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Secret Blizzard

actor · actor:secretblizzard single-source

Russian FSB Centre 16 APT (Microsoft: Secret Blizzard; historically Turla); 2026 coverage includes Microsoft Threat Intelligence's Kazuar P2P botnet anatomy (2026-05-14) and the STOCKSTAY diplomatic-espionage backdoor of Kazuar lineage.

Aliases: Turla, FSB Centre 16, TURLA RELIC

Coverage
6
3 about it · 3 mentions · first 2026-05-16 → last 2026-11-11
Latest activity
2026-11-11
ESET: Turla's Cereal runs the victim's own Exchange server as C2 and wraps transport agents to collect mail
Peak priority
high
1 high · 2 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, defense, energy · regions: europe, switzerland, russia-cis
Sources cited
26
18 hosts
2026-06-266 appearances2026-11-11

Action items (2)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Secret Blizzard, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • On every internet-facing Exchange server, compare ncobjapi.dll and wbemcomn.dll in C:\\Windows\\System32\\wbem\\ and the Microsoft.Exchange .ni.dll files in the .NET native image cache with the Microsoft originals and list the non-Microsoft assemblies loaded into EdgeTransport.exe, because ESET places the Cereal loader at those locations and Get-TransportAgent shows nothing new.
    2026-11-11ESET: Turla's Cereal runs the victim's own Exchange…
  • Disable Cisco Smart Install (no vstack) and confirm CVE-2018-0171 is remediated on every internet-facing IOS/IOS XE device, and alert on inbound SNMP Set-Requests carrying the config-copy OIDs named in the advisory (1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1 Cisco Config Copy; 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.5 Config Copy Server Address); both are in-use FSB Centre 16 access and config-exfiltration vectors.
    2026-07-13CVE-2018-0171

Defender insights

What each entry about Secret Blizzard tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-11NOTABLEESET: Turla's Cereal runs the victim's own Exchange server as C2 and wraps transport agents to collect mail

Exposure · triage · detection

2026-07-13HIGHexploited19-agency advisory details FSB Centre 16 router hijacking via SNMP and Cisco Smart Install as the UK and EU attribute Poland's Dec-2025 grid sabotage

Latest update · triage · detection

2026-06-27NOTABLEexploitedTurla's STOCKSTAY: a four-component .NET backdoor for diplomatic intelligence collection

Detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

uses

collaborates with

documented in

related to

attributed activity

Story timeline

Every entry that names Secret Blizzard, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-11-11Turla's Cereal toolset turns a compromised on-premises Exchange server into the command channel and mail collector at Kazakh and Romanian government bodies, with no attacker infrastructure and no new transport agent registered (ESET)
    active-threatsESET: Turla's Cereal runs the victim's own Exchange server as C2 and wraps transport agents to collect mail
  2. 2026-10-23MythicRatatoskr: ESET documents a Go backdoor that hides its command server inside the Yggdrasil mesh network, and a UAC-0099 to Sandworm access handoff that ended in a Group Policy wiper attack on a Ukrainian grain logistics firm
    mentionactive-threatsESET: a backdoor reaches its C2 through the Yggdrasil mesh; Sandworm wiped the victim two months after UAC-0099 got in
  3. 2026-07-13AIVD/MIVD: Russia-linked actors hijack default-credential IP cameras along NATO military-supply routes to monitor Ukraine-bound shipments
    mentionactive-threatsDutch intelligence: Russia hijacked default-credential internet cameras along military-supply routes; four EU states summon Russian ambassadors
  4. 2026-07-13FSB Centre 16 (Static Tundra) router-hijacking campaign: 19-agency joint advisory, formal Poland energy-grid attribution and first joint EU/UK cyber sanctions
    deep-dive19-agency advisory details FSB Centre 16 router hijacking via SNMP and Cisco Smart Install as the UK and EU attribute Poland's Dec-2025 grid sabotage
  5. 2026-06-27Turla's STOCKSTAY: a four-component .NET backdoor for diplomatic intelligence collection
    deep-dive
  6. 2026-06-26ESET's 2025 Gamaredon paper: exfil and C2 moved wholesale onto trusted cloud services (ANNUAL REPORT)
    mentionresearch
ATT&CK techniques (45 across 14 tactics)

