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Model Context Protocol (MCP)

product · product:model-context-protocol-mcp single-source

Coverage
2
first 2026-07-23 → last 2026-10-11
Latest activity
2026-10-07
CloudSEK: a Gentlemen affiliate reached victims through stolen GitLab CI/CD secrets and drove attacks over MCP
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, public-sector, healthcare
Sources cited
3
3 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Model Context Protocol (MCP) tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-07NOTABLECloudSEK: a Gentlemen affiliate reached victims through stolen GitLab CI/CD secrets and drove attacks over MCP

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-07-23NOTABLECrowdStrike documents SANDWORM_MODE, an npm worm that abuses AI coding-assistant MCP configs and git hooks to harvest developer credentials

Triage

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-07A Gentlemen ransomware affiliate ran his own leak site and reached his victims through stolen CI/CD secrets, with attack commands driven through an MCP server (CloudSEK)
    active-threatsCloudSEK: a Gentlemen affiliate reached victims through stolen GitLab CI/CD secrets and drove attacks over MCP
  2. 2026-07-23SANDWORM_MODE, an npm supply-chain worm that 'lives off the AI toolchain', poisoning MCP servers in AI coding assistants to steal developer credentials
    researchCrowdStrike documents SANDWORM_MODE, an npm worm that abuses AI coding-assistant MCP configs and git hooks to harvest developer credentials

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
Model Context Protocol (MCP) ×2
ATT&CK techniques (14 across 10 tactics)

14 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · Event Triggered Execution
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Event Triggered Execution
  • StealthValid Accounts · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
  • Credential AccessBrute Force: Password Cracking · Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files · Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys
  • DiscoveryVirtualization/Sandbox Evasion
  • CollectionData from Information Repositories: Code Repositories · Data from Cloud Storage
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: DNS
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
  • ImpactData Destruction · Defacement: Internal Defacement

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×1

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

Evidence: 2026-07-23/sandworm-mode-npm-ai-toolchain-supply-chain-worm-mcp · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546Event Triggered Execution×1

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.

Evidence: 2026-07-23/sandworm-mode-npm-ai-toolchain-supply-chain-worm-mcp · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546Event Triggered Execution×1

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.

Evidence: 2026-07-23/sandworm-mode-npm-ai-toolchain-supply-chain-worm-mcp · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion×1

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-07-23/sandworm-mode-npm-ai-toolchain-supply-chain-worm-mcp · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1110.002Brute Force: Password Cracking×1

Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. OS Credential Dumping can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Further, adversaries may leverage Data from Configuration Repository in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×2

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · 2026-07-23/sandworm-mode-npm-ai-toolchain-supply-chain-worm-mcp · ATT&CK page ↗

T1552.004Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys×1

Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion×1

Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-07-23/sandworm-mode-npm-ai-toolchain-supply-chain-worm-mcp · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1213.003Data from Information Repositories: Code Repositories×1

Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

T1530Data from Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1

Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-07-23/sandworm-mode-npm-ai-toolchain-supply-chain-worm-mcp · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage×1

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1485Data Destruction×1

Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

T1491.001Defacement: Internal Defacement×1

An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites or server login messages, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of Internal Defacement in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.

Evidence: 2026-10-07/gentlemen-affiliate-azazel-ci-cd-secrets-mcp-attacks · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Model Context Protocol (MCP) (2)

2026-10-07 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

A Gentlemen ransomware affiliate ran his own leak site and reached his victims through stolen CI/CD secrets, with attack commands driven through an MCP server (CloudSEK)

CloudSEK reports that an exposed open directory and a misconfigured storage server revealed the operation of "Azazel", a Russian-speaking affiliate of the Gentlemen ransomware group, who used the group's tooling, negotiation channels and ransom-note template but published victims on a leak site of his own and kept the proceeds, so the Gentlemen operator lost the revenue (CloudSEK, 2026-10-05). Two servers held about 6 TB of stolen data from some two dozen victims, spanning logistics, insurance, pharmaceutical, AI, medical-device and government-adjacent organisations (CloudSEK, 2026-10-05).

