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FortiBleed

incident · incident:fortibleed-fortigate-credential-exposure single-source

Active credential-compromise campaign against internet-facing FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways (SOCRadar: more than 86,644 compromised devices in 194 countries): a Russian-speaking operator validates leaked credentials, cracks harvested hashes offline and moves into Active Directory. SOCRadar tied the infrastructure to INC/Lynx; an FBI and U.S. Secret Service advisory of 2026-10-06 says operators create administrator accounts on compromised firewalls, in some cases locking owners out, and that access brokers using the chain have supplied INC/Lynx and Payload ransomware affiliates.

Coverage
2
first 2026-06-18 → last 2026-10-22
Latest activity
2026-10-22
Group-IB: k0t takes edge devices in bulk and decrypts FortiGate configurations offline; enable…
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, finance, telco · regions: europe
Sources cited
15
10 hosts
2026-06-182 appearances2026-10-22

Action items (2)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about FortiBleed, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • On every FortiGate (FortiOS 5.6.11, 6.0.7, 6.2.1 or later; check the FortiManager and HA note in Fortinet's FG-IR-19-007 first where it applies), enable private-data-encryption with an operator-defined key, and for any device that was internet-reachable with a brute-forceable administrator login or an unpatched exposed service, treat the LDAP and Active Directory bind and administrator credentials stored in its configuration as known to the attacker and rotate them, bind accounts first.
    2026-10-22CVE-2025-64446 +2
  • Audit every internet-facing FortiGate for administrator accounts and REST API keys nobody created, then terminate all administrator and VPN sessions and reset every administrator and VPN password.
    2026-06-18FBI and Secret Service: FortiBleed is still active…

Defender insights

What each entry about FortiBleed tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-22NOTABLEexploitedGroup-IB: k0t takes edge devices in bulk and decrypts FortiGate configurations offline; enable private-data-encryption

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-06-18HIGHexploitedFBI and Secret Service: FortiBleed is still active, locks admins out of FortiGates and feeds ransomware affiliates

Exposure · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

related to

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-22k0t: Group-IB and NyxLab describe a probable access broker that mass-exploits FortiWeb and PAN-OS GlobalProtect, brute-forces FortiGate and decrypts stolen FortiGate configurations offline with the default key, with victims later listed by Qilin and The Gentlemen
    active-threatsGroup-IB: k0t takes edge devices in bulk and decrypts FortiGate configurations offline; enable private-data-encryption
  2. 2026-06-18FortiBleed: an active credential-compromise campaign against internet-facing FortiGate firewalls, now locking administrators out and supplying ransomware affiliates
    active-threatsFBI and Secret Service: FortiBleed is still active, locks admins out of FortiGates and feeds ransomware affiliates
ATT&CK techniques (38 across 14 tactics)

38 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceActive Scanning · Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases
  • Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · External Remote Services · Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · System Services: Service Execution
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · External Remote Services · Create Account: Local Account
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping · OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets · OS Credential Dumping: DCSync · Brute Force: Password Guessing · Brute Force: Password Cracking · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Brute Force: Credential Stuffing · Forced Authentication · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
  • DiscoveryRemote System Discovery · Network Service Discovery · Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups · File and Directory Discovery · Account Discovery · Network Share Discovery · Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
  • Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash · Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie
  • CollectionData from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump
  • Command and ControlRemote Access Tools
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel · Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
  • ImpactAccount Access Removal

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1595Active Scanning×1

Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1596.005Search Open Technical Databases: Scan Databases×1

Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Resource Development TA0042

T1583Acquire Infrastructure×1

Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Some infrastructure providers offer free trial periods, enabling infrastructure acquisition at limited to no cost. Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×2

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1569.002System Services: Service Execution×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and Net.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×2

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×2

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003OS Credential Dumping×1

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.004OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets×1

Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts. LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.006OS Credential Dumping: DCSync×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.001Brute Force: Password Guessing×1

Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.002Brute Force: Password Cracking×1

Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. OS Credential Dumping can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Further, adversaries may leverage Data from Configuration Repository in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×2

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.004Brute Force: Credential Stuffing×1

Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1187Forced Authentication×1

Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1558.003Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting×1

Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1018Remote System Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1046Network Service Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups×1

Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1083File and Directory Discovery×1

Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087Account Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., Valid Accounts).