45 techniques observed across 3 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceActive Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks · Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
  • Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server · Compromise Infrastructure: Server · Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices · Obtain Capabilities: Exploits
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Drive-by Compromise · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Phishing · Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
  • ExecutionWindows Management Instrumentation · Command and Scripting Interpreter · User Execution: Malicious File · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · Server Software Component: Transport Agent · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationProcess Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection · Exploitation for Privilege Escalation · Valid Accounts · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Valid Accounts · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Execution Guardrails · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL · Reflective Code Loading
  • Defense ImpairmentModify System Image: Patch System Image
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping · OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets
  • DiscoveryPermission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups · Account Discovery: Domain Account
  • CollectionData from Local System · Email Collection: Remote Email Collection · Automated Collection · Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library · Data from Configuration Repository: SNMP (MIB Dump) · Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol · Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Proxy · Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel · Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
  • ImpactData Destruction

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1595.001Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks×1

Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1595.002Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning×1

Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Resource Development TA0042

T1583.003Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server×1

Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1584.004Compromise Infrastructure: Server×1

Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a Server or Virtual Private Server, adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1584.008Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices×1

Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not Initial Access to that environment, but rather to leverage these devices to support additional targeting.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1588.005Obtain Capabilities: Exploits×1

Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1189Drive-by Compromise×1

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566Phishing×2

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1047Windows Management Instrumentation×1

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter×1

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.002Server Software Component: Transport Agent×1

Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails. Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution×1

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon. These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1055.001Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection×1

Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart Execution×1

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon. These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027.009Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads×1

Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to Subvert Trust Controls by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055.001Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection×1

Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1480Execution Guardrails×1

Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign. Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1620Reflective Code Loading×1

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1601.001Modify System Image: Patch System Image×1

Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses. Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file. Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003OS Credential Dumping×1

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1003.004OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets×1

Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts. LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups×1

Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1005Data from Local System×1

Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.

Evidence: 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1114.002Email Collection: Remote Email Collection×1

Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1119Automated Collection×1

Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1560.002Archive Collected Data: Archive via Library×1

An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including Python rarfile, libzip, and zlib. Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

T1602.001Data from Configuration Repository: SNMP (MIB Dump)×1

Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1602.002Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump×1

Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071Application Layer Protocol×2

Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×2

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090Proxy×1

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography×1

Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×2

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/turla-cereal-exchange-server-c2-and-mail-collector-gov · 2026-06-27/turla-s-stockstay-a-four-component-net-backdoor-for-diplomat · ATT&CK page ↗

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1485Data Destruction×1

Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Secret Blizzard (3)

2026-11-11 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Turla's Cereal toolset turns a compromised on-premises Exchange server into the command channel and mail collector at Kazakh and Romanian government bodies, with no attacker infrastructure and no new transport agent registered (ESET)

ESET found a previously undocumented .NET toolset, Cereal, on a Kazakh government organisation's Exchange server on 2025-11-28 and, after tuning its detections, on a Romanian government organisation's Exchange server compromised from 2025-12-23; in Romania the mail-collection module was configured to identify messages to or from NATO and EU institutional addresses (ESET Research, 2026-11-10). ESET attributes Cereal to Turla with high confidence, on the concurrent use of another component publicly linked to Turla and conceptual similarity to older Turla malware, and could not determine the initial access method, although it considers a vulnerability exploit possible because the servers are reachable from the internet (ESET Research, 2026-11-10).

