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DragonForce

actor · actor:dragonforce single-source

Ransomware-as-a-service operator; pipeline coverage includes SimpleHelp RMM exploitation and the first in-the-wild Microsoft Teams TURN-relay C2 (Backdoor.Turn) intrusion.

Coverage
5
first 2026-05-07 → last 2026-09-29
Latest activity
2026-09-29
Microsoft: the same toolkit rides into victims regardless of which ransomware brand signs the note
Peak priority
high
3 high · 2 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, healthcare, education · regions: us, europe, switzerland
Sources cited
23
13 hosts
2026-06-175 appearances2026-09-29

Action items (5)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about DragonForce, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Patch every internet-facing NetScaler ADC/Gateway to the fixed build in Citrix's NetScaler security bulletin for CVE-2025-5777 now, and after patching terminate ALL active ICA/PCoIP and AAA sessions; tokens harvested via CVE-2025-5777 remain valid across the patch.
    2026-07-10CVE-2025-5777
  • Hunt NetScaler ns.log for a burst of AAA LOGIN_FAILED events carrying binary/unprintable User values from a single source IP, and for any authenticated session driven from an IP that has no preceding successful authentication.
    2026-07-10CVE-2025-5777
  • Forward NetScaler logs off-box to a SIEM before hunting, on-device ns.log rotates fast enough to lose the evidence.
    2026-07-10CVE-2025-5777
  • Alert on gpupdate followed closely by an AppMgmt (Application Management) service start and a new SYSTEM-context process, and on net user / net localgroup Administrators account creation outside change management.
    2026-07-10CVE-2025-5777
  • Inventory endpoints for unexpected ScreenConnect, Zoho Assist, Netbird or Atera installs not tied to a sanctioned RMM deployment.
    2026-07-10CVE-2025-5777

Defender insights

What each entry about DragonForce tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-09-29HIGHMicrosoft: the same toolkit rides into victims regardless of which ransomware brand signs the note

Triage

2026-08-20NOTABLEThe tell is the timing: a recovery offer that arrives while the intrusion is still private is foreknowledge, not marketing

Triage

2026-07-14NOTABLEDragonForce claims 850 GB from Geneva's IFAGE, layering an unconfirmed extortion listing onto a narrower April breach the foundation already disclosed

Latest update

2026-07-10HIGHexploitedHuntress reconstructs a productised CitrixBleed 2-to-DragonForce runbook: token theft, a registry-symlink SYSTEM escalation, then ransomware

Triage

2026-06-17HIGHDragonForce abuses Microsoft Teams TURN relays for C2 and chains four vulnerable drivers (BYOVD)

Detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

collaborates with

attributed activity

Story timeline

  1. 2026-09-29Storm-2570: a ransomware affiliate reuses a consistent commodity RMM/tunnelling/credential-theft toolkit across four separate RaaS brands, with government agencies among its confirmed victims
    active-threatsMicrosoft: the same toolkit rides into victims regardless of which ransomware brand signs the note
  2. 2026-08-20"Ransom Busters" emails ransomware victims before their incident is public, offering to delete the stolen data for a fee, and the tooling says it is the same affiliate who took it
    active-threatsThe tell is the timing: a recovery offer that arrives while the intrusion is still private is foreknowledge, not marketing
  3. 2026-07-14DragonForce lists Geneva's IFAGE adult-education foundation on its leak site, claiming 850 GB; an attribution and volume IFAGE has not confirmed
    active-threatsDragonForce claims 850 GB from Geneva's IFAGE, layering an unconfirmed extortion listing onto a narrower April breach the foundation already disclosed
  4. 2026-07-10CitrixBleed 2 (CVE-2025-5777) weaponised into a repeatable IAB kill chain ending in DragonForce ransomware (STAC3725)
    deep-diveHuntress reconstructs a productised CitrixBleed 2-to-DragonForce runbook: token theft, a registry-symlink SYSTEM escalation, then ransomware
  5. 2026-06-17DragonForce abuses Microsoft Teams TURN relays for C2 and chains four vulnerable drivers (BYOVD)
    deep-dive
ATT&CK techniques (29 across 12 tactics)

29 techniques observed across 5 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · System Services: Service Execution · Hijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceAccount Manipulation · Modify Registry · Create Account · Create Account: Local Account
  • Privilege EscalationExploitation for Privilege Escalation · Account Manipulation
  • StealthIndicator Removal · Hijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • Defense ImpairmentModify Registry · Disable or Modify Tools
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping · OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · OS Credential Dumping: NTDS · Credentials from Password Stores · Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
  • DiscoveryRemote System Discovery · Network Service Discovery
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services · Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol · Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token · Lateral Tool Transfer
  • Command and ControlProxy · Remote Access Tools · Protocol Tunneling
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Financial Theft

Initial Access TA0001

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×2

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

T1569.002System Services: Service Execution×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and Net.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1098Account Manipulation×1

Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1112Modify Registry×1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136Create Account×1

Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.

