Amazon CloudWatch Logs
product · product:amazon-cloudwatch-logs single-source
Defender insights
What each entry about Amazon CloudWatch Logs tells a defender to do, newest first.
Story timeline
ATT&CK techniques (8 across 8 tactics)
8 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ReconnaissanceActive Scanning: Wordlist Scanning
- Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- PersistenceValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Create Account: Cloud Account
- Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- StealthValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials
- DiscoveryCloud Service Discovery · Cloud Infrastructure Discovery · Cloud Storage Object Discovery
- CollectionData from Cloud Storage
Reconnaissance TA0043
T1595.003Active Scanning: Wordlist Scanning×1
Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to Brute Force, its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: Gather Victim Org Information, or Search Victim-Owned Websites).
Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗
T1136.003Create Account: Cloud Account×1
Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1552Unsecured Credentials×1
Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Shell History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).
Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1526Cloud Service Discovery×1
An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗
T1580Cloud Infrastructure Discovery×1
An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗
T1619Cloud Storage Object Discovery×1
Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to File and Directory Discovery on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. Cloud Infrastructure Discovery) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗
Collection TA0009
T1530Data from Cloud Storage×1
Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/artex-aws-cloudwatch-log-secret-hunting-cognito-self-signup · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Amazon CloudWatch Logs (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- securitylabs.datadoghq.com1 (50%)
- wiz.io1 (50%)