The command channel is the victim's own Exchange server. CerealNeuron runs on the compromised server and passively waits for requests on web paths made to look like Outlook Web Access, Autodiscover and ActiveSync traffic; a correctly encrypted request is treated as a command and a bad one gets a normal-looking Exchange error page, and ESET found no operator-controlled server and could not identify ingress addresses (ESET Research, 2026-11-10). CerealHermit is a network-less variant that reads encrypted command files from disk, and each task runs as a small .NET assembly inside a CerealRunner (mailbox retrieval, Active Directory and WMI queries, LSA secrets extraction, file operations) (ESET Research, 2026-11-10). CerealLoader, the only component written to disk in recognisable .NET form, abuses .NET VTable fixups so native code runs before managed code and is placed where trusted processes load it: the System32 wbem directory (ncobjapi.dll, wbemcomn.dll, loaded by WMI) and the .NET native image cache (ESET Research, 2026-11-10). CerealBox, injected into EdgeTransport.exe, wraps the handlers of transport agents already loaded, so "no new agent appears anywhere in Exchange's configuration"; it keeps messages with .doc, .docx or .pdf attachments that match hard-coded sender, recipient, subject or attachment-name lists and stages them compressed and encrypted on disk for exfiltration through CerealNeuron (ESET Research, 2026-11-10).

Triage: third-party anti-spam, data-loss-prevention and archiving products also inject into the transport service, but they are vendor-signed and appear in the transport-agent configuration, which CerealBox does not; the native image cache regenerates legitimately after .NET updates, so a changed timestamp alone is weak, while a file that does not match the Microsoft binary is the signal.

Instead – adding insult to injury – the victim’s compromised Exchange server is co-opted to act as the C&C infrastructure.

We attribute Cereal, with high confidence, to the Russia-aligned APT group Turla, based on the concurrent use of another component publicly linked to Turla and conceptual similarities to older Turla malware.

Once inside, CerealBox accesses Exchange’s internal structures, finds the existing transport agents, and wraps their handlers with malicious code.

No new agent appears anywhere in Exchange’s configuration.

it was configured to identify emails sent to, or received from, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU).

ESET Research
threat11 Nov 03:40Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

2026-07-13 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2018-0171exploitedupdatedNATOA1

FSB Centre 16 (Static Tundra) router-hijacking campaign: 19-agency joint advisory, formal Poland energy-grid attribution and first joint EU/UK cyber sanctions

Background. The FSB Centre 16 network-device cluster is not new; it has a decade-plus public record under the vendor labels Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, Crouching Yeti, Dragonfly and Ghost Blizzard, and Cisco Talos profiled it in August 2025 as "Static Tundra," documenting long-term compromise of unpatched and end-of-life network gear for configuration theft and persistent collection (Cisco Talos, 2025-08-20). What is new is a same-day trio of actions on 2026-07-13: a much fuller TTP disclosure, a formal government attribution of a destructive attack, and the first coordinated EU/UK cyber-sanctions package.

A joint Cybersecurity Advisory carrying 19 authoring and co-sealing agencies across 13 countries, NSA, CISA, FBI and DC3 (US) alongside the cyber and intelligence authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Poland and Sweden, describes FSB Centre 16 opportunistically compromising poorly configured routers across communications, defense industrial base, energy, financial services, government (especially state/local), and healthcare sectors (NSA/CISA/FBI joint advisory, 2026-07-13; NCSC-UK, 2026-07-13). The advisory notes these TTPs overlap with Salt Typhoon activity, so the hardening below counters more than one actor.

