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Scattered Spider

actor · actor:scattered-spider single-source

Decentralised, English-fluent cybercrime collective (not a single hierarchical group) responsible for over 100 network intrusions since 2022 using vishing/smishing SSO-lookalike phishing, SIM-swap and help-desk-impersonation initial access, and BlackCat/ALPHV or DragonForce ransomware deployment. Group-IB (2026-07-07) reframes it as a movement of independent 3-5-person subclusters unified by shared TTPs, casting its own '0ktapus' designation and Microsoft's Octo Tempest, Mandiant's UNC3944 and Palo Alto's Muddled Libra as overlapping subcluster labels rather than distinct groups.

Aliases: 0ktapus, Octo Tempest, UNC3944, Muddled Libra

Coverage
4
2 about it · 2 mentions · first 2026-05-19 → last 2026-08-10
Latest activity
2026-08-10
ESXi's minimal shell is expressive enough to hide commands, and its logging captures the parsing stage rather…
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, healthcare, energy · regions: europe, uk
Sources cited
13
10 hosts
2026-05-194 appearances2026-08-10

Defender insights

What each entry about Scattered Spider tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-08-10NOTABLEESXi's minimal shell is expressive enough to hide commands, and its logging captures the parsing stage rather than the result

Triage

2026-06-23NOTABLETwo Scattered Spider members plead guilty over the 2024 Transport for London intrusion

Latest update

Story timeline

Every entry that names Scattered Spider, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-08-10CrowdStrike catalogues 21 working command-obfuscation techniques inside VMware ESXi's BusyBox ash shell, and shell logs record the command before expansion, so the logged string is not what ran
    researchESXi's minimal shell is expressive enough to hide commands, and its logging captures the parsing stage rather than the result
  2. 2026-07-10'Helix' data-extortion cluster pairs manager-impersonation vishing with device-code phishing and automated SharePoint exfiltration
    mentionactive-threatsReliaQuest: new 'Helix' extortion cluster (BlackFile/ShinyHunters lineage) vishes staff into device-code sign-ins, then bulk-loots SharePoint
  3. 2026-06-23Two Scattered Spider members plead guilty over the 2024 Transport for London intrusion
    active-threats
  4. 2026-05-19Grafana Labs CoinbaseCartel breach; victim confirms source-code-only theft, no customer data, ransom rejected
    mentionactive-threats
ATT&CK techniques (9 across 7 tactics)

9 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceGather Victim Identity Information: Credentials
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Phishing · Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · Account Manipulation
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Account Manipulation
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Valid Accounts · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
  • Credential AccessMulti-Factor Authentication Request Generation

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1589.001Gather Victim Identity Information: Credentials×1

Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/two-scattered-spider-members-plead-guilty-over-the-2024-tran · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/two-scattered-spider-members-plead-guilty-over-the-2024-tran · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566Phishing×1

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/two-scattered-spider-members-plead-guilty-over-the-2024-tran · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.004Phishing: Spearphishing Voice×1

Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/two-scattered-spider-members-plead-guilty-over-the-2024-tran · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×1

Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/esxi-busybox-ash-command-obfuscation-21-techniques · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/two-scattered-spider-members-plead-guilty-over-the-2024-tran · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098Account Manipulation×1

Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/two-scattered-spider-members-plead-guilty-over-the-2024-tran · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/two-scattered-spider-members-plead-guilty-over-the-2024-tran · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098Account Manipulation×1

Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/two-scattered-spider-members-plead-guilty-over-the-2024-tran · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/esxi-busybox-ash-command-obfuscation-21-techniques · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/two-scattered-spider-members-plead-guilty-over-the-2024-tran · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-08-10/esxi-busybox-ash-command-obfuscation-21-techniques · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1621Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation×1

Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.

Evidence: 2026-06-23/two-scattered-spider-members-plead-guilty-over-the-2024-tran · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Scattered Spider (2)

2026-08-10 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

CrowdStrike catalogues 21 working command-obfuscation techniques inside VMware ESXi's BusyBox ash shell, and shell logs record the command before expansion, so the logged string is not what ran

CrowdStrike has published a systematic test of command obfuscation inside VMware ESXi's shell, catalogued as 21 distinct working techniques across six classes and validated against a named build, "ESX 7.0.3 build-20036589 running the VMware-provided BusyBox at /usr/lib/vmware/busybox/bin/busybox, which enables the awk GNU math extensions" (CrowdStrike, 2026-08-07). The motivation is that the hypervisor layer is where ransomware operations end: CrowdStrike names Scattered Spider and Akira among the groups that have demonstrated that reaching it allows an adversary to encrypt virtual machines, disable logging and cripple a data centre at once.

