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Storm-0940

actor · actor:storm-0940 single-source

Microsoft's designation for a China-state aligned actor active since 2021 that targets organizations across many industries for data theft, historically through password spraying and exploitation of internet-facing applications, and persists by adding credentials to existing OAuth applications; Microsoft reports it has used the ARTEX framework against hundreds of organizations since at least September 2026 and assesses it was responsible for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup compromise (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-10-21).

Coverage
3
2 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-10-18 → last 2026-11-08
Latest activity
2026-11-08
Microsoft: Storm-0940 runs ARTEX at machine speed; Mandiant now sees agent frameworks in incident-response…
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, technology
Sources cited
22
18 hosts
2026-10-183 appearances2026-10-30

Action items (4)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Storm-0940, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • In every Okta org that allows self-service registration, review the accounts created since 2026-10-13 and every Okta Verify enrollment on them, and remove self-created accounts that nobody provisioned.
    2026-10-22Microsoft: Storm-0940 runs ARTEX at machine speed…
  • In every Entra tenant you or your MSP administer, disable without deleting the seven ConnectWise application identities that ConnectWise lists by client ID (Cloud Backup is 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae; the other six are in ConnectWise's advisory), dormant connections included, and keep them disabled, because ConnectWise's restoration of 2026-10-28 has partners consent a new application, “ConnectWise Cloud Backup for M365”, in each tenant, so take its details only from the instructions on ConnectWise's Trust Center; where Graph activity logs were enabled, review them for these apps until at least 90 minutes after you disabled them, because a token issued before the disable stays valid for up to 90 minutes, and preserve the sign-in and audit logs promptly without delaying containment, because Entra ID Free keeps only 7 days.
    2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…
  • In the same tenants list the apps owned by the ConnectWise tenant (ID 3f9cd7a0-127a-4ed4-bf06-2f830d5616b7), and disable each that you do not use or cannot verify as safe.
    2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…
  • In the same tenants review every enterprise application and app registration, MSP management and security tools first but none skipped (Huntress saw the secrets planted on apparently random applications, in one tenant on some of the least privileged ones), for client secrets, certificates and federated credentials added since 2026-10-13 and remove any you did not create; also check the directory roles, owners and consent grants held by ConnectWise and SkyKick service principals, Conditional Access exclusions for them, and mailbox forwarding, inbox and transport rules and delegated access, because disabling the vendor applications does not remove access planted through them.
    2026-10-18ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+…

Defender insights

What each entry about Storm-0940 tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-22NOTABLEMicrosoft: Storm-0940 runs ARTEX at machine speed; Mandiant now sees agent frameworks in incident-response cases

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-10-18HIGHexploitedConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+ Microsoft 365 tenants; disabling it does not undo planted access

Exposure · triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

uses

overlaps with

attributed activity

Story timeline

Every entry that names Storm-0940, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-10-30VAPOR PANDA: CrowdStrike reports a China-nexus actor running the ARTEX agent framework against more than 200 organisations from 17 October, among them foreign ministries in Europe and a Greek government entity, and deploying the BLOODALCHEMY backdoor
    mentionactive-threatsCrowdStrike: VAPOR PANDA runs ARTEX against 200+ organisations, European foreign ministries among them
  2. 2026-10-22ARTEX: Microsoft reports Storm-0940, a China-state aligned actor, running an open-source multi-agent LLM penetration-testing framework against hundreds of organizations, with privileged cloud access in under three hours in some cases, and Expel sees the same infrastructure abuse Okta self-service registration
    active-threatsMicrosoft: Storm-0940 runs ARTEX at machine speed; Mandiant now sees agent frameworks in incident-response cases
  3. 2026-10-18ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick): the vendor's Microsoft 365 application credential was used to sign in to customer tenants, with directory-role self-assignments in about 50 tenants and, Huntress reports, added credentials in two
    active-threatsConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+ Microsoft 365 tenants; disabling it does not undo planted access
ATT&CK techniques (17 across 9 tactics)

