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Sandworm

actor · actor:sandworm single-source-national-cert

Russian GRU-linked destructive/disruptive threat actor. Referenced in pipeline coverage as the contested alternative attribution for the 29 December 2025 Poland energy-grid sabotage: earlier ESET reporting (via BleepingComputer, 2026-01-24) attributed the DynoWiper attack to Sandworm, while CERT Polska and the 2026-07-13 UK/EU government attribution assign the incident to the Static Tundra / FSB Centre 16 cluster.

Aliases: APT44, Seashell Blizzard, UAC-0113, Voodoo Bear, SANDWORM RELIC

Coverage
5
3 about it · 2 mentions · first 2026-05-10 → last 2026-09-20
Latest activity
2026-09-18
Cisco has replaced the hot fixes for its CVSS 10.0 Secure FMC authentication bypass with the September…
Peak priority
high
2 high · 1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, defense, technology · regions: europe, russia-cis, switzerland
Sources cited
29
21 hosts
2026-05-105 appearances2026-08-04

Action items (3)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Sandworm, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Upgrade every Secure FMC to its September 2026 hardening release (7.0 and earlier to 7.0.10, 7.2 to 7.2.12, 7.4 to 7.4.8, 7.6 to 7.6.6, 7.7 to 7.7.13, 10.0 to 10.0.2, 10.1 to 10.1.0). Cisco replaced the earlier per-train hot fixes with these releases on 2026-09-16; there is no workaround, and no configuration makes an FMC non-vulnerable.
    2026-08-04CVE-2026-20079 +2
  • Run Cisco's revised compromise check on every FMC that has been network-reachable since 2026-03-04: in expert mode, zgrep "package_info.*license" /var/log/messages*, a hit naming /var/tmp/license.tmp means the chain reached the package-install step, and Cisco directs those cases to TAC rather than to self-remediation.
    2026-08-04CVE-2026-20079 +2
  • Disable Cisco Smart Install (no vstack) and confirm CVE-2018-0171 is remediated on every internet-facing IOS/IOS XE device, and alert on inbound SNMP Set-Requests carrying the config-copy OIDs named in the advisory (1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1 Cisco Config Copy; 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.5 Config Copy Server Address); both are in-use FSB Centre 16 access and config-exfiltration vectors.
    2026-07-13CVE-2018-0171

Defender insights

What each entry about Sandworm tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-07-20NOTABLEGRU's Sandworm adopts ClickFix, blockchain-hidden C2 (EtherHiding) and a Signal-lured Android backdoor, transferable tradecraft for EU CI defenders

Triage

2026-07-13HIGHexploited19-agency advisory details FSB Centre 16 router hijacking via SNMP and Cisco Smart Install as the UK and EU attribute Poland's Dec-2025 grid sabotage

Latest update · triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

overlaps with

related to

attributed activity

Story timeline

Every entry that names Sandworm, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-08-04CVE-2026-20079, Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center: unauthenticated authentication bypass to root, unpatched for five months and only exploitable in a post-boot window (CVSS 10.0)
    trending-vulnerabilitiesCisco has replaced the hot fixes for its CVSS 10.0 Secure FMC authentication bypass with the September hardening releases
  2. 2026-07-20CERT-UA: Sandworm subcluster UAC-0145 pairs ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA with Ethereum-smart-contract C2 resolution and a Signal-delivered Android backdoor
    active-threatsGRU's Sandworm adopts ClickFix, blockchain-hidden C2 (EtherHiding) and a Signal-lured Android backdoor, transferable tradecraft for EU CI defenders
  3. 2026-07-13FSB Centre 16 (Static Tundra) router-hijacking campaign: 19-agency joint advisory, formal Poland energy-grid attribution and first joint EU/UK cyber sanctions
    deep-dive19-agency advisory details FSB Centre 16 router hijacking via SNMP and Cisco Smart Install as the UK and EU attribute Poland's Dec-2025 grid sabotage
  4. 2026-05-30ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026: Sandworm strikes NATO energy, Lazarus targets EU drone sector, UNC5221 pivots to Ivanti SPAWN toolset
    mentionresearch
  5. 2026-05-10Bauman University "Department No. 4", leaked GRU cyber-operator training pipeline reveals direct line to Sandworm and APT28 operations against European targets
    mentionresearch
ATT&CK techniques (32 across 13 tactics)