Two findings carry the operational weight. The first is that the assumption behind ignoring this shell is wrong; BusyBox's minimal footprint does not mean minimal capability, because it keeps POSIX compliance for command substitution, variable expansion, escape-sequence interpretation and quoting, and the bundled awk brings string manipulation, arithmetic, bitwise operations and its own command-execution facility. The obfuscation engine, in other words, is a coreutils applet rather than the shell, which is precisely why hardening and monitoring approaches designed for a full Linux server shell do not transfer.

The second finding is the one that changes detection engineering, and it is a property of the platform's own telemetry: "ESX shell logs capture commands during the parsing stage, before expansions occur." The logged string is therefore the obfuscated form, not the command that executed. CrowdStrike states the consequence plainly for the concrete case; "Any detection strategy that searches for the keyword 'esxcli' would miss this command entirely." Any rule, hunt query or SIEM correlation built on literal administrative command names against ESXi shell telemetry inherits this gap, regardless of vendor.

Detection, telemetry class first. The usable signal is the ESXi shell command log itself, but keyed on structure rather than on command names: substitution and expansion syntax, escape-sequence density, arithmetic or bitwise construction of strings, and invocations of the shell's text-processing applet in positions where an administrator would type a command name. CrowdStrike calibrated false-positive risk against real production activity and lists what normal looks like (service restarts, vendor hardware tools, backup scripts, certificate renewal, NTP restarts, configuration greps) none of which resemble any of the six classes. Triage: administrators legitimately use quoting and variables in ESXi shell one-liners, so their presence alone is not the signal; the discriminator is obfuscation that serves no readability or scripting purpose, a command name assembled from fragments or computed arithmetically, when typing it directly would have been shorter.

The critical insight is that ESX shell logs capture commands during the parsing stage, before expansions occur.

All techniques were validated on ESX 7.0.3 build-20036589 running the VMware-provided BusyBox at /usr/lib/vmware/busybox/bin/busybox, which enables the awk GNU math extensions (xor, and, or).

Any detection strategy that searches for the keyword "esxcli" would miss this command entirely.

CrowdStrike 2026-08-07
research10 Aug 04:45Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: CrowdStrike

2026-06-23 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdated

Two Scattered Spider members plead guilty over the 2024 Transport for London intrusion

Thalha Jubair (20) and Owen Flowers (18) changed their pleas to guilty at Woolwich Crown Court on 2026-06-22, both admitting conspiracy to commit unauthorised acts against Transport for London under the Computer Misuse Act (UK National Crime Agency, 2026-06-22; ITV News, 2026-06-22). The 31 August – 3 September 2024 intrusion disrupted TfL services for three months, forced in-person password resets for all 28,000 staff, and affected roughly 10 million customers including Oyster systems, at a cost the NCA puts at £29M in loss and recovery (ITV and the BBC reported £39M. Flowers additionally admitted attempted intrusions against US healthcare providers Sutter Health and SSM Health; the NCA ties both defendants to the Scattered Spider collective (UNC3944 / Storm-0875), and sentencing is set for 16 July 2026 (Yahoo/BBC, 2026-06-22).

a total of 148 systems became inoperable, including critical ones that required significant manual workarounds and delays.

UK National Crime Agency

Flowers and Jubair purchased partial TfL credentials from "well-known criminal forums" and used those to reset the 2FA on employee accounts, a process that took multiple attempts.

Woolwich Crown Court heard that the pair impersonated an employee and socially engineered a TfL helpdesk worker into resetting the password for their account.

The Register 2026-07-16
Updaterun 2026-07-17T0409Z-intelentitiesevidencesourcestechniquesbody

The guilty-plea entry recorded that two Scattered Spider members admitted the 2024 TfL intrusion but did not carry the access mechanics. The 2026-07-16 sentencing (five years six months each, at Woolwich Crown Court) put the chain on the court record, and it is the reason to revisit this. The pair bought partial TfL employee credentials from criminal forums, then "impersonated an employee and socially engineered a TfL helpdesk worker into resetting the password for their account" and, over multiple attempts, reset the account's 2FA, using the reset credentials for initial and sustained access (The Register, 2026-07-16). The NCA confirmed the impact scale, "a total of 148 systems became inoperable, including critical ones that required significant manual workarounds and delays" (NCA, 2026-07-16), and TfL later established that data on roughly 7 million users had been accessible, far beyond the ~5,000 initially believed (The Register, 2026-07-16). The CPS put the remediation cost at £29 million (CPS, 2026-07-16).

threat23 Jun 04:52Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats3
  • Research1

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com2 (15%)
  • nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk2 (15%)
  • theregister.com2 (15%)
  • ca.news.yahoo.com1 (8%)
  • cps.gov.uk1 (8%)
  • crowdstrike.com1 (8%)
  • itv.com1 (8%)
  • reliaquest.com1 (8%)
  • other2 (15%)
All cited sources (13)