Evidence: 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×3

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×2

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098Account Manipulation×1

Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1070Indicator Removal×1

Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Rather than broadly removing evidence, adversaries may target specific artifacts that appear anomalous or are likely to draw scrutiny, while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1112Modify Registry×1

Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×2

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003OS Credential Dumping×1

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×1

Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555Credentials from Password Stores×2

Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.

Evidence: 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1018Remote System Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.

Evidence: 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

T1046Network Service Discovery×3

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021Remote Services×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×1

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1570Lateral Tool Transfer×2

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1090Proxy×1

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Evidence: 2026-06-17/dragonforce-abuses-microsoft-teams-turn-relays-for-c2-and-ch · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×3

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×1

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×2

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-09-29/microsoft-storm-2570-cross-raas-toolkit · 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-07-10/citrixbleed-2-dragonforce-iab-kill-chain-stac3725 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1657Financial Theft×2

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.

Evidence: 2026-08-20/ransom-busters-rogue-affiliate-fake-recovery-firm · 2026-07-14/dragonforce-leak-claim-ifage-geneva-adult-education · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about DragonForce (5)

2026-09-29 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOB2

Storm-2570: a ransomware affiliate reuses a consistent commodity RMM/tunnelling/credential-theft toolkit across four separate RaaS brands, with government agencies among its confirmed victims

Microsoft Threat Intelligence profiles Storm-2570, a ransomware affiliate it has tracked since April 2025 that operates across multiple ransomware-as-a-service ecosystems rather than committing to one brand, deploying Qilin, DragonForce, Anubis and BERT payloads interchangeably against victims in healthcare, education, government agencies and services, financial services, energy, retail, IT and food/agriculture across the US, Canada, UK, Spain, the Netherlands and Puerto Rico (Microsoft Security Blog, 2026-09-24). Post-compromise, the affiliate routinely conducts internal network discovery using NetScan, SoftPerfect Network Scanner Portable and Nmap alongside native discovery commands and file-searching activity, to identify reachable hosts and services, map internal networks and locate systems, shares and files of interest ahead of credential access or encryption. Regardless of the final ransomware brand, Microsoft describes a recurring commodity toolchain across deployments: MeshAgent/MeshCentral, frequently renamed per-victim (for example meshagent64-[org].exe) and one of the affiliate's most frequently observed tools, as the operational bridge from initial access into account manipulation and credential access; Atera plus Splashtop, ScreenConnect, NinjaRMM, and, in one intrusion, a persistent LocalSystem-service Cloudflared.exe tunnel, and ngrok exposing RDP for redundant remote access; ntdsutil-driven Install-From-Media dumps of ntds.dit for offline domain-credential extraction; Mimikatz, LaZagne and pypykatz for credential harvesting; systematic Windows Defender tampering (disabling real-time monitoring, adding C:\PerfLogs exclusions, direct WinDefend registry edits) ahead of deployment; PsExec-driven lateral movement using @ip.txt host lists, including an rdp.bat script that force-enables RDP, alongside Impacket and NetExec over SMB; and s5cmd- or Rclone-based exfiltration to attacker-controlled S3 buckets ahead of double-extortion.

Because the toolkit, not the ransomware brand, is what recurs, defenders who alert only on a known ransomware binary or a specific RaaS brand's indicators will miss the affiliate entirely on its next engagement under a different payload. The consistent tradecraft gives a detection surface that survives a brand switch: a renamed MeshAgent binary establishing outbound C2, an ntdsutil IFM snapshot followed by offline credential extraction, a persistent-service Cloudflared.exe process, discovery-scanner activity (NetScan/Nmap) ahead of lateral movement, and s5cmd/Rclone processes initiating outbound transfers to cloud object storage are the behaviors Microsoft's reporting keys on across Storm-2570 engagements, independent of which ransomware note appears at the end. Microsoft's own post closes with a Defender XDR detection and mitigation mapping tied to each of these behaviors.