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1135Network Share Discovery×1

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1550.002Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash×1

Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1550.004Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie×1

Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1602.002Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump×1

Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/k0t-fortiweb-fortigate-globalprotect-edge-device-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1531Account Access Removal×1

Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials, revoked permissions for SaaS platforms such as Sharepoint) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a System Shutdown/Reboot to set malicious changes into place.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about FortiBleed (2)

2026-10-22 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2025-64446 +2exploitedNATOB2

k0t: Group-IB and NyxLab describe a probable access broker that mass-exploits FortiWeb and PAN-OS GlobalProtect, brute-forces FortiGate and decrypts stolen FortiGate configurations offline with the default key, with victims later listed by Qilin and The Gentlemen

Group-IB and NyxLab describe a campaign by an operator they track as k0t (Group-IB lists CryptoFeel as a potential alias, and Scrooge as a likely collaborator and possible alias) that enumerates internet-facing VPN and firewall appliances in bulk and attacks the product directly, chiefly Fortinet firewalls and Palo Alto GlobalProtect portals (Group-IB, 2026-10-21). A custom script exploits CVE-2025-64446 against FortiWeb, a relative path traversal that lets an unauthenticated attacker run administrative commands, or brute-forces exposed Fortinet devices as a fallback (Group-IB, 2026-10-21; CISA KEV, 2026-10-21). Against PAN-OS it exploits CVE-2026-0257, the GlobalProtect authentication bypass, with a forged authentication-override cookie (Group-IB, 2026-10-21). On a compromised FortiGate the tool downloads the configuration and decrypts its secrets locally with the default FortiOS key, the weakness tracked as CVE-2019-6693, recovering LDAP and Active Directory bind and, Group-IB says, administrator credentials, although Fortinet's advisory excludes the administrator's password and says FIPS-CC devices are not impacted; unless private-data-encryption is set, the device falls back to that known key (Group-IB, 2026-10-21; Fortinet, 2019-11-19).

After access the operators work by hand with NetExec, Impacket, Kerbrute, relayed PetitPotam and Mimikatz, keep access through OpenConnect, MeshCentral agents, AdaptixC2, Atera and AnyDesk, and exfiltrate with Rclone to Wasabi and MEGA (Group-IB, 2026-10-21). Group-IB sees victim overlap with the Qilin and The Gentlemen leak sites and assesses the operators are probably initial-access brokers, but says no relationship is confirmed, and it found indications of a possible connection with the FortiBleed cluster alongside negligible overlap in the compromised credentials (Group-IB, 2026-10-21). CISA lists all three CVEs in KEV, with ransomware use marked known for CVE-2026-0257 and CVE-2019-6693 (CISA KEV, 2026-10-21).

Triage: OpenConnect, MeshCentral, Atera, AnyDesk and Rclone are legitimate tools, so Group-IB advises judging execution context, installation source, operator account, destination and timing rather than tool names (Group-IB, 2026-10-21).

Large-scale campaign involving vulnerability exploitation and brute-forcing of exposed network devices

Many victims seen in this campaign have also been observed to be later listed by ransomware groups, Qilin and the Gentlemen, on their Data Leak Sites (DLS).

Because this decryption is performed against a copy of the configuration held by the operator, it is not detectable on the appliance itself and cannot be prevented by access control alone

Enable the ‘private-data-encryption’ setting on FortiGate appliances and supply an operator-defined key.

Group-IB (with NyxLab) 2026-10-21

Builds on: Qilin and Inc ransomware exploit the GlobalProtect bypass; one intrusion pivoted to vCenter and… · FBI and Secret Service: FortiBleed is still active, locks admins out of FortiGates and feeds…

threat22 Oct 03:46Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-06-18 · view entry permalink →

HIGHexploitedupdatedNATOA1

FortiBleed: an active credential-compromise campaign against internet-facing FortiGate firewalls, now locking administrators out and supplying ransomware affiliates