17 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceActive Scanning
  • Resource DevelopmentObtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Trusted Relationship
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles · Account Manipulation: Device Registration · Create Account: Cloud Account · Server Software Component: Web Shell
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials · Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles · Account Manipulation: Device Registration
  • StealthValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Credential AccessBrute Force: Password Spraying
  • DiscoveryAccount Discovery: Domain Account · Account Discovery: Cloud Account · Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
  • Command and ControlIngress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1595Active Scanning×1

Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Resource Development TA0042

T1588.007Obtain Capabilities: Artificial Intelligence×1

Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks, including creating scripts, assisting social engineering, developing payloads, and to Query Public AI Services in support of Reconnaissance.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×2

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1199Trusted Relationship×1

Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.

Evidence: 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×2

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials×2

Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.003Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles×2

An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.003Create Account: Cloud Account×1

Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×2

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.001Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials×2

Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.003Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles×2

An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×2

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×2

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · 2026-10-18/connectwise-cloud-backup-skykick-m365-app-credential-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.004Account Discovery: Cloud Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1580Cloud Infrastructure Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-10-22/artex-storm-0940-agentic-llm-pentest-spraying-oauth-abuse · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Storm-0940 (2)

2026-10-22 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

ARTEX: Microsoft reports Storm-0940, a China-state aligned actor, running an open-source multi-agent LLM penetration-testing framework against hundreds of organizations, with privileged cloud access in under three hours in some cases, and Expel sees the same infrastructure abuse Okta self-service registration

Microsoft Threat Intelligence reports that as early as September 2026 Storm-0940, a China-state aligned actor active since 2021, used the agentic penetration-testing framework ARTEX to automate attacks on hundreds of organizations across many industries, government and military among them (Microsoft, 2026-10-21). ARTEX is an open-source multi-agent LLM system that can use any AI model and runs a penetration test from reconnaissance to exfiltration with little human involvement (Microsoft, 2026-10-21). Microsoft says ARTEX accelerated the abuse of compromised applications already granted access to Microsoft 365 tenants (Microsoft, 2026-10-21), and Expel adds that it is not a vulnerability and only speeds up familiar techniques such as password spraying and OAuth-application abuse (Expel, 2026-10-21); most targeting failed, yet several cases went from first targeting to privileged cloud access in under three hours (Microsoft, 2026-10-21). Microsoft assesses the same actor was behind the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application-credential abuse (Microsoft, 2026-10-21).

Expel saw Storm-0940 infrastructure scan a customer and, from 2026-10-13, abuse its Okta self-service registration with no ConnectWise application involved: the attacker created five accounts of its own, enrolled Okta Verify on three of them about a minute after activation, made 50 single sign-on logins with more than 100 OAuth tokens issued and ran a password spray that Okta ThreatInsight blocked (Expel, 2026-10-21). Expel says the shared source address is its only link to Storm-0940, the activity alone does not prove ARTEX was used, and it had not seen the technique reported before (Expel, 2026-10-21). Other actors use it: CrowdStrike analysed an unnamed, probably Chinese-speaking and financially motivated actor that ran ARTEX against South Korean financial institutions from late September (CrowdStrike, 2026-10-07), and Recorded Future, which tracks that activity as TAG-217, says use of ARTEX and other AI penetration-testing tools is not limited to it (Recorded Future, 2026-10-16).

Wiz Research independently reports that throughout October 2026 it tracked an actor using ARTEX-associated tooling, overlapping with Storm-0940, against IT and software vendors, focused on identity providers (Okta, Entra, Cognito) and Microsoft 365 integrations, and says that most attempts failed and that none of the techniques is novel (Wiz, 2026-10-22). It describes a consistent sequence: downloading JavaScript bundles, exposed source maps, runtime configuration and OpenAPI documents, then calling internal API routes by name minutes later; fabricated authorization codes and malformed state values against Microsoft OAuth callbacks; unsigned JWTs tried against more than 60 SSO route variants in two minutes; and account-recovery, sign-up and Cognito calls such as InitiateAuth, ForgotPassword and ResendConfirmationCode (Wiz, 2026-10-22). Its password sprays against Entra and Okta hit hundreds of users, mainly software engineers, in bursts of 20 to 60 minutes with a unique user agent per burst, a median gap of one second between attempts and new source addresses within minutes of a block (Wiz, 2026-10-22).