Triage: MeshAgent, Atera, ScreenConnect and NinjaRMM are legitimate tools many organizations already run for IT support; the discriminator is not the tool's presence but its provenance and configuration: a renamed executable (meshagent64-[org].exe rather than the vendor's own binary name), an RMM agent installed outside a change-managed deployment window, or a Cloudflared.exe process registered as a persistent LocalSystem service rather than invoked interactively are the signals Microsoft's own telemetry keys on.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed Storm-2570 in multiple investigated intrusions affecting organizations in United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands, and Puerto Rico, including healthcare and public health, education, government agencies and services, financial services, energy, consumer retail, Information technology (IT), food and agriculture, consumer services, commercial facilities, non-government organization (NGO), chemicals, critical manufacturing, and transportation.

Microsoft Security Blog / Microsoft Threat Intelligence 2026-09-24

Builds on: Cisco Talos: a Qilin intrusion's own staging directory held ransomware deployment scripts the…

threat29 Sep 04:55Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-08-20 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

"Ransom Busters" emails ransomware victims before their incident is public, offering to delete the stolen data for a fee, and the tooling says it is the same affiliate who took it

An entity styling itself Ransom Busters has been emailing organisations in the middle of a ransomware incident, writing to addresses at the victim's own domain and asking to be put in touch with the chief executive or IT leadership (GuidePoint Security, 2026-08-18). It presents itself as a project that assists victims of cyberattacks, claims to have held unauthorised access to criminal groups' servers for more than three years, says it has found the victim's stolen data on one of those servers, and offers to return the files, destroy the attackers' backups and (because it claims access to the operation's key storage) help restore encrypted data. The fee is $20,000 to $60,000 to delete the stolen data from the ransomware group's servers.

The property that separates this from ordinary ambulance-chasing is when it arrives. GuidePoint notes that legitimate recovery-service solicitation generally follows an attack becoming public knowledge; this outreach lands before the incident is publicly known at all, which means the sender knew about an intrusion nobody had disclosed (GuidePoint Security, 2026-08-18). Responding to two of these incidents, GuidePoint's teams found the same set of artefacts in both victim environments: one network-scanning utility used for internal reconnaissance, one cloud-object-storage command-line tool used to move data out to attacker-controlled cloud storage, one remote-monitoring-and-management tool installed through a PowerShell script as a secondary access channel, a locally created backdoor account whose password was identical in both intrusions, and an identical attacker-controlled workstation name appearing in both. GuidePoint weighed and rejected the obvious innocent explanation (a standardised affiliate playbook or a shared virtual-machine image distributed inside one programme) because the same overlap recurred across incidents belonging to different ransomware operations, which makes it a fingerprint of an operator rather than of a programme. On that basis it assesses with moderate confidence that Ransom Busters is a single affiliate employed across several operations, using affiliate-level access to divert ransom negotiations away from the operation it is working for, and states it observed the behaviour while responding to incidents involving DragonForce, Settra and Anubis (GuidePoint Security, 2026-08-18).

A second incident-response firm has seen the same thing independently. Coveware confirmed to BleepingComputer that it responded to at least one incident involving contact from the same group or individual, and its senior director of incident response drew the same distinction, that what makes this different from a routine recovery-service pitch is the approach to a victim whose incident was not yet public (BleepingComputer, 2026-08-19). No victim is reported to have paid Ransom Busters; in one incident the victim paid the underlying ransomware operator instead.

GRIT assesses with moderate confidence that “Ransom Busters” is not a bona fide third-party victim services firm, but rather a single ransomware affiliate with employment across multiple RaaS operations, using their affiliate access to divert ransom payment discussions away from the original ransomware operation.

We observed this behavior while responding to incidents from threat groups including DragonForce, Settra and Anubis.

