CTIPilot

Microsoft Edge

product · product:microsoft-edge single-source

Coverage timeline
3
first 2026-07-28 → last 2026-09-10
Peak priority
high
2 high · 1 notable
Sources cited
13
11 hosts
Sections touched
2
active-threats, trending-vulnerabilities
Co-occurring entities
8
see Co-occurring entities below
ATT&CK techniques
22
pinned v19.2 · see below

ATT&CK techniques

22 techniques observed across 3 entries, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Initial Access TA0001

T1189Drive-by Compromise×2

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:

Evidence: 2026-09-10/cve-2026-87491-chrome-v8-oob-write-seventh-2026-zero-day · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1203Exploitation for Client Execution×2

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/cve-2026-87491-chrome-v8-oob-write-seventh-2026-zero-day · 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1176Software Extensions×1

Adversaries may abuse software extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Software extensions are modular components that enhance or customize the functionality of software applications, including web browsers, Integrated Development Environments (IDEs), and other platforms. Extensions are typically installed via official marketplaces, app stores, or manually loaded by users, and they often inherit the permissions and access levels of the host application.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055Process Injection×2

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055Process Injection×2

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.003Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window×1

Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.

Evidence: 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×2

An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.

Evidence: 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1115Clipboard Data×1

Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.

Evidence: 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

T1185Browser Session Hijacking×1

Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.

Evidence: 2026-07-28/medusahvnc-hidden-desktop-browser-session-hijacking · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1

Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-09-10/bluemoon-exploit-kit-four-state-actors-chrome-windows-chain · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-09-10CVE-2026-87491, Google Chrome: V8 out-of-bounds write exploited in the wild, patched in Chrome 153 (seventh exploited Chrome zero-day of 2026)
    trending-vulnerabilitiesGoogle ships an emergency Chrome fix for a seventh actively exploited V8 zero-day this year
  2. 2026-09-10BlueMoon: four separate state-nexus actor clusters independently weaponize a shared Chrome V8 + Windows kernel zero-day chain within one week
    active-threatsFour espionage clusters ran the identical click-to-SYSTEM exploit kit within days of each other, Proofpoint calls it the same code, not parallel development
  3. 2026-07-28MedusaHVNC: a malware-as-a-service RAT that drives the victim's own logged-in browser on an invisible second Windows desktop
    active-threatsMedusaHVNC rides real logged-in browser sessions on a hidden Windows desktop, defeating device-based fraud checks

Where this entity is cited

  • active-threats2
  • trending-vulnerabilities1

Source distribution

  • cisa.gov2 (15%)
  • thehackernews.com2 (15%)
  • advisories.ncsc.nl1 (8%)
  • blackfog.com1 (8%)
  • cert.ssi.gouv.fr1 (8%)
  • chromereleases.googleblog.com1 (8%)
  • euvdservices.enisa.europa.eu1 (8%)
  • helpnetsecurity.com1 (8%)
  • other3 (23%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

All cited sources (13)

Entries about Microsoft Edge (3)

2026-09-10 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-85046 +1exploitedNATOB2

BlueMoon: four separate state-nexus actor clusters independently weaponize a shared Chrome V8 + Windows kernel zero-day chain within one week