Triage: Python and curl user agents match common legitimate automation, so Expel treats them as supporting evidence only, and a Python user agent on an application that normally calls Microsoft Graph with a .NET SDK is the anomaly (Expel, 2026-10-21).

used the agentic AI penetration testing framework ARTEX to automate attacks targeting hundreds of organizations globally across a broad range of industries

including multiple instances where the time from initial targeting to privileged access was less than 3 hours

While the majority of the targeting wasn’t successful, Storm-0940 achieved privileged cloud persistence at many organizations in a brief time.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence 2026-10-21

Used Okta self-service registration to create five accounts of its own, then enrolled Okta Verify on three of them

The shared IP is our only link to Storm-0940, and this activity alone doesn’t prove ARTEX was used.

ARTEX isn’t a vulnerability, so there’s nothing to patch. It speeds up familiar techniques like password spraying and OAuth app abuse.

Expel 2026-10-21

the threat actor is likely a Chinese speaker and financially motivated

CrowdStrike Counter Adversary Operations 2026-10-07

Throughout October 2026, we identified an actor using tooling associated with ARTEX, an autonomous AI penetration-testing agent, to target multiple IT and software vendors.

Wiz Research 2026-10-22

In 38 of the incidents, the threat actor demanded ransom payments of 360 million won ($270,000), promising in exchange not to leak stolen data.

BleepingComputer 2026-10-26

Of the victim companies, 60 were counted as hacked using AI. (translated from Korean)

Yonhap News Agency 2026-10-26

Since late August 2026, we have observed threat actors actively operating popular open-source multi-agent pentesting platforms like ARTEX, PentAGI, CAIRN and other potentially custom harnesses within Mandiant incident response engagements

Although the original repository was taken down by its creator in October 2026 due to widespread threat actor abuse, the framework continues to proliferate globally via community forks

individual ARTEX execution sequences ran in compressed bursts of roughly 2 to 25 seconds

Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant 2026-10-31

a Cambodia-based intrusion cluster that primarily targets financial organizations in Southeast Asia

Microsoft Threat Intelligence 2026-10-21

Threat actors barely interacted with their agent fleets.

Check Point Research 2026-11-05
Improvementrun 2026-10-24T0255Z-intelbodyevidencesourcessourcing_note

Wiz Research reports an actor using ARTEX-associated tooling, overlapping with Storm-0940, against IT and software vendors throughout October 2026, focused on Okta, Entra and Cognito and on Microsoft 365 integrations, with most attempts failing (Wiz, 2026-10-22). It describes the log signatures of the agent: source-map and OpenAPI downloads followed minutes later by calls to internal routes that appear only in those files, fabricated OAuth callback values, unsigned JWTs tried against more than 60 SSO route variants in two minutes, account-recovery and sign-up calls, and password-spray bursts of 20 to 60 minutes against Entra and Okta with a unique user agent per burst and a median gap of one second between attempts (Wiz, 2026-10-22). Wiz says chaining, automatic adaptation to rate limits and blocks, and tests against heavily scrutinised Microsoft OAuth flows separate the agent from a human operator (Wiz, 2026-10-22).