32 techniques observed across 3 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceActive Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks · Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
  • Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server · Compromise Infrastructure: Server · Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices · Obtain Capabilities: Exploits
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Drive-by Compromise · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Phishing
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · User Execution: Malicious File · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Server Software Component: Web Shell · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationExploitation for Privilege Escalation · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Valid Accounts · Valid Accounts: Default Accounts
  • Defense ImpairmentModify System Image: Patch System Image · Disable or Modify Tools
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping
  • CollectionData from Configuration Repository: SNMP (MIB Dump) · Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol · Application Layer Protocol: DNS · Proxy · Web Service · Dynamic Resolution · Protocol Tunneling
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
  • ImpactData Destruction · Data Encrypted for Impact

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1595.001Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks×1

Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1595.002Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning×1

Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Resource Development TA0042

T1583.003Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server×1

Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1584.004Compromise Infrastructure: Server×1

Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a Server or Virtual Private Server, adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1584.008Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices×1

Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not Initial Access to that environment, but rather to leverage these devices to support additional targeting.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1588.005Obtain Capabilities: Exploits×1

Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1189Drive-by Compromise×2

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×2

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566Phishing×1

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×1

An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation×2

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078.001Valid Accounts: Default Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1601.001Modify System Image: Patch System Image×1

Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses. Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file. Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003OS Credential Dumping×1

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1602.001Data from Configuration Repository: SNMP (MIB Dump)×1

Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1602.002Data from Configuration Repository: Network Device Configuration Dump×1

Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071Application Layer Protocol×1

Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1

Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090Proxy×1

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

T1568Dynamic Resolution×1

Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×1

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1485Data Destruction×1

Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.

Evidence: 2026-07-13/fsb-centre-16-static-tundra-router-hijacking-advisory · ATT&CK page ↗

T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.

Evidence: 2026-08-04/cve-2026-20079-cisco-secure-fmc-auth-bypass-root-hotfix · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Sandworm (3)

2026-08-04 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-20079 +2exploitedupdatedNATOA1

CVE-2026-20079, Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center: unauthenticated authentication bypass to root, unpatched for five months and only exploitable in a post-boot window (CVSS 10.0)

Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center is the box that holds the policy, the rules and the credentials for a firewall fleet, and CVE-2026-20079 gives an unauthenticated caller root on it. Cisco describes the flaw as "due to an improper system process that is created at boot time", reachable by sending crafted HTTP requests, and scores it CVSS 3.1 10.0 (CWE-288) against Secure FMC Software and Cisco Security Cloud Control Firewall Management "regardless of device configuration" (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-08-03). What makes this worth acting on now rather than in March is the timeline: the advisory went out on 2026-03-04 with no fix and no workaround, and the per-train hot fixes plus the first compromise-check guidance only arrived with advisory version 2.0 on 2026-07-31, and Cisco has revised that check three times since, v2.1 and v2.2 the same day and v2.3 on 2026-08-03. For roughly five months the only available response was exposure reduction. Those hot fixes are no longer the remediation: revision 2.6 of 2026-09-16 replaced them with the September hardening releases (see the correction below).

