CTIPilot
AI-generated · no human review · verify critical claims against the linked source. how it works →

MuddyWater

actor · actor:muddywater single-source

Iran MOIS-linked APT; Rapid7 links with moderate confidence a 2026 Chaos-branded extortion intrusion that harvested credentials and MFA through Microsoft Teams screen sharing, and Symantec documents a Q1 2026 DLL side-loading campaign abusing signed Fortemedia/SentinelOne binaries with ChromElevator ABE bypass.

Aliases: Seedworm

Coverage
4
2 about it · 2 mentions · first 2026-05-08 → last 2026-10-11
Latest activity
2026-05-28
MuddyWater / Seedworm, Symantec and Carbon Black document new DLL-side-loading pair via signed Fortemedia and…
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
education
sectors: education, public-sector, manufacturing · regions: middle-east, apac, europe
Sources cited
7
6 hosts
2026-05-084 appearances2026-09-21

Defender insights

What each entry about MuddyWater tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-08NOTABLEAn intrusion posing as Chaos ransomware stole data without encrypting it, and Rapid7 ties it to Iran's MuddyWater through a code-signing certificate and C2

Triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

overlaps with

attributed activity

Story timeline

Every entry that names MuddyWater, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-09-21REF9334/KREMLIN forges Chromium's own Secure Preferences integrity hashes to silently install a banking-fraud browser extension outside the Web Store, resolving C2 through an Ethereum smart contract
    mentionactive-threatsElastic Security Labs: a Brazilian banking-fraud toolkit defeats Chromium's extension-integrity check by extracting the browser's own signing keys from memory
  2. 2026-07-09Check Point: Iran MOIS-linked "Cavern Manticore" ships a modular .NET C2 that uses three compilation formats as an anti-analysis layer, delivered via SysAid RMM abuse
    mentionactive-threatsCavern Manticore's C2 splits across IL, Mixed-Mode and NativeAOT binaries to break RE toolchains, pushed through SysAid's legitimate deployment feature
  3. 2026-05-28MuddyWater / Seedworm, Symantec and Carbon Black document new DLL-side-loading pair via signed Fortemedia and SentinelOne binaries, ChromElevator for Chromium App-Bound Encryption bypass, Node.js orchestration
    researchMuddyWater / Seedworm, Symantec and Carbon Black document new DLL-side-loading pair via signed Fortemedia and SentinelOne binaries, ChromElevator for Chromium
  4. 2026-05-08Rapid7 links a Chaos-branded extortion intrusion to MuddyWater with moderate confidence: Teams screen-sharing harvested credentials and MFA, and no files were encrypted
    active-threatsAn intrusion posing as Chaos ransomware stole data without encrypting it, and Rapid7 ties it to Iran's MuddyWater through a code-signing certificate and C2
ATT&CK techniques (11 across 9 tactics)

11 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Phishing: Spearphishing via Service
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · Account Manipulation: Device Registration
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Account Manipulation: Device Registration
  • StealthValid Accounts
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager
  • DiscoveryAccount Discovery · Domain Trust Discovery
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
  • Command and ControlProxy: Multi-hop Proxy · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.003Phishing: Spearphishing via Service×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.005Account Manipulation: Device Registration×1

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1087Account Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., Valid Accounts).

Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗

T1482Domain Trust Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy×1

Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.

Evidence: 2026-05-28/muddywater-seedworm-symantec-and-carbon-black-document-new-d · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-05-08/muddywater-iran-mois-deploys-chaos-ransomware-as-false-flag · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about MuddyWater (2)

2026-05-28 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

MuddyWater / Seedworm, Symantec and Carbon Black document new DLL-side-loading pair via signed Fortemedia and SentinelOne binaries, ChromElevator for Chromium App-Bound Encryption bypass, Node.js orchestration

Symantec's Threat Hunter Team and Broadcom's Carbon Black published findings on 2026-05-12 documenting a Q1 2026 MuddyWater (a.k.a. Seedworm, Static Kitten, MERCURY, TEMP.Zagros, attributed to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security) espionage campaign across at least nine organisations on four continents. The story re-surfaced this run via fresh aggregator coverage on 2026-05-26 (The Hacker News), included in window on that basis. Named victim categories include industrial and electronics manufacturing, education and public-sector bodies, financial services, and an international airport in the Middle East (Symantec / Broadcom Threat Intelligence, 2026-05-12; The Hacker News, 2026-05-26; Industrial Cyber, 2026-05-13).