Proofpoint documents BlueMoon, a newly named exploit kit chaining a Chrome V8 JIT type-confusion bug (CVE-2026-85046) with an uncredentialed V8 sandbox escape and a Windows kernel ALPC/WNF heap-overflow local-privilege-escalation flaw (CVE-2026-85880) into a single click-to-SYSTEM chain (Proofpoint, 2026-09-08). The V8 bugs were a patch-gap zero-day: "the change containing the fix for CVE-2026-85046 was committed on 7 August 2026 but was not rolled into the general stable Chromium build until 3 September 2026" (Proofpoint, 2026-09-08), a nearly four-week window during which the public upstream diff let an exploit developer reverse-engineer and weaponize the bug before Chrome's stable channel shipped it; CVE-2026-85880 was separately patched by Microsoft as part of its September 2026 Patch Tuesday updates (The Hacker News, 2026-09-09); the referenced 2026-09-09 Windows entry covers Microsoft's own MSRC confirmation that it was exploited in the wild. After the browser-side chain achieves code execution and escapes the renderer sandbox, a reflectively loaded DLL fingerprints the host to decide whether to run the kernel LPE against a specific list of Windows builds, Proofpoint's own table names Windows 10 1809/2004/20H2/21H1/21H2/22H2, Windows 11 21H2's initial release build, and Server 2019/2022, a wider list than Microsoft's own advisory for this CVE, which describes the legacy line only and states it does not affect Windows 11 (Contradiction, unresolved here), then a process-injection stub runs an operator-supplied command inside the Chrome broker process, by default a plain curl download-and-execute, a deliberately crude step Proofpoint reads as evidence the developer traded stealth for speed. Four distinct espionage clusters adopted the identical kit within days of each other, each with its own delivery and payload: TA412/APT31 (from 2026-08-28) used student-internship and academic-conference spearphishing against US NGOs, mining and commodity-trading firms to install a malicious Chromium extension disguised as "Google Gemini" (GemStone), using an HMAC-forgery technique, named GhostChrome-X by outside researchers (The Hacker News, 2026-09-09), against Chrome's Secure Preferences integrity check so the extension survives the browser's own unauthorized-extension protection; GemStone keylogs, steals cookies/session storage, screenshots on keyword match and polls its C2 every 30 seconds to 60 minutes. UNK_LateNight (from 2026-09-02) targeted US aerospace/defense firms with B2B/RFQ lures to sideload the ShadowPad backdoor via a scheduled task. UNK_DoubleCheck (from 2026-09-02) phished a Vietnamese manufacturer from a compromised Southeast Asian government mailbox, obfuscating its loader and staging a second DLL from a Cloudflare R2 bucket. UNK_QuietRacket (from 2026-09-03) targeted government, consulting and financial-sector organizations in Indonesia and Singapore with conference-themed lures, resolving C2 entirely through DNS-over-HTTPS TXT-record lookups to a Cloudflare Worker. A Proofpoint researcher assessed the near-identical, simultaneous adoption as deliberate distribution rather than independent discovery: "there's no way that this is parallel development. The code is practically identical, even the variable naming, the commentary. It's the same kit. One hundred percent" (Mark Kelly, Proofpoint, via The Record, 2026-09-09). Patching Chrome and Windows closes the entry vector but removes nothing already installed, the GemStone extension, ShadowPad's DLL-sideload persistence, and the other clusters' scheduled tasks all survive a patch untouched.

Triage: a process tree rooted at the browser (browser → command shell → curl or a download utility → a newly dropped executable) is the chain's own crude final stage and a strong discriminator on its own; a scheduled task created immediately following a browser-initiated download narrows it further, since legitimate browser activity does not normally create scheduled tasks.

The change containing the fix for CVE-2026-85046 was committed on 7 August 2026 but was not rolled into the general stable Chromium build until 3 September 2026.

Proofpoint Threat Research 2026-09-08

While CVE-2026-85046 was patched by Google last week, CVE-2026-85880 was addressed by Microsoft as part of its September 2026 Patch Tuesday updates.

The Hacker News 2026-09-09

There’s no way that this is parallel development. The code is practically identical, even the variable naming, the commentary. It’s the same kit. One hundred percent.

The Record (Recorded Future News) 2026-09-09

Builds on: 2026-09-04/cve-2026-85046-chrome-v8-type-confusion-exploited · 2026-09-09/windows-september-2026-two-exploited-lpe-zero-days-kev

threat10 Sep 04:50Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-09-10 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-87491exploitedNATOA2

CVE-2026-87491, Google Chrome: V8 out-of-bounds write exploited in the wild, patched in Chrome 153 (seventh exploited Chrome zero-day of 2026)

Google's Chrome 153 stable release (2026-09-08, versions 153.0.8010.36/.37 Windows/Mac, 153.0.8010.36 Linux) fixes 230 security bugs, including CVE-2026-87491, an out-of-bounds write in V8 that Google confirms is being exploited: "Google is aware that an exploit for CVE-2026-87491 exists in the wild" (Google, via Help Net Security, 2026-09-09). NVD describes the mechanism as allowing "a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page" (NVD, via The Hacker News, 2026-09-09), user interaction (visiting or being served the page) is required, but no authentication or special access. ENISA's EUVD records a CVSS 3.1 base score of 8.8 (ENISA EUVD, 2026-09-09); Google has disclosed no detail on the exploitation vector, victims, or actor, consistent with its practice of withholding detail until most users have updated. CERT-FR and NCSC-NL both independently issued advisories within a day of release ("Google reports that the vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-87491 is being actively exploited," translated from Dutch, NCSC-NL, advisory NCSC-2026-0354, 2026-09-09), and CISA added the CVE to KEV the same day (CISA, 2026-09-09), with a due date of 2026-09-23 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-09-09). This is the seventh Chrome zero-day Google has confirmed under active exploitation in 2026; every Chromium-derived browser (Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi) inherits the same V8 engine and needs the equivalent update.

