CTIPilot
AI-generated · no human review · verify critical claims against the linked source. how it works →

EtherRAT

malware · malware:etherrat single-source

Node.js remote-access trojan targeting Windows workstations via social engineering and Linux servers via exploitation of server-side vulnerabilities, retrieving its command-and-control URL from a predefined smart contract through public Ethereum RPC endpoints; modules cover credential theft, lateral movement and web-server hijacking (Red Canary, 2026-08-20). Microsoft's own Defender detection signatures for a mechanistically overlapping Node.js/Ethereum-smart-contract implant read Trojan:JS/EtherRatz.A!MTB / .B!MTB (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-09-02), Microsoft's own reporting never uses the name EtherRAT, so EtherRatz is carried here as an alias reflecting the overlap, not a vendor-confirmed identity.

Aliases: EtherRatz

Coverage
5
3 about it · 2 mentions · first 2026-05-29 → last 2026-11-15
Latest activity
2026-11-15
Ransom-ISAC: Gentlemen affiliate, VPN without MFA to Domain Admin in an hour; GPO locker likely lost a…
Peak priority
high
1 high · 2 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, finance, telco · regions: europe
Sources cited
10
8 hosts

Action items (3)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about EtherRAT, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Restrict inbound Microsoft Teams external collaboration to a vetted allow-list of domains, or require explicit user opt-in per external organisation, given the campaign's initial-access channel is unsolicited Teams chats/calls impersonating internal IT support.
    2026-09-03The intrusion's most consequential step is a…
  • Restrict WinRM (TCP 5985) inbound to domain controllers and certificate authorities to a small, known set of administrative source hosts; the campaign's lateral-movement step specifically relies on WinRM being reachable from ordinary workstations to these systems.
    2026-09-03The intrusion's most consequential step is a…
  • Establish which users, systems and applications in your estate legitimately make HTTPS calls to public blockchain RPC endpoints (for most public-sector estates the honest answer is none) and alert on anything outside that set; chainlist.org enumerates the widely-used endpoints adversaries prefer.
    2026-08-23Dead-drop C2 moved from novelty to routine, and the…

Defender insights

What each entry about EtherRAT tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-15NOTABLERansom-ISAC: Gentlemen affiliate, VPN without MFA to Domain Admin in an hour; GPO locker likely lost a replication race

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-09-03HIGHThe intrusion's most consequential step is a remote-management connection from a non-administrative process to systems that should never see one

Triage

2026-08-23NOTABLEDead-drop C2 moved from novelty to routine, and the control is an egress baseline rather than a blocklist

Triage

Story timeline

Every entry that names EtherRAT, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-11-15The Gentlemen affiliate: an SSL-VPN account without MFA, a Windows Server 2003 host and a dormant local administrator gave Domain Admin in under an hour; the GPO locker most likely lost a replication race, so antivirus was disabled estate-wide but only one host was encrypted (Ransom-ISAC)
    active-threatsRansom-ISAC: Gentlemen affiliate, VPN without MFA to Domain Admin in an hour; GPO locker likely lost a replication race
  2. 2026-09-03A Teams helpdesk-impersonation campaign installs a Node.js implant (Microsoft detection name: EtherRatz) via a silent MSI, then pivots over WinRM straight to domain controllers and certificate authorities
    active-threatsThe intrusion's most consequential step is a remote-management connection from a non-administrative process to systems that should never see one
  3. 2026-08-23Dead-drop command-and-control went commodity: three of four new entrants on Red Canary's monthly list resolve their C2 from a dead drop, two of them from a public blockchain, and the fourth is a GUI for Entra ID device-code phishing
    researchDead-drop C2 moved from novelty to routine, and the control is an egress baseline rather than a blocklist
  4. 2026-06-17Huntress: Potemkin loader delivers RMMProject RAT and bypasses Chromium App-Bound Encryption
    mentionresearch
  5. 2026-05-29The Gentlemen ransomware, Microsoft publishes full technical dissection of the Storm-2697 Go-encryptor
    mentionactive-threats
ATT&CK techniques (38 across 13 tactics)