Updaterun 2026-10-27T0256Z-intelevidencesourcessourcing_notesummary

Seoul Metropolitan Police announced on 2026-10-26 that it referred a 32-year-old gang leader to prosecutors on 2026-10-23, with six accomplices investigated without detention, for taking 8.2 million personal-data records and internal files from more than 90 organizations since September 2025, among them cram schools, hospitals, golf courses, universities and large-company affiliates, and for sending extortion e-mails (Yonhap, 2026-10-26, translated from Korean). BleepingComputer, citing local media, reports that the group demanded 360 million won (about USD 270,000) in 38 of the incidents in exchange for not leaking the data, that the police say the leader used the ARTEX framework, the same system used in the attacks on South Korean banks, and that he moved from conventional tools to AI utilities in late August 2026 (BleepingComputer, 2026-10-26). Yonhap counts 60 of the victims as hacked with AI and describes the system as the AI autonomous penetration-testing system used in the recent financial-sector data thefts without naming it, so the ARTEX name is BleepingComputer's (Yonhap, 2026-10-26). No encryption step is reported, and the police say AI lowered the barrier to entry and call this the first arrest in Korea in a large-scale hacking and personal-data theft case that exploited generative AI (BleepingComputer, 2026-10-26). The framework is therefore in use by a financially motivated criminal group as well as by the state-aligned actor Microsoft describes; no source reports a Swiss victim.

Updaterun 2026-11-01T0256Z-intelheadlinesummaryentitiestechniquessourcesevidencesourcing_note

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant report that since late August 2026 they have seen threat actors operate ARTEX, PentAGI, CAIRN and possibly custom harnesses inside Mandiant incident-response engagements, with agents carrying out significant parts of the attack lifecycle such as lateral movement, database exploitation and exfiltration preparation (GTIG and Mandiant, 2026-10-31). They say ARTEX has been adopted since late August by financially motivated extortion groups and suspected PRC-nexus clusters, whose operations affected organizations in government, technology, chemicals and materials, and manufacturing in the United States, and that the campaign Wiz tracks, which GTIG tracks as UNC7228, overlaps with Microsoft's Storm-0940 and dates back to at least August 2026 (GTIG and Mandiant, 2026-10-31). The original ARTEX repository was taken down by its creator in October because of abuse, but community forks, among them a commercial one, keep the framework in circulation (GTIG and Mandiant, 2026-10-31).

In several cases the operators handed ARTEX compromised credentials and told it to run the later stages. GTIG's log signature for the agent is execution in bursts of roughly 2 to 25 seconds, error-driven retries and forensically noisy trial and error; in one case, given valid credentials, the framework used an application's SQL API to point the MySQL general log at a web-accessible .jsp path and then ran SELECT statements carrying script tags, likely intended to write web shells under somewhat-incremental file names until they ran cleanly (GTIG and Mandiant, 2026-10-31).

Updaterun 2026-11-07T0256Z-intelsummaryentitiestechniquessourcesevidencesourcing_note

Microsoft Threat Intelligence reports that Storm-3358, a Cambodia-based intrusion cluster that primarily targets financial organisations in Southeast Asia and a smaller number of large financial organisations globally, began using ARTEX against the financial sector in October 2026 (Microsoft, 2026-11-06). Microsoft says the cluster combines ARTEX with conventional automated tools to scan internet-facing systems, exploit flaws including anonymous file upload and server-side request forgery, and install the open-source remote access tools WISP, vshell and AdaptixC2, which ARTEX agents download with netcat and curl (Microsoft, 2026-11-06). Microsoft's tell for an agent on a scanned system is "a wide variety of requests in a brief time", retries of variations on one technique and a move to next-stage actions at machine speed; ARTEX by default drives Nmap, curl, wget, Python HTTP clients and headless Chromium through Playwright, and blocking their default traits will not stop an agent, which "will quickly change them" (Microsoft, 2026-11-06). In Microsoft's testing, honeypots, decoys, tarpits and fake wins helped reduce the attack traffic reaching real assets, with no figures given (Microsoft, 2026-11-06).

Check Point Research counts 2,557 systems that host or hosted ARTEX panels, 1,608 of them live and public, and ten that exposed the full database; in those ten consoles the operators set a goal and then "barely interacted with their agent fleets" (Check Point, 2026-11-05). The campaigns it reads are opportunistic crime, not espionage: iOS signing certificates from grey-market shops, a cryptocurrency-service campaign and game-account credentials. In the signing-shop campaign the agents got in through hardcoded administrator passwords in JavaScript bundles, missing API authentication, command injection, insecure direct object references, weak administrative credentials and template injection (Check Point, 2026-11-05). Check Point does not name Storm-3358.