The mechanics explain why exposure is narrower than a CVSS 10.0 suggests, and why the detection guidance matters more than usual. VulnCheck built a working exploit and published the chain on 2026-03-26: a startup process leaves a partial csm_processes session in the sfsnort.sessions database, and if nobody authenticates after boot that session persists and can be upgraded using the hardcoded machine-user credential report:snortrules, yielding the sf_action_id request token; an arbitrary file write through the validateLicense bulk AJAX endpoint on sajaxintf.cgi drops a Cisco-format Makeself script to /var/tmp/license.tmp, and calling pjb.cgi with SF::UI::DataObjectLibrary::upgradeReadinessCall makes the appliance process that file as an upgrade package, executing it as root (VulnCheck, 2026-03-26). VulnCheck also found the precondition is fragile (dashboard interaction by a real administrator, cloud-managed session activity, or a periodic cleanup all clear the injected session) so in its assessment the realistic exploitation window is shortly after a reboot, or on appliances nobody logs into. That same source counts roughly 300 internet-facing FMC instances on Censys and between 600 and 700 on FOFA.

Cisco's advisory, as first published on 2026-08-03, said it had seen no public announcements or malicious use of this CVE (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-08-03); CISA's KEV addition on 2026-09-09 (see the update below) now confirms active exploitation Cisco itself had not observed, and Cisco's own advisory has since been revised to say the same thing. The reason to treat it as out-of-band even before that KEV listing sat on the same web interface: the separate static low-privilege credential flaw CVE-2026-20316 is CISA KEV-listed with exploitation Cisco says has been ongoing since July 2026 (covered here on 2026-07-30), and in that advisory Cisco raises the Security Impact Rating to High specifically because "this vulnerability can be used with other Cisco Secure FMC Software vulnerabilities to elevate privileges" (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-08-03). An attacker already using the exploited flaw for low-privilege read access is one documented step from the root path this CVE opens.

Detection, and the discriminator: both advisories key compromise assessment on the same artifact, a package_info.pl invocation against /var/tmp/license.tmp in /var/log/messages*, run as root via sudo from the www account. Legitimate FMC upgrades and licensing operations do run package_info.pl, so the file path is the signal rather than the command: a genuine upgrade references a package under Cisco's own upgrade directories, not a temporary file in /var/tmp. Because the injected session only survives while no administrator has authenticated, correlate any unauthenticated web-UI activity against appliance boot and uptime records, a request sequence reaching CGI endpoints with no preceding interactive login, minutes after a reboot, is the shape here. Hardening beyond the fixed release is exposure reduction; Cisco notes that "If the FMC management interface does not have public internet access, the attack surface that is associated with this vulnerability is reduced", and low-touch appliances that nobody logs into are precisely the ones that stay exploitable longest.

A vulnerability in the web interface of Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass authentication and execute script files on an affected device to obtain root access to the underlying operating system.

Cisco has assigned this security advisory a Security Impact Rating (SIR) of High rather than Medium as the score indicates. The reason is that this vulnerability can be used with other Cisco Secure FMC Software vulnerabilities to elevate privileges.

Cisco PSIRT 2026-08-03

In August 2026, the Cisco PSIRT became aware of active exploitation of this vulnerability.

Cisco PSIRT (advisory revision 2.5, 2026-09-09)

A registered sftunnel peer has incorrect permissions to write an arbitrary file to any location on the device.

A successful exploit could allow the attacker to write a file to the device that is executed with root privileges. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have valid user credentials on the affected device.

Cisco PSIRT (cisco-sa-fmc-sftunn-codex-c3O4Jft2)

The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory.

Cisco PSIRT (cisco-sa-fmc-sftunn-codex-c3O4Jft2 / cisco-sa-fmc-javarce-y2NypXwk)
Updaterun 2026-09-10T0410Z-intelcvestagssummarybody

CISA added CVE-2026-20079 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-09-09, with a remediation due date of 2026-09-12 for federal civilian agencies. This confirms active exploitation that Cisco's own advisory had not reported as of its last revision, and reverses the no-known-malicious-use framing this entry's main analysis carried. The compromise check and hot-fix guidance above are unchanged; any FMC that has been network-reachable since 2026-03-04 and has not yet had the compromise check run should be treated as a priority, not a precaution.

