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Cavern Manticore

actor · actor:cavern-manticore single-source

Iran MOIS-linked APT targeting Israeli government and IT-sector organizations, sharing technical/infrastructure overlap with MuddyWater and OilRig's Lyceum subgroup; operates the modular .NET C2 framework 'Cavern' (Check Point Research, 2026-07-06).

Coverage timeline
1
first 2026-07-09 → last 2026-07-09
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Sources cited
1
1 hosts
Sections touched
1
active-threats
Co-occurring entities
2
see Related entities below
ATT&CK techniques
4
pinned v19.1 · see below

Hunting pivots

Tags
espionageiran-nexusnation-state

ATT&CK techniques

4 techniques observed across 1 entry — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Execution TA0002

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-07-09/cavern-manticore-iran-mois-modular-net-c2-anti-analysis · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-07-09/cavern-manticore-iran-mois-modular-net-c2-anti-analysis · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-07-09/cavern-manticore-iran-mois-modular-net-c2-anti-analysis · ATT&CK page ↗

T1620Reflective Code Loading×1

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).

Evidence: 2026-07-09/cavern-manticore-iran-mois-modular-net-c2-anti-analysis · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-07-09/cavern-manticore-iran-mois-modular-net-c2-anti-analysis · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-07-09Check Point: Iran MOIS-linked "Cavern Manticore" ships a modular .NET C2 that uses three compilation formats as an anti-analysis layer, delivered via SysAid RMM abuse
    active-threatsCavern Manticore's C2 splits across IL, Mixed-Mode and NativeAOT binaries to break RE toolchains — pushed through SysAid's legitimate deployment feature

Where this entity is cited

  • active-threats1

Source distribution

  • research.checkpoint.com1 (100%)

Related entities

All cited sources (1)

Entries about Cavern Manticore (1)

2026-07-09 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB3

Check Point: Iran MOIS-linked "Cavern Manticore" ships a modular .NET C2 that uses three compilation formats as an anti-analysis layer, delivered via SysAid RMM abuse

Check Point Research documented Cavern Manticore, an Iran MOIS-linked APT it assesses shares technical and infrastructure overlap with MuddyWater and OilRig's Lyceum subgroup, targeting Israeli government and IT-sector organisations (Check Point Research, 2026-07-06). Its namesake framework, Cavern, is a modular post-exploitation .NET C2 whose components are deliberately compiled into three different binary formats: pure IL-only .NET (the mhm.dll file-ops/DPAPI-decrypt module, db.dll SQL browser, ode.dll LDAP/AD-recon module), Mixed-Mode C++/CLI IL+native (the uxtheme.dll Cavern Agent core), and .NET 8 NativeAOT native-only (n-HTCommp.dll HTTPS/WebSocket transport, n-ten.dll network recon/SMB brute-force, n-sws.dll SOCKS5/WSS tunnel). The compilation-format diversity is itself the anti-analysis layer: each format demands a different reverse-engineering toolchain, and NativeAOT strips framework symbols and resolves security-sensitive P/Invoke calls (WNetAddConnection2, NetShareEnum, NetLocalGroupGetMembers) through runtime descriptor tables rather than the PE import table, hiding capability from import-based triage (Check Point Research, 2026-07-06).

Delivery is the transferable part: the actor abused SysAid's legitimate software-update/deployment feature — not a SysAid vulnerability — to push a WinDirStat DLL-sideloading package that loads the trojanized uxtheme.dll as the Cavern Agent, which exports 83 functions mimicking the real Windows theming library (82 empty stubs; the one live export, EnableThemeDialogTexture, is the C2 entry point) — a sandbox trap for automated analysis that only invokes default exports. Each loaded module is isolated in its own .NET AppDomain via a MarshalByRefObject proxy so modules can be unloaded cleanly after use, leaving minimal forensic residue; most samples score zero or near-zero on VirusTotal. ATT&CK: T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information (via compilation-format diversity), T1620 Reflective Code Loading (AppDomain-isolated modules), T1219 Remote Access Software (SysAid deployment abuse).

Cavern Manticore is an Iran MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security)-linked actor, with links to the OilRig subgroup named Lyceum

the compilation format itself becomes the anti-analysis layer, since each of the three formats has to be reversed with a different toolchain

SysAid was not compromised, and no SysAid vulnerability was involved. The attacker had already gained access to the victim environment and abused a legitimate software-deployment feature

Check Point Research 2026-07-06
threat09 Jul 04:32Zsingle-sourceOpen finding ↗
Sources: Check Point Research