The differentiating TTPs from prior MuddyWater coverage are twofold. First, DLL side-loading via two pairs of legitimately signed third-party binaries: Fortemedia audio-driver binary fmapp.exe side-loading a malicious fmapp.dll; SentinelOne's sentinelmemoryscanner.exe side-loading a rogue sentinelagentcore.dll, abuse of a signed security-product binary specifically chosen to bypass signature-based detection. Both malicious DLLs embed ChromElevator, an open-source post-exploitation tool that bypasses Chromium App-Bound Encryption to extract passwords, cookies and payment-card data without triggering AV. Second, orchestration moved to Node.js: node.exe appears as a parent-process ancestor of cmd.exe before any operator commands, i.e. a Node.js script (not a human operator) drives the kill chain. PowerShell scripts pulled from a staging server perform discovery (T1087, T1482), screenshot capture, SAM-hive theft via VSS (T1003.002), and SOCKS5 reverse-proxy tunnelling (T1090.003). A credential harvester calls CredUIPromptForWindowsCredentialsW to display a Windows security dialogue and trick targets into entering credentials. A Kerberos TGT extractor via GSS-API was also observed.

Why it matters to us: signed-binary side-loading abusing a security-product binary is the highest-value evasion class; signature-based controls are bypassed by design. Detection: Sysmon EID 7 image-loads from fmapp.exe or sentinelmemoryscanner.exe outside their expected installation directories; alert on node.exe as a parent of cmd.exe or powershell.exe -enc in non-developer environments; flag CredUIPromptForWindowsCredentialsW calls from non-standard parents. Hardening: AppLocker / WDAC enforcing signed-and-known-path DLL loads; restrict node.exe execution to development OUs.

research28 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-05-08 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB3

Rapid7 links a Chaos-branded extortion intrusion to MuddyWater with moderate confidence: Teams screen-sharing harvested credentials and MFA, and no files were encrypted

Rapid7 investigated an early-2026 intrusion that presented as an attack by the Chaos ransomware-as-a-service operation and assesses, "with moderate confidence", that it is linked to MuddyWater (Seedworm), the Iranian state-sponsored group, on the strength of a code-signing certificate and command-and-control infrastructure (Rapid7, 2026-05-06). The actor opened external one-on-one Microsoft Teams chats, moved victims into screen-sharing sessions, had them type credentials into locally created text files and change their MFA configuration to include attacker-controlled devices, then established persistence with the remote management tools DWAgent and AnyDesk (Rapid7, 2026-05-06). It authenticated to internal systems, including a domain controller, with several compromised accounts and deployed a downloader for the Darkcomp backdoor that Rapid7 says is firmly attributed to MuddyWater (Rapid7, 2026-05-06). The actor exfiltrated data and demanded ransom under the Chaos brand by email, but forwent file encryption in favour of data theft and long-term persistence (Rapid7, 2026-05-06). Rapid7 reads the false flag as deniability for espionage and prepositioning, particularly in the US; Chaos itself had claimed 36 victims by late March 2026 (Rapid7, 2026-05-06). The Hacker News reported the research the same day (The Hacker News, 2026-05-06).

Triage: legitimate external Teams support sessions exist; the discriminator is an MFA method added during or right after a chat with an external tenant, a step a genuine support session has no reason to include.

Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-audittitleheadlinesummaryevent_datetagsregionsentitiestechniquessourcesverificationsourcing_noteconfidenceclassificationbody

Rapid7, not Deep Instinct, reported this intrusion, and it links it to MuddyWater only "with moderate confidence" (Rapid7, 2026-05-06). The actor encrypted nothing: it used the Chaos brand to demand ransom by email after stealing data. Rapid7 describes no government or defence victim in this intrusion and describes the prepositioning as "particularly in the US". The Teams chats with screen sharing were the main intrusion path, not a parallel vector, and Rapid7 describes no certificate theft or forging; the code-signing certificate is attribution evidence.

threat08 May 05:00Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats3
  • Research1

Source distribution

  • thehackernews.com2 (29%)
  • elastic.co1 (14%)
  • industrialcyber.co1 (14%)
  • rapid7.com1 (14%)
  • research.checkpoint.com1 (14%)
  • security.com1 (14%)