Updaterun 2026-09-13T0409Z-intelentitiestechniquestagsevidencesourcesbody

Cisco Talos confirmed active exploitation by three distinct post-compromise clusters (Cisco Talos, 2026-09-09). UAT-12197 exploited this CVE alone, planting a JSP web shell in the CSM Tomcat webroot and a JAR-based command executor used to query the FMC's internal user database for credentials (Cisco Talos, 2026-09-09). UAT-11823 exploited both this CVE and CVE-2026-20316 together; Talos states the cluster "overlaps in tooling with the Sandworm APT actor" (Cisco Talos, 2026-09-09), replacing the appliance's license.tmp file with a malicious root-executed package before deploying a variant of Cyclops Blink, the modular implant the US and UK previously attributed to Sandworm. UAT-11988 entered via CVE-2026-20316's static credential alone and, after AD/MySQL credential harvesting, tunnel-based lateral movement and disabling security tooling, deployed ransomware whose subsequent actions Talos found "were consistent with those of Qilin ransomware affiliates" (Cisco Talos, 2026-09-09). Cisco's own advisory was separately revised (v2.5, 2026-09-09) to confirm it became aware of active exploitation of this vulnerability in August 2026 (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-09), and Cisco has scheduled a further comprehensive Secure FMC/ASA/FTD hardening release for 2026-09-16 (Cisco PSIRT advance notification, 2026-09-09).

A JSP file appearing in the CSM Tomcat webroot, or a JAR-based executor querying the FMC's own user database, is UAT-12197's signature; a Cyclops Blink deployment resolves its command-and-control address over DNS-over-HTTPS rather than a hardcoded address, so DoH lookups from the FMC management-plane process are a discriminator; and a SOCKS5 proxy or reverse-SSH tunnel originating from the FMC and forwarding LDAP, LDAPS, Kerberos, SMB or NetBIOS/WinRM traffic toward the internal directory is UAT-11988's lateral-movement signature, worth treating as an active-compromise indicator whether or not ransomware has yet deployed.

Updaterun 2026-09-18T0410Z-intelcvessourcesevidencebody

Cisco's promised 2026-09-16 hardening release shipped on schedule, adding two more critical, unauthenticated-adjacent root-RCE flaws to the same Secure FMC product line: CVE-2026-20324 (CVSS 9.9), a flaw in the sftunnel inter-device communication protocol where a registered peer has incorrect file-write permissions, letting an attacker who already holds valid low-privilege device credentials write an arbitrary file that executes as root (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-16); and CVE-2026-20242 (CVSS 9.8), an insecure Java deserialization bug in the FMC External Database Access feature reachable by a host already present in that feature's allowlist, needing no credentials of its own (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-16). Cisco confirms ASA and FTD Software are not affected by either flaw; there is no workaround for CVE-2026-20324, while CVE-2026-20242 can be mitigated by disabling External Database Access entirely until patched. Cisco states it is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of either flaw.

Correctionrun 2026-09-20T1308Z-auditheadlinecvesactionsbody

The per-train hot fixes are no longer Cisco's remediation for CVE-2026-20079. Revision 2.6 of the advisory, dated 2026-09-16, records "Replaced hot fixes with the security hardening releases", and the Fixed Releases table now reads 7.0 and earlier to 7.0.10, 7.2 to 7.2.12, 7.4 to 7.4.8, 7.6 to 7.6.6, 7.7 to 7.7.13, 10.0 to 10.0.2 and 10.1 to 10.1.0 (Cisco PSIRT, 2026-09-16). Cisco adds that the hardening releases carry this fix "as well as multiple other internally discovered vulnerabilities" and recommends upgrading to them, directing anyone who still needs hot-fix detail to its support centre. An appliance patched with the earlier hot fix is fixed for this flaw but not for the rest of the hardening release.

