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Settra

actor · actor:settra single-source

Ransomware-as-a-service operation named by GuidePoint Security as one of the programmes whose victims were approached by the Ransom Busters persona (GuidePoint Security, 2026-08-18).

Coverage
3
2 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-05-30 → last 2026-11-15
Latest activity
2026-11-11
Insikt: GhostFrame implant re-disables ESXi execInstalledOnly every five seconds and steals guest credentials
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
·
regions: us, europe
Sources cited
10
9 hosts
2026-05-303 appearances2026-11-11

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Settra, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • On every ESXi host that sits behind a SonicWall, Palo Alto Networks or Fortinet VPN appliance that was compromised or unpatched since late August, check for an unexpected executable under /opt, a process masquerading as the ESXi host daemon, changes to /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh, and an ESXi firewall or execInstalledOnly setting that switches itself back off, because Insikt reports the implant resets both controls about every five seconds and re-enabling them without removing its persistence is futile.
    2026-11-11Insikt: GhostFrame implant re-disables ESXi…

Defender insights

What each entry about Settra tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-11NOTABLEInsikt: GhostFrame implant re-disables ESXi execInstalledOnly every five seconds and steals guest credentials

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-08-20NOTABLEThe tell is the timing: a recovery offer that arrives while the intrusion is still private is foreknowledge, not marketing

Triage

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

collaborates with

overlaps with

Story timeline

Every entry that names Settra, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-11-11GhostFrame: Recorded Future's Insikt Group finds an ESXi post-exploitation framework (vmhostd-core implant, VM control panel, VMkatz credential theft) used by TAG-218, whose activity overlaps Settra ransomware and which targeted SonicWall, Palo Alto Networks and Fortinet VPN appliances in the US and Europe
    active-threatsInsikt: GhostFrame implant re-disables ESXi execInstalledOnly every five seconds and steals guest credentials
  2. 2026-08-20"Ransom Busters" emails ransomware victims before their incident is public, offering to delete the stolen data for a fee, and the tooling says it is the same affiliate who took it
    active-threatsThe tell is the timing: a recovery offer that arrives while the intrusion is still private is foreknowledge, not marketing
  3. 2026-05-30CVE-2026-0257, Palo Alto PAN-OS GlobalProtect: pre-auth authentication bypass via certificate reuse, marked by CISA as used in ransomware campaigns
    mentiontrending-vulnerabilitiesQilin and Inc ransomware exploit the GlobalProtect bypass; one intrusion pivoted to vCenter and ESXi past in-guest EDR

Hunting pivots

Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (17 across 11 tactics)

17 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  • PersistenceBoot or Logon Initialization Scripts: RC Scripts · Create Account: Local Account
  • Privilege EscalationBoot or Logon Initialization Scripts: RC Scripts
  • StealthMasquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Reflective Code Loading
  • Defense ImpairmentDisable or Modify Tools · Disable or Modify System Firewall
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · OS Credential Dumping: NTDS · OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets
  • DiscoveryNetwork Service Discovery
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: VNC
  • Command and ControlProxy · Remote Access Tools · Non-Standard Port
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
  • ImpactFinancial Theft

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1037.004Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: RC Scripts×1

Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1037.004Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: RC Scripts×1

Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1620Reflective Code Loading×1

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1686Disable or Modify System Firewall×1

Adversaries may disable or modify host-based or network firewalls to impair defensive mechanisms and enable further action. Once an adversary has gathered sufficient privileges, they can tamper with firewall services, policies, or rule sets to remove restrictions on inbound or outbound traffic. For example, this may include turning off firewall profiles, altering existing rules to permit previously blocked ports or protocols, or adding new rules that create covert communication paths (e.g., adding a new firewall rule for a well-known protocol (such as RDP) using a non-traditional and potentially less secure port).