Google is aware that an exploit for CVE-2026-87491 exists in the wild.

Google (via Help Net Security)

Out-of-bounds write in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 153.0.8010.36 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page.

NVD (via The Hacker News)

Google reports that the vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-87491 is being actively exploited.

NCSC-NL (advisory NCSC-2026-0354)
vulnerability10 Sep 04:35Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-07-28 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

MedusaHVNC: a malware-as-a-service RAT that drives the victim's own logged-in browser on an invisible second Windows desktop

The interesting property of MedusaHVNC is not that it steals credentials (it does, and advertises a "Browser Recovery" feature for passwords, cookies and history across Chrome, Edge, Brave, Firefox and Telegram) but that it makes stealing them partly unnecessary. Its hidden-VNC module opens a real browser on a second, invisible Windows desktop, and because "[t]he browser still runs on the victim's device, so it can load an existing profile, including cookies and session state", the operator inherits whatever the user is already logged into (BlackFog, 2026-07-27). The resulting traffic leaves the victim's machine, from the victim's network, with the victim's browser profile and device characteristics, which is the entire point, since the fraud and risk-engine controls that would normally challenge a session key on exactly those signals. SecurityWeek's account of the same research notes that hidden desktops are a legitimate Windows capability used by specialised software and only occasionally by malware (SecurityWeek, 2026-07-27).

The delivery chain is five stages and leans on trusted components throughout. Windows Script Host executes an obfuscated JScript launcher, which sleeps for just over seven and a half seconds before reconstructing its embedded files into a randomly named subfolder of %TEMP% (an AutoIt interpreter, a configuration file and an extensionless encrypted payload) and dropping a batch file into the Startup folder for persistence. The AutoIt component runs without a visible window, decrypts the payload with a single-byte XOR key to produce a native 64-bit loader, and then launches C:\Windows\System32\charmap.exe, the Character Map utility, into which the loader is injected; BlackFog notes this stage is corroborated by a public sandbox process tree showing charmap.exe as a child of the AutoIt process. Inside that host process two further layers come off (a 16-byte repeating XOR across roughly a megabyte of the .data section, then ChaCha20 with a 32-byte key and 12-byte nonce) yielding an unsigned PE32+ console executable carrying a .pay section and the family string. Alongside the hidden desktop, the seller's own panel advertises a "Mem Exec" feature described as running .NET and native payloads in memory with an AMSI patch and ETW bypass, security-tooling tampering that BlackFog reports from the marketplace listing rather than from the analysed sample, so it should be treated as claimed capability rather than confirmed behaviour. The payload speaks a custom protocol over raw TCP via native Winsock calls to a hardcoded endpoint, and its imported API surface is what BlackFog reads as the HVNC workflow: BitBlt, EnumWindows and PrintWindow for screen and window capture, SendInput and SetWindowsHookExW for synthetic input, and the clipboard functions for moving data into and out of the session (BlackFog, 2026-07-27).

Triage: charmap.exe is the sharpest discriminator in the chain. The Character Map is an interactive accessory a user opens from the Start menu; an instance spawned by a scripting or automation interpreter, running with no window, holding a network socket, or hosting injected code is not a benign variant of that behaviour. Around it, look for the sequence rather than any single event, wscript.exe executing script content that writes an AutoIt interpreter into a %TEMP% subfolder, a Startup-folder write from that same process tree, and an AutoIt binary running from a user-writable path where the organisation does not deploy AutoIt. Legitimate AutoIt use exists in many estates, which is why the parent chain and the write location matter more than the interpreter's presence. The hidden desktop itself is the weakest thing to hunt for, since the capability is a supported Windows feature with genuine software using it.

The browser still runs on the victim’s device, so it can load an existing profile, including cookies and session state.

The AutoIt stage then starts C:\\Windows\\System32\\charmap.exe, the standard Windows Character Map utility. The public sandbox process tree shows charmap.exe as a child of the AutoIt process, and the loader is injected into it, using the trusted system binary as a host for the payload.

BlackFog 2026-07-27

Hidden desktops are a legitimate Windows capability, often used by specialized software, and occasionally used by malware.

SecurityWeek 2026-07-27
threat28 Jul 04:55Zsingle-sourceOpen finding ↗