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Sandworm
actor
· actor:sandwormsingle-source-national-cert
Russian GRU-linked destructive/disruptive threat actor. Referenced in pipeline coverage as the contested alternative attribution for the 29 December 2025 Poland energy-grid sabotage: earlier ESET reporting (via BleepingComputer, 2026-01-24) attributed the DynoWiper attack to Sandworm, while CERT Polska and the 2026-07-13 UK/EU government attribution assign the incident to the Static Tundra / FSB Centre 16 cluster.
23 techniques observed across 2 entries — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
Reconnaissance TA0043
T1595.001Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks×1
Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.
Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.
Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.
Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not Initial Access to that environment, but rather to leverage these devices to support additional targeting.
Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×1
An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions—such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs—that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
T1601.001Modify System Image: Patch System Image×1
Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses. Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file. Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime.
Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
T1602.001Data from Configuration Repository: SNMP (MIB Dump)×1
Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
T1602.002Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump×1
Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.
Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.
Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
active-threatsGRU's Sandworm adopts ClickFix, blockchain-hidden C2 (EtherHiding) and a Signal-lured Android backdoor — transferable tradecraft for EU CI defenders
deep-dive19-agency advisory details FSB Centre 16 router hijacking via SNMP and Cisco Smart Install as the UK and EU attribute Poland's Dec-2025 grid sabotage
CERT-UA: UAC-0145 is a subcluster of UAC-0002, also known as Sandworm / APT44 / Seashell Blizzard (the typed vocabulary has no actor→actor subcluster edge; related-to records the stated hierarchy without overclaiming)
Where this entity is cited
research2
weekly-long-running1
weekly-annual-reports1
weekly-research1
deep-dive1
active-threats1
Source distribution
bleepingcomputer.com2 (9%)
thehackernews.com2 (9%)
blog.talosintelligence.com1 (4%)
cert.gov.ua1 (4%)
cert.pl1 (4%)
cisa.gov1 (4%)
cloud.google.com1 (4%)
gov.uk1 (4%)
other13 (57%)
Co-occurring entities
Derived — referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
CERT-UA reports that UAC-0145 — a subcluster of UAC-0002 / Sandworm (APT44, Seashell Blizzard), the GRU-linked destructive-actor family — compromised at least 10 legitimate websites between June and July 2026 to serve a fake CAPTCHA that instructs visitors to paste and run a PowerShell command in the ClickFix pattern (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19). The PowerShell one-liner drops a VBS persistence stub into the Startup folder — "one of the variants of such a program was called GHETTOVIBE," per CERT-UA — which stages a PowerShell reconnaissance script (SCOUTCURL) that profiles the host, while two loaders, FLUIDLEECH (masquerading as software for removing computer viruses) and LOADLOOP, fetch a Python backdoor, FREAKYPOLL (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19). The compromised-site injection uses a bespoke tool, SMARTAXE, layered on the commodity Cloaking.House traffic-filtering service to serve different content by visitor; the injected CAPTCHA "content to be injected into the web page employs the EtherHiding technique to retrieve the domain name of the remote resource from an Ethereum smart contract" (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19) — a eth_call-style read that replaces a hardcoded C2 domain and survives takedowns because the resolution layer lives on-chain.
Separately, UAC-0145 distributes a full-featured Android backdoor, COWARDDUCK, via Signal disguised as security software; it collects contacts, files matching targeted extensions, and real-time geolocation, uploading via the Dropbox API and pulling C2 tasking from content hosted on legitimate services (e.g. Steam Community) proxied through a public search-engine proxy — both chosen to blend into normal outbound traffic (CERT-UA, 2026-07-19). CERT-UA frames this as a continuation of its multi-year UAC-0145 tracking; the group's earlier tradecraft (trojanized torrent installers, Signal "antivirus" lures) is background — the in-window delta is the ClickFix vector, the EtherHiding C2-resolution layer, and the COWARDDUCK mobile backdoor. The ClickFix pivot marks a departure from Sandworm's prior reliance on trojanized Windows/Office installers (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19).
The CAPTCHA content to be injected into the web page employs the EtherHiding technique to retrieve the domain name of the remote resource from an Ethereum smart contract using an address specified in the source code.
The malware embedded in the APK file is a full-featured backdoor codenamed COWARDDUCK that can clandestinely collect the following details
Background. The FSB Centre 16 network-device cluster is not new — it has a decade-plus public record under the vendor labels Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, Crouching Yeti, Dragonfly and Ghost Blizzard, and Cisco Talos profiled it in August 2025 as "Static Tundra," documenting long-term compromise of unpatched and end-of-life network gear for configuration theft and persistent collection (Cisco Talos, 2025-08-20). What is new is a same-day trio of actions on 2026-07-13: a much fuller TTP disclosure, a formal government attribution of a destructive attack, and the first coordinated EU/UK cyber-sanctions package.
A joint Cybersecurity Advisory carrying 19 authoring and co-sealing agencies across 13 countries — NSA, CISA, FBI and DC3 (US) alongside the cyber and intelligence authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Poland and Sweden — describes FSB Centre 16 opportunistically compromising poorly configured routers across communications, defense industrial base, energy, financial services, government (especially state/local), and healthcare sectors (NSA/CISA/FBI joint advisory, 2026-07-13; NCSC-UK, 2026-07-13). The advisory notes these TTPs overlap with Salt Typhoon activity, so the hardening below counters more than one actor.