38 techniques observed across 3 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · External Remote Services · Phishing: Spearphishing via Service
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · External Remote Services · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthMasquerading · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Valid Accounts: Local Accounts · System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec · System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
  • Defense ImpairmentDomain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Disable or Modify Tools · Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping · Brute Force · Steal Application Access Token · Credentials from Password Stores · Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication · Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
  • DiscoverySystem Network Configuration Discovery · Remote System Discovery · System Information Discovery · Account Discovery: Domain Account · Network Share Discovery · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks · Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Windows Remote Management
  • CollectionScreen Capture
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Ingress Tool Transfer · Dynamic Resolution
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
  • ImpactData Encrypted for Impact · Inhibit System Recovery

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.003Phishing: Spearphishing via Service×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×2

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×2

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×1

An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1543.001Create or Modify System Process: Launch Agent×1

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>. Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1036Masquerading×1

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.003Valid Accounts: Local Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.007System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec×1

Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi). The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.011System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32×1

Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1

Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1484.001Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification×1

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\<DOMAIN>\SYSVOL\<DOMAIN>\Policies\`.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685.005Disable or Modify Tools: Clear Windows Event Logs×1

Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003OS Credential Dumping×1

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110Brute Force×1

Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1528Steal Application Access Token×1

Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555Credentials from Password Stores×1

Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1556.006Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication×1

Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1558.003Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting×1

Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1016System Network Configuration Discovery×1

Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1018Remote System Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1082System Information Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1135Network Share Discovery×1

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1

Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.006Remote Services: Windows Remote Management×2

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1113Screen Capture×1

Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×2

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-08-23/blockchain-dead-drop-c2-commodity-graphspy · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×2

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · 2026-09-03/teams-helpdesk-impersonation-nodejs-implant-winrm-dc-pivot · ATT&CK page ↗

T1568Dynamic Resolution×1

Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1490Inhibit System Recovery×1

Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.

Evidence: 2026-11-15/gentlemen-affiliate-vpn-no-mfa-da-gpo-locker-failed · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about EtherRAT (3)

2026-11-15 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOC2

The Gentlemen affiliate: an SSL-VPN account without MFA, a Windows Server 2003 host and a dormant local administrator gave Domain Admin in under an hour; the GPO locker most likely lost a replication race, so antivirus was disabled estate-wide but only one host was encrypted (Ransom-ISAC)

Ransom-ISAC reconstructs an early-August 2026 intrusion into a small company by a Gentlemen ransomware affiliate from forensic images of two domain controllers, event logs of 41 hosts and firewall logs (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13). Entry was an SSL-VPN account without MFA that succeeded on the first attempt from an unusual country; neither egress address appears in any earlier failed login, so the credential was most likely held beforehand. Within the hour the actor ran an anonymous SMB sweep, three Kerberoast-style service-ticket requests (the KDC logged an RC4 and DES downgrade against an AES-only account) and hundreds of failed SMB logons against a domain controller, then used a dormant, weak-password local administrator on an end-of-life Windows Server 2003 SQL host that allowed null sessions. A Domain Admin session opened on the domain controller less than an hour after the first login; Ransom-ISAC could not prove how and says the credentials were most likely taken from that host. The actor then pushed a Rust credential harvester, which takes the DPAPI domain backup key, and EtherRAT, a Node.js implant that reads its command address from an Ethereum smart contract and never reached it; data left through the VPN tunnel over about two days of a weekend (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13).

The locker, run on a domain controller in domain-wide mode, built a GPO linked enforced at the domain root and the Domain Controllers container, with eight registry values that disable antivirus and a Preferences scheduled task in SYSVOL. The call that declares the Preferences extension reached a domain controller the GPO had not replicated to, the script suppressed the error and no client read the task: antivirus was off estate-wide but the locker ran on one host, which wiped its logs (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13).

Triage: scanners and inventory tools also sweep SMB anonymously and legacy applications use null sessions (the finding is a dormant account logging on right after); developers resolve Ethereum RPC providers, so scope that rule to servers; administrators edit GPOs, so correlate with the change calendar (Ransom-ISAC, 2026-11-13).

Everything here comes from a single incident response engagement.

The GPO still turned off the antivirus across the estate, but the locker ran on only one host.

