Storm-0940
actor · actor:storm-0940 single-source
Microsoft's designation for a China-state aligned actor active since 2021 that targets organizations across many industries for data theft, historically through password spraying and exploitation of internet-facing applications, and persists by adding credentials to existing OAuth applications; Microsoft reports it has used the ARTEX framework against hundreds of organizations since at least September 2026 and assesses it was responsible for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup compromise (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-10-21).
Action items (4)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Storm-0940, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- In every Okta org that allows self-service registration, review the accounts created since 2026-10-13 and every Okta Verify enrollment on them, and remove self-created accounts that nobody provisioned.2026-10-22Microsoft: Storm-0940 runs ARTEX at machine speed…
- In every Entra tenant you or your MSP administer, disable without deleting the seven ConnectWise application identities that ConnectWise lists by client ID (Cloud Backup is 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae; the other six are in ConnectWise's advisory), dormant connections included, and keep them disabled, because ConnectWise's restoration of 2026-10-28 has partners consent a new application, “ConnectWise Cloud Backup for M365”, in each tenant, so take its details only from the instructions on ConnectWise's Trust Center; where Graph activity logs were enabled, review them for these apps until at least 90 minutes after you disabled them, because a token issued before the disable stays valid for up to 90 minutes, and preserve the sign-in and audit logs promptly without delaying containment, because Entra ID Free keeps only 7 days.2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…
- In the same tenants list the apps owned by the ConnectWise tenant (ID 3f9cd7a0-127a-4ed4-bf06-2f830d5616b7), and disable each that you do not use or cannot verify as safe.2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…
- In the same tenants review every enterprise application and app registration, MSP management and security tools first but none skipped (Huntress saw the secrets planted on apparently random applications, in one tenant on some of the least privileged ones), for client secrets, certificates and federated credentials added since 2026-10-13 and remove any you did not create; also check the directory roles, owners and consent grants held by ConnectWise and SkyKick service principals, Conditional Access exclusions for them, and mailbox forwarding, inbox and transport rules and delegated access, because disabling the vendor applications does not remove access planted through them.2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…
Defender insights
What each entry about Storm-0940 tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · triage · detection
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
uses
- ARTEXMicrosoft: Storm-0940 used ARTEX to automate attacks on hundreds of organizations since at least September 2026
overlaps with
- UNC7228GTIG says the campaign it tracks as UNC7228 overlaps Microsoft's Storm-0940
attributed activity
- ConnectWise Cloud Backup (SkyKick) application-credential abuse against Microsoft 365 tenants (October 2026)Microsoft assesses that Storm-0940 was responsible; an attribution by Microsoft alone, which ConnectWise has not confirmed
Story timeline
Every entry that names Storm-0940, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-10-30VAPOR PANDA: CrowdStrike reports a China-nexus actor running the ARTEX agent framework against more than 200 organisations from 17 October, among them foreign ministries in Europe and a Greek government entity, and deploying the BLOODALCHEMY backdoor
- 2026-10-22ARTEX: Microsoft reports Storm-0940, a China-state aligned actor, running an open-source multi-agent LLM penetration-testing framework against hundreds of organizations, with privileged cloud access in under three hours in some cases, and Expel sees the same infrastructure abuse Okta self-service registration
- 2026-10-18ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick): the vendor's Microsoft 365 application credential was used to sign in to customer tenants, with directory-role self-assignments in about 50 tenants and, Huntress reports, added credentials in two
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (17 across 9 tactics)
17 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ReconnaissanceActive Scanning
- Resource DevelopmentObtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence
- Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Trusted Relationship
- PersistenceValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Create Account: Cloud Account · Server Software Component: Web Shell
- Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles · Account Manipulation: Device Registration
- StealthValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- Credential AccessBrute Force: Password Spraying
- DiscoveryAccount Discovery: Domain Account · Account Discovery: Cloud Account · Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
- Command and ControlIngress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools
Reconnaissance TA0043
T1595Active Scanning×1
Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
Resource Development TA0042
T1588.007Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence×1
Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks, including creating scripts, assisting social engineering, developing payloads, and to Query Public AI Services in support of Reconnaissance.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×2
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1199Trusted Relationship×1
Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.
Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×2
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials×2
Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.003Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles×2
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1136.003Create Account: Cloud Account×1
Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1
Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×2
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials×2
Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.003Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles×2
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×2
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×2
Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1087.004Account Discovery: Cloud Account×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1580Cloud Infrastructure Discovery×1
An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
T1219Remote Access Tools×1
An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Storm-0940 (2)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- ARTEX×3
- ConnectWise Cloud Backup (SkyKick) application-credential abuse against Microsoft 365 tenants (October 2026)×2
- Microsoft Entra ID×2
- AdaptixC2×1
- BLOODALCHEMY×1
- ConnectWise Cloud Backup×1
- ConnectWise Cloud Management×1
- Okta×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- bleepingcomputer.com2 (9%)
- crowdstrike.com2 (9%)
- huntress.com2 (9%)
- microsoft.com2 (9%)
- cert.europa.eu1 (5%)
- cloud.google.com1 (5%)
- connectwise.com1 (5%)
- expel.com1 (5%)
- other10 (45%)
All cited sources (22)
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/former-pentester-used-artex-ai-to-steal-82-million-data-records/
- bleepingcomputer.comBleepingComputerhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-breach-microsoft-365-tenants-via-connectwise-supply-chain-attack/
- cert.europa.euCERT-EUhttps://cert.europa.eu/blog/from-penetration-testing-to-cyber-threat-beware-of-artex
- cloud.google.comGoogle Threat Intelligence Group and Mandianthttps://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/artex-and-friends-enter-agentic-offensive-frameworks
- connectwise.comConnectWise Trust Center (advisory)https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories
- crowdstrike.comCrowdStrike Counter Adversary Operationshttps://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/unknown-threat-actor-uses-artex-to-target-south-korean-finance/
- crowdstrike.comCrowdStrikehttps://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/vapor-panda-uses-artex-to-scale-global-campaign/
- expel.comExpelhttps://expel.com/blog/storm-0940-artex-attacks-connectwise-app-abuse-and-okta-sign-ups/
- heise.deheise onlinehttps://www.heise.de/news/Angriffe-via-ConnectWise-Cloud-Backup-11495835.html
- huntress.comHuntress (AI, Scripts, Operator: Inside the ConnectWise Attack)https://www.huntress.com/blog/connectwise-attack-ai
- huntress.comHuntresshttps://www.huntress.com/blog/vendor-credential-enables-unauthorized-access
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Threat Intelligencehttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/10/21/storm-0940-uses-artex-agentic-ai-connectwise-supply-chain-compromise/
- microsoft.comMicrosoft Threat Intelligencehttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/06/artex-abuse-expands-as-cybercriminals-target-financial-sector/
- netzwoche.chNetzwoche (Gohack26 report)https://www.netzwoche.ch/news/2026-11-02/wie-it-lieferketten-und-insider-zur-gefahr-werden-koennen
- recordedfuture.comRecorded Future Insikt Grouphttps://www.recordedfuture.com/blog/tag-217-artex-south-korean-banks
- research.checkpoint.comCheck Point Researchhttps://research.checkpoint.com/2026/hacking-on-autopilot-inside-artex-cybercrime-campaigns/
- sophos.comSophos X-Opshttps://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/connectwise-cloud-backup-application-abused-in-token-sweep
- specterops.ioSpecterOpshttps://specterops.io/blog/2026/10/17/connectwise-skykick-breach-microsoft-365/
- status.connectwise.comConnectWise status page (Cloud Backup incident, update of 2026-10-28 17:09 UTC)https://status.connectwise.com/pages/incident/619cf82551fec9053d612f09/6ad263692dc48705ab3da2cb
- todyl.comTodylhttps://www.todyl.com/blog/investigation-unauthorized-access-through-the-connectwise-cloud-backup-microsoft-365-app
- wiz.ioWiz Researchhttps://www.wiz.io/blog/artex-in-the-wild-storm-0940-expands-targeting-of-it-and-software-vendors
- yna.co.krYonhap News Agencyhttps://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20261026075100004