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×1

Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.004OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets×1

Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts. LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1046Network Service Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.005Remote Services: VNC×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1090Proxy×1

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

T1571Non-Standard Port×1

Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated (for example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443). Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/ghostframe-esxi-post-exploitation-framework-tag-218 · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1657Financial Theft×1

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Settra (2)

2026-11-11 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

GhostFrame: Recorded Future's Insikt Group finds an ESXi post-exploitation framework (vmhostd-core implant, VM control panel, VMkatz credential theft) used by TAG-218, whose activity overlaps Settra ransomware and which targeted SonicWall, Palo Alto Networks and Fortinet VPN appliances in the US and Europe

Insikt Group describes GhostFrame, a previously undocumented command-and-control and post-exploitation framework for compromised VMware ESXi hosts, which it saw used by TAG-218, a group "whose operations overlap with Settra ransomware" (Recorded Future, 2026-11-10). Operators must already hold root on the host: the implant, an ELF named vmhostd-core generated from a web operator panel, does not exploit a vulnerability to gain access (Recorded Future, 2026-11-10). It copies itself to /opt/vmhostd-core, edits the ESXi boot script /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh and runs /sbin/auto-backup.sh to keep the change across reboots, masquerades as vmhostd, and about every five seconds disables the ESXi firewall and the execInstalledOnly control that restricts execution of unsigned binaries, so an administrator who re-enables them is undone (Recorded Future, 2026-11-10). Its command channel opens simultaneous TCP connections to one address on ports 53, 2222, 3389, 4444, 8443 and 9443, keeps the first that succeeds and retries after a random delay of 5 to 12 seconds, which Insikt notes is a network detection opportunity; the implant is mainly an in-memory shellcode loader (Recorded Future, 2026-11-10).

From the hypervisor the panel can list registered VMs, change power state, create or delete snapshots, enable VNC on a guest, run a SOCKS5 proxy for pivoting, intercept ESXi logins, and run the open-source VMkatz against VM memory snapshots, virtual disks or whole datastores which Insikt says may let an operator obtain NTLM hashes, Kerberos tickets, SAM and LSA secrets and NTDS.dit credentials without deploying malware inside each VM (Recorded Future, 2026-11-10). Insikt ties TAG-218's victim-facing servers to VPN-appliance targeting across the US and Europe between late August and October 2026, "predominantly SonicWall, Palo Alto Networks, and Fortinet devices", and says four of those organisations later appeared on the Settra leak site; it assesses that other financially motivated actors are highly likely to adopt the framework, which is an assessment, not an observation (Recorded Future, 2026-11-10). Unit 42 independently reports that after CVE-2026-0257 exploitation attackers pivot from the VPN gateway directly to the virtualization layer (Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, 2026-10-20).

Triage: administrators legitimately edit local.sh, create snapshots and use VNC; the discriminators are a firewall-off and execInstalledOnly loop, a /opt/vmhostd-core file or vmhostd process where the genuine daemon is vmware-hostd, and snapshot-file reads by a non-backup account.

Insikt Group identified GhostFrame being used by TAG-218, a threat activity group whose operations overlap with Settra ransomware.

Operators must already have root-level access to the ESXi host to deploy and execute the implant, as the implant does not exploit a vulnerability to gain access.

These commands run approximately every five seconds, allowing the implant to disable the controls again if an administrator attempts to restore them.

targeting virtual private network (VPN) appliances across the US and Europe between late August and October 2026, predominantly SonicWall, Palo Alto Networks, and Fortinet devices.

Recorded Future (Insikt Group) 2026-11-10

The most significant evolution in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) following successful exploitation of CVE-2026-0257 is the direct pivot to the virtualization layer.

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 2026-10-20
Correctionrun 2026-11-15T1407Z-auditbody

Insikt Group gives the persistence file as /opt/vmhostd-core and says the implant presents its process as vmhostd, a name resembling the genuine vmware-hostd daemon; either the file or the process is the indicator it lists (Recorded Future, 2026-11-10). Its reading of the VMkatz capability is hedged: the capabilities suggest that an operator controlling an ESXi host may be able to obtain credentials from hosted Windows systems without first deploying credential-stealing malware inside each VM (Recorded Future, 2026-11-10).