Updaterun 2026-11-08T1309Z-auditsourcessummary

CERT-EU, the cybersecurity service of the EU institutions, says it has seen several threat actors use ARTEX to automate their campaigns in recent weeks and has observed AI-driven activity against its own constituency that highly likely involved ARTEX; it assesses that the framework's public availability will likely accelerate adoption, notes that the public versions are independent forks since the original author withdrew the repository in October, and maps the activity to active scanning, tool acquisition and exploitation of public-facing applications (CERT-EU, 2026-11-05). Its guidance adds one point beyond limiting exposure and isolating management panels: keep non-severe findings in the remediation cycle, because AI-enabled tooling can chain minor misconfigurations into higher-impact attack paths (CERT-EU, 2026-11-05). In Switzerland, Roman Hüssy, co-head of GovCERT at the Federal Office for Cybersecurity, said at Gohack26 that no case in which autonomous AI agents hacked someone had been reported to the office so far, while AI makes attacks easier and more convincing (translated from German) (Netzwoche, 2026-11-02).

Builds on: ConnectWise SkyKick app credential used in 162+ Microsoft 365 tenants; disabling it does not…

threat22 Oct 03:45Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-10-18 · view entry permalink →

HIGHexploitedupdatedNATOA1

ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick): the vendor's Microsoft 365 application credential was used to sign in to customer tenants, with directory-role self-assignments in about 50 tenants and, Huntress reports, added credentials in two

ConnectWise says it identified unauthorized access to application identities within its Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick) environment; on 2026-10-17 it disabled seven application identities, suspended the service, says the shared Cloud Backup credentials are no longer valid, and warns that disabling does not reverse changes already made in a tenant (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). As of ConnectWise's update of 2026-10-19 01:15 UTC, Cloud Backup, SaaS Security and Cloud Management remained suspended with no confirmed restoration time (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19), and its status page of 2026-10-28 says partners can now re-authorize Microsoft 365 backup and restore through a new application (ConnectWise status page, 2026-10-28); ConnectWise reports no successful threat activity in the environments it monitors since it implemented mitigations (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19) and says it cannot independently determine whether a given partner or customer tenant was affected (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). Huntress and Todyl report that on 2026-10-15 the app's identity signed in to customer Microsoft 365 tenants from one hosting-provider address and received app-only Microsoft Graph tokens; the credential sits in the vendor's own tenant, so no user, MFA prompt or user Conditional Access was involved, and the app's consent covers read and write access to mail, files and Teams chats (Huntress, 2026-10-16; Todyl, 2026-10-15). Huntress confirmed unauthorized sign-ins in 162 tenants by 2026-10-16 and later counted almost 1,000 tenants with sign-in activity from that address, over 300 successful, after password spraying against four law-firm tenants on 13 and 14 October, and a separate failed wave targeted 16 tenants in policy and national-security sectors (Huntress, 2026-10-16). In about 50 of its tenants, ConnectWise Cloud Management apps assigned themselves directory roles, mostly Exchange Administrator; in one the Teams app added itself to Global Administrator and client secrets were added to an MSP management application and to Huntress's own application within about five minutes, the credential additions from private Azure space (Huntress, 2026-10-16). Huntress later identified a second tenant with the same sequence, the application granting itself Global Administrator and then planting a new secret on a small number of other applications, within two minutes of the first around 03:45 UTC on 2026-10-15, with the choice of applications apparently random (Huntress, 2026-10-16). It says the unauthorized sign-ins with the credential were bunched across the morning of 2026-10-15 UTC, that the last successful one it observed was at 08:44 UTC that day with only failed attempts afterwards in the tenants where it can read sign-in logs, and that in the two tenants it reviewed it found no mailbox or file manipulation and no user or policy changes (Huntress, 2026-10-16). Microsoft Threat Intelligence, as BleepingComputer relays it, called it an active supply-chain attack and assessed likely abuse of existing permissions including Directory.ReadWrite.All (BleepingComputer, 2026-10-17). Microsoft Threat Intelligence later assessed that Storm-0940, a China-state aligned actor, was responsible, using the ARTEX agentic-AI framework to attempt sign-ins to more than 2,250 tenants (Microsoft, 2026-10-21). How the credential was obtained and what was read remain unknown (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19; BleepingComputer, 2026-10-17).