Ransom-ISAC 2026-11-13
threat15 Nov 04:28Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Ransom-ISAC

2026-09-03 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOB2

A Teams helpdesk-impersonation campaign installs a Node.js implant (Microsoft detection name: EtherRatz) via a silent MSI, then pivots over WinRM straight to domain controllers and certificate authorities

Microsoft Threat Intelligence documents a human-operated intrusion campaign that abuses Microsoft Teams external collaboration to impersonate IT or helpdesk personnel, pretexts include "Microsoft Security Update," "Spam Filter Update" and "Account Verification," sometimes reinforced with a phone call, and socially engineers the victim into approving a "request control" prompt during a Teams screen-share, or into opening Quick Assist and reading back a connection code (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-09-02). Once remote control is granted through the legitimate support tool, the operator uses PowerShell inside that same session to silently pull a malicious MSI, disguised with update-themed names and hosted on a widely used cloud-storage platform to blend with legitimate traffic, and installs it via msiexec /qn. The MSI stages a portable Node.js runtime plus a separately encrypted implant file; a deferred MSI custom action launches hidden bootstrap code that decrypts the implant and hands it to Node.js via standard input or a temporary script file, evading controls keyed on unsigned executables or conventional script extensions (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-09-02). Per-user persistence uses an HKCU Run value or Startup-folder shortcut, both named "EdgeUpdate." The implant polls its command-and-control over randomised HTTPS long-polling and executes returned JavaScript dynamically, performing sandbox and antivirus discovery, periodic screenshot capture, and ADSI-based Active Directory sweeps, enumerating domain-joined servers and harvesting user object and description-attribute content, with randomised sleep jitter to stay quiet. A dormant capability in the analysed implants queries an Ethereum smart contract for an updated command-and-control URL, disabled in the recovered builds, which fall back to a hard-coded server instead (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-09-02). Microsoft's own Defender detection names for the implant are Trojan:JS/EtherRatz.A!MTB and Trojan:JS/EtherRatz.B!MTB its article does not otherwise name the campaign or the implant. The same detection table names the MSI/loader stage Trojan:JS/SynkLoader.SA and Trojan:Win32/SynkLoader.SA, the family behind a near-identical Teams helpdesk-impersonation chain documented separately on 2026-08-24 (Expel), a detection-level overlap on the loader stage, distinct from the Node.js implant this entry otherwise describes.

The intrusion's most consequential step is lateral movement: operator-issued tasking through the Node.js implant initiates internal WinRM connections on TCP 5985 to a large set of domain-joined systems, explicitly including domain controllers and certificate authorities, activity Microsoft frames as the hallmark of an intrusion that precedes large-scale data theft, extortion or ransomware deployment (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-09-02). The Node.js/dormant-Ethereum-smart-contract-C2 mechanism overlaps the malware family already tracked as EtherRAT from Red Canary's August monthly round-up, though Microsoft's own reporting never uses that name for this implant; the connection is a mechanistic overlap this entry records, not an identity Microsoft itself asserts.

Triage: an external Microsoft Teams chat or call that leads to a screen-share "request control" approval or a Quick Assist connection-code exchange, particularly one impersonating internal IT, is the point at which this campaign is still stoppable; legitimate internal helpdesk workflows do not typically originate from an external tenant. Downstream, a WinRM connection to a domain controller or certificate authority originating from a non-administrative PowerShell process, or a node.exe process reading a script staged under a user's AppData directory and launched by wscript.exe, are both behaviours normal administrative tooling does not produce.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed a human-operated intrusion campaign that abuses Microsoft Teams external collaboration to impersonate IT or helpdesk personnel and socially engineer users into granting an interactive remote session.

The analyzed implants also contained dormant logic capable of querying an Ethereum smart contract for an updated C2 URL. This functionality was disabled in the recovered builds, which instead used a hard-coded fallback server.

operator-issued tasking executed through the Node.js backdoor initiated internal remote-management connections over WinRM on TCP port 5985 to a large set of domain-joined systems

Microsoft Threat Intelligence 2026-09-02

Builds on: Dead-drop C2 moved from novelty to routine, and the control is an egress baseline rather than a… · SynkLoader pairs a fake Windows lock screen with a backconnect proxy, so the stolen domain…

threat03 Sep 05:21Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-08-23 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Dead-drop command-and-control went commodity: three of four new entrants on Red Canary's monthly list resolve their C2 from a dead drop, two of them from a public blockchain, and the fourth is a GUI for Entra ID device-code phishing

