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Anubis (ransomware-as-a-service)

actor · actor:anubis-raas

Ransomware-as-a-service operation named by GuidePoint Security as one of the programmes whose victims were approached by the Ransom Busters persona (GuidePoint Security, 2026-08-18). Distinct from the unrelated Anubis Android banking-trojan family.

Coverage timeline
1
first 2026-08-20 → last 2026-08-20
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Sources cited
2
2 hosts
Sections touched
1
active-threats
Co-occurring entities
3
see Related entities below
ATT&CK techniques
6
pinned v19.2 · see below

ATT&CK techniques

6 techniques observed across 1 entry — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1046Network Service Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1657Financial Theft×1

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-08-20"Ransom Busters" emails ransomware victims before their incident is public, offering to delete the stolen data for a fee — and the tooling says it is the same affiliate who took it
    active-threatsThe tell is the timing: a recovery offer that arrives while the intrusion is still private is foreknowledge, not marketing

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry — each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

collaborates with

Where this entity is cited

  • active-threats1

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (50%)
  • guidepointsecurity.com1 (50%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived — referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Entries about Anubis (ransomware-as-a-service) (1)

2026-08-20 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

"Ransom Busters" emails ransomware victims before their incident is public, offering to delete the stolen data for a fee — and the tooling says it is the same affiliate who took it

An entity styling itself Ransom Busters has been emailing organisations in the middle of a ransomware incident, writing to addresses at the victim's own domain and asking to be put in touch with the chief executive or IT leadership (GuidePoint Security, 2026-08-18). It presents itself as a project that assists victims of cyberattacks, claims to have held unauthorised access to criminal groups' servers for more than three years, says it has found the victim's stolen data on one of those servers, and offers to return the files, destroy the attackers' backups and — because it claims access to the operation's key storage — help restore encrypted data. The fee is $20,000 to $60,000 to delete the stolen data from the ransomware group's servers.

The property that separates this from ordinary ambulance-chasing is when it arrives. GuidePoint notes that legitimate recovery-service solicitation generally follows an attack becoming public knowledge; this outreach lands before the incident is publicly known at all, which means the sender knew about an intrusion nobody had disclosed (GuidePoint Security, 2026-08-18). Responding to two of these incidents, GuidePoint's teams found the same set of artefacts in both victim environments: one network-scanning utility used for internal reconnaissance, one cloud-object-storage command-line tool used to move data out to attacker-controlled cloud storage, one remote-monitoring-and-management tool installed through a PowerShell script as a secondary access channel, a locally created backdoor account whose password was identical in both intrusions, and an identical attacker-controlled workstation name appearing in both. GuidePoint weighed and rejected the obvious innocent explanation — a standardised affiliate playbook or a shared virtual-machine image distributed inside one programme — because the same overlap recurred across incidents belonging to different ransomware operations, which makes it a fingerprint of an operator rather than of a programme. On that basis it assesses with moderate confidence that Ransom Busters is a single affiliate employed across several operations, using affiliate-level access to divert ransom negotiations away from the operation it is working for, and states it observed the behaviour while responding to incidents involving DragonForce, Settra and Anubis (GuidePoint Security, 2026-08-18).

A second incident-response firm has seen the same thing independently. Coveware confirmed to BleepingComputer that it responded to at least one incident involving contact from the same group or individual, and its senior director of incident response drew the same distinction — that what makes this different from a routine recovery-service pitch is the approach to a victim whose incident was not yet public (BleepingComputer, 2026-08-19). No victim is reported to have paid Ransom Busters; in one incident the victim paid the underlying ransomware operator instead.

GRIT assesses with moderate confidence that “Ransom Busters” is not a bona fide third-party victim services firm, but rather a single ransomware affiliate with employment across multiple RaaS operations, using their affiliate access to divert ransom payment discussions away from the original ransomware operation.

We observed this behavior while responding to incidents from threat groups including DragonForce, Settra and Anubis.

GuidePoint Security (GRIT) 2026-08-18
threat20 Aug 04:52Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