Triage: the vendor's apps sign in from Azure addresses with a .NET SDK user agent, while the credential additions used a Python user agent; Python and curl are common in administration, so Huntress says the combination of actor, operation and user agent is the signal (Huntress, 2026-10-16). Role self-assignments carrying the vendor's own user agent are not proven benign, since Huntress has not confirmed vendor automation (Huntress, 2026-10-16).

Partners must re-authorize each Microsoft 365 tenant using the new application, “ConnectWise Cloud Backup for M365,” to resume backup and restore operations.

ConnectWise status page (Cloud Backup incident, update of 2026-10-28 17:09 UTC) 2026-10-28

We recently identified unauthorized access to application identities within the ConnectWise Cloud Backup environment.

Disabling the affected connections prevents new authentication through those connections; it does not reverse changes previously made inside a tenant.

Whether a product vulnerability contributed has not been established

ConnectWise Trust Center (advisory) 2026-10-21

As of 19:00 UTC on October 16, Huntress has confirmed unauthorized sign-ins in 162 tenants.

The credential type was a client assertion, which means the credential lives in the vendor's own tenant.

These tenants are in the policy, national security, trade, and critical mineral sectors.

Huntress 2026-10-16

Because the application already held broad, previously granted permissions in each tenant, those sign-ins gave the attacker the technical ability to read and write mail and attachments, OneDrive and SharePoint files, and Teams chats.

Revoking user sessions does not end this access.

Todyl 2026-10-15

Previously issued access tokens may remain usable until they expire or are otherwise invalidated.

ConnectWise Trust Center (advisory) 2026-10-21

Disabling the app in a tenant stops new tokens from being issued there, though tokens already issued stay valid for up to 90 minutes.

Todyl 2026-10-15

Older tenants may list them under SkyKick names.

SpecterOps 2026-10-17

Since implementing mitigations, we have not observed successful threat activity in the environments we monitor.

ConnectWise Trust Center (advisory) 2026-10-21

the last confirmed successful sign-in we observed with this credential was at 08:44 UTC on October 15

Huntress has identified a second tenant with post-compromise activity

the application granted itself Global Administrator, then planted a new secret on a small number of other applications in the tenant to keep a foothold

The choice of which applications to backdoor appeared to be random in the two tenants we reviewed.

The access may have been used for Microsoft Graph directory reads, which leave no audit record.

we also found no evidence of mailbox or file manipulation, or user or policy changes

Huntress 2026-10-16

Tenants were accessed in strictly ascending tenant GUID order.

As of this publication, there is no evidence that the application created new secrets, applications, consents, or role assignments in the reviewed tenants.

Sophos X-Ops 2026-10-19

Microsoft assesses that Storm-0940 was responsible for the recently disclosed

Storm-0940 used ARTEX to attempt to sign-in to more than 2,250 tenants.

These changes can remain active as a backdoor even after the original compromised application is mediated.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence 2026-10-21

On our own telemetry alone, we put our confidence that an LLM was involved in the escalation tooling at low to medium.

Alert when a service principal assigns itself

Huntress (AI, Scripts, Operator: Inside the ConnectWise Attack) 2026-10-26
Improvementrun 2026-10-19T0256Z-intelactionssourcesevidencesourcing_notebody

ConnectWise's update of 2026-10-18 01:00 UTC took SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline in addition to Cloud Backup, which had been suspended since 2026-10-17, so ConnectWise SaaS Security monitoring and alerting is out of service as well, and the update of 2026-10-19 01:15 UTC still gives no restoration time (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). Disabling an app stops new tokens only: Todyl and SpecterOps each state that tokens already issued stay valid for up to 90 minutes, and ConnectWise says that after it revoked the Cloud Backup certificates previously issued tokens may remain usable until they expire (Todyl, 2026-10-15; SpecterOps, 2026-10-17; ConnectWise, 2026-10-19). SpecterOps hunts for applications owned by the ConnectWise tenant, noting that older tenants may list them under SkyKick names (SpecterOps, 2026-10-17).

