MuddyWater
actor · actor:muddywater single-source
Iran MOIS-linked APT; Rapid7 links with moderate confidence a 2026 Chaos-branded extortion intrusion that harvested credentials and MFA through Microsoft Teams screen sharing, and Symantec documents a Q1 2026 DLL side-loading campaign abusing signed Fortemedia/SentinelOne binaries with ChromElevator ABE bypass.
Aliases: Seedworm
Coverage
4
2 about it · 2 mentions · first 2026-05-08 → last 2026-10-11
Latest activity
2026-05-28
MuddyWater / Seedworm, Symantec and Carbon Black document new DLL-side-loading pair via signed Fortemedia and…
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
education
sectors: education, public-sector, manufacturing · regions: middle-east, apac, europe
Sources cited
7
6 hosts
2026-05-084 appearances2026-09-21
Defender insights
What each entry about MuddyWater tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage · detection
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
overlaps with
- Cavern ManticoreCheck Point notes technical/infrastructure overlap with MuddyWater and Lyceum
attributed activity
Story timeline
Every entry that names MuddyWater, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-09-21REF9334/KREMLIN forges Chromium's own Secure Preferences integrity hashes to silently install a banking-fraud browser extension outside the Web Store, resolving C2 through an Ethereum smart contract
- 2026-07-09Check Point: Iran MOIS-linked "Cavern Manticore" ships a modular .NET C2 that uses three compilation formats as an anti-analysis layer, delivered via SysAid RMM abuse
- 2026-05-28MuddyWater / Seedworm, Symantec and Carbon Black document new DLL-side-loading pair via signed Fortemedia and SentinelOne binaries, ChromElevator for Chromium App-Bound Encryption bypass, Node.js orchestration
- 2026-05-08Rapid7 links a Chaos-branded extortion intrusion to MuddyWater with moderate confidence: Teams screen-sharing harvested credentials and MFA, and no files were encrypted
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (11 across 9 tactics)
11 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessValid Accounts · Phishing: Spearphishing via Service
- PersistenceValid Accounts · Account Manipulation: Device Registration
- Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Account Manipulation: Device Registration
- StealthValid Accounts
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager
- DiscoveryAccount Discovery · Domain Trust Discovery
- Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
- Command and ControlProxy: Multi-hop Proxy · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools
- ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel
Initial Access TA0001
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗
T1566.003Phishing: Spearphishing via Service×1
Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.
Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗
T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1
Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.
Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1
Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1087Account Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., Valid Accounts).
Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗
T1482Domain Trust Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy×1
Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.
Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗
T1219Remote Access Tools×1
An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗
Exfiltration TA0010
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.
Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about MuddyWater (2)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Cavern×1
- Cavern Manticore×1
- Chaos (ransomware-as-a-service)×1
- Google Chrome×1
- KREMLIN×1
- Microsoft Edge×1
- OilRig×1
- REF9334×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- thehackernews.com2 (29%)
- elastic.co1 (14%)
- industrialcyber.co1 (14%)
- rapid7.com1 (14%)
- research.checkpoint.com1 (14%)
- security.com1 (14%)
All cited sources (7)
- elastic.coElastic Security Labshttps://www.elastic.co/security-labs/threat-command/malicious-browser-extension-kremlin-banking-malware
- industrialcyber.coIndustrial Cyber (2026-05-13)https://industrialcyber.co/threats-attacks/symantec-uncovers-iran-linked-seedworm-espionage-campaign-targeting-airport-government-manufacturing-sectors/
- rapid7.comRapid7https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-muddying-tracks-state-sponsored-shadow-behind-chaos-ransomware/
- research.checkpoint.comCheck Point Researchhttps://research.checkpoint.com/2026/cavern-manticore-exposing-iran-linked-modular-c2-framework/
- security.comSymantec / Broadcom Threat Intelligence (2026-05-12)https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/iran-seedworm-electronics
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker News (2026-05-26)https://thehackernews.com/2026/05/muddywater-uses-dll-side-loading-in.html
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/05/muddywater-uses-microsoft-teams-to.html