The primary access vector is not a novel exploit but weak SNMP hygiene. The actors scan internet IP ranges for SNMP agents that accept common or default community strings, then issue spoofed-source SNMP Set-Requests carrying object identifiers that instruct the device to copy its running configuration to a file (commonly config.bkp or output.txt) and transfer it, usually over TFTP, to a leased VPS or a compromised FTP server (joint advisory, 2026-07-13). The advisory names the exact OIDs abused, 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1 (Cisco Config Copy) and 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.5 (the destination address for the copied config). A stolen configuration frequently discloses further credentials and additional community strings, feeding lateral movement. Talos's profile records the actor guessing or reusing insecure read-write community strings such as public and anonymous (Cisco Talos, 2025-08-20). Secondarily ("occasionally," per the advisory) the actors exploit known Cisco bugs and the Smart Install (SMI) feature, naming CVE-2018-0171 (the Smart Install pre-auth RCE, in CISA KEV since 2021) and CVE-2008-4128 (end-of-life devices only, no patch). Persistence has historically included the SYNful Knock IOS firmware implant.

The Poland grid attribution. On the same day, the UK together with EU member states formally attributed the destructive 29 December 2025 attack on Poland's energy grid to FSB Centre 16 (NCSC-UK, 2026-07-13). CERT Polska's own incident report describes coordinated destructive activity against 30-plus wind and photovoltaic grid-connection substations (RTU, HMI and protection-relay firmware damaged or system files deleted) and a combined heat-and-power plant serving roughly half a million people, where wiper malware was blocked by the operator's EDR before detonation; CERT Polska tied the activity to the Static Tundra / Berserk Bear / Ghost Blizzard / Dragonfly cluster via VPS, router and anonymizing-infrastructure overlap and called it "the first publicly described destructive activity attributed to this activity cluster" (CERT Polska, 2026-01-30). Note the attribution is contested at the cluster-label level: earlier ESET reporting attributed the same DynoWiper attack to the GRU's Sandworm (BleepingComputer, 2026-01-24), and the EU Council statement names FSB Centre 16 as the parent controlling several groups including Turla, so treat "FSB Centre 16" as an umbrella unit rather than a single team.

The sanctions package is the policy layer: the EU designated 9 individuals and 4 entities and the UK designated 24, covering senior GRU figures, the front company IMPULS accused of recruiting hackers for GRU Unit 29155, Lumma Stealer operators, and the disinformation outlet Rybar LLC (UK Government, 2026-07-13; BleepingComputer, 2026-07-13).

Detection. The telemetry classes to prioritise on network gear: network-flow and firewall logs for inbound SNMP Set-Requests (especially with spoofed or unfamiliar source addresses) and for outbound TFTP sessions initiated from a router/switch management interface to non-management destinations; device syslog and AAA/TACACS+ logs for unexpected "config copy" events, new local-account creation, and unexplained drops in logging volume, Talos documents the actor tampering with TACACS+ configuration to blind logging and standing up GRE tunnels to redirect victim traffic (Cisco Talos, 2025-08-20); and IDS rules keyed to inbound SNMP Set-Requests carrying the config-copy OIDs above, as the advisory recommends (joint advisory, 2026-07-13). Baseline NetFlow for the new GRE tunnel endpoints Talos describes.

Defender takeaway. For a Swiss or European CI operator this is a router-hygiene mandate with a live destructive precedent next door. Disable Smart Install where it is not in active use, confirm CVE-2018-0171 is patched, migrate management SNMP to v3 with authPriv and disable SNMPv1/v2c (or, where legacy SNMP is unavoidable, replace every default/weak community string and enforce read-only), restrict all management protocols to known stations via out-of-band ACLs, use Cisco password hashing type 8 (never 0/4/7), and treat the device configuration held in your management system (not the device itself) as the source of truth so a tampered config is detectable.

Triage: legitimate network-management stations poll SNMP on a predictable cadence from a known IP set, almost always read-only GET/GET-NEXT. The signal is a write (SNMP Set-Request) (particularly one carrying the config-copy OIDs) from a source outside the management range or with an inconsistent/spoofed source address, followed by an outbound TFTP transfer from the device; either alone is weak, the sequence config-write-then-TFTP-egress is the discriminator.

