ctipilot.ch

MuddyWater

actor · actor:muddywater single-source

Iran MOIS-linked APT active against European and Middle-Eastern targets; 2026 pipeline coverage documents a Chaos-ransomware false-flag with Teams credential harvesting and a Q1 2026 DLL side-loading campaign abusing signed Fortemedia/SentinelOne binaries with ChromElevator ABE bypass (Symantec).

Aliases: Seedworm

Coverage timeline
6
first 2026-05-04 → last 2026-07-19
Peak priority
notable
6 notable
Sources cited
13
12 hosts
Sections touched
5
active-threats, research, weekly-annual-reports
Co-occurring entities
3
see Related entities below
ATT&CK techniques
14
pinned v19.2 · see below
2026-05-046 appearances2026-07-19

ATT&CK techniques

14 techniques observed across 4 entries — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1595.002Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning×1

Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.

Evidence: 2026-07-19/weekly-w29-ai-tradecraft-accelerant · ATT&CK page ↗

Resource Development TA0042

T1587.001Develop Capabilities: Malware×1

Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-07-19/weekly-w29-ai-tradecraft-accelerant · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1566Phishing×1

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.

Evidence: 2026-07-19/weekly-w29-ai-tradecraft-accelerant · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.004Phishing: Spearphishing Voice×1

Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-07-09/cavern-manticore-iran-mois-modular-net-c2-anti-analysis · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-07-09/cavern-manticore-iran-mois-modular-net-c2-anti-analysis · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-07-09/cavern-manticore-iran-mois-modular-net-c2-anti-analysis · ATT&CK page ↗

T1620Reflective Code Loading×1

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).

Evidence: 2026-07-09/cavern-manticore-iran-mois-modular-net-c2-anti-analysis · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates×1

Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1087Account Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., Valid Accounts).

Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗

T1482Domain Trust Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy×1

Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-07-09/cavern-manticore-iran-mois-modular-net-c2-anti-analysis · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-07-19The week's AI-and-attackers reporting converged on a calibrated read — AI is accelerating existing tradecraft, not creating a new attack class — and handed defenders a concrete hunt signal: emoji and Unicode artefacts in compiled-malware debug strings
    weekly-researchAI as tradecraft accelerant, not inflection — Insikt's Iran playbook, a jailbroken Gemini rebuilding C2 in six minutes, and an emoji-in-debug-string hunt signal
  2. 2026-07-09Check Point: Iran MOIS-linked "Cavern Manticore" ships a modular .NET C2 that uses three compilation formats as an anti-analysis layer, delivered via SysAid RMM abuse
    active-threatsCavern Manticore's C2 splits across IL, Mixed-Mode and NativeAOT binaries to break RE toolchains — pushed through SysAid's legitimate deployment feature
  3. 2026-05-28MuddyWater / Seedworm — Symantec and Carbon Black document new DLL-side-loading pair via signed Fortemedia and SentinelOne binaries, ChromElevator for Chromium App-Bound Encryption bypass, Node.js orchestration
    researchMuddyWater / Seedworm — Symantec and Carbon Black document new DLL-side-loading pair via signed Fortemedia and SentinelOne binaries, ChromElevator for Chromium
  4. 2026-05-08MuddyWater (Iran/MOIS) deploys Chaos ransomware as false flag; harvests credentials via Teams
    active-threats
  5. 2026-05-04MuddyWater (Iran / MOIS) Chaos ransomware false-flag + Teams BEC
    weekly-long-running
  6. 2026-05-04Mandiant M-Trends 2026
    weekly-annual-reports

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry — each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

overlaps with

attributed activity

Where this entity is cited

  • active-threats2
  • weekly-annual-reports1
  • weekly-long-running1
  • research1
  • weekly-research1

Source distribution

  • research.checkpoint.com2 (15%)
  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (8%)
  • cloud.google.com1 (8%)
  • cybersecuritydive.com1 (8%)
  • deepinstinct.com1 (8%)
  • industrialcyber.co1 (8%)
  • rapid7.com1 (8%)
  • recordedfuture.com1 (8%)
  • other4 (31%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived — referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

All cited sources (13)

Entries about MuddyWater (6)

2026-07-19 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

The week's AI-and-attackers reporting converged on a calibrated read — AI is accelerating existing tradecraft, not creating a new attack class — and handed defenders a concrete hunt signal: emoji and Unicode artefacts in compiled-malware debug strings

The prior two weeklies tracked AI moving "from target to operator." This week the reporting matured into a calibration, and the useful output for a technical defender is less the narrative than one concrete hunt technique.