A dataset branded "FortiBleed" was reported on 2026-06-18: researcher Bob Diachenko found a server holding what appeared to be valid Fortinet VPN credentials, Hudson Rock counted 73,932 unique firewall URLs across 194 countries affecting 21,632 unique domains, and Kevin Beaumont, who confirmed the authenticity of some of the admin logins and passwords, put the dataset at roughly 75,000 Fortinet devices (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18). Fortinet's position is that this is not a new Fortinet vulnerability: it believes threat actors are reusing credentials from previous incidents and using brute force against devices with weak password hygiene and no multi-factor authentication (Fortinet PSIRT, 2026-06-19). BleepingComputer reports researcher Bob Diachenko's claim that a Russian-speaking multi-operator group harvested the credentials, cracked intercepted SSL VPN hashes on a 45-GPU cluster and moved laterally into internal Active Directory environments, with several organisations fully compromised; Diachenko says he drew this from files the attackers left exposed on the same server (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18); Arctic Wolf is separately tracking the FortiBleed campaign's reach across 194 countries (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-17). The technique class is valid-account abuse following credential access, not exploitation of a fresh CVE.

which abuses FortiOS's built-in diagnose sniffer packet functionality to capture authentication traffic traversing compromised FortiGate devices

BleepingComputer

we believe the activity involves threat actors reusing credentials from previous incidents and employing brute-force techniques against devices with weak password hygiene and no multi-factor authentication (MFA)

SecurityWeek

The FBI says that in some incidents, the threat actor creates administrator accounts and uses their privileges to delete existing admin accounts or change their passwords, denying victims access to their devices.

Some groups benefiting from this are INC/Lynx ransomware and Payload ransomware.

BleepingComputer
Updaterun 2026-06-20-4cfd00efregionssourcestagsbody

The FortiBleed SSL VPN credential-harvesting campaign has grown from the 73,932 firewall URLs reported on 2026-06-18 (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18) to 86,644 confirmed compromised credentials across 194 countries, and CISA has published a hardening alert (SecurityWeek, 2026-06-19; CISA, 2026-06-18).

The new detail is methodology and impact, as researcher Bob Diachenko claims it: the operators intercept SSL VPN authentication, crack the hashes on a 45-GPU cluster managed through Hashtopolis and pivot into internal Active Directory environments (SecurityWeek, 2026-06-19; BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18). CISA's alert urges terminating active sessions and resetting credentials, storing administrator logins with PBKDF2, reviewing logs, enabling phishing-resistant MFA and locking down management access (SecurityWeek, 2026-06-19). Fortinet advises checking for unexpected administrator access from an unknown IP and reviewing domain controller logs for lateral movement (Fortinet PSIRT, 2026-06-19).

Updaterun 2026-06-23-165387f6evidencesectorssourcesbody

New analysis published 2026-06-22 gives a more detailed description of the tool chain behind the FortiBleed credential-harvesting campaign. SOCRadar's report, as BleepingComputer describes it, alleges a purpose-built Golang tool, FortigateSniffer, that abuses FortiOS's built-in diagnose sniffer packet command to capture authentication traffic on a compromised FortiGate, with a component named SNIFTRAN reconstructing the captured traffic into PCAP files and a Python toolkit extracting cleartext credentials, password hashes, Kerberos tickets and NTLM authentication material from them, across 24 protocols (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-22).

Fortinet's PSIRT response confirms the campaign uses no new vulnerability: it reuses credentials from the previously-disclosed CVE-2026-24858, CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719 plus brute force against devices lacking strong passwords and MFA (Fortinet PSIRT, 2026-06-19; SecurityWeek, 2026-06-22). Reported tradecraft includes a distributed 36-GPU cluster rented from a GenAI company for offline cracking of the harvested hashes, according to researcher Kevin Beaumont (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-22), where Diachenko's earlier claim was a 45-GPU cluster managed through Hashtopolis (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18); SOCRadar characterises the operators as Russian-speaking (SOCRadar, 2026-06-16).

The delta for defenders is a concrete detection surface that earlier coverage lacked: the tool connects to the FortiGate over SSH and launches the diagnose sniffer packet command (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-22), so hunt for unexpected invocations of that command on the appliance; because harvested Active Directory credentials are the downstream prize, any directory account a FortiBleed-corpus device authenticated against deserves to be treated as exposed, with domain controller logs reviewed for unusual access by those accounts (Fortinet PSIRT, 2026-06-19). Upgrade to firmware with PBKDF2 password hashing to make offline cracking expensive, terminate active sessions, enable MFA and disable external management access.