Builds on: Kaspersky: ESXi and Proxmox ransomware ran on a monitoring server's root password and admin… · Qilin's October build spreads through vCenter and ESXi, reboots into Safe Mode and prints notes… · Qilin and Inc ransomware exploit the GlobalProtect bypass; one intrusion pivoted to vCenter and…

threat11 Nov 03:41Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-08-20 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

"Ransom Busters" emails ransomware victims before their incident is public, offering to delete the stolen data for a fee, and the tooling says it is the same affiliate who took it

An entity styling itself Ransom Busters has been emailing organisations in the middle of a ransomware incident, writing to addresses at the victim's own domain and asking to be put in touch with the chief executive or IT leadership (GuidePoint Security, 2026-08-18). It presents itself as a project that assists victims of cyberattacks, claims to have held unauthorised access to criminal groups' servers for more than three years, says it has found the victim's stolen data on one of those servers, and offers to return the files, destroy the attackers' backups and (because it claims access to the operation's key storage) help restore encrypted data. The fee is $20,000 to $60,000 to delete the stolen data from the ransomware group's servers.

The property that separates this from ordinary ambulance-chasing is when it arrives. GuidePoint notes that legitimate recovery-service solicitation generally follows an attack becoming public knowledge; this outreach lands before the incident is publicly known at all, which means the sender knew about an intrusion nobody had disclosed (GuidePoint Security, 2026-08-18). Responding to two of these incidents, GuidePoint's teams found the same set of artefacts in both victim environments: one network-scanning utility used for internal reconnaissance, one cloud-object-storage command-line tool used to move data out to attacker-controlled cloud storage, one remote-monitoring-and-management tool installed through a PowerShell script as a secondary access channel, a locally created backdoor account whose password was identical in both intrusions, and an identical attacker-controlled workstation name appearing in both. GuidePoint weighed and rejected the obvious innocent explanation (a standardised affiliate playbook or a shared virtual-machine image distributed inside one programme) because the same overlap recurred across incidents belonging to different ransomware operations, which makes it a fingerprint of an operator rather than of a programme. On that basis it assesses with moderate confidence that Ransom Busters is a single affiliate employed across several operations, using affiliate-level access to divert ransom negotiations away from the operation it is working for, and states it observed the behaviour while responding to incidents involving DragonForce, Settra and Anubis (GuidePoint Security, 2026-08-18).

A second incident-response firm has seen the same thing independently. Coveware confirmed to BleepingComputer that it responded to at least one incident involving contact from the same group or individual, and its senior director of incident response drew the same distinction, that what makes this different from a routine recovery-service pitch is the approach to a victim whose incident was not yet public (BleepingComputer, 2026-08-19). No victim is reported to have paid Ransom Busters; in one incident the victim paid the underlying ransomware operator instead.

GRIT assesses with moderate confidence that “Ransom Busters” is not a bona fide third-party victim services firm, but rather a single ransomware affiliate with employment across multiple RaaS operations, using their affiliate access to divert ransom payment discussions away from the original ransomware operation.

We observed this behavior while responding to incidents from threat groups including DragonForce, Settra and Anubis.

GuidePoint Security (GRIT) 2026-08-18
threat20 Aug 04:52Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats2
  • Vulns1

Source distribution

  • arcticwolf.com2 (20%)
  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (10%)
  • cisa.gov1 (10%)
  • guidepointsecurity.com1 (10%)
  • rapid7.com1 (10%)
  • recordedfuture.com1 (10%)
  • security-hub.ncsc.admin.ch1 (10%)
  • security.paloaltonetworks.com1 (10%)
  • other1 (10%)
All cited sources (10)