The actors scan for Internet IP ranges with active Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agents that accept common or default community strings for authentication

NSA / CISA / FBI / DC3 joint Cybersecurity Advisory (19 agencies, 13 countries) 2026-07-13

The UK together with EU member states has also today formally attributed the December 2025 attack on Poland's energy grid to Russia's FSB Centre 16.

NCSC-UK 2026-07-13

This is, however, the first publicly described destructive activity attributed to this activity cluster.

CERT Polska 2026-01-30

This reckless attack failed but could have caused 500,000 citizens to lose electricity in the depths of winter.

UK Government (FCDO) 2026-07-13

Members of the Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre (C4) have observed the targeting and compromise of French entities using the Turla intrusion set operated by the 16th Centre of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB).

CERT-FR (ANSSI) 2026-07-13

Russian technology companies supporting the intelligence service are also affected. For example, Advanced System Technology (AST) and NPP Gamma will no longer be allowed to do business in the EU in the future.

heise online (citing EU Council statement)
Updaterun 2026-07-13T2009Z-intelentitiesevidenceregionssourcestagstechniquesbody

The morning entry covered the 19-agency Static Tundra/Berserk Bear advisory (SNMP and Cisco Smart Install router hijacking) and the UK/EU attribution of the December 2025 Polish grid sabotage. This delta covers the sibling FSB Centre 16 cluster (Turla) which France and the EU formally attributed the same day. France's Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre (C4, ANSSI, COMCYBER, DGA, DGSE, DGSI and the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs) and the EU High Representative jointly attributed the Turla intrusion set to the FSB's 16th Centre on 2026-07-13, publishing CERT-FR's technical report CERTFR-2026-CTI-005 alongside formal French and EU attribution statements (CERT-FR, 2026-07-13; ANSSI, 2026-07-13). France's COMCYBER describes Turla as an FSB 16th Centre attack mode (mode opératoire) used for intelligence-gathering since at least 2004 (COMCYBER, 2026-07-13). The 16th Centre is the parent unit behind both this Turla/Secret Blizzard espionage set and the Static Tundra/Berserk Bear router-hijacking cluster covered this morning, the EU-sanctions reporting describes the 16th Centre as controlling groups including Turla (heise online, 2026-07-13).

ANSSI documents French Turla victims including Ministry of Armed Forces webmail accounts compromised since 2017, the network of the French Embassy in Moscow (2018), a justice-sector personnel-training host (2019) and an advanced-technology company (2025), plus opportunistic intermediary compromises across varied sectors between 2019 and 2025 used as relay infrastructure (CERT-FR, 2026-07-13). The initial-access tradecraft combines spearphishing and watering-hole attacks that lure targets into downloading malicious files masquerading as legitimate software, plus exploitation of vulnerabilities in webmail/messaging services, browsers, business applications and web servers; the operators favour rented or previously-compromised infrastructure for camouflage (ANSSI, 2026-07-13). In coordination, the EU sanctioned 9 individuals and 4 organisations (entry bans and asset freezes), including the enabler firms Advanced System Technology (AST) and NPP Gamma, and the UK sanctioned 24 individuals and organisations; the EU Council statement names Germany, Poland, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovakia, Romania and Finland among affected states (heise online, 2026-07-13).

threat13 Jul 12:40Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-06-27 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2025-8088exploited

Turla's STOCKSTAY: a four-component .NET backdoor for diplomatic intelligence collection

Background. Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG, formerly Mandiant) published a full technical analysis of STOCKSTAY on 2026-06-25, a modular .NET backdoor it attributes with high confidence to Turla (also tracked as Secret Blizzard, SUMMIT and FSB Center 16) with activity dating to December 2022 (Google Cloud / GTIG, 2026-06-25). GTIG ties STOCKSTAY to Turla's long-running Kazuar implant lineage through shared code: the K1MORPHER Squirrel3-based string obfuscator Turla introduced in April 2025, identical environmental-keying logic, and the same component-separation design pattern, placing this tool in the same toolset GTIG and others have tracked across European diplomatic targeting for years (The Record, 2026-06-26). Primary targets are Ukrainian government and military organisations and European entities with Italian foreign-policy interests.

