2026-10-19NOTABLECalendar-invite phishing spreads: Outlook and Gmail add the lure on their own and keep it after the email is deleted
Microsoft Outlook
product · product:microsoft-outlook
Coverage
2
first 2026-07-21 → last 2026-10-19
Latest activity
2026-10-19
Calendar-invite phishing spreads: Outlook and Gmail add the lure on their own and keep it after the email is…
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, technology · regions: middle-east
Sources cited
7
6 hosts
Defender insights
What each entry about Microsoft Outlook tells a defender to do, newest first.
Exposure · detection
Latest update · triage
Story timeline
- 2026-10-19Phishing lures sent as ICS calendar invites land in Outlook and Gmail calendars without a click and stay after the email is deleted; EvilTokens used them for Microsoft 365 device-code phishing
- 2026-07-21HOLLOWGRAPH: a Cavern-framework backdoor that turns a compromised Microsoft 365 calendar into a Graph-API dead-drop C2
Hunting pivots
Releases covered
Microsoft Outlook ×2
ATT&CK techniques (12 across 7 tactics)
12 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
- ExecutionUser Execution: Malicious Link
- PersistenceValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- Credential AccessSteal Application Access Token
- Command and ControlFallback Channels · Application Layer Protocol: DNS · Web Service: Bidirectional Communication · Ingress Tool Transfer · Dynamic Resolution · Encrypted Channel
Initial Access TA0001
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1
Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.
Evidence: 2026-10-19/ics-calendar-invite-phishing-auto-added-outlook-gmail · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1204.001User Execution: Malicious Link×1
An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Link. Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via Malicious File.
Evidence: 2026-10-19/ics-calendar-invite-phishing-auto-added-outlook-gmail · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1528Steal Application Access Token×1
Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.
Evidence: 2026-10-19/ics-calendar-invite-phishing-auto-added-outlook-gmail · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1008Fallback Channels×1
Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1
Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1568Dynamic Resolution×1
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
T1573Encrypted Channel×1
Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Evidence: 2026-07-21/hollowgraph-m365-calendar-graph-api-c2-cavern · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Microsoft Outlook (2)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Microsoft 365×2
- Cavern×1
- Cavern Manticore×1
- EvilTokens×1
- Google Calendar×1
- Google Workspace×1
- HOLLOWGRAPH×1
- Microsoft Entra ID×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- securelist.com2 (29%)
- group-ib.com1 (14%)
- infosecurity-magazine.com1 (14%)
- netcraft.com1 (14%)
- research.checkpoint.com1 (14%)
- theguardian.com1 (14%)
All cited sources (7)
- group-ib.comGroup-IB Threat Intelligencehttps://www.group-ib.com/blog/hollowgraph-microsoft-365/
- infosecurity-magazine.comInfosecurity Magazinehttps://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/hollowgraph-microsoft-calendars/
- netcraft.comNetcrafthttps://www.netcraft.com/blog/how-attackers-get-into-your-calendar-the-easy-way
- research.checkpoint.comCheck Point Researchhttps://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/
- securelist.comKaspersky Securelist (GReAT)https://securelist.com/project-cav3rn-continues/120991/
- securelist.comKaspersky (Securelist / GReAT)https://securelist.com/project-cav3rn-cyberespionage-framework-using-outlook-and-dns/120757/
- theguardian.comThe Guardianhttps://www.theguardian.com/money/2026/oct/11/calendar-phishing-scam-meeting-renewal-google-microsoft-paypal