Updaterun 2026-10-20T0256Z-inteltitlesummaryactionssourcesevidencesourcing_notebody

Huntress's update of 2026-10-19 13:30 ET identified a second tenant with post-compromise activity, a tenant Huntress did not originally protect, where it got deployed to collect telemetry (Huntress, 2026-10-16). In both tenants the activity was fast and scripted, within two minutes of each other around 03:45 UTC on 2026-10-15: the application granted itself Global Administrator and then planted a new secret on a small number of other applications to keep a foothold (Huntress, 2026-10-16). The choice of applications appeared random: the same flow picked two different sets, one application present in both was backdoored in only one, and in one tenant the applications that received secrets were among the least privileged in the environment while far more powerful ones were untouched (Huntress, 2026-10-16).

Huntress says the unauthorized sign-ins with the credential were tightly bunched across the morning of 2026-10-15 UTC, the last confirmed successful sign-in it observed was at 08:44 UTC, and it saw only failed attempts afterwards in the tenants where it can read sign-in logs (Huntress, 2026-10-16). The access may have been used for Microsoft Graph directory reads, which leave no audit record, and in the two tenants Huntress reviewed it found no evidence of mailbox or file manipulation or of user or policy changes (Huntress, 2026-10-16). The check for planted credentials therefore has to cover every application registration and enterprise application in the tenant, and a clean audit log does not exclude directory reads. ConnectWise's latest readable update (2026-10-19 01:15 UTC) gives no restoration time (ConnectWise, 2026-10-19).

Improvementrun 2026-10-21T0256Z-intelsourcesevidencesourcing_notebody

Sophos X-Ops independently observed the token requests: on 2026-10-15 a single virtual private server authenticated as the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application and requested app-only Microsoft Graph tokens for about 96 minutes, from 07:11 UTC, in strictly ascending tenant-ID order, one to six minutes apart, using Python HTTP-library user agents, and the sweep included tenants with no active backup subscription (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-10-19). Sophos found no hands-on-keyboard activity and no evidence that the application created new secrets, applications, consents or role assignments in the tenants it reviewed, which differs from the role grants and added secrets Huntress reports in other tenants; Sophos says it is unclear how the credential was obtained and what was done with the tokens (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-10-19). The two vendors' sweep timings differ: Huntress puts the first app sign-ins at 06:13 to 08:34 UTC on 2026-10-15 with tenants taken in sorted GUID order a few seconds apart (Huntress, 2026-10-16), where Sophos gives about 96 minutes from 07:11 UTC, one to six minutes apart; the vantage points differ, so both are reported as stated.

Updaterun 2026-10-22T0256Z-intelbodyentitiesevidencesourcessourcing_notesummary

Microsoft Threat Intelligence assesses that Storm-0940, a China-state aligned actor active since 2021, was responsible for the compromise. It says AI agents running the ARTEX framework kept signing in to customer tenants as the ConnectWise applications, without an interactive user sign-in, and in multiple tenants went on to Microsoft Graph reconnaissance, application credential changes and attempts to change privileges (Microsoft, 2026-10-21). It counts attempted sign-ins to more than 2,250 tenants and links the activity to an automated cross-tenant password spray between 2026-10-10 and 2026-10-14 against 327 accounts at eight organizations, from the same network range and including an address that ConnectWise's advisory later listed among its indicators; the spray peaked on 2026-10-11 at 2,900 failed logons a minute and produced no successful authentication (Microsoft, 2026-10-21).

