ARTEX against AWS: Datadog sees agent sessions open with anonymous S3 reads, search CloudWatch Logs for secrets with stolen long-term IAM keys, and self-register in public Cognito user pools to obtain AWS credentials
ARTEX in AWS: CloudWatch log searches for secrets, Cognito self-sign-up for credentials; hunt CloudTrail for both
Analysis
Datadog Security Labs reports that in October 2026 operators of ARTEX, the agentic penetration-testing framework Microsoft ties to Storm-0940, worked against several AWS environments with a focus on financial data, and that every session it reviewed opened with unauthenticated S3 reads, which CloudTrail records with a userIdentity type of AWSAccount and an accountId of anonymous, calling GetObject, ListObjects and similar read APIs (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09). Where S3 hosted a web front end, the agent read build manifests and runtime configuration, and it requested objects named like placeholders just before bursts of key guesses (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09), the habit Wiz saw as a request for a path that should not exist before each fuzzing run (Wiz Research, 2026-10-22).
With a valid long-term IAM access key, the agent's most frequent call was CloudWatch Logs FilterLogEvents, always with a limit of 1,000 events: it first searched log text for the names of cryptocurrency firms, hedge funds and invoicing terms and, in a later session on 2026-10-20, for storage links, internal addresses, database references, passwords and AKIA-style access keys (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09).
Without a key, the agent self-registered in a public Cognito user pool, iterating against a PreSignUp Lambda that checked a tenant domain, then ran InitiateAuth, RespondToAuthChallenge, GetUser and GetTokensFromRefreshToken and traded the tokens for short-term AWS credentials, which CloudTrail shows under the CognitoIdentityCredentials role session name; some SignUp calls named the tool in the user agent (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09). It then tried read-only discovery calls such as ListBuckets, ListSecrets, DescribeParameters, ListTopics, DescribeLogGroups, GetRestApis, DescribeRepositories and ListFunctions, all of which failed because the identity pool's authenticated role was narrow (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09).
Datadog found hundreds of internet-exposed ARTEX consoles, often in Mandarin, and says the distributions it analysed do not appear to carry a cloud methodology of their own, so the post-exploitation playbook depends on the model in use; some versions block .gov, .gov.cn, .edu and .edu.cn targets by default (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09).
Triage: FilterLogEvents is a routine call for log tooling and engineers; the discriminator is a long-term user key searching log text for credentials, internal addresses or company names at a constant page limit, from an address that key does not normally use.
Cited evidence
In October 2026, Datadog observed in-the-wild activity from ARTEX, an AI-native penetration framework, against several AWS environments, with a focus on accessing financial data.
Before either, every session we reviewed opened with unauthenticated S3 requests.
We saw the agent go further, registering an account, collecting tokens, trading them for AWS credentials, then enumerating resources.
In this case, all of them failed because the identity pool's authenticated role did not grant the required permissions.
Sources2
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