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CAIRN (Cisco Talos)

tool · tool:cairn-talos

Cisco Talos' open-source research toolkit, released 2026-09-22, for discovering and tracking AI-integrated malware; used to find CLOSEDQUORUM (Cisco Talos, 2026-09-22). Distinct from the unrelated Gambit Security-documented autonomous exploitation engine also named Cairn (tool:cairn-exploitation-engine).

Aliases: Cognitive Artifact Intelligence Research Network

Coverage timeline
1
first 2026-09-24 → last 2026-09-24
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Sources cited
2
2 hosts
Sections touched
1
active-threats
Co-occurring entities
5
see Co-occurring entities below
ATT&CK techniques
9
pinned v19.2 · see below

ATT&CK techniques

9 techniques observed across 1 entry, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.003Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription×1

Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.004Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call×1

Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.012Process Injection: Process Hollowing×1

Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.003Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription×1

Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1055.004Process Injection: Asynchronous Procedure Call×1

Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.012Process Injection: Process Hollowing×1

Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1567.004Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration Over Webhook×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client without the need for the client to continuously poll the server. Many public and commercial services, such as Discord, Slack, and `webhook.site`, support the creation of webhook endpoints that can be used by other services, such as Github, Jira, or Trello. When changes happen in the linked services (such as pushing a repository update or modifying a ticket), these services will automatically post the data to the webhook endpoint for use by the consuming application.

Evidence: 2026-09-24/closedquorum-llm-orchestrated-c2-implant · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-09-24CLOSEDQUORUM: Cisco Talos documents the first publicly reported Windows implant that lets a panel of four commercial LLMs vote on its next action instead of a human operator
    active-threatsA malware implant treats commercial AI chatbot endpoints as its command-and-control infrastructure, no attacker server required

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

related to

Where this entity is cited

  • active-threats1

Source distribution

  • blog.talosintelligence.com1 (50%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (50%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Entries about CAIRN (Cisco Talos) (1)

2026-09-24 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOA2

CLOSEDQUORUM: Cisco Talos documents the first publicly reported Windows implant that lets a panel of four commercial LLMs vote on its next action instead of a human operator

Cisco Talos disclosed CLOSEDQUORUM on 2026-09-22, a 16.4MB, 64-bit Go-compiled Windows implant it says is "the first publicly documented Windows implant to apply this model to tactical command and control" (Cisco Talos, 2026-09-22). Instead of a dedicated attacker-operated server, its ModelOrchestrator component queries up to four commercial LLM providers (DeepSeek, Qwen, Mistral and Google Gemini) each cycle, with a system prompt instructing each model to "provide ONLY executable decisions" alongside host context (hostname, OS version, admin status) and the current target process. Each provider must respond with a fixed JSON schema naming one of four actions; interModelDiscussion() tallies the providers' decisions by plurality vote and executes the winner, discarding any malformed or off-schema response. On a tie, a hardcoded preference order settles it: "DeepSeek holds the deciding vote in any tie" (Cisco Talos, 2026-09-22), followed by Qwen and then Mistral; if every provider fails to return a usable decision, the implant sleeps and retries rather than falling back to a default action.

The four possible actions are steal (simultaneous LSASS memory dumping via SeDebugPrivilege and MiniDumpWriteDump, Chrome/Edge/Firefox saved-credential harvesting, and MetaMask/Exodus/Ethereum wallet data collection), inject (Early Bird APC injection into a suspended process by default, or PEB-walk process hollowing when a model selects that exploit type), persist (establishes three mechanisms, a Windows-Update-themed Registry Run-key value, a scheduled task, and a permanent WMI event subscription that fires a script every 60 seconds), and move, which has no handler in the public build. Independent of the LLM-selected action, the implant suppresses ETW telemetry by overwriting EtwEventWrite with a single RET instruction, blinding any host-side ETW consumer to its subsequent activity (Cisco Talos, 2026-09-22). Every model decision, its stated reasoning, and staged or stolen data are relayed to the operator through a Discord webhook, with exfiltrated files AES-256-GCM encrypted, base64-encoded and posted in roughly 1,900-byte chunks at one-second intervals. Talos found the binary via CAIRN, an open-source research toolkit for tracking AI-integrated malware that it released the same day, and dates the analysed build to 2026-06-17 under a prior alias, BALZAK, before it was renamed on 2026-07-03. Talos's CAIRN toolkit is unrelated to a similarly-named autonomous exploitation engine used in separate, unrelated 2026 campaigns; the shared name is coincidental. Talos states plainly "we do not have confirmation of in-the-wild deployment," though artifacts in the binary connect its developer to carding-forum postings dating back to 2025 (Cisco Talos, 2026-09-22). The publicly distributed build ships with placeholder API keys and a dummy Discord webhook, so Talos has not observed a complete end-to-end execution; Talos assesses the actual distribution model puts a developer generating a customised binary with an individual operator's credentials injected at compile time, meaning any live deployment would run on infrastructure Talos has not seen.

Talos frames the finding as evidence of "effort displacement", an entire phase of an intrusion handed to a model rather than merely AI-assisted tooling. The Hacker News, reporting on the disclosure, draws its own comparison to LAMEHUG, malware Ukraine's CERT-UA reported in July 2025 that asked an AI model to write commands for a task already set in its code, contrasting it with CLOSEDQUORUM asking the models to choose the task itself (The Hacker News, 2026-09-23). The implant's failure modes are deterministic and, Talos notes, exploitable by defenders: provider refusals and rate limits, a fixed tie-break order, and a sleep-retry response to total provider failure rather than a default action.

exhibits fully autonomous command and control (C2). While we do not have confirmation of in-the-wild deployment, artifacts from the binary were used to connect the developer to postings on criminal forums related to carding, dating back to 2025.

CLOSEDQUORUM represents a shift in effort displacement for attackers, in which expanding portions of the attack chain can be executed without operator involvement.

CLOSEDQUORUM is, to our knowledge, the first publicly documented Windows implant to apply this model to tactical command and control (C2). After deployment, it delegates the selection of its next action to a panel of commercial large language models (LLMs) and executes the resulting decision, with the intent of harvesting user credentials and crypto wallets. It does not require continued commands from a human operator or tasking from a dedicated, attacker-operated C2 server; the complete dynamic operation is delegated to the AI.

DeepSeek holds the deciding vote in any tie

Cisco Talos 2026-09-22
threat24 Sep 04:45Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