Every victim outside one deeper intrusion was reached the same way: GitLab CI/CD variable stores and git history were mined for tokens, database credentials, API keys and SSH private keys with enumeration and secret-scanning tools, and one GitLab instance that served two unrelated organisations gave footholds at both (CloudSEK, 2026-10-05). From one CI/CD token the actor reached more than 150 databases, payment gateways and hundreds of source repositories across a SaaS platform and its clients, and at a platform hosting a government-linked financial registry it exfiltrated more than 120,000 records and then killed the PostgreSQL process and deleted the production data directory (CloudSEK, 2026-10-05). The deeper intrusion, into an AI platform, ran for weeks: an API that fetches user-supplied URLs server-side gave an unauthenticated route into the internal network, a recovered master key decrypted every secret in the cluster configuration, a hardcoded authentication-bypass token that had been removed from the code but stayed in git history gave lasting access, offline cracking was run against administrator hashes from the monitoring stack, and an object-storage bucket was mirrored continuously (CloudSEK, 2026-10-05). Ransom notes were pushed to eight surfaces, among them the login message, the SSH banner, a database configuration parameter, a database-admin login template, a repository README and an issue opened against the victim's project, and CloudSEK reports that the verification script drove these checks through an MCP server bound to a local port, an operational use of MCP as an attack execution channel of which CloudSEK has not identified earlier public reporting (CloudSEK, 2026-10-05).

Triage: legitimate backup jobs also mirror object storage to remote destinations, so the discriminator is the destination and the source host, not the copy command itself (CloudSEK, 2026-10-05).

Every confirmed victim was reached through stolen CI/CD secrets.

Azazel registered a reverse shell handler as a tool inside an AI coding assistant via MCP, then drove attack execution through it.

Azazel recovered credentials from commits that appeared removed from the current branch.

CloudSEK TRIAD 2026-10-05
Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-auditsummarysourcing_note

CloudSEK's key findings state that "Every confirmed victim was reached through stolen CI/CD secrets", but its account of the AI-platform intrusion says entry was through an AI medical imaging API that fetches user-supplied URLs server-side without validation, and its own wording elsewhere is that "Every victim outside the AI sector engagement was reached the same way" (CloudSEK, 2026-10-05). CI/CD secret theft is the entry path for every victim except that one.

threat07 Oct 04:46Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-07-23 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

SANDWORM_MODE, an npm supply-chain worm that 'lives off the AI toolchain', poisoning MCP servers in AI coding assistants to steal developer credentials

CrowdStrike's research describes SANDWORM_MODE as a multi-stage npm supply-chain worm (first discovered February 2026) that targets AI-augmented developer workflows rather than only conventional package distribution or build systems, what CrowdStrike frames as "living off the AI toolchain," abusing the normalised runtime behaviours of AI coding assistants, CI automation and LLM tooling so its actions blend into legitimate developer telemetry (CrowdStrike, 2026-07-21). On install the worm writes unexpected entries into AI coding-assistant configuration files (Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf) that register a rogue Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool provider staged in a hidden directory, and it injects hooks under the global git-template hooks path so persistence fires on future git operations. It then harvests credentials from environment variables and .env/SSH-key files (npm tokens, AWS keys, SSH keys, and API keys for multiple LLM providers) fingerprints the host to separate developer workstations from CI runners, and delays full activation 48–96 hours on workstations (immediately on CI) specifically to defeat tools that correlate install-time and behaviour signals, falling back to DNS tunnelling when primary exfiltration is blocked (SecurityBrief, 2026-07-22). The load-bearing defender lesson is CrowdStrike's own candour: of 14 investigated behaviours only 9 produced any signal and only 2 met the fidelity bar for customer-visible alerting, because npm publishes, repo pushes, LLM-API calls, credential handling and file writes overlap heavily with legitimate developer and CI activity (CrowdStrike, 2026-07-21).

SANDWORM_MODE introduces an analogous pattern for AI-augmented development environments: living off the AI toolchain.

Of 14 investigated behaviors, only 9 could produce any signal, and only 2 met the fidelity bar for customer-visible alerting.

CrowdStrike 2026-07-21
research23 Jul 04:34Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Research1
  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • cloudsek.com1 (33%)
  • crowdstrike.com1 (33%)
  • securitybrief.com.au1 (33%)