-16 (§ 4).
Changed: evidence regions sectors sources body
- Update 2026-10-06T0405Z-intel
CISA's KEV catalog (version 2026.10.04) now marks CVE-2026-0257 as used in known ransomware campaigns, and Arctic Wolf's report of 2026-07-20 describes June 2026 intrusions in which Qilin ransomware deployment began with the bypass, so an exposed, unpatched gateway needs a compromise assessment of the network behind it as well as the patch.
Changed: title headline summary priority immediate_action tags entities techniques affected_products sources evidence sourcing_note classification actions body
- Correction 2026-10-11T1307Z-audit
Arctic Wolf's June report describes Impacket-consistent SMB reconnaissance in a subset of intrusions that did not progress beyond session setup, not lateral movement, and its sector list describes the exploitation wave as a whole. Two hunting lines named log fields and Windows event ids no source gives and are rewritten. Added: Rapid7 and Unit 42 saw no post-access activity or lateral movement in the May and early June intrusions, Rapid7 saw the same spoofed client MAC address in both waves, and Rapid7 published a proof of concept the day CISA listed the flaw.
Changed: body event_date
- Update 2026-10-21T0256Z-intel
Unit 42's update of 2026-10-19 and 2026-10-20 names Qilin and Inc as ransomware operators exploiting CVE-2026-0257 and describes one intrusion that pivoted from the VPN gateway to vCenter and ESXi with offline credential theft from a domain controller's virtual disk, so the compromise assessment has to include the virtualization and backup tier.
Changed: headline summary entities sources evidence sourcing_note actions body
- Correction 2026-10-21T0800Z-audit
Palo Alto's advisory makes the one-time re-authentication an automatic consequence of the PAN-OS upgrade, because the fixed firewall regenerates the override cookie, not a step to force; the action and the 2026-06-10 and 2026-10-06 sections now say so. The CVE record carries the affected trains and fixed builds from the advisory, and a triage line adds Arctic Wolf's pattern of a cookie decryption failure followed quickly by a successful cookie login.
Changed: actions cves body
- Correction 2026-10-25T1308Z-audit
The 2026-06-10 section cited Rapid7 for the CWE-565 classification, which is Palo Alto's; the classification now cites Palo Alto's advisory and the mechanism follows Rapid7's wording, and a quoted Unit 42 sentence follows Unit 42's copyedit of 2026-10-23.
Changed: body evidence
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