Updaterun 2026-10-08T0404Z-inteltitleheadlinesummarytagsentitiestechniquesaffected_productsclassificationsourcesevidencesourcing_noteactionsbody

A joint advisory of the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service (JCSA-20261006-01, 2026-10-06) calls FortiBleed an active, global credential-compromise campaign against internet-facing FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways, cites SOCRadar for more than 86,644 compromised devices in 194 countries, and says attackers are continuing to scan exposed devices with previously obtained credentials (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06). The operators scan exposed SSL VPN portals, run credential stuffing and password spraying from earlier Fortinet leak dumps and infostealer logs, pull password hashes and session tokens from compromised devices and crack the hashes offline with Hashcat and Hashtopolis on a rented GPU cluster; the advisory ties the success to reused or leaked credentials and a legacy SHA-256 password storage (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06).

What the advisory adds is the lockout. On a compromised firewall the actors create administrator accounts that were not there before and, in some cases, delete existing accounts or change their passwords, so the owners cannot log in and recovery needs steps beyond patching and password resets (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06; BleepingComputer, 2026-10-07). Cracked credentials are enriched and validated by scripts that filter out honeypots and rank targets by revenue and network structure; with verified credentials the attackers enumerate Active Directory accounts and spray passwords to find privileged users, and the operation packages working VPN configurations and target lists for sale, the role of an initial-access broker (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06). The advisory says the chain has been an initial entry point for ransomware affiliates, currently INC/Lynx and Payload (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06); SOCRadar had attributed FortiBleed to the Lynx / INC ransomware group in a 29 June update to its report (SOCRadar, 2026-06-16), after reaching both groups' negotiation panels on a server used in the campaign (BleepingComputer, 2026-10-07).

The advisory's measures: restrict external management through trusted hosts, a local-in policy or no internet administration at all; terminate all administrative and VPN sessions and reset all Fortinet VPN and administrator passwords; require phishing-resistant MFA on remote access and administrator accounts; review users, configuration and REST API keys for entries nobody created, removing unknown keys and refreshing the legitimate ones; enforce PBKDF2 for administrator password storage per Fortinet's guidance for FortiOS 7.2.11 and later; and review firewall, VPN, authentication and domain controller logs for lateral movement (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06). On the FortiGate itself, in analyst judgement, the administrator accounts, passwords and REST API keys the advisory says to review are recorded in the device's configuration and administrator audit log, which is where an unexpected change shows.

Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-auditactionsbody

The FBI and Secret Service advisory tells operators to review firewall, VPN, authentication and domain controller logs and to check users, configuration and REST API keys for entries nobody created (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06); it does not name specific Windows event ids or a domain-wide credential rotation, which earlier hunting guidance here attached to the campaign. The mapping of those checks to the FortiGate's own configuration and administrator audit log is a reading of the advisory, not part of it.

Correctionrun 2026-10-21T0800Z-auditbody

The first FortiBleed figures come from three researchers. Bob Diachenko found a server holding what appeared to be valid Fortinet VPN credentials, Hudson Rock counted 73,932 unique firewall URLs across 194 countries affecting 21,632 unique domains, and Kevin Beaumont, who confirmed the authenticity of some of the admin logins and passwords, put the dataset at roughly 75,000 Fortinet devices (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18). SOCRadar's attribution of the campaign to the Lynx / INC ransomware group dates from a 29 June update to its report (SOCRadar, 2026-06-16). Contradiction: BleepingComputer's October recap dates that link to July (BleepingComputer, 2026-10-07). The FBI and Secret Service advise reviewing firewall and VPN users and other configuration for unauthorized changes, preferably against a well-known configuration, with particular attention to the addition of unrecognized accounts (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06).

incident18 Jun 05:10Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats2

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com3 (20%)
  • cisa.gov2 (13%)
  • fortiguard.fortinet.com2 (13%)
  • securityweek.com2 (13%)
  • arcticwolf.com1 (7%)
  • fortinet.com1 (7%)
  • group-ib.com1 (7%)
  • ic3.gov1 (7%)
  • other2 (13%)
All cited sources (15)