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Amazon Cognito

product · product:amazon-cognito single-source

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-15 → last 2026-11-15
Latest activity
2026-11-15
ARTEX in AWS: CloudWatch log searches for secrets, Cognito self-sign-up for credentials; hunt CloudTrail for…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Amazon Cognito tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-15NOTABLEARTEX in AWS: CloudWatch log searches for secrets, Cognito self-sign-up for credentials; hunt CloudTrail for both

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-15ARTEX against AWS: Datadog sees agent sessions open with anonymous S3 reads, search CloudWatch Logs for secrets with stolen long-term IAM keys, and self-register in public Cognito user pools to obtain AWS credentials
    active-threatsARTEX in AWS: CloudWatch log searches for secrets, Cognito self-sign-up for credentials; hunt CloudTrail for both

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
Amazon Cognito
ATT&CK techniques (8 across 8 tactics)

8 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceActive Scanning: Wordlist Scanning
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Create Account: Cloud Account
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials
  • DiscoveryCloud Service Discovery · Cloud Infrastructure Discovery · Cloud Storage Object Discovery
  • CollectionData from Cloud Storage

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1595.003Active Scanning: Wordlist Scanning×1

Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to Brute Force, its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: Gather Victim Org Information, or Search Victim-Owned Websites).

Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.003Create Account: Cloud Account×1

Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1552Unsecured Credentials×1

Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Shell History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).

Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1526Cloud Service Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗

T1580Cloud Infrastructure Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗

T1619Cloud Storage Object Discovery×1

Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to File and Directory Discovery on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. Cloud Infrastructure Discovery) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1530Data from Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Amazon Cognito (1)

2026-11-15 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

ARTEX against AWS: Datadog sees agent sessions open with anonymous S3 reads, search CloudWatch Logs for secrets with stolen long-term IAM keys, and self-register in public Cognito user pools to obtain AWS credentials

Datadog Security Labs reports that in October 2026 operators of ARTEX, the agentic penetration-testing framework Microsoft ties to Storm-0940, worked against several AWS environments with a focus on financial data, and that every session it reviewed opened with unauthenticated S3 reads, which CloudTrail records with a userIdentity type of AWSAccount and an accountId of anonymous, calling GetObject, ListObjects and similar read APIs (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09). Where S3 hosted a web front end, the agent read build manifests and runtime configuration, and it requested objects named like placeholders just before bursts of key guesses (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09), the habit Wiz saw as a request for a path that should not exist before each fuzzing run (Wiz Research, 2026-10-22).

With a valid long-term IAM access key, the agent's most frequent call was CloudWatch Logs FilterLogEvents, always with a limit of 1,000 events: it first searched log text for the names of cryptocurrency firms, hedge funds and invoicing terms and, in a later session on 2026-10-20, for storage links, internal addresses, database references, passwords and AKIA-style access keys (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09).

Without a key, the agent self-registered in a public Cognito user pool, iterating against a PreSignUp Lambda that checked a tenant domain, then ran InitiateAuth, RespondToAuthChallenge, GetUser and GetTokensFromRefreshToken and traded the tokens for short-term AWS credentials, which CloudTrail shows under the CognitoIdentityCredentials role session name; some SignUp calls named the tool in the user agent (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09). It then tried read-only discovery calls such as ListBuckets, ListSecrets, DescribeParameters, ListTopics, DescribeLogGroups, GetRestApis, DescribeRepositories and ListFunctions, all of which failed because the identity pool's authenticated role was narrow (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09).

Datadog found hundreds of internet-exposed ARTEX consoles, often in Mandarin, and says the distributions it analysed do not appear to carry a cloud methodology of their own, so the post-exploitation playbook depends on the model in use; some versions block .gov, .gov.cn, .edu and .edu.cn targets by default (Datadog Security Labs, 2026-11-09).

Triage: FilterLogEvents is a routine call for log tooling and engineers; the discriminator is a long-term user key searching log text for credentials, internal addresses or company names at a constant page limit, from an address that key does not normally use.

In October 2026, Datadog observed in-the-wild activity from ARTEX, an AI-native penetration framework, against several AWS environments, with a focus on accessing financial data.

Before either, every session we reviewed opened with unauthenticated S3 requests.

We saw the agent go further, registering an account, collecting tokens, trading them for AWS credentials, then enumerating resources.

In this case, all of them failed because the identity pool's authenticated role did not grant the required permissions.

Datadog Security Labs 2026-11-09

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threat15 Nov 15:09Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • securitylabs.datadoghq.com1 (50%)
  • wiz.io1 (50%)