Microsoft warns that the application credential changes can remain active as a backdoor after the vendor application is remediated, and asks tenants to review service-principal sign-ins from at least 2026-10-15, and from 2026-10-01 where records exist, together with the Entra audit trail for credential additions, role assignments, consents and owner changes (Microsoft, 2026-10-21). Expel, which analysed the activity separately, relays the attribution, notes that ConnectWise's fix leaves secrets planted on other applications in place and that Graph directory reads leave no Entra audit record, and says Huntress has not tied its Global Administrator observation to the same operator (Expel, 2026-10-21). ConnectWise itself says that, based on the evidence available to it, including threat intelligence shared by Microsoft, it appears a China state-aligned group was responsible and used an openly available agentic AI framework (ConnectWise, 2026-10-21). It began restoring services in controlled phases on 2026-10-21, expects it to take several days, says the start of restoration does not mean all capabilities are available, and tells partners to keep affected connections disabled until formal instructions apply to their service, while noting that its actions do not remove unauthorized access already established in individual customer tenants (ConnectWise, 2026-10-21; heise online, 2026-10-21).

Correctionrun 2026-10-25T1308Z-auditbodyevidence

The update of 2026-10-22 attached a rate of 2,900 attempts a minute to the ARTEX sign-ins against more than 2,250 tenants. Microsoft gives no rate for those sign-ins: 2,900 a minute is the peak of failed logons in the separate password spray of 10 to 14 October, reached on 11 October (Microsoft, 2026-10-21). The figure now sits with the spray.

Improvementrun 2026-10-27T0256Z-intelevidencesourcessourcing_note

Huntress published its analysis of what drove the 2026-10-15 activity on 2026-10-26, working from Entra sign-in and directory audit logs in the tenants it monitors. It says its telemetry aligns with Microsoft's Storm-0940 and ARTEX account without independently confirming it, that it is highly confident an operator, a person or an LLM, adapted the tooling between runs, and that its confidence that an LLM was involved in the escalation tooling is low to medium on its own telemetry and medium to high once Microsoft's attribution is included (Huntress, 2026-10-26). Its evidence for adaptation: a certificate upload that failed on a thumbprint mismatch ended one run with no retry, and the next run 55 seconds later retried the same error with growing waits until it worked; in a second tenant that refused removal of the Global Administrator role, the actor granted a different role to a sibling principal and the original service principal was then deleted (Huntress, 2026-10-26). Microsoft Graph reads are not recorded in the Entra audit log and no victim Huntress knows of had Graph activity logging enabled, so a clean audit log does not show that no Graph access took place (Huntress, 2026-10-26). Huntress recommends alerting when a service principal assigns itself Global Administrator or Privileged Role Administrator, deletes itself, or when one vendor principal grants a role to a sibling, and turning on Graph activity logs where licensing allows (Huntress, 2026-10-26).

Updaterun 2026-10-29T0255Z-intelupdated_atsourcesevidenceactionsbody

ConnectWise's status page announced on 2026-10-28 at 17:09 UTC, after restoration in controlled phases had begun on 2026-10-21, that it is beginning phased restoration for partners, starting with Microsoft 365 backups and restores through a new, security-hardened application, with other features returning in phases over the coming days (ConnectWise status page, 2026-10-28). Partners must re-authorize each Microsoft 365 tenant using the new application, “ConnectWise Cloud Backup for M365”, to resume backup and restore operations, and ConnectWise points to its Trust Center for the detailed instructions (ConnectWise status page, 2026-10-28). Before that, from 2026-10-26, it had said it would first enable a process to restore data from existing backups and then phased re-enrollment, and it still told partners to keep affected connections disabled until instructions applied to their service (ConnectWise status page, 2026-10-28).

incident18 Oct 03:30Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats3

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com2 (9%)
  • crowdstrike.com2 (9%)
  • huntress.com2 (9%)
  • microsoft.com2 (9%)
  • cert.europa.eu1 (5%)
  • cloud.google.com1 (5%)
  • connectwise.com1 (5%)
  • expel.com1 (5%)
  • other10 (45%)
All cited sources (22)