2026-09-24ROUTINEA malware implant treats commercial AI chatbot endpoints as its command-and-control infrastructure, no attacker server required
CLOSEDQUORUM
malware · malware:closedquorum single-source
64-bit Go Windows implant that delegates C2 action-selection to a plurality vote among up to four commercial LLM providers (DeepSeek, Qwen, Mistral, Gemini) instead of an attacker-operated server; capabilities are LSASS/browser/crypto-wallet credential theft, Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing, and triple persistence (Registry Run key, scheduled task, WMI event subscription), with results relayed and data exfiltrated via a Discord webhook. Discovered by Cisco Talos via its CAIRN toolkit; no confirmed in-the-wild deployment as of disclosure (Cisco Talos, 2026-09-22).
Aliases: BALZAK
Coverage
1
first 2026-09-24 → last 2026-10-20
Latest activity
2026-09-24
A malware implant treats commercial AI chatbot endpoints as its command-and-control infrastructure, no…
Peak priority
routine
1 routine
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
3
3 hosts
Defender insights
What each entry about CLOSEDQUORUM tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage · detection
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
related to
- CAIRN (Cisco Talos)Discovered by Cisco Talos via its CAIRN research toolkit, released the same day as the CLOSEDQUORUM disclosure.
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (11 across 9 tactics)
11 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call · Process Injection: Process Hollowing · Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- StealthProcess Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call · Process Injection: Process Hollowing · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks
- Defense ImpairmentDisable or Modify Tools
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- DiscoveryVirtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks
- Command and ControlWeb Service: Bidirectional Communication
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration Over Webhook
Execution TA0002
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
T1546.003Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription×1
Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
T1055.004Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call×1
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
T1055.012Process Injection: Process Hollowing×1
Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
T1546.003Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription×1
Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1055.004Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call×1
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
T1055.012Process Injection: Process Hollowing×1
Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497.003Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
Defense Impairment TA0112
T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1
Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×1
Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1
Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1497.003Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1567.004Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration Over Webhook×1
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client without the need for the client to continuously poll the server. Many public and commercial services, such as Discord, Slack, and `webhook.site`, support the creation of webhook endpoints that can be used by other services, such as Github, Jira, or Trello. When changes happen in the linked services (such as pushing a repository update or modifying a ticket), these services will automatically post the data to the webhook endpoint for use by the consuming application.
Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about CLOSEDQUORUM (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- blog.talosintelligence.com1 (33%)
- gambit.security1 (33%)
- thehackernews.com1 (33%)
All cited sources (3)
- blog.talosintelligence.comCisco Taloshttps://blog.talosintelligence.com/the-closed-quorum-inside-the-first-reported-autonomous-ai-c2-implant/
- gambit.securityGambit Securityhttps://gambit.security/blog-posts/autonomous-ai-agents-online-retailers-25-a-company
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/09/windows-malware-is-built-to-let-up-to.html