Red Canary's monthly threat round-up, published 2026-08-20 against July 2026 telemetry, is useful here not for its rankings but for what the new arrivals have in common: three of the four resolve their command-and-control address from a dead drop rather than from a hardcoded domain or IP, and two of those read that dead drop off a public blockchain (Red Canary, 2026-08-20). The technique, querying a smart contract whose stored value is the current C2 URL, which Red Canary calls EtherHiding and dates to first reporting in 2023; has been documented for a while; what this round-up records is its arrival in commodity tooling, Red Canary counts three of its top ten using it this month, two of them new arrivals.

The mechanics are worth stating precisely because they determine what a defender can and cannot block. Phexia, a macOS remote-access tool and stealer delivered through malicious copy-and-paste lures, queries public Polygon RPC endpoints for a smart contract's value, decodes the ABI-encoded response to extract a URL, posts to it and pipes the reply into osascript; it keeps Telegram and Steam profiles as redundant dead-drop channels and persists with a LaunchAgent that sets both KeepAlive and RunAtLoad. EtherRAT is "a Node.js-based remote access trojan observed targeting Windows workstations via social engineering and Linux servers via exploitation of server-side vulnerabilities", polling one or more public Ethereum RPC endpoints for a C2 URL held at a predefined contract address, with modules for credential theft, lateral movement and web-server hijacking. CastleRAT resolves its dead drop through steamcommunity.com or adversary-controlled domains. Red Canary's own summary of why this matters operationally: "The technique makes traditional C2 blocking challenging, since the URL can be updated dynamically by adversaries", the operator rewrites one contract value and the change propagates to every installation without redistributing the malware.

The fourth entrant is a different problem. GraphSpy is an open-source initial-access and post-exploitation tool for Entra ID and Microsoft 365 that, in Red Canary's words, "runs a local web server that presents a browser-based GUI, which enables less technical adversaries to engage in Entra ID attacks". It centralises device-code phishing, primary refresh token theft and abuse, Windows Hello for Business key registration, MFA method manipulation, and exfiltration from SharePoint, OneDrive, Outlook and Teams. Red Canary notes it is the third device-code phishing tool to reach its top ten in 2026, after GraphRunner in May and Kali365 in June, three separate toolkits in four months packaging the same identity attack behind progressively lower skill requirements.

Detection concepts, telemetry class first. For the dead-drop families the signal is in egress telemetry: an outbound HTTPS session from an endpoint or server to a public blockchain RPC endpoint, made by a process that has no business speaking to one; the request itself is ordinary-looking JSON-RPC to a widely used, reputable host, so the discriminator is the process and the host role, not the destination's reputation. On macOS, correlate it with process-lineage telemetry showing osascript executing content received from a network read, and with persistence artifacts; a newly written LaunchAgent whose program arguments carry an encoded payload. For GraphSpy the surface is identity telemetry rather than endpoint: device-code authentication events for users and locations that have no workflow requiring that flow, primary refresh token issuance followed by access from an unfamiliar device, and new Windows Hello for Business key or MFA method registration on an account that did not request it. Red Canary's own mitigation for the device-code half is to revoke the affected user's refresh tokens and active sessions, reset credentials, force re-authentication, and restrict the device-code flow through Conditional Access policies "for users and locations that do not require it".

GraphSpy runs a local web server that presents a browser-based GUI, which enables less technical adversaries to engage in Entra ID attacks.

The technique makes traditional C2 blocking challenging, since the URL can be updated dynamically by adversaries

the public blockchain RPC endpoints highlighted on chainlist.org are a good place to start, as adversaries are more likely to leverage widely-used URLs instead of standing up their own infrastructure

Red Canary 2026-08-20
research23 Aug 04:46Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Red Canary

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats3
  • Research2

Source distribution

  • huntress.com2 (20%)
  • microsoft.com2 (20%)
  • learn.microsoft.com1 (10%)
  • ransom-isac.org1 (10%)
  • redcanary.com1 (10%)
  • research.checkpoint.com1 (10%)
  • thedfirreport.com1 (10%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (10%)
All cited sources (10)