The calibrated read. Recorded Future's Insikt Group synthesised cyber, information-operations and military reporting on Iran's 2026 conflict activity and concluded that "AI has almost certainly enhanced Iran's asymmetric tactics and hybrid warfare doctrine, but has not fundamentally altered the strategic logic underpinning Iran's approach" (Recorded Future / Insikt Group, 2026-07-16). GuidePoint's Q2 review, cutting directly against the alarmist framing, likewise assessed that "the prevailing concern that AI will enable a new class of catastrophic AI-native attacks remains largely unrealized" (Cybersecurity Dive on GuidePoint GRIT, 2026-07-09, pre-window background). Both frame AI as an effort-multiplier — which the week's field evidence bears out: Trend Micro's Patriot Bait analysis documented a jailbroken Gemini agent autonomously writing, deploying and self-repairing a replacement C2 server and confirming bot reconnection in six minutes, with the human operator contributing an estimated ~11% (Trend Micro, 2026-07-14).

Where the acceleration bites — and leaves a fingerprint. Insikt's technically concrete threads are reconnaissance (CloudSEK reproduced CyberAv3ngers-style LLM-agent ICS recon and found "an actor can move from intent to a list of accessible US ICS devices with known default credentials in under five minutes"), phishing (Google GTIG documented APT42 feeding Gemini a target biography to script multi-turn rapport-building conversations), and malware development. It is the last that yields a defender signal: across four independently-reporting labs, Insikt notes emoji/Unicode artefacts in compiled malware — Group-IB found the Rust-based CHAR backdoor's debug strings carried emojis, "a trait rarely seen in human-authored code," and ZScaler, Check Point and HarfangLab reported similar indicators in separate Iran-nexus toolsets — assessed as an AI-generation artefact operators failed to sanitise before compilation. Separately, Check Point's AI Security Report identifies the durable agent-compromise primitive as a planted configuration file an AI agent loads and trusts persistently, meaning any config or memory store an agent trusts is a persistence surface needing integrity monitoring (Check Point, 2026-07-14).

a trait rarely seen in human-authored code

Group-IB (via Recorded Future / Insikt Group, on emoji debug strings in the CHAR malware)

The prevailing concern that AI will enable a new class of catastrophic AI-native attacks remains largely unrealized.

Cybersecurity Dive (on GuidePoint GRIT Q2 2026) 2026-07-09

Builds on: 2026-07-14/check-point-annual-ai-security-report-2026 · 2026-07-14/patriot-bait-jailbroken-gemini-cli-autonomous-c2

research19 Jul 23:26Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-07-09 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB3

Check Point: Iran MOIS-linked "Cavern Manticore" ships a modular .NET C2 that uses three compilation formats as an anti-analysis layer, delivered via SysAid RMM abuse

Check Point Research documented Cavern Manticore, an Iran MOIS-linked APT it assesses shares technical and infrastructure overlap with MuddyWater and OilRig's Lyceum subgroup, targeting Israeli government and IT-sector organisations (Check Point Research, 2026-07-06). Its namesake framework, Cavern, is a modular post-exploitation .NET C2 whose components are deliberately compiled into three different binary formats: pure IL-only .NET (the mhm.dll file-ops/DPAPI-decrypt module, db.dll SQL browser, ode.dll LDAP/AD-recon module), Mixed-Mode C++/CLI IL+native (the uxtheme.dll Cavern Agent core), and .NET 8 NativeAOT native-only (n-HTCommp.dll HTTPS/WebSocket transport, n-ten.dll network recon/SMB brute-force, n-sws.dll SOCKS5/WSS tunnel). The compilation-format diversity is itself the anti-analysis layer: each format demands a different reverse-engineering toolchain, and NativeAOT strips framework symbols and resolves security-sensitive P/Invoke calls (WNetAddConnection2, NetShareEnum, NetLocalGroupGetMembers) through runtime descriptor tables rather than the PE import table, hiding capability from import-based triage (Check Point Research, 2026-07-06).