The primary access vector is not a novel exploit but weak SNMP hygiene. The actors scan internet IP ranges for SNMP agents that accept common or default community strings, then issue spoofed-source SNMP Set-Requests carrying object identifiers that instruct the device to copy its running configuration to a file (commonly config.bkp or output.txt) and transfer it, usually over TFTP, to a leased VPS or a compromised FTP server (joint advisory, 2026-07-13). The advisory names the exact OIDs abused — 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1 (Cisco Config Copy) and 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.5 (the destination address for the copied config). A stolen configuration frequently discloses further credentials and additional community strings, feeding lateral movement. Talos's profile records the actor guessing or reusing insecure read-write community strings such as public and anonymous (Cisco Talos, 2025-08-20). Secondarily — "occasionally," per the advisory — the actors exploit known Cisco bugs and the Smart Install (SMI) feature, naming CVE-2018-0171 (the Smart Install pre-auth RCE, in CISA KEV since 2021) and CVE-2008-4128 (end-of-life devices only, no patch). Persistence has historically included the SYNful Knock IOS firmware implant.
The Poland grid attribution. On the same day, the UK together with EU member states formally attributed the destructive 29 December 2025 attack on Poland's energy grid to FSB Centre 16 (NCSC-UK, 2026-07-13). CERT Polska's own incident report describes coordinated destructive activity against 30-plus wind and photovoltaic grid-connection substations — RTU, HMI and protection-relay firmware damaged or system files deleted — and a combined heat-and-power plant serving roughly half a million people, where wiper malware was blocked by the operator's EDR before detonation; CERT Polska tied the activity to the Static Tundra / Berserk Bear / Ghost Blizzard / Dragonfly cluster via VPS, router and anonymizing-infrastructure overlap and called it "the first publicly described destructive activity attributed to this activity cluster" (CERT Polska, 2026-01-30). Note the attribution is contested at the cluster-label level: earlier ESET reporting attributed the same DynoWiper attack to the GRU's Sandworm (BleepingComputer, 2026-01-24), and the EU Council statement names FSB Centre 16 as the parent controlling several groups including Turla — so treat "FSB Centre 16" as an umbrella unit rather than a single team.
The sanctions package is the policy layer: the EU designated 9 individuals and 4 entities and the UK designated 24, covering senior GRU figures, the front company IMPULS accused of recruiting hackers for GRU Unit 29155, Lumma Stealer operators, and the disinformation outlet Rybar LLC (UK Government, 2026-07-13; BleepingComputer, 2026-07-13).
Detection. The telemetry classes to prioritise on network gear: network-flow and firewall logs for inbound SNMP Set-Requests (especially with spoofed or unfamiliar source addresses) and for outbound TFTP sessions initiated from a router/switch management interface to non-management destinations; device syslog and AAA/TACACS+ logs for unexpected "config copy" events, new local-account creation, and unexplained drops in logging volume — Talos documents the actor tampering with TACACS+ configuration to blind logging and standing up GRE tunnels to redirect victim traffic (Cisco Talos, 2025-08-20); and IDS rules keyed to inbound SNMP Set-Requests carrying the config-copy OIDs above, as the advisory recommends (joint advisory, 2026-07-13). Baseline NetFlow for the new GRE tunnel endpoints Talos describes.
Defender takeaway. For a Swiss or European CI operator this is a router-hygiene mandate with a live destructive precedent next door. Disable Smart Install where it is not in active use, confirm CVE-2018-0171 is patched, migrate management SNMP to v3 with authPriv and disable SNMPv1/v2c (or, where legacy SNMP is unavoidable, replace every default/weak community string and enforce read-only), restrict all management protocols to known stations via out-of-band ACLs, use Cisco password hashing type 8 (never 0/4/7), and treat the device configuration held in your management system — not the device itself — as the source of truth so a tampered config is detectable.
Triage: legitimate network-management stations poll SNMP on a predictable cadence from a known IP set, almost always read-only GET/GET-NEXT. The signal is a write (SNMP Set-Request) — particularly one carrying the config-copy OIDs — from a source outside the management range or with an inconsistent/spoofed source address, followed by an outbound TFTP transfer from the device; either alone is weak, the sequence config-write-then-TFTP-egress is the discriminator.
The actors scan for Internet IP ranges with active Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agents that accept common or default community strings for authentication
The most significant new actor finding the dailies did not carry is Turla's STOCKSTAY — Google GTIG characterised a multi-component .NET/Windows Forms backdoor that communicates C2 over secure WebSocket and shares significant code overlap with Kazuar (Turla's staple implant since 2017). Delivery used malicious RDP files by phishing and, as recently as November 2025, RAR archives exploiting WinRAR's CVE-2025-8088 (a flaw also abused by Sandworm, Gamaredon and RomCom). Current targeting is Ukrainian government and military, but earlier victims had Italian, Dutch, Polish and German foreign-policy interest — a direct read-across for Swiss federal and European governmental entities with Ukraine-adjacent policy work (The Hacker News). This sits alongside the week's other Russia-nexus signal: FBI/CISA escalated their warning that Russian intelligence (tracked as UNC5792) is now phishing Signal Backup Recovery Keys for persistent account takeover, and ESET's Gamaredon retrospective (§ 7) shows the FSB-linked group moving exfil and C2 wholesale onto trusted cloud services.
Two non-Russian clusters round out the picture. Unit 42 documented CL-STA-1062, a Chinese-speaking cluster (overlapping Talos's UAT-7237) deploying the new TinyRCT .NET backdoor via AppDomainManager injection against Southeast-Asian government and state-owned energy targets (Unit 42); Kaspersky GReAT analysed the StrikeShark cluster's SharkLoader deploying Cobalt Strike via "Perfect DLL Hijacking" against government targets (Securelist). And SentinelLABS' macOS.Gaslight, a DPRK-aligned Rust backdoor, notably turns prompt injection on the LLM-assisted analyst rather than the sandbox (SentinelLABS) — an early instance of tradecraft built specifically to poison AI-assisted triage. Attribute the claim to the research outfit, not the state, where the source itself hedges.