Builds on: Cisco patches an actively exploited hardcoded credential in Secure FMC: CVSS 5.3, but Cisco…

vulnerability04 Aug 04:45Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-07-20 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOA2

CERT-UA: Sandworm subcluster UAC-0145 pairs ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA with Ethereum-smart-contract C2 resolution and a Signal-delivered Android backdoor

CERT-UA reports that UAC-0145, a subcluster of UAC-0002 / Sandworm (APT44, Seashell Blizzard), the GRU-linked destructive-actor family, compromised at least 10 legitimate websites between June and July 2026 to serve a fake CAPTCHA that instructs visitors to paste and run a PowerShell command in the ClickFix pattern (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19). The PowerShell one-liner drops a VBS persistence stub into the Startup folder ("one of the variants of such a program was called GHETTOVIBE," per CERT-UA) which stages a PowerShell reconnaissance script (SCOUTCURL) that profiles the host, while two loaders, FLUIDLEECH (masquerading as software for removing computer viruses) and LOADLOOP, fetch a Python backdoor, FREAKYPOLL (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19). The compromised-site injection uses a bespoke tool, SMARTAXE, layered on the commodity Cloaking.House traffic-filtering service to serve different content by visitor; the injected CAPTCHA "content to be injected into the web page employs the EtherHiding technique to retrieve the domain name of the remote resource from an Ethereum smart contract" (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19); a eth_call-style read that replaces a hardcoded C2 domain and survives takedowns because the resolution layer lives on-chain.

Separately, UAC-0145 distributes a full-featured Android backdoor, COWARDDUCK, via Signal disguised as security software; it collects contacts, files matching targeted extensions, and real-time geolocation, uploading via the Dropbox API and pulling C2 tasking from content hosted on legitimate services (e.g. Steam Community) proxied through a public search-engine proxy, both chosen to blend into normal outbound traffic (CERT-UA, 2026-07-19). CERT-UA frames this as a continuation of its multi-year UAC-0145 tracking; the group's earlier tradecraft (trojanized torrent installers, Signal "antivirus" lures) is background; the in-window delta is the ClickFix vector, the EtherHiding C2-resolution layer, and the COWARDDUCK mobile backdoor. The ClickFix pivot marks a departure from Sandworm's prior reliance on trojanized Windows/Office installers (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19).

The CAPTCHA content to be injected into the web page employs the EtherHiding technique to retrieve the domain name of the remote resource from an Ethereum smart contract using an address specified in the source code.

The malware embedded in the APK file is a full-featured backdoor codenamed COWARDDUCK that can clandestinely collect the following details

The Hacker News 2026-07-19
threat20 Jul 04:30Zsingle-source · national CERTOpen finding →

2026-07-13 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2018-0171exploitedupdatedNATOA1

FSB Centre 16 (Static Tundra) router-hijacking campaign: 19-agency joint advisory, formal Poland energy-grid attribution and first joint EU/UK cyber sanctions

Background. The FSB Centre 16 network-device cluster is not new; it has a decade-plus public record under the vendor labels Berserk Bear, Energetic Bear, Crouching Yeti, Dragonfly and Ghost Blizzard, and Cisco Talos profiled it in August 2025 as "Static Tundra," documenting long-term compromise of unpatched and end-of-life network gear for configuration theft and persistent collection (Cisco Talos, 2025-08-20). What is new is a same-day trio of actions on 2026-07-13: a much fuller TTP disclosure, a formal government attribution of a destructive attack, and the first coordinated EU/UK cyber-sanctions package.

A joint Cybersecurity Advisory carrying 19 authoring and co-sealing agencies across 13 countries, NSA, CISA, FBI and DC3 (US) alongside the cyber and intelligence authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Poland and Sweden, describes FSB Centre 16 opportunistically compromising poorly configured routers across communications, defense industrial base, energy, financial services, government (especially state/local), and healthcare sectors (NSA/CISA/FBI joint advisory, 2026-07-13; NCSC-UK, 2026-07-13). The advisory notes these TTPs overlap with Salt Typhoon activity, so the hardening below counters more than one actor.