Architecture and mechanics. STOCKSTAY is partitioned into four .NET assemblies that communicate over Windows WM_COPYDATA inter-process messages, deliberately decoupling the network layer from command execution. MARKETMAKER is the downloader/installer that establishes Registry Run-key persistence masquerading as MicrosoftUpdateOneDrive (T1547.001); STOCKMARKET ("cor") is the orchestrator that generates a 4096-bit RSA key pair on first run; STOCKBROKER ("net") is a proxy-aware WebSocket tunneller built on the open-source websocket-sharp library; and STOCKTRADER ("sys") is the backdoor executor supporting 13 commands (directory listing, file get/put, process execution, registry read/write/delete, screenshot capture, WMI-based system reconnaissance, archive unpacking, and self-destruct). Configuration is AES-encrypted using hostname/domain-name environmental keying (T1480) once past the reconnaissance phase, so the payload will not decrypt or execute off-target, a standard Turla anti-analysis measure.

Command-and-control. C2 responses are wrapped in an RSA-4096-encrypted "CryptoContainer" JSON structure and tunnelled over encrypted WebSocket sessions hosted on legitimate PaaS platforms (Render.com, Glitch) (T1071.001). The controller (a Python Tornado WebSocket server storing victim data in a SQLite database) was found in a public GitHub repository, and the use of third-party PaaS prevents the platform operator from introspecting the encrypted traffic. The implant enforces working hours (09:00–18:00, Mon–Fri) to blend with normal activity.

Delivery / kill chain. Initial access is via spearphishing (T1566.001/.002) using diplomatic-themed lures (drone content, military logistics, diplomatic-education platforms), with malicious RDP configuration files and RAR archives exploiting WinRAR path traversal CVE-2025-8088 for code drop, followed by MSI/HTA execution. STOCKSTAY is then installed, keys to its environment, establishes Run-key persistence, and beacons out over PaaS-hosted WebSockets, staging the operator's interactive command set (T1059) for collection (T1005) and exfiltration over the C2 channel (T1041). GTIG notes deployment alongside other confirmed Turla tools (WILDDAY, DIAMONDBACK).

Detection concepts (no IOCs). Alert on outbound WebSocket connections to *.onrender.com / *.glitch.me from non-browser processes; WM_COPYDATA messages between unrelated processes in EDR telemetry (Sysmon EID 8/10 process-injection/access correlation); Registry Run-key creation pointing at user-space paths masquerading as Microsoft/OneDrive updaters (Sysmon EID 13 / Windows EID 4657); LNK or RDP-config writes into staging directories (Sysmon EID 11); and the WinRAR CVE-2025-8088 exploitation pattern (archive extraction writing files outside the target directory). GTIG published YARA and Google SecOps detection rules with the report.

Hardening / mitigation. Patch WinRAR to 7.11+ to close CVE-2025-8088; enable AMSI and ETW for .NET assemblies and block the AppDomainManager-hijack DLL-placement path; apply GPO to restrict RDP-config auto-connection; and where not operationally required, block Render/Glitch WebSocket egress at the perimeter for diplomat and ministry workstations. For Swiss federal and cantonal foreign-affairs, defence and diplomatic environments, the named Italian-foreign-policy targeting puts this squarely in scope.

Background.

ctipilot v2 brief (migrated)
vulnerability27 Jun 05:17Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats3
  • Deep dive2
  • Research1

Source distribution

  • attack.mitre.org5 (19%)
  • welivesecurity.com3 (12%)
  • bleepingcomputer.com2 (8%)
  • nltimes.nl2 (8%)
  • blog.talosintelligence.com1 (4%)
  • cert.pl1 (4%)
  • cert.ssi.gouv.fr1 (4%)
  • cloud.google.com1 (4%)
  • other10 (38%)
All cited sources (26)