GuidePoint Security (GRIT) 2026-08-18
threat20 Aug 04:52Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-07-14 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOC3

DragonForce lists Geneva's IFAGE adult-education foundation on its leak site, claiming 850 GB; an attribution and volume IFAGE has not confirmed

The German-title source reads "the DragonForce group claims to have captured 850 gigabytes of data from IFAGE; the foundation had already warned of a leak of sensitive data." IFAGE (Fondation pour la formation des adultes à Genève), a Geneva adult-education foundation, disclosed in May 2026 that it suffered an intrusion on 11–12 April 2026 (detected 13 April): unauthorized exfiltration of current- and former-employee data, no ransom demand recorded at the time, reported to the Federal Data Protection and Transparency Commissioner, and described by IFAGE as resolved (La Télé, 2026-05-15). On 14 July 2026, Swiss IT outlet Inside IT reported that the extortion group DragonForce has now listed IFAGE on its leak site, claiming 850 GB, an order of magnitude beyond the scope IFAGE described, and a specific actor attribution IFAGE itself never made (Inside IT, 2026-07-14). No IFAGE statement responding to the listing, and no second independent outlet corroborating the DragonForce name or the 850 GB figure, could be located as of this run.

Die Gruppe Dragonforce will 850 Gigabyte an Daten von Ifage erbeutet haben. Die Stiftung hatte bereits vor einem Abfluss sensibler Daten gewarnt.

Inside IT Switzerland 2026-07-14

Des données usuelles de collaborateurs ont été compromises

La Télé 2026-05-15

Des photos de pièces d'identité, des adresses e-mail et postales, ainsi que des numéros de téléphone ou encore des résultats d'examens ont été publiés.

Leur divulgation par les cybercriminels concerne tant des employés de l'institut que des bénéficiaires (étudiants, entreprises, etc.).

20 minutes
Updaterun 2026-07-26T1308Z-auditevidencesectorssourcesbody

The DragonForce listing against IFAGE (the Fondation pour la formation des adultes à Genève) is no longer an unverified leak-site claim. The group carried out its threat and published the data, which Le Temps reported had been done as of Thursday 2026-07-23: "Des photos de pièces d'identité, des adresses e-mail et postales, ainsi que des numéros de téléphone ou encore des résultats d'examens ont été publiés.", identity-document photographs, e-mail and postal addresses, telephone numbers and examination results (20 minutes, 2026-07-24). The same report states that their disclosure by the cybercriminals "concerne tant des employés de l'institut que des bénéficiaires (étudiants, entreprises, etc.)"; it covers both the institute's employees and its beneficiaries, meaning students and companies. It also cites an expert consulted by Le Temps who put the exposure at thousands of documents spanning several years and running to 2026. ICTjournal had reported the extortion threat a week earlier (ICTjournal, 2026-07-17).

The operationally interesting part is the gap between the victim's scoping and the published set. IFAGE's earlier public account of its incident placed the impact on employee data rather than student or pedagogical records; the leak contains multi-year examination results for students. First coverage flagged that the group's claimed volume already exceeded the institute's own disclosure, and publication has now settled that discrepancy in the attackers' favour. Nothing in the reporting identifies the initial-access vector, so no access-path lesson is available from this incident.

Contradiction: the sources and the victim do not agree on whether a ransom was ever demanded, and this entry does not resolve it. 20 minutes frames the publication as the consequence of an unpaid demand; "Si la rançon demandée n'était pas payée, les pirates informatiques qui s'en sont pris en avril à l'Ifage (Fondation pour la formation des adultes à Genève) promettaient de mettre en ligne les données dérobées", while also reporting the foundation's own position that "La fondation avait aussi affirmé qu'elle n'avait pas reçu de demande de rançon, mais que, le cas échéant, elle refuserait de payer": it had received no ransom demand, but would refuse to pay if one came (20 minutes, 2026-07-24). ICTjournal is more definite on the demand's existence, reporting a week earlier that a ransom was now being demanded and that the group threatened to publish at the expiry of the ultimatum posted on its leak site (ICTjournal, 2026-07-17). A leak-site ultimatum naming a ransom the victim says never reached it is a common pattern and not necessarily either party misspeaking; demands are frequently posted publicly rather than delivered.

incident14 Jul 20:22Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Earlier coverage (2)

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats3
  • Deep dive2

Source distribution

  • attack.mitre.org10 (43%)
  • bleepingcomputer.com2 (9%)
  • 20min.ch1 (4%)
  • guidepointsecurity.com1 (4%)
  • helpnetsecurity.com1 (4%)
  • huntress.com1 (4%)
  • ictjournal.ch1 (4%)
  • inside-it.ch1 (4%)
  • other5 (22%)
All cited sources (23)