The primary access vector is not a novel exploit but weak SNMP hygiene. The actors scan internet IP ranges for SNMP agents that accept common or default community strings, then issue spoofed-source SNMP Set-Requests carrying object identifiers that instruct the device to copy its running configuration to a file (commonly config.bkp or output.txt) and transfer it, usually over TFTP, to a leased VPS or a compromised FTP server (joint advisory, 2026-07-13). The advisory names the exact OIDs abused, 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1 (Cisco Config Copy) and 1.3.6.1.4.1.9.9.96.1.1.1.1.5 (the destination address for the copied config). A stolen configuration frequently discloses further credentials and additional community strings, feeding lateral movement. Talos's profile records the actor guessing or reusing insecure read-write community strings such as public and anonymous (Cisco Talos, 2025-08-20). Secondarily ("occasionally," per the advisory) the actors exploit known Cisco bugs and the Smart Install (SMI) feature, naming CVE-2018-0171 (the Smart Install pre-auth RCE, in CISA KEV since 2021) and CVE-2008-4128 (end-of-life devices only, no patch). Persistence has historically included the SYNful Knock IOS firmware implant.

The Poland grid attribution. On the same day, the UK together with EU member states formally attributed the destructive 29 December 2025 attack on Poland's energy grid to FSB Centre 16 (NCSC-UK, 2026-07-13). CERT Polska's own incident report describes coordinated destructive activity against 30-plus wind and photovoltaic grid-connection substations (RTU, HMI and protection-relay firmware damaged or system files deleted) and a combined heat-and-power plant serving roughly half a million people, where wiper malware was blocked by the operator's EDR before detonation; CERT Polska tied the activity to the Static Tundra / Berserk Bear / Ghost Blizzard / Dragonfly cluster via VPS, router and anonymizing-infrastructure overlap and called it "the first publicly described destructive activity attributed to this activity cluster" (CERT Polska, 2026-01-30). Note the attribution is contested at the cluster-label level: earlier ESET reporting attributed the same DynoWiper attack to the GRU's Sandworm (BleepingComputer, 2026-01-24), and the EU Council statement names FSB Centre 16 as the parent controlling several groups including Turla, so treat "FSB Centre 16" as an umbrella unit rather than a single team.

The sanctions package is the policy layer: the EU designated 9 individuals and 4 entities and the UK designated 24, covering senior GRU figures, the front company IMPULS accused of recruiting hackers for GRU Unit 29155, Lumma Stealer operators, and the disinformation outlet Rybar LLC (UK Government, 2026-07-13; BleepingComputer, 2026-07-13).

Detection. The telemetry classes to prioritise on network gear: network-flow and firewall logs for inbound SNMP Set-Requests (especially with spoofed or unfamiliar source addresses) and for outbound TFTP sessions initiated from a router/switch management interface to non-management destinations; device syslog and AAA/TACACS+ logs for unexpected "config copy" events, new local-account creation, and unexplained drops in logging volume, Talos documents the actor tampering with TACACS+ configuration to blind logging and standing up GRE tunnels to redirect victim traffic (Cisco Talos, 2025-08-20); and IDS rules keyed to inbound SNMP Set-Requests carrying the config-copy OIDs above, as the advisory recommends (joint advisory, 2026-07-13). Baseline NetFlow for the new GRE tunnel endpoints Talos describes.

Defender takeaway. For a Swiss or European CI operator this is a router-hygiene mandate with a live destructive precedent next door. Disable Smart Install where it is not in active use, confirm CVE-2018-0171 is patched, migrate management SNMP to v3 with authPriv and disable SNMPv1/v2c (or, where legacy SNMP is unavoidable, replace every default/weak community string and enforce read-only), restrict all management protocols to known stations via out-of-band ACLs, use Cisco password hashing type 8 (never 0/4/7), and treat the device configuration held in your management system (not the device itself) as the source of truth so a tampered config is detectable.