Delivery is the transferable part: the actor abused SysAid's legitimate software-update/deployment feature — not a SysAid vulnerability — to push a WinDirStat DLL-sideloading package that loads the trojanized uxtheme.dll as the Cavern Agent, which exports 83 functions mimicking the real Windows theming library (82 empty stubs; the one live export, EnableThemeDialogTexture, is the C2 entry point) — a sandbox trap for automated analysis that only invokes default exports. Each loaded module is isolated in its own .NET AppDomain via a MarshalByRefObject proxy so modules can be unloaded cleanly after use, leaving minimal forensic residue; most samples score zero or near-zero on VirusTotal. ATT&CK: T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading, T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information (via compilation-format diversity), T1620 Reflective Code Loading (AppDomain-isolated modules), T1219 Remote Access Software (SysAid deployment abuse).

Cavern Manticore is an Iran MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security)-linked actor, with links to the OilRig subgroup named Lyceum

the compilation format itself becomes the anti-analysis layer, since each of the three formats has to be reversed with a different toolchain

SysAid was not compromised, and no SysAid vulnerability was involved. The attacker had already gained access to the victim environment and abused a legitimate software-deployment feature

Check Point Research 2026-07-06
threat09 Jul 04:32Zsingle-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-05-28 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

MuddyWater / Seedworm — Symantec and Carbon Black document new DLL-side-loading pair via signed Fortemedia and SentinelOne binaries, ChromElevator for Chromium App-Bound Encryption bypass, Node.js orchestration

Symantec's Threat Hunter Team and Broadcom's Carbon Black published findings on 2026-05-12 documenting a Q1 2026 MuddyWater (a.k.a. Seedworm, Static Kitten, MERCURY, TEMP.Zagros — attributed to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security) espionage campaign across at least nine organisations on four continents. The story re-surfaced this run via fresh aggregator coverage on 2026-05-26 (The Hacker News) — included in window on that basis. Named victim categories include industrial and electronics manufacturing, education and public-sector bodies, financial services, and an international airport in the Middle East (Symantec / Broadcom Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-12; The Hacker News, 2026-05-26; Industrial Cyber, 2026-05-13).

The differentiating TTPs from prior MuddyWater coverage are twofold. First, DLL side-loading via two pairs of legitimately signed third-party binaries: Fortemedia audio-driver binary fmapp.exe side-loading a malicious fmapp.dll; SentinelOne's sentinelmemoryscanner.exe side-loading a rogue sentinelagentcore.dll — abuse of a signed security-product binary specifically chosen to bypass signature-based detection. Both malicious DLLs embed ChromElevator, an open-source post-exploitation tool that bypasses Chromium App-Bound Encryption to extract passwords, cookies and payment-card data without triggering AV. Second, orchestration moved to Node.js: node.exe appears as a parent-process ancestor of cmd.exe before any operator commands — i.e. a Node.js script (not a human operator) drives the kill chain. PowerShell scripts pulled from a staging server perform discovery (T1087, T1482), screenshot capture, SAM-hive theft via VSS (T1003.002), and SOCKS5 reverse-proxy tunnelling (T1090.003). A credential harvester calls CredUIPromptForWindowsCredentialsW to display a Windows security dialogue and trick targets into entering credentials. A Kerberos TGT extractor via GSS-API was also observed.

Why it matters to us: signed-binary side-loading abusing a security-product binary is the highest-value evasion class — signature-based controls are bypassed by design. Detection: Sysmon EID 7 image-loads from fmapp.exe or sentinelmemoryscanner.exe outside their expected installation directories; alert on node.exe as a parent of cmd.exe or powershell.exe -enc in non-developer environments; flag CredUIPromptForWindowsCredentialsW calls from non-standard parents. Hardening: AppLocker / WDAC enforcing signed-and-known-path DLL loads; restrict node.exe execution to development OUs.

research28 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

Earlier coverage (3)