Triage: legitimate network-management stations poll SNMP on a predictable cadence from a known IP set, almost always read-only GET/GET-NEXT. The signal is a write (SNMP Set-Request) (particularly one carrying the config-copy OIDs) from a source outside the management range or with an inconsistent/spoofed source address, followed by an outbound TFTP transfer from the device; either alone is weak, the sequence config-write-then-TFTP-egress is the discriminator.

The actors scan for Internet IP ranges with active Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agents that accept common or default community strings for authentication

NSA / CISA / FBI / DC3 joint Cybersecurity Advisory (19 agencies, 13 countries) 2026-07-13

The UK together with EU member states has also today formally attributed the December 2025 attack on Poland's energy grid to Russia's FSB Centre 16.

NCSC-UK 2026-07-13

This is, however, the first publicly described destructive activity attributed to this activity cluster.

CERT Polska 2026-01-30

This reckless attack failed but could have caused 500,000 citizens to lose electricity in the depths of winter.

UK Government (FCDO) 2026-07-13

Members of the Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre (C4) have observed the targeting and compromise of French entities using the Turla intrusion set operated by the 16th Centre of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB).

CERT-FR (ANSSI) 2026-07-13

Russian technology companies supporting the intelligence service are also affected. For example, Advanced System Technology (AST) and NPP Gamma will no longer be allowed to do business in the EU in the future.

heise online (citing EU Council statement)
Updaterun 2026-07-13T2009Z-intelentitiesevidenceregionssourcestagstechniquesbody

The morning entry covered the 19-agency Static Tundra/Berserk Bear advisory (SNMP and Cisco Smart Install router hijacking) and the UK/EU attribution of the December 2025 Polish grid sabotage. This delta covers the sibling FSB Centre 16 cluster (Turla) which France and the EU formally attributed the same day. France's Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre (C4, ANSSI, COMCYBER, DGA, DGSE, DGSI and the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs) and the EU High Representative jointly attributed the Turla intrusion set to the FSB's 16th Centre on 2026-07-13, publishing CERT-FR's technical report CERTFR-2026-CTI-005 alongside formal French and EU attribution statements (CERT-FR, 2026-07-13; ANSSI, 2026-07-13). France's COMCYBER describes Turla as an FSB 16th Centre attack mode (mode opératoire) used for intelligence-gathering since at least 2004 (COMCYBER, 2026-07-13). The 16th Centre is the parent unit behind both this Turla/Secret Blizzard espionage set and the Static Tundra/Berserk Bear router-hijacking cluster covered this morning, the EU-sanctions reporting describes the 16th Centre as controlling groups including Turla (heise online, 2026-07-13).

ANSSI documents French Turla victims including Ministry of Armed Forces webmail accounts compromised since 2017, the network of the French Embassy in Moscow (2018), a justice-sector personnel-training host (2019) and an advanced-technology company (2025), plus opportunistic intermediary compromises across varied sectors between 2019 and 2025 used as relay infrastructure (CERT-FR, 2026-07-13). The initial-access tradecraft combines spearphishing and watering-hole attacks that lure targets into downloading malicious files masquerading as legitimate software, plus exploitation of vulnerabilities in webmail/messaging services, browsers, business applications and web servers; the operators favour rented or previously-compromised infrastructure for camouflage (ANSSI, 2026-07-13). In coordination, the EU sanctioned 9 individuals and 4 organisations (entry bans and asset freezes), including the enabler firms Advanced System Technology (AST) and NPP Gamma, and the UK sanctioned 24 individuals and organisations; the EU Council statement names Germany, Poland, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovakia, Romania and Finland among affected states (heise online, 2026-07-13).